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Shame: The Basics
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Shame interrupts us in an unwelcome way. It is hard to imagine any per-
son who would like to feel the interrupting power of shame. Moreover, 
when we do feel shame, we search for ways to overcome it – in various 
responsive movements. This book is about shame from these perspec-
tives. Hence, the title we have chosen. 
Despite its often unwelcome occurrence, we regularly encounter the 
claim that shame serves some positive functions as well. But is that really 
the case? Can shame make a positive contribution to human life, or 
should we strive to make shame obsolete? This question forms the main 
background of the present book. To bring the short version of our con-
clusion to the fore: Shame is not so much a moral or non-moral phenom-
enon as it is an ambiguous and complex element in human life. It is part 
of an evolved composite cluster of interrelated emotional and cognitive 
abilities that makes possible the complexity of human interactions and 
relationships. As such, it may complicate the relationship that people 
have to their bodies, and in a religious context it is also often profoundly 
problematic. Accordingly, shame is not only one emotion among others; 
it is deeply rooted in the architecture of the self. Thus, shame plays an 
essential part in our self ’s complex becoming and being-in-the-world. We 
will attempt to elaborate this point in the following chapters. In so doing, 
we will focus on elements in human life that seem to closely condition 
intense experiences of shame: the body, religion, and morality. The rea-
son for this limitation is apparent: these dimensions of human life have 
to do with basic elements in how we relate to ourselves and others, and 
they have a profound impact on self-experiences as well as on how we 
experience ourselves as beings in relation with others. Other dimensions 
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in human life are also connected to shame, and what we say about these 
three dimensions may have a bearing on and enhance understanding of 
how it functions in other dimensions. 
Shame in the headlines 
During much of 2016–17, shame appeared in the headlines of Norwegian 
newspapers in ways formerly unprecedented. This was connected to two 
phenomena: the first, and the one which received the most coverage, was 
a TV series about a group of Norwegian adolescents in their final years at 
high school. It depicted the struggles of ordinary young lives in easily recog-
nizable ways. Therefore, it received much attention. The remarkable thing 
was that not only young people got “hooked” on this series – older viewers 
did as well. The name of the series, which ran for several seasons, is Shame.1
No one seems to have questioned the choice of name, even though 
shame is not explicitly thematized in the series. However, when we take a 
closer look, shame seems to function as a tacit organizing principle for the 
social interaction between the characters. Shame manifests itself when the 
characters define themselves as part of a group or outside of it, or when 
they conceal important life experiences such as abuse, homosexuality, or 
absent parents. That so many people were attracted to it and able to iden-
tify with the characters and the theme indicates that shame, although not 
often explicitly talked about, is nevertheless present and can be identified 
in peoples’ lives. In the series, topics like body image, sexuality, belonging, 
moral dilemmas, and religion were negotiated in different ways. 
Shame also reached the headlines of Norwegian newspapers in quite a 
different way. A small group of young women with an immigrant back-
ground declared themselves “the shameless Arabian daughters” in youth 
blogs and columns. They opposed the religiously and culturally defined 
uses of shame as an instrument of social control and discipline. It was both 
a feminist and a human rights-based protest directed against an idealized 
image of the “perfect Arabian girl,” excluded and protected from the pub-
lic sphere. One of the “shameless daughters”, Nancy Herz, expressed her 
1 Julie Andem, „Skam,“ in Skam (Norway: NRK, 2015), Television.
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anger and opposition to the use of shaming tactics: “If anyone ought to be 
ashamed, it is those who, due to their narrow-minded attitudes, condemn 
homosexuals, support murderers and legislation against blasphemy, and 
allow rotten imams to remain in their positions”2 (Aftenposten 25/4/2016). 
“The shameless Arabian daughters” received a great deal of attention and 
support, even in the Prime Minister’s annual speech on New Years’ Eve. It 
also initiated a public discussion on how shame and other social control 
phenomena were at play, especially in immigrant communities. Feminist 
contributors also revealed the gendered bias of shame as a mechanism of 
social control: far more women than men are subjected to shaming. They 
are told to behave properly to avoid tainting both themselves and their fam-
ilies with shame. Such attempts at discipline may involve an unhealthy mix 
of elements, such as body focus, religion, and presumed moral attitudes. 
From a more distant perspective, the name the young women gave 
themselves, “the shameless Arabian daughters,” was well chosen. It 
expresses a head-on challenge and confrontation with the old, culturally 
defined notion of what being shameless entails. Instead of a concept sig-
nifying lack of modesty, morality, and religious and cultural adherence, 
they presented shamelessness as a liberating concept, freeing it from its 
immoral and gendered use as an instrument of social control.3
As we write the final version of the Introduction, in the summer of 
2020, the consequences of the #Metoo campaign have reached far into 
the corridors of power. In boardrooms and parliaments, holders of seats 
have toppled, and powerful men that earlier considered themselves to be 
invincible have found out otherwise. Many have discovered that shame 
can shift place. Victims of sexual abuse and sexual harassment experi-
ence that society has finally opened a social space for their narrative, and 
that the power of boardrooms is no longer influential enough to close 
down that space. They also experience that with the recognition of their 
stories, blame can finally be shifted – from the offended to the offender. 
2 Nancy Herz, “Vi er de skamløse, arabiske jentene – vår tid begynner nå,” Column, Aftenposten 
(Oslo), 25th april 2016.
3 Thus, the “daughters” exemplify the need for diversity in the understanding of what shameless 
may mean in a moral and cultural context. This is a topic we will return to in Chapter 6, “Shame 
and Morality”. 
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We claim that the above examples represent a noteworthy cultural and 
moral shift; they are examples of a Western and late-modern interna-
tional rediscovery of shame. In both public and scholarly discussions, 
we see a new interdisciplinary and critical interest in the phenomenon. 
Surely, as a social phenomenon, shame has always been tacitly present in 
societal and relational mechanisms. But the critical discussion of shame 
has mainly belonged to the domain of psychotherapists and psycholo-
gists. The linguistic repertoire for the self-understanding of the modern, 
liberal and liberated human being contained few words and little space 
for shame, as it was abandoned as a cultural and societal remnant belong-
ing to a pre-modern society without a sufficient level of liberty. 
We argue that this lack of both linguistic repertoire and social space 
has, both scholarly and publicly, depleted the interpretative resources we 
have at hand for experiencing and understanding our human condition. 
The many faces of shame are present even when it is not identified, artic-
ulated, or understood. Therefore, we need to develop a nuanced interdis-
ciplinary understanding of shame that captures both the ambiguity, the 
complexity, and the relevance of shame. The ambiguity and complexity 
not only suggest that it is sensitive to what goes on in different contexts 
and relations. It also suggests that different contexts may offer different 
resources for the identification, articulation, and handling of the man-
ifested face of shame. This is the task we have before us and, like many 
other contemporary scholars, we find it important to establish a clearer 
and better understanding of how shame is a part of human reality. 
A holistic interdisciplinary approach
The following is an interdisciplinary study where we attempt to draw on 
resources from different fields of research. But even though we will tangle 
with disciplines such as psychology, feminist studies, religious studies, 
and so on, we come to these scholarly fields from the viewpoint of philos-
ophy/moral philosophy. Thus, a fundamental philosophical perspective 
has informed both our readings and the final analysis presented in this 
book. The foundation for our interdisciplinary approach is, therefore, to 
be identified in philosophy.
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The success of natural science points to the importance of the phys-
iological and biological factors in human life as important premises of 
both human existence and experience. We cannot ignore these factors 
when we discuss the phenomenon of shame. Shame is an embodied phe-
nomenon. Nevertheless, when we ask what it takes to become human, 
we need to include other dimensions of experience than those studied by 
the natural sciences. In the following, we therefore speak about shame as 
expressed in different experiential dimensions. These dimensions are not 
separate “layers” of reality, but are only used to indicate how shame as a 
phenomenon is related to more than our inner, psychological structure 
or architecture. Shame has to do with our relational and social mode of 
being-in-the-world, and with culture and society, as much as being about 
society. Anthropologist Agustín Fuentes expresses it well when he points 
to how “humans need to be around each other for social, physiological 
and psychological reasons, and becoming (and being) human is a process 
that is simultaneously biological and cultural. We need to grow up around 
another to be fully human.”4 This means, for example, that we also need to 
see emotions as constituted by our relational mode of being-in-the-world.5 
Accordingly, we argue for a holistic interpretation of human life, and this 
is reflected in how we approach shame. We cannot ignore either psycho-
logical, social, or cultural dimensions of human experience of self and 
others. To reduce the study of human experience down to, for example, 
a reductionistic question of biology or psychology is especially unhelpful 
when it comes to an understanding of the complexities of shame. 
Shame has many faces and many places  
in human experience
Human consciousness and our senses are not indiscriminately open, but are 
always intentionally directed and guided by a specific perspective. More-
over, the different dimensions of our experience cannot be fully separated 
4 Agustín Fuentes, Race, Monogamy, and Other Lies They Told You: Busting Myths About Human 
Nature (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 29.
5 In one way, this can be read as an argument for seeing shame as a social emotion. We will specify 
this later. 
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from each other. Our experience of the “inner world”, such as our expe-
rience of love, is more often than not related directly to the experience of 
our family in the social-cultural dimension of experience. Furthermore, 
our experience of nature, for example our physical body, is contingent on 
how our body is experienced in the socio-cultural world. This interplay 
and interconnectedness contribute to how shame both manifests itself and 
functions in our complex world of experience. We may experience shame as 
an emotion, but at the same time, our cheeks may turn deep red in shame. 
The young child who has been subjected to demeaning sexual abuse may 
experience that both the terror and the shame he or she experiences are 
inscribed as automatic reactions deep in the limbic brain – as fight, flight or 
freeze responses, eye aversion, or in a body that automatically seeks to hide. 
In recent philosophy, the complex interplay between the different dimen-
sions of experience – the psychological, socio-cultural, and natural – is 
acknowledged as important for understanding human agency and inter-
action.6 An analysis based on these dimensions makes it possible to differ-
entiate between different factors in human experience and understand how 
they are expressed. As indicated, these dimensions cannot be separated 
from each other but are interdependent. They mutually condition our expe-
rience of ourselves and the world. This interdependency can be further elab-
orated. We cannot sufficiently access our inner dimension (of intentions, 
feelings, desires, and memories related to shame) without language (which 
belongs to the social and cultural dimension, i.e., symbolic world). Further, 
the symbolic world of language we use to articulate both shame and the 
conditions of shame cannot be explicated without also being related to the 
natural dimension and the body that harbors our desires and emotions.
Shame must be accessed: the role  
of signs and symbols 
After birth, the infant immediately finds herself part of the social dimen-
sion and tries to make sense of it. The specific type of human sociality 
6 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols. (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1984) and John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995). 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   18 2/25/2021   4:38:34 PM
i n t r o d u c to ry  r e m a r k s
19
would not be possible without interaction being enabled by signs, sym-
bols, and language – features that are specific to the human species in 
the way they appear.7 The infant must learn how to interpret the world 
through different signs. It is this capacity for semiotic engagement with 
the world, the capacity to understand and use signs and symbols, that 
makes social experience accessible.8 However, that does not mean that 
the social dimension is only experienced through signs and symbols. As 
we grow older, it is through the development of the capacity for signs 
and symbols that shame can be cognitively accessed, articulated, and 
dealt with. Shame can be, for example, a bodily experience manifested in 
muscle tone, posture, and gaze. A body can also take on a semiotic func-
tion when shame is deliberately inscribed in both skin and flesh through 
self-mutilation or anorexia. If the semiotic resources are poor or dimin-
ished, our capacity for interaction with both ourselves and others may 
be impeded. To put it succinctly, our capacity to identify, articulate and 
understand shame depends on the semiotic resources available to us.
Obvious examples of this are Freud’s version of psychoanalysis and 
Protestant theology’s focus on guilt, which have both, to a large extent, 
rendered shame a neglected phenomenon. The cultural movements they 
represent reduced the resources for nuanced interpretations of the impact 
that shame has as an important phenomenon in human life. Philosopher 
Charles Taylor says that humans are self-interpreting animals.9 Our abil-
ities for such self-interpretation are dependent upon the resources we 
have at hand in the culture and the society in which we participate. This 
can explain the variations in the way shame is addressed and shaped in 
different cultural contexts. It is empirically evident both in history and 
7 Cf. the elaborations in Terrence William Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Lan-
guage and the Brain, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997).
8 It is possible to develop the understanding of this dimension in a very extensive manner, but 
there is no great point in doing that here. For an understanding of the social dimension of 
human life, see John R. Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) and The Construction of Social Reality (New 
York: Free Press, 1995). For characteristic traits in human culture against the backdrop of evo-
lutionary theory, cf. also J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in 
science and Theology, (Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans, 2006), 222f.
9 Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985), 45–76. 
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in different social and cultural contexts in the present that the world of 
signs and symbols is dynamic, complicated and powerful and, accord-
ingly, it makes shame a culturally manifold concept.10 What is considered 
shameful in one social and cultural context may be considered entirely 
appropriate in another. The validity of the language used for shame is 
therefore dependent upon agreement on its use and its referents. We 
establish, negotiate, and renegotiate these normative conventions about 
what is shameful and what is not in our social world, and experience 
the impact of these conventions on social behavior. Thus, the interplay 
between signs and symbols on the one hand, and the users of these on 
the other hand, mirrors the shifting power-dynamics of society through 
changing conventions and what are conceived as acceptable practices. 
The “shameless Arabian daughters” and the #Metoo campaign we men-
tioned above are excellent examples of these shifting power dynamics, 
especially since the renegotiation of what and who is shameful, and what 
and who is shameless, is quickly made possible through social media. 
When power shifts, so too do signs and symbols; in this case, both the 
use of shame/shamelessness and what its referent is. Thus, shame does not 
exist without beings who are both embedded in these normative conven-
tions, socialized into acting on them and, hopefully, able to renegotiate 
them towards greater liberty for their users. 
Shame and our inner world
That some experiences are accessible to us only because of our capac-
ities for language is perhaps most obvious in what we call the inner 
or psychological dimension of experience. Shame shapes and is itself 
shaped by elements such as emotion, memory, and self-perception. The 
inner dimension of experience develops and shifts through life, and the 
10 Cf. Daniel M. T. Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches,” 
Journal of Cognition and Culture 4, no. 2 (2004). See also Gershen Kaufman, Shame: The Power 
of Caring (Rochester: Schenkman Books, 1992), 220–25, and Emi Furukawa, June Tangney, and 
Fumiko Higashibara, “Cross-Cultural Continuities and Discontinuities in Shame, Guilt, and 
Pride: A Study of Children Residing in Japan, Korea and the USA,” Self and Identity 11, no. 1 
(2012); Richard A. Schweder, “Toward a Deep Cultural Psychology of Shame,” Social Research: 
An International Quarterly of Social Science 70, no. 4 (2003).
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changes have a lot to do with how we deal with our shame (or shame-
lessness). Hence, shame is more than an affect when it comes to how it 
appears in human life. It is always framed and shaped within a life-story 
that is the result of our relational mode of being. As such, it is also tied to 
our intentions and our desires, be they acquired or innate. Therefore, we 
need to address shame from an angle that is broader than what we find in 
psychoanalytic theory or affect theory.11 This is the reason why we draw 
on Heinz Kohut’s self-psychology and Martha Nussbaum’s philosophy in 
the coming chapters.
Our inner world is only indirectly accessible to us, for at least two rea-
sons. First, we become aware of our shame by learning about ourselves 
through others. It is by communicating with others that we develop the 
ability or competence to find the appropriate words for what is going 
on.12 Accordingly, access to this experience requires both a certain level 
of authenticity and self-consciousness (or self-awareness), and a type of 
self-knowledge that is developed through the use of everyday language 
and theoretical language as well. Thus, we cannot appropriate our inner 
world without learning about ourselves from others, that is, by using 
social and cultural resources that offer us an adequate language.13 This 
11 Although we think that S. Tomkins points to important features in shame, his affect-theoretical 
approach to shame ignores the distinction between affect and emotion in a way that downplays 
some of the complexities that we want to highlight Chapter 3. 
12 This indirectly accessible character has been a problem for the more direct, empirically oriented 
forms of psychology, which have partially rejected the necessity of speaking about the inner and 
instead focused on psychology as the study of human behavior (B.F. Skinner). This approach 
loses out on the points that we try to make, and we consider it rather restricted as the only way 
to speak about the inner life of humans – as that which matters most to us. 
13 As we see it, this is one of the lasting insights of psychoanalysis. For further explanation on these 
points in a context of psychology and philosophy of religion, see Jan-Olav Henriksen, Relating 
God and the Self: Dynamic Interplay (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), Chapter 3. Deacon points to 
how “language functions as a sort of shared code for translating certain essential attributes of 
memories and images between individuals who have entirely idiosyncratic experiences. This is 
possible because symbolic reference strips away any necessary link to the personal experiences 
and musings that ultimately support it. The dissociation allows individuals to supply their own 
indexical and iconic mnemonics in order to ground these tokens in new iconic and indexical 
representations during the process of interpretation […]. The “subjective distance” from what 
is represented confers a representational freedom to thought processes that is not afforded by 
the direct recall or imagining of experiences. This is crucial for the development of self-con-
sciousness, and for the sort of detachment from immediate arousal and compulsion that allows 
self-control. Self-representation, in the context of representations of alternative pasts and fu-
tures, could not be attained without a means for symbolic representation. It is this representation 
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fact suggests a point we will develop later, namely that overcoming shame 
to a large extent requires a competence acquired through social interac-
tion and participation. Secondly, the articulation of our innermost emo-
tions, our idiosyncratic history, and what we carry with us as individual 
personalities, are socially constructed. Our access to these elements 
depends on whether others have provided us with a language to under-
stand ourselves, about what we think and feel, and what it may mean. 
But it is also dependent on our ability to access the inner world of others, 
which again, is dependent on their ability to articulate with authenticity 
what they experience. 
The experiences of our inner world tell us something about the tight 
dynamic between our self-interpretation, our experiences, and how these 
experiences are made accessible to us through language and interaction 
with others. The content and shape of our lives and experiences are very 
much dependent on how we symbolically relate to the inner dimension, 
and to our “inner selves.” Relating to ourselves through language is a way 
of opening up to a complex and interplaying experiential world where the 
experience of the body (as our “natural” mode) is central as well. Actu-
ally, as we shall see later on, the body’s semiotic function as a carrier of 
signs and symbols seems to have attracted much focus in contemporary 
research.
Shame and embodiment
Because the embodied experience of being-in-the-world is usually rec-
ognized and articulated through the signs and symbols of language, the 
self-conscious phenomenon of shame normally presupposes language. 
However, as we mentioned above, that is not to say that language is 
always the only or the dominant way of expressing shame. Neurobiolog-
ical research shows that children who are subjected to sexual abuse, for 
example, may find it difficult to both articulate and understand the terror 
they have experienced, but still, it may leave them with a sense of deep 
of self that is held accountable in social agreements, that becomes engaged in the experience of 
empathy, and that is the source for rational, reflective intentions.” Deacon, The Symbolic Species: 
The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain, 451. 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   22 2/25/2021   4:38:34 PM
i n t r o d u c to ry  r e m a r k s
23
and toxic shame. Due to processes deep in the structures of the limbic 
brain, such experiences can, for example, alter the way the brain perceives 
danger. When they lead to a shutdown of the thalamus, traumatic expe-
riences can remain as horrific remnants of past experiences – as strong 
sensory images, such as sound and visual images – without being inte-
grated into the autobiographical memory, thus evading both the time and 
space of a narrative.14 Where ordinary memory is integrated, articulated, 
and interpreted through the axis of narrative time and space, traumatic 
memory can evade time and space. One of the language centers in the 
brain may also go into an off-line mode when children experience severe 
trauma.15 Thus, wordless and narratively disintegrated fragments of past 
traumatic experiences can be left floating around in the subconscious, 
always threatening to break into consciousness through flashbacks of raw 
and isolated shards of painful and shameful experiences.16 Reliving these 
sensations is not about reliving narratively ordered memories, but means 
actually reliving the experience.17 Thus, the lack of a narrative, of a story 
ordering signs and symbols, makes it difficult to both cognitively access 
and articulate the shame these fragmented experiences can carry.
On the other hand, research also points to how experiences of shame 
seem to be necessary for the development of the infant’s brain. In the 
infant’s second year, such experiences contribute to the development of 
the orbitofrontal cortex, which is the region of the brain that is involved 
in social, emotional, motivational and self-regulatory processes. Thus, 
what we will later address as “optimal frustration” in the Chapter 3 has 
a biological or neurological counterpart that makes it possible for the 
infant to develop an adequate and sufficiently attuned mode of partici-
pating in the social world.18 
14 Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma 
(New York: Viking, 2014), 70.
15 Ibid., 43f.
16 Terje Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep (Kristiansand: Portal 
Forlag, 2017), 79f.
17 fMRI scans of flashback experiences show, for example, strong activity in Brodman’s area 19, 
where sensory images are first registered in the brain. Thus, flashback experiences are not so 
much experiencing the past, as reliving what actually happened. Ibid., 80.
18 See Allan N. Schore, “Early Shame Experiences and Infant Brain Development,” in Paul Gilbert 
and Bernice Andrews, Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture (New York: 
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Even though shameful experiences may evade narrative articula-
tion, at least to a certain extent, they may find other and coarser ways of 
expressing themselves. Thus, shame can manifest itself through the signs 
and symbols of the body. Unrecognized and unarticulated toxic shame 
can inscribe and express itself through the body and contribute to severe 
illness over time.19
The way forward
Our access to reality is dependent on our interpretative resources and 
competencies. So too with shame. Shame as a reality articulates itself in 
our physiology and biology, through our interactions in the social world, 
and in our psychological experiences of self (and others). How shame is 
experienced is also dependent on the conditions that exist in our biology, 
our social and cultural resources, and in our inner world. The human 
experience of shame is, therefore, not static, but dynamic, shaped in the 
interplay between different dimensions of experience. It is also very much 
a product of evolution, and of the evolvement of our symbolic capaci-
ties. These capacities are what allow us to express shame or contribute 
to shaming. The different dimensions of human experience we have 
described are all significant to the understanding of shame, and it would 
be a mistake to say that shame has its origin, significance or meaning in 
only one of them. The reality of shame articulates itself as a biophysical, 
socio-cultural and inner psychological experience. Accordingly, shame 
is not only multifaceted but potentially also deeply ambiguous. How-
ever, for the sake of the following analysis, we can unravel the complexity 
through a threefold “optic”. 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Allan N. Schore, Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The 
Neurobiology of Emotional Development (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
1994). Here referred to by Miryam Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female 
Sexuality (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2017), 46. 
19 Anna Luise Kirkengen, Inscribed Bodies: Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse (Dordrecht; 
Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2001).
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1. The first element is the mechanisms of shame. Shame has its roots 
deep in our evolutionary history, evolving into a complex phenome-
non that presently adapts to the complexity of modern/postmodern 
societies. The mechanisms of shame answer to the question of what 
functions shame serves in the cultural complexity of modern/post-
modern societies. The mechanisms of shame are the biologically 
and intra-psychological functions of shame as they are displayed 
in the current culture. One example may be that shame seems to 
serve a protective function, generating different strategies in differ-
ent contexts.
2. Shame is always set in motion under a set of complex defining 
conditions. These are, for example, cultural and social conditions 
that define both the way shame is displayed and the coping strate-
gies applied. For instance, shame is both displayed and coped with 
differently in a Chinese context compared to a Western European 
context. These sets of conditions are value-laden and can serve 
to impede or liberate both the display and the coping strategies 
of shame. One example here is how some religious or ideological 
norm-systems may serve as shame-inducing and oppressive social 
structures. “The shameless Arabian daughters” mentioned earlier 
are examples of both a rebellion against such oppressive conditions 
as well as a call for a more liberating religious norm-system where 
shame can be displayed, articulated and handled easier. Another 
example is the aforementioned #Metoo campaign, where the con-
ditions for both articulating and coping with the shame of being a 
victim of sexual harassment have changed dramatically.
  However, material conditions also define the way the mecha-
nisms of shame are displayed, articulated, and handled. Examples 
can be how material conditions, such as belonging to a vulnerable 
minority group, access to housing or food, and education, may be 
experienced as both shame-inducing and oppressive conditions that 
do not sufficiently allow for the articulation and handling of shame. 
3. The third element deals with the contextual consequences of shame. 
The consequences of shame must be analyzed in view of both the 
identified mechanisms and conditions under which shame appears. 
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In this context, we aim at both a phenomenological description and 
analysis in order to trace the complexity of both mechanisms and 
conditions in a Western postmodern context.
Against the backdrop of these distinctions, we aim to proceed as fol-
lows in the next chapters: In Chapter 2, we present the main features in 
recent research on shame for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive 
approach that allows us to understand it as a complex phenomenon. Then, 
in Chapter 3, we show how this understanding relates to and is substan-
tiated by important features in psychological research. Taken together, 
these two chapters lay the foundation for our analysis of how shame 
works within the three different realms that are important for many peo-
ple in the Western world: shame related to body and embodiment, shame 
related to religion, and shame in the context of ethics and morality. These 
three contexts are, accordingly, dealt with in Part II of the book. We have 
chosen these areas because they appear to be obvious sites for the use of 
shame in contemporary culture. Moreover, we have also had first-hand 
experience of these areas in our own professional lives as professors of 
ethics and religion, and our concomitant dealings with students, as well 
as with other people who have crossed our paths. Hence, although the 
following is mainly based on research literature, our study also builds 
on perspectives that are rooted in our lives as relational human beings 
who have been exposed to the challenges and suffering of others. These 
meetings with real others have not been without impact on the topics on 
which we have chosen to focus.
By investigating the role that shame has in relation to the body, reli-
gion, and morality, we can substantiate further our main theses: a) That 
shame implies an interruption of human agency that depends on specific 
conditions and is actualized by mechanisms that go beyond the context in 
question, and b) that shame implies movements that display the relational 
character of human existence, as it entails an impetus towards moving 
away from others as well as to moving towards restitution of commu-
nity. The analyses we make provide further nuances to the mechanisms 
and conditions for shame that we identify in the first part of the study. 
Against the backdrop of these analyses, we conclude that shame is not the 
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most helpful emotion to build and sustain mature agents in postmodern 
society. 
It goes without saying that in a field like this, with so many research 
disciplines involved, it is not possible to comment in detail on all rele-
vant material. Nevertheless, we hope that our fundamental approach to 
shame, and the way we demonstrate its relevance in the fields of embodi-
ment, religion, and morality, may still contribute to a deeper understand-
ing of shame and the conditions in which it operates in the contemporary 
world – despite the fact that it sometimes goes under the radar, or one 
lacks a sufficiently nuanced language for articulating how it works. 
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Shame comes in many forms. In the aftermath of #MeToo, it washes 
through political parties and over parliament members when the media 
exposes their sexist behavior and their harassment of women. But it can 
also wash over the victims of such behavior. It may also invade the Syrian 
refugee who managed to get out of Raqqa while many of his family mem-
bers did not. Shame also comes in a varying degree of severity. There 
is a vast difference between the rather trivial and short-lived shameful 
experience of losing your towel when you are putting on your swimming 
trunks on the beach, to the toxic and invasive shame that can define a 
whole life.20 Sometimes it hits with a powerful and shattering force. Other 
times it sneaks slowly in, but over time takes hold of both body and mind. 
As such, shame colonizes, often accompanied by, but also pervading other 
emotions. Shame is like desire: it shapes the way in which we experience 
our relations to those around us. This formative and binding power of 
shame is succinctly described by Virginia Burrus:
Shame is an emotion of which we frequently seem deeply ashamed. Famously 
the great inhibitor, shame at once suppresses and intensifies other affects with 
which it binds. Shame can even bind with shame: “Shame, indeed, covers shame 
itself – it is shameful to express shame.”21 
Thus, shame is in a peculiar way self-pervasive; in its strongest modes, it 
breaks in and occupies the self, and extends further as more shame is pro-
duced because one is ashamed. However, even though shame is strongly 
pervasive, it is also elusive. It can colonize every dimension of human 
20 See Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep, and Kirkengen, 
Inscribed Bodies: Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse.
21 Virginia Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects (Philadelphia: Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 1. 
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experience, and still be difficult to describe because our sources of artic-
ulation are poor, impeded or restricted. 
Evolution: Core positions on the complexities  
of nature and culture
Why do humans have such a propensity for shame? Where does it come 
from? Modern research on shame started in the early nineteen-seventies 
and was clinically focused.22 Today, the field of shame research is a maze 
of different perspectives and is conducted on various levels. One approach 
addresses the origin of shame. Evolutionary biology, sociobiology, neuro-
history, and other disciplines have brought their specific perspectives into 
the discussion. In this chapter, we want to focus on some of the accounts 
they offer for understanding the (evolutionary) origins of shame. 
One topic any evolutionary account of shame needs to grapple with is 
the relation between biology and culture. How much does any given cul-
ture contribute to the shaping of a phylogenic trait, and how much does 
the phylogenic trait shape the cultural conditions in which it evolves? Our 
brain controls our body and its functions in any given environment.23 As 
cultures shift, the body will adapt and remain integrated within human 
culture through coevolutionary processes and manifest itself through dif-
ferent cultural representations. Thus, the various cultural expressions of 
shame are the result of these coevolutionary processes that can be traced 
back to a pan-human (proto-shame) capacity to experience this emo-
tion.24 However, it is not possible to follow a straight evolutionary line 
backward towards an obvious origin. Different cultures can both exag-
gerate, suppress, and shape the display of shame. Therefore, any evolu-
tionary account of shame needs to be based on cross-cultural research. It 
is only when we realize that the different cultural variations of displayed 
22 Helen Block Lewis, “Shame and Guilt in Neurosis,” Psychoanalytic Review 58, no. 3 (1971); “The 
Role of Shame in Symptom Formation,” in Emotions and Psychopathology (Boston: Springer, 
1988).
23 Jörg Wettlaufer, “Neurohistorical and Evolutionary Aspects of a History of Shame and Shaming,” 
RCC Perspectives, no. 6 (2012).
24 Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches.”
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shame emerge from the same biological origins as different manifesta-
tions in the course of ontogenetic development, that we can start to trace 
the history of shame and, further, understand its function in human cul-
ture and society.25
Even though most (if not all) researchers recognize the evolutionary 
dynamic between culture and shame display and see it as a premise for 
any evolutionary account of shame, this does not imply that they concep-
tualize shame along the same lines. Within a universalist psychological 
framework, the evolutionary account of shame builds on the assumption 
of a species-wide human psychological make-up featuring social emo-
tions, such as shame and guilt.26 Variations in shame display in differ-
ent human cultures along the hominid evolutionary timeline are rooted 
in basic psychological functioning that can be traced through different 
cultural variations. Of course, culture contributes to variations in the 
way the psychological function is manifested, for example, through emo-
tional display:
There are important cross-cultural differences, but these are found in the man-
ifestation of common psychological processes; thus, there can be differences in 
the readiness at which certain cognitive algorithms are available, in the situa-
tions which solicit certain emotions and, in the beliefs, and norms that control 
patterns of social interaction.27
Although cultural manifestation or display may differ, the impact of cul-
ture does not create much divergence in the actual function of the core 
psychological functioning. Instead, there seems to be a psychic unity of 
25 Heidi Keller, Ype H. Poortinga, and Axel Schölmerich, “Introduction,” in Between Culture and 
Biology: Perspectives on Ontogenetic Development, ed. Heidi Keller, Ype H. Poortinga, and Axel 
Schölmerich, Cambridge Studies in Cognitive Perceptual Development (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002). This anthology gives a broad introduction to the field of ontoge-
netic development. 
26 See also Ype H. Poortinga and Karel Soudijn, “Behaviour-Culture Relationships and Ontoge-
netic Development,” in Between Culture and Biology: Perspectives on Ontogenetic Development 
(2002).
27 Keller, Poortinga, and Schölmerich, 4.
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mankind, as these mechanisms seem to hold true across the span of cul-
tures as universal psychological functions.28
At the opposite end of the spectrum of evolutionary accounts, we find 
more relativist approaches, for example, in the field of cultural psychol-
ogy. These give stronger emphasis to the formative power of culture. The 
backdrop of such positions is the claim that both culture and man are 
constructs that have developed through complex historical processes. 
Attempts to understand human psychological functioning need to take 
these complex cultural constructions as their starting point.29 Whatever 
biological backgrounds they may have in common, these have little to 
offer to the interpretation of what it is to be an actual person, since this 
person and her shame – as part of a core psychological function – also 
need to be understood from the point of view of the social and cultural 
history of man. Psychological processes, such as shame and shaming, are 
not only embedded in a culture, they are part of the constitution and 
construction of culture in the same way as both a culture and a person 
is a construct. Thus, the only empirical reference for any description and 
theory of shame/shame processes is the singular culture in which shame 
processes are displayed. As such, the study of biological processes, as in 
hominid evolution, needs to take into consideration both the cultural 
embeddedness of human ontogenetics as well as the cultural embedded-
ness of attempts to describe and understand the narrative about the evo-
lution of shame.30
28 Poortinga and Soudijn. Of course, studies report statistical invariance on dependent variables 
that can be ascribed to culture. But according to Poortinga and Soudijn, in studies that report 
such invariance the inter-individual differences tend to be larger than the intercultural differenc-
es. See e.g. Ype H. Poortinga and Dianne A. Van Hemert, “Personality and Culture: Demarcating 
between the Common and the Unique,” Journal of Personality 69, no. 6 (2001). 
29 Michael Cole, “Culture and Development” in Between Culture and Biology: Perspectives on On-
togenetic Development, ed. Heidi Keller, Ype H. Poortinga, and Axel Schölmerich, Cambridge 
Studies in Cognitive Perceptual Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
30 Along the universalist-relativist axis, there is a host of meta-theoretical, philosophical and meth-
odological premises underlying the various positions that make comparisons difficult. As an ex-
ample, on the one hand, universalist positions tend to focus on causal mechanisms between cul-
ture and human behavior in order to establish an evolutionary line. On the other hand, relativists 
focus on historicity and context in order to understand the interplay between a person and con-
text. Thus, these positions are both epistemologically, ontologically different, and thus, as research 
objects, release different methodological considerations. However, this falls outside our scope. For 
an introduction, see Poortinga and Soudijn, “Behaviour-Culture Relationships and Ontogenetic 
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Between universalists and relativists
Anthropologist Daniel M. T. Fessler strikes a fair balance between the 
universalist and the relativist positions we have sketched in the previ-
ous section. He argues that cultural constructivist accounts of emotional 
experience emphasize what he calls the “culturally constituted nature of 
subjective reality”.31 In other words, tracing the evolutionary road back 
to a proto-shame is difficult because, according to Fessler, there are no 
displays of shame that: 
… provide a direct and complete avenue for the exploration of pan-human 
emotional architecture – differential cultural exaggerating or ignoring of var-
ious features of emotional experience is such that relying on a single society 
(or set of related societies) limits our ability to discern the full outline of the 
species-typical trait.32
Fessler shows the complexity of tracing the evolutionary origin of shame and 
shame processes through empirical examples. He argues, for example, that 
the link between shame and failure seems to have some universal origin, 
while the relationship between the emotions of shame and guilt, as they are 
differently expressed in collectivistic versus individualistic cultures, seems 
to have a cultural background more than being the result of pan-human 
psychology. Consequently, it is not altogether clear what can be labeled core 
psychological functioning and what the constructs of culture are. As we 
understand Fessler, attempts to discern between core biological functioning 
and mere cultural construct must be based on cross-cultural studies.
Even though there are cultural differences in how and why emotions 
are triggered, it seems to be some consensus among researchers across the 
span of different approaches that human emotions have an evolutionary 
origin, even though there is lacking consensus of what this origin might 
be. This is not made easier by a lack of consensus of the definition of 
Development.”; Walter J Lonner and John Adamopoulos, “Culture as Antecedent to Behavior,” in 
Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Vol. 1: Theory and Method, ed. Ype H. Poortinga, Janak 
Pandey, and John W. Berry (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1997).; Joan G. Miller, “Theoretical Issues in 
Cultural Psychology,” Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology 1 (1997); Fons J.R. Van de Vijver and 
Kwok Leung, Methods and Data Analysis for Cross-Cultural Research, Vol. 1 (Sage, 1997).
31 Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches.”
32 Ibid., 209.
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shame itself. Fessler suggests two criteria that any compelling account 
of the evolution of shame should meet. First, it would need to give a 
phylogenic account, i.e., is an evolutionary account of the trait of shame 
through evolutionary history.33 Secondly, it would have to include what he 
calls an ultimate account, that is, it would need to make clear how shame 
would increase the biological fitness in the environment where it evolved. 
A phylogenic account: continuity
Many, including Fessler himself, argue for a phylogenic continuity 
between human shame and the rank-related emotions of non-human 
primates.34 Shame and pride are emotions that motivate behaviors that 
increase and control status or rank in a group. Shame is an aversive emo-
tion and associated with lower or subordinate positions, while pride is a 
rewarding emotion associated with domination and the pursuit of high 
rank. In all social animals, high rank is associated with easier access to 
resources that increase fitness. Thus, belonging to a tribe with strong and 
resourceful leaders secures the ability to procreate in a world of scant 
resources. Displaying shame contributes to securing the social position of 
subordinates or those of lower-rank in the tribe. These motivational but 
opposing emotions (shame – pride) have also been tied to specific action 
tendencies, such as averted gaze (shame) or direct gaze (pride), bent pos-
ture (shame) or erect posture (pride), or the already mentioned tendency 
of the shamed to flee, hide or avoid social contact when shamed and so 
forth. Thus, as a motivational feeling, shame has increased the biological 
fitness of lower-ranked individuals in strongly hierarchical societies or 
tribes and has, thus, remained throughout the hominid evolution. Sig-
nals or displays of either dominance or subordination are, of course, not 
related specifically to the hominid evolution.
Gilbert argues along similar lines and points to an important difference 
in the way non-human and human primates organize their societies.35 
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews, “Shame, Status and Social Roles: Psychobiology and Evolu-
tion.,” in Shame: Interpersonal Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture, edited by Paul Gilbert and 
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Non-human primates seem to establish rank-positions through their 
ability to fight. Fighting abilities are attributes that are rewarded with 
high social status, and thus, contribute to (biological) fitness. However, as 
primates evolved into human primates, the establishment of social posi-
tions and social order became a more complicated process. The hominid 
hierarchical structure upheld by a social rank-system based on fighting 
ability probably evolved into small and more flexible hunter-gatherer 
societies where social positions were determined not by fighting ability 
but by socially valued personal attributes of material or social character 
(small acephalous groups).36 Hence, in a new, more complex and flexible 
society, biological fitness was secured by the individual’s ability to both 
attract and hold positive social prestige.37 Accordingly, shame evolved 
from a social rank-system determined by dominance, to a more complex 
social rank-system determined by prestige or social recognition.  
An ultimate account: the ability to think 
The above account of shame as the result of social interaction that rec-
ognizes more than physical capacities presupposes that human primates 
have a mind, that is, the ability to think of others as having an inner 
world similar to the one they experience within themselves. It must give 
an account of the evolution of the necessary cognitive abilities to expe-
rience such self-conscious emotions, as well as the ability to reflect over 
the complexities of what other individuals think is socially desirable or 
undesirable. Furthermore, to reflect on social attraction, as well as on 
how holding power is valued by others or oneself, presupposes the evolve-
ment of symbolic self-awareness, self-presentation, as well as metacogni-
tion through language. Consequently, human shame is a lot more than an 
evolved competency signaling that our social status is decreasing in the 
Bernice Andrews (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Paul Gilbert, “Evolution, Social 
Roles, and the Differences in Shame and Guilt,” Social Research 70, no. 4 (2003). According to 
Fessler, this is an important point in establishing the phylogenic linkage between non- human 
and human shame.
36 Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches.”
37 This is what Gilbert calls Social Attention Holding Power (SAHP).
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eyes of the other. It indicates that our self-evaluation and self-judgment 
has assessed us as non-desirable.38 
Consequently, as we see it, shame is a part of an evolved composite 
cluster of interrelated affective, emotional, and cognitive abilities that 
makes possible the complexity of human interactions and relationships. 
Thus, shame is not only an emotional consequence of the evolvement 
of complex societies. It is rooted deeply in the evolution of the cultur-
ally constructed architecture and expression of the human self. In this 
complex web of relations and interactions, we express ourselves through 
intentionally directed desires, interests or orientations. Shame may be 
our response when these are impeded, scorned, devaluated or shunned. 
Shame is thus an evolved culturally constituted response to our complex 
relational mode of being-in-the-world when we experience the vulnera-
bility of expressing and exposing ourselves.
The ambiguity of shame: further lines of 
research on evolution and society
Psychological research has not reached any consensus on either defini-
tion, components, mechanisms, or the consequences of shame.39 How-
ever, a core thesis has been that shame is an emotional experience that 
38 Even though the submission-thesis seems to be the core evolutionary explanation of shame, 
there are many variations within the main theory. Peter R. Breggin, “The Biological Evolution of 
Guilt, Shame and Anxiety: A New Theory of Negative Legacy Emotions,” Medical Hypotheses 85, 
no. 1 (2015) suggests that the evolution of shame, guilt and anxiety developed as emotional re-
straints against aggressive self-assertion within our own group. Thus, the hominid evolutionary 
advantage of being both aggressive and able to cooperate secured dominion outside the tribe. 
The evolvement of moral restraints secured the family unit or the tribe, thus optimizing the 
capacity to procreate within the group and the capacity to dominate outside the group. Matteo 
Mameli, “Meat Made Us Moral: A Hypothesis on the Nature and Evolution of Moral Judgment,” 
Biology & Philosophy 28, no. 6 (2013) gives an account of moral judgment in terms of emotional 
disposition. His hypothesis is that the ability to make moral judgments evolved as an increas-
ing moralization of social sanctioning. This evolved as bands of hunters started cooperating in 
large-game hunting, and the need to control and punish bullies and cheats arose. There is a clear 
resemblance (which he also acknowledges) to Christopher Boehm’s theories of the evolution 
of human conscience and morality. See e.g., Christopher Boehm, “The Moral Consequences of 
Social Selection,” Behaviour 151, no. 2–3 (2014); Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, 
and Shame (New York: Basic Books, 2012).
39 Paul Gilbert, “What Is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies,” in Shame: Interpersonal 
Behavior, Psychopathology, and Culture, ed. Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (New York: Ox-
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occurs when your self-image is temporarily shattered or even damaged in 
some way. Thus, shame signals an undesirable defect of the self, accom-
panied by a broken self-image or/and social image. To protect this bro-
ken image, the shameful person tries to isolate the damaged self from 
further negative evaluation.40 According to Gausel and Leach, there also 
seems to be a consensus about the harmful effects of shame, whether one 
focuses on its damage to self-image or social image. They presume that 
shame manifests damage that needs to be hidden and protected from the 
negative evaluation of others. This withdrawal or protective hiding has 
negative effects, psychologically, socially, and ethically.41
Evolution revisited
Any general theory of shame needs to take into consideration why shame 
seems to be such a powerful emotion in human life, even with its cul-
tural differences. Even though there is no clear consensus about the finer 
points of the evolution of shame, the general theory seems to be reason-
ably undebatable. If we can trace shame through our phylogenic history 
as part of a motivational system that evolved during the evolution of our 
hominid line towards more complex societies and higher cognitive abil-
ities, this is relevant for our understanding of shame’s recent functions. 
If the capacity for shame is part of the evolved architecture of the self, it 
becomes necessary to establish substantial evidence if we assess shame 
as solely maladaptive. From an evolutionary standpoint, it would require 
what Fessler called an “ultimate account”.42 In that case, it would have 
to explain how the absence of shame would increase the biological fit-
ness in the environment where it evolves. If shame has (mainly) adverse 
effects, one would expect that it would be selected out over time, whereas 
ford University Press, 1998); Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney, The 
Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research (New York: Guilford Press, 2007).
40 For an explication of the emotion of shame in comparison to the emotion of guilt, se for example 
June Price Tangney and Ronda L. Dearing, Shame and Guilt. (New York: Guildford, 2002).
41 Nicolay Gausel and Colin Wayne Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Man-
agement of Moral Failure: Rethinking Shame,” European Journal of Social Psychology 41, no. 4 
(2011).
42 Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches.”
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other attributes with higher significance for fitness would prevail. How-
ever, such an account would only be a prediction of future societies, as it 
would not explain the prevalence of culturally different shame displays 
in the past.
Martha Nussbaum is among those who actually suggest that in con-
temporary society, shame is potentially maladaptive from a philosoph-
ical and psychological point of view. In Political Emotions, she shows 
how the conscious or deliberate employment of negative emotions like 
shame, envy, and fear are problematic when one engenders them on a 
societal level to make divisions between groups. It is also relevant when it 
comes to employing shame for the purpose of castigating minorities. The 
above-mentioned emotions inhibit other important human features, like 
love and compassion, which are crucial for the development of a more 
humane society.43 The difference between Nussbaum’s approach and that 
of Fessler is not only conditioned by how Nussbaum operates with a more 
extensive normative repertoire for the assessment of shame than Fessler. 
It is also conditioned by how Nussbaum allows for a more sophisticated 
approach to the ambiguity of shame that addresses its potential harm, 
despite its contribution to fitness. Thereby, she moves beyond the evolu-
tionary approach and opens up to a more sociological, and not merely a 
biological, approach to shame. 
Fessler, on the other hand, claims that there is a distorting Western 
bias in the empirical studies of shame. This bias has provided us with an 
incomplete view of what he calls the “underlying species-typical emo-
tional architecture of man”.44 This incomplete view has made it challeng-
ing to explore both the phylogeny and the functions of shame:
Perhaps more than any other emotion, shame, which makes subordinance, 
prestige failure, and social rejection aversive, reflects the probable evolution of 
hominid social systems from highly hierarchical structures to more fluid forms 
of organization. Though differentially masked or elaborated by the diverse 
cultures of today, shame carries the hallmarks of a motivational system that 
43 Martha Craven Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts; London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013), 363ff. 
44 Fessler, “Shame in Two Cultures: Implications for Evolutionary Approaches.”
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evolved in bands of hunter-gatherers, groups in which widespread cooperation 
occurred alongside disparities in power and prestige.45
A narrow-minded psychological reading of shame through the lens of 
Western culture easily loses sight of the important social function of 
shame in the evolution of human cultures and leaves us with an incom-
plete and negative reading of its functions. If different cultures constitute 
different displays of shame, for example, through exaggeration or sup-
pression, any account of shame needs to take both phylogenic history and 
cultural diversity into account. 
Shame and the social matrix
Recently, biologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and others, have all 
suggested new ways of both differentiating and contextualizing shame, 
especially in light of cross-cultural research. There seem to be signifi-
cant cultural variations in how the relations between selfhood, society, 
and the function of shame are constituted and constructed.46 In that con-
text, sociologist Thomas Scheff’s critique has similarities with Fessler’s. 
However, Scheff’s focus is not on the evolution of shame but rather on 
the sociological function of shame as a bonding emotion. He claims that 
shame is the primary emotion regulating our daily life. Shame experiences 
signal threats to our social bonds.47 Thus, it contributes to maintaining 
the relational networks in which our lives are embedded. Paradoxically, 
given the importance of shame, modern society has repressed and con-
fined shame to an individually oriented and psychologically damaging 
personal experience. Thus, it has become a taboo. 
Accordingly, Scheff claims that the exploration of shame within the 
domain of psychology has lost sight of the social matrix of shame by 
45 Ibid., 251.
46 Vivian L. Vignoles et al., “Beyond the ‘East–West’ Dichotomy: Global Variation in Cultural Mod-
els of Selfhood,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 145, no. 8 (2016); Daniel Sznycer 
et al., “Shame Closely Tracks the Threat of Devaluation by Others, Even Across Cultures,” Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2016).
47 Thomas J. Scheff, “Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory,” Sociological Theory 18, 
no. 1 (2000).
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focusing on the individual emotional experience.48 Even though a narrow 
focus can shed light on such a personal experience, one loses an essential 
frame of reference for understanding the sociological function of shame 
if it is approached from a mere individual perspective. What is especially 
important to note is that Scheff’s own reclaiming of shame reaches far 
wider than the psychological definition commented upon above: 
I use a sociological definition of shame, rather than the more common psycho-
logical one (perception of a discrepancy between ideal and actual self). If one 
postulates that shame is generated by a threat to the bond, no matter how slight, 
then a wide range of cognates and variants follow: not only embarrassment, 
shyness, and modesty, but also feelings of rejection or failure, and heightened 
self-consciousness of any kind.49
Thus, Scheff includes a whole family of experiences in the concept of 
shame, or the bond effect, as he also calls it. We agree with Scheff that it is 
obvious that a definition of shame, and an understanding of the compo-
nents and mechanisms of shame, need to take into consideration its social 
context. It even seems superfluous to mention that a social emotion needs 
to be contextualized in order to understand its function, conditions and 
mechanisms. If shame, as we claim, is an evolved culturally constituted 
response to our complex relational mode of being-in-the-world when we 
experience the vulnerability of expressing and exposing ourselves, it is by 
definition contextual and social, and it is displayed differently in different 
cultures. Hence, Fessler’s argument about the Western bias underscores 
Scheff’s point. Nevertheless, we are not convinced that Scheff’s argument 
about the modern repression of shame is correct. It seems that our his-
tory of shame is more complicated. That does not mean that shame is 
not repressed both in modern and postmodern society. Moreover, it is 
not always adequately articulated or analyzed.50 As we have previously 
mentioned, the poor cultural resources for the articulation of shame in 
48 Ibid.; “Shame in Self and Society,” Symbolic Interaction 26, no. 2 (2003).
49 “Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory.”, 97.
50 For example, the religious and the psychological focus on guilt (following the focus of the Ref-
ormation and Freud, respectively) has led to instances of shame being underdiagnosed or falsely 
diagnosed as guilt. Shame has also been less focused on in recent psychology on trauma, despite 
its prevailing presence in victims. See, for an example of this, Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma 
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contemporary Western society make coping with shame difficult, as a 
society, a group, or an individual.51 That is not necessarily a new phe-
nomenon. What is new, however, in the postmodern, transparent, virtual 
culture, is the display of shamelessness on the internet and in different 
social media. Here, we see people display elements of their private lives 
with hardly any restrictions or shame – although they may sometimes 
experience shaming as a response to what they present there. 
Social psychology and recent attempts at 
differentiating shame
As we saw above, Scheff expands the definition of shame by cramming a 
whole family of different experiences into the concept. His aim to clarify 
shame conceptually is less successful. By the conceptual expansion he 
makes, it becomes even more difficult to establish formal and material 
criteria for what shame is. Our suggestion, as mentioned above, is to view 
shame as part of an evolved composite cluster of interrelated emotional 
and cognitive abilities that makes possible the complexity of human 
interactions and relationships. That makes it necessary to conceptualize, 
for example, both shame and the emotion of guilt as separate and differ-
entiated phenomena for the purpose of identifying the different possible 
functions these can have as responses to the way we express ourselves 
in our social matrix. Thus, shame as a response to a perceived defect in 
our self-image that threatens our social bonds can certainly spur us into 
repairing action. Hence, shame as an internal phenomenon can prompt us 
to act in prosocial ways. Furthermore, shame and shaming processes can 
certainly contribute to both deregulating and fortifying social positions 
and social bonds. However, when the concept of shame is not sufficiently 
differentiated from how we conceptualize other socially conditioned feel-
ings, we lose the ability to differentiate between shame that isolates and 
shame that bonds. We also lose the chance to understand the ambiguous 
ways shame functions in the architecture of the self.
and Recovery (New York, N.Y.: BasicBooks, 1992), which hardly focuses on shame at all, despite 
mentioning it on the title page.
51 Cf. above, 20f.
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We pointed out above how shame in psychological research is appraised 
as a negative emotional experience, since the broken self-image and/or 
social image needs protection through, for example, withdrawal from 
interpersonal arenas. However, a recent position within social psychology 
has offered a more nuanced understanding of shame that can bring us 
closer to an ultimate account. This new line of research has focused more 
on the possible positive outcome of shame.52 This does not mean that the 
prevailing understanding of shame as associated with withdrawal and 
other defensive measures is wholly incorrect.53 Nevertheless, it contrib-
utes to a differentiation in the understanding of shame.
De Hooge et al. have suggested that shame, as a moral emotion, is asso-
ciated with two motives.54 These are parallel with two of the movements 
that shame causes, and which we have suggested earlier. The first is the 
protect motive. The second is the restore motive; shame can activate pro-
social behavior to restore the damaged self when the experience of shame 
is relevant for the decision at hand (endogenous), but not when it is not 
relevant (exogenous). In other words, the choices you have to make in 
a shameful situation seem to push you towards prosocial actions. How-
ever, when removed from the situation, you tend to withdraw. Thus, as a 
moral emotion, shame can function as a prosocial commitment device to 
restore the threatened self. However, such prosocial commitment seems 
to be dependent on the assessment that such restoration of self is possible 
and not too risky. Accordingly, the restore motive diminishes when the 
risk and difficulty of restoration are too great, whereas the protect motive 
52 This new line of research corresponds to a fairly common experience: when you experience 
shame, for example, because you have not done your job correctly or as good as could be expect-
ed, the answer is not always to hide away to protect your self-image. It can also be the opposite: 
you get right back in the saddle in order to prove that you can do it as well as anyone, and thus 
restore both the broken self-image and/or social image of who you are.
53 Colin Wayne Leach and Atilla Cidam, “When Is Shame Linked to Constructive Approach Ori-
entation? A Meta-Analysis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 109, no. 6 (2015).
54 Ilona E. De Hooge, Seger M. Breugelmans, and Marcel Zeelenberg, “Not So Ugly after All: When 
Shame Acts as a Commitment Device,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 95, no. 4 
(2008) and Ilona E. De Hooge, Marcel Zeelenberg, and Seger M. Breugelmans, “Restore and Pro-
tect Motivations Following Shame,” Cognition and Emotion 24, no. 1 (2010). What we do in the 
following paragraphs is to thematize some of the relationships between psychology and moral 
shame. We present a more extensive discussion of the relationship between shame and morality 
in Chapter 6.
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seems to remain unaffected by risk factors. In other words, the balance 
between these two motives is shifting, and this sometimes makes it diffi-
cult to distinguish between protective behavior and avoidance behavior.55
Even though De Hooge et al. list empirical evidence supporting this 
understanding, we will later raise the question of whether identifying 
shame as a moral emotion is too constricting. We will claim that shame 
is not a moral emotion, but that it sometimes serves a moral function. De 
Hooge et al., however, seem to develop their ideas from a moral defini-
tion of shame, instead of seeing it as a psychological phenomenon that 
can be incorporated into moral frameworks. In other words, our moral 
sense uses shame for its own purposes, it is not shame that leads us to 
moral action. This conceptual turn opens up a room for understanding 
the many times when shame does not serve moral functions, for example, 
when it expresses itself through anger or even violence.56
In a theory-driven meta-analysis of 90 research publications, Leach 
and Cidam confirm the link between shame, constructive-approach 
motivation, and behavior.57 One dominant finding is that the experience 
of shame related to a reparable moral failure seems to motivate construc-
tive approaches, such as prosocial action or self-improvement. But when 
the experience of shame is related to a failure that damages the whole self, 
and where reparable strategies seem futile, or might even enhance the 
chance of further failure, prosocial action is absent. Spurred by this dual 
perspective on shame, Gausel and Leach developed a new conceptual 
model of shame where they differentiated between self-image and social 
image.58 Accordingly, there are two basically different ways to appraise 
our moral failures.59 We can interpret them as threats to our self-image, 
55 De Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans, “A Functionalist Account of Shame-Induced 
Behaviour,” Cognition and Emotion 25, no. 5 (2011).
56 We deal more extensively with this topic in Chapter 6.
57 Leach and Cidam, “When Is Shame Linked to Constructive Approach Orientation? A Meta-
Analysis.”
58 Gausel and Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Management of Moral Fail-
ure: Rethinking Shame.” Further, shame is differentiated in 3 different appraisals and 4 different 
feelings (see the model, ibid., 475).
59 Nicolay Gausel, “Self-Reform or Self-Defense? Understanding How People Cope with Their 
Moral Failures by Understanding How They Appraise and Feel About Their Moral Failures,” in 
Social Issues, Justice and Status, edited by Mira Moshe and Nicoleta Corbu (New York: Nova, 
2013).
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that is, we understand them as the result of a defect in ourselves. Such 
a defect does not need to be global; that is, it does not mean that our 
whole self-image is lost or broken. We are, for example, able to differ-
entiate between acknowledging our moral defects as husbands, and still 
recognize that we are good at what we do at work, as well as being pass-
able fathers. And even though it is shameful and unpleasant to admit 
to such a defect, shame may spur us to both self-reform and reparation 
of possible bonds that may be broken because of our failures. However, 
in some instances, appraisal of moral failure may be of such a character 
that our global self-image is broken and seems irreparable. Then we find 
no other alternative than protective strategies like withdrawal or hiding 
from others. 
The other option is to interpret moral failure as a threat to our social 
image through the condemnation of others. In other words, because of 
our moral failure, we may feel threatened by rejection from others, and 
thus, the social bonds that hold us together are at stake.60 When those 
with whom we share social bonds see our failures and reject us, we lose 
the necessary bonds that support us through much-needed relationships. 
An appraisal of lost social image may be real or imagined.61 Nevertheless, 
as our actions are often social, so too are our failures. We may lie to our-
selves, but more often, we lie to others. When others seeus lying or cheat-
ing, or see our betrayal or violence, it is our social image that is at stake. 
Why do some people concern themselves with social image, and others 
with self-image? According to Gausel, it depends on the quality of our 
social bonds. Some have stronger social bonds, which may be tied to more 
mature people than others. Such bonds are not so easily cut because of 
moral failure. When those with whom we share important bonds are able 
to differentiate between what we do and who we are, the fear of loss of 
self-image and possible rejection seems to lessen. This is a crucial insight, 
60 Ibid. Scheff, “Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory.”; “Shame in Self and Society.” 
The approach offered here can also be related to the one offered in Krista K. Thomason, “Shame, 
Violence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, no. 1 (2015), who distin-
guishes between identity and self-conception in her analysis of shame. Shame is the result of 
their difference. See more on this in Chapter 6 below. 
61 Gausel and Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Management of Moral 
Failure: Rethinking Shame.”
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well-documented in both criminological studies and abuse studies.62 
For those who try to deal with their own moral failures, the ability to 
distinguish between self-image and failure is crucial. When important 
social ties are cut because of rejection, the loss of social image leaves scant 
resources for the self to come to grips with this important distinction. It 
is more likely that the severing of social ties and loss of social image will 
enhance the overlap between global self-image and moral failure. When 
all you are left with is what you have done, the resources are inadequate 
for self-improvement and restoration of social bonds. 
However, rejection is a subjective feeling and does not need to actu-
ally take place. Possibly, feelings of rejection may correlate with perceived 
social image. Much is at stake when the loss of social image is a possibil-
ity. Our standing and our position in the social order are in play, and, 
thus, we go to great lengths to hide our moral failures, to prevent the 
downgrading of our social image.63
One core strategy is self-defense, by trying to conceal or cover up fail-
ure so that no one will notice. Another strategy can be aggression towards 
others, by aggressive behavior and shifting blame. In victimological stud-
ies, we often see strategies such as victim blaming or scapegoating com-
ing into play. A third strategy is the use of social defense strategies that 
aim at enhancing social standing, as a counterweight to the weight of 
moral failures, such as when a political candidate accused of greediness 
directs full media focus to his alleged philanthropic foundation.
Previously, we asked whether it would be possible to find an approach 
that could contribute to a more ultimate account of shame. In several 
ways, what we have now presented does. Even though the suggested 
route to an ultimate account of shame is not yet fully researched, the 
above contributes to a more nuanced understanding of shame that takes 
into account the social function of shame, as well as identifying ethi-
cally relevant prosocial functions of shame. If shame, as we have sug-
gested, is an evolved response in human self-architecture that regulates 
62 Paul Leer-Salvesen, Tilgivelse (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1998); Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns 
Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep.
63 Gausel and Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Management of Moral 
Failure: Rethinking Shame.”
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our self-expression in our vulnerable complex relational mode of being- 
in-the-world, it makes sense to differentiate between a partial and a 
full rupture of our self-image. Our self-image reflects our assessment 
of the social and personal value of our self-expression in this 
complex network. We can summarize the complexities at hand in the 
following list:
1. Shame may warn us that the way we express our intentions, desires, 
interests or orientations, falls short of what we perceive as suffi-
ciently valuable and acceptable in our relational network. 
2. If our shortcomings are sufficiently severe, our social image may 
be severely damaged and beyond repair. Thus, our whole self- 
image may shatter, and leave us with an all-encompassing and 
chronic sense of shame and limited options, such as avoidance 
behavior and other protective strategies. 
3. However, in many instances, shame is a reminder to ourselves that 
our vulnerable position in our relational network is at play, thus 
spurring us to regulate and improve our self-expression and our 
self-image through reparative prosocial strategies. We may, for 
example, be ashamed of our impatient and rude attitude towards a 
neighbor that regularly pesters us. Our shame is a response to the 
fact that this attitude does not reflect who we want to be and thus 
leads us to reparable strategies. Through shame, we are made aware 
of our moral failure as a neighbor, and it makes us change our atti-
tude in concord with who we want to be. 
4. Nevertheless, in severe cases, such as, for example, for victims of 
abuse, shame can be all-pervasive, leaving the victim in a state 
of chronic and toxic shame and with a full rupture to their self- 
image. The mechanisms of such abuse often transport both the 
experience of moral responsibility and moral guilt from the abuser 
to the abused. It leaves the victim with a full-blown destructive self- 
image, a “willing victim of sexual abuse.” For many in this situa-
tion, there are no strategies for regaining a positive self-image, and 
the only way left is to hide the ruptured self-image through different 
protective strategies.
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Preliminary circumscription: shame and the 
question of morality 
Shame and guilt as emotions with a potential 
moral function 
We saw above that Scheff included a whole family of concepts and phe-
nomena within the concept of shame. It is not uncommon to associate 
shame with a wide array of phenomena such as anger, embarrassment, 
blushing, pride, and so forth. The most prominent neighboring phe-
nomenon, however, is guilt. In the following, we will try to set these two 
concepts apart in order to understand the difference between shame and 
guilt as two possibly moral emotions.
Haidt suggests a preliminary definition of moral emotions as “those 
that are linked to the interest and welfare of either a society as a whole 
or at least of persons other than the judge or agent.”64 Both shame and 
guilt can be classified as such emotions. The main question we will try 
to answer in the following is: in what way may we describe and identify 
shame as a possible moral emotion in relation to guilt? However, we bear 
in mind our previous remark about how these emotions are not moral 
in themselves but can serve moral purposes under given circumstances. 
The discussion is still ongoing about what constitutes and what is typ-
ical of the emotions of shame and guilt. The empirical mapping of these 
emotions through various instruments has not led to a clear understand-
ing. The discussion is still going strong and hard to oversee but has nev-
ertheless contributed to some insights into the architecture of the moral 
self. The moral function of shame and guilt, and the role they play as we 
try to express ourselves in the interrelated mode of being-in-the-world, is 
essential for understanding both moral/immoral reflection and action. 
Tangney et al. suggest that the self-conscious emotions, such as shame, 
guilt, embarrassment, and pride, are crucial elements in our moral 
64 Jonathan Haidt, “The Moral Emotions,” in Handbook of Affective Sciences, ed. Richard J. Davidson, 
Klaus R. Scherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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apparatus. These emotions influence the links between moral standards 
and moral behavior.65 They also disclose our relational constitution as 
humans. 
The most prominent line of research views guilt as the prosocial oppo-
site of antisocial shame.66 In other words, shame and guilt are adversar-
ies in an emotional tug-of-war.67 The underlying assumption here is that 
shame focuses on the self, whereas guilt focuses on the actions of the self. 
Thus, shame is an emotional response indicating that the self is flawed, 
defective and/or rejected, while guilt is an emotional response indicating 
that the actions of the self are flawed, defective, and/or rejected.68 Conse-
quently, shame and guilt have different roles and different moral values 
in our moral apparatus. When you have harmed or violated other people, 
shame will protect you through isolation and withdrawal. However, as a 
rule, it will also widen or fortify the moral gap between the offender and 
the offended. As the gap widens or fortifies, the possibilities for making 
moral amends for wrongdoing lessen. Consequently, it contributes little 
to repairing or closing the moral gap. Hence, shame is a response when 
the interests of the self are threatened but does not promote strategies for 
repair when harm has been done.
Guilt, on the other hand, focuses on the action or the harm that 
has been done. It is morally other-oriented. It reminds us of the harm 
or violation our actions have brought on others, and for which we are 
morally responsible, and, therefore, need to seek amends for. Because 
it is not a response signaling a defect of the self, it does not activate 
65 June Price Tangney, Jeffrey Stuewig, and Debra J. Mashek, “What’s Moral About the Self- 
Conscious Emotions?” in The Self-Conscious Emotions, ed. Jessica L. Tracy, Richard W. Robins, 
and June Price Tangney (New York: The Guilford Press, 2007).
66 For a review of arguments, see Tangney and Dearing, Shame and Guilt.
67 Tamara J. Ferguson et al., “Shame and Guilt as Morally Warranted Experiences,” in The Self- 
Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research, edited by Richard W. Robins, Jessica L. Tracy, and 
June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford Press, 2007). For a historical overview of the research of 
shame as a self-conscious emotion, see Kurt W. Fischer and June Price Tangney, “Self-Conscious 
Emotions and the Affect Revolution: Framework and Overview,” in Self-Conscious Emotions, 
edited by Kurt W. Fischer and June Price Tangney (New-York (1995): Guilford Press, 1995). 
68 Tangney and Dearing, Shame and Guilt; Gausel and Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social 
Image in the Management of Moral Failure: Rethinking Shame”; Paula M. Niedenthal, June Price 
Tangney, and Igor Gavanski, “’If Only I Weren’t’ Versus ’If Only I Hadn’t’: Distinguishing Shame 
and Guilt in Counterfactual Thinking,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, no. 4 
(1994).
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avoidance-behavior strategies such as running or hiding. Rather, it is an 
emotional (and potentially) moral response pushing us towards moral 
behavior that aims at repairing or closing the moral gap between the 
offender and the victim. Thus, guilt can be a morally positive emotion by 
reminding us of our wrongdoing, as well as providing us with the chance 
to develop a reflective space in which to evaluate both actions and moral 
repair strategies without threatening the self.69 
Shame and guilt are categorically different
We argue that, from a moral point of view, there is a categorical difference 
between guilt and the feeling of guilt, and between shame and guilt. We 
have earlier suggested that shame is an emotional response deeply rooted 
in the architecture of the self as a response tied to rejection, demeaning 
or shunning of our (intentionally guided) self-expression, thus exposing 
our vulnerability in the world and interrupting our immediate agency. 
Hence, shame is a response that regulates our relational ties, either by 
repairing or further severing them. Guilt, however, is basically a moral 
and subsequently sometimes a legal condition that can elicit morally rele-
vant emotional responses, such as feelings of both guilt and shame.70 As a 
moral condition, guilt describes the relation between subjects when harm 
or violation has occurred. Guilt appears in a specific context and situa-
tion that renders someone a victim of the action or attitudes of others. As 
such, guilt as a moral condition between subjects exists independently 
of feelings or emotions of guilt. A sexual offender may abuse his victim 
without anger, remorse or feeling of guilt, but that does not alter the fact 
that the moral condition between the offender and the victim is one of 
guilt. Therefore, we need to distinguish clearly between the experience of 
guilt and the condition of guilt. 
69 Ferguson et al., “Shame and Guilt as Morally Warranted Experiences”; June Price Tangney and 
Kurt W. Fischer, Self-Conscious Emotions: The Psychology of Shame, Guilt, Embarrassment, and 
Pride (New York: Guilford Press, 1995). 
70 Jeff Elison, “Shame and Guilt: A Hundred Years of Apples and Oranges,” New Ideas in Psychology 
23, no. 1 (2005).
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Elison is among the scholars who make the critical distinction between 
guilt and feeling of guilt. He proposes the following definition: “Guilt is 
an objective description or a subjective evaluation which may be made by 
someone other than the party deemed guilty.”71 The question is whether 
his definition provides a sufficient way of articulating the distinction. Put 
briefly, a person can certainly be found guilty of a moral and legal offense 
in a court of law, through an evaluation of the facts of the case and the 
testimonies of the offender, the victim, and other witnesses. Nevertheless, 
guilt is more than a socio-legal condition. It can also be established out-
side the courtrooms, in everyday situations where we find others or our-
selves guilty of actions or attitudes towards others by breaking established 
moral norms. Thus, guilt is not only a matter of who has the authority to 
judge someone guilty. It is a matter of the contextual premises on which a 
moral judgment is based. Accordingly, it is a question of whether it is con-
textually fair or reasonable to judge someone as guilty of breaking moral 
norms, and thus violating a victim. The principle of fairness is important, 
especially if culpable responsibility for wrongdoing is a premise for some 
forms of shame and/or feelings of guilt.72 
Marion Smiley questions the assumption that guilt is only applicable 
when emerging from voluntary acts. She holds that in real life, the criteria 
of clear intent and a free will through voluntary action does not work. 
Both intent and will come in degrees, shaped by the contextual possibil-
ities and limitations of the situation in which they are executed. This is 
the reason why the question of possible culpability needs to be based on 
the principle of fairness; that is, it needs to take into account the contex-
tual complexity of the situation where the alleged violation occurred. It 
is important to consider the principle of fairness – not only for delivering 
just verdicts in a court of law, but also in the complexity of everyday life 
where the possibility of doing harm is always present, either by intent, 
negligence, or by accident and sheer bad luck. 
On a deeper level, one can also raise the question of whether guilt only 
exists as a consequence of a moral evaluation that meets the suggested 
71 Ibid.
72 For further explication of the principle of fairness, see Marion Smiley, Moral Responsibilities and 
the Boundaries of Community (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).
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criteria. A murderer who kills his victim without moral reflection or 
moral feelings of any kind is still morally guilty of murder, even when 
there are no witnesses to his act. Thus, it makes sense to understand guilt 
as something more than the result of moral evaluation only. It is rather 
an existential ever-present possibility of harm or wrongdoing between 
ourselves and others due to our vulnerable relational mode of being-
in-the-world. As interdependent beings, we expose others to our way of 
expressing desires, interests, or orientations. Thus, we always leave open 
the possibility to harm or violate others in the same way as we are exposed 
ourselves. Thus, guilt takes on an objective character in the case of moral-
ity that is not similar to what we can say about shame. The closest we can 
come to a parallel is when we make assessments like “She did something 
for which she ought to feel ashamed.”
Shame: a part of the human capabilities
It follows from the above analysis that the emotions of guilt and shame 
can both be linked closely to the fundamental moral condition. Thus, 
emotions such as shame and guilt are both part of the human capabilities 
that, for example, make us able to recognize and act upon the precarious 
moral dimension of our mode of being-in-the-world. These capabilities 
are deeply rooted in the architecture of the self, as part of a cluster of cog-
nitive and emotional capabilities that aid and regulate our self-expression 
in our interrelated and dependent mode of being-in-the-world. As such, 
these emotions may serve as moral responses or reminders of conditions 
of guilt. On the other hand, we need to keep in mind that displays of guilt 
and shame may be emotional responses that are morally irrelevant. Thus, 
an unqualified categorization of these as moral emotions is somewhat 
misleading, as we have already suggested. A more adequate description, 
based on their function as emotional capabilities, is to consider them as 
part of the human emotional capabilities that under certain conditions 
can serve a moral function. The question remains, however, whether 
these conditions can be sufficiently identified.
It is obvious that shame is not always elicited by harmful actions 
or wrongdoing that constitutes a condition of guilt. Shame may, for 
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example, be the response to the way our body is displayed in the world 
when it does not conform to the prevalent cultural ideals.73 It may also 
be a victim’s confused and emotional response to degrading abuse and 
traumatization. Hence, shame is complex and ambivalent and does not 
always serve a moral purpose. According to Aakvaag, shame needs to 
meet three interrelated criteria to be morally useful.74 First, there needs 
to be a fit between shame and the situation in which it occurs. In other 
words, it must be a reasonable response in the context at hand. As an 
example, have we acted in violation of our norms and values that put our 
self-image at risk? When a victim of sexual abuse responds with shame, 
it is not a moral response to wrongdoing. Rather, it is a consequence of 
the corrupted moral logic of sexual abuse, where responsibility, guilt, and 
shame are often transported from the offender to the victim.75 
We use the notion ‘transport’ here and in the following to indicate how 
a violation’s corrupted moral logic often transports such feelings from a 
perpetrator as the one who should, rightly, harbor them, to the victim. 
Even though the offender may not deliberately attempt to transport these 
feelings, it may still take place as part of the corrupted logic of the act 
itself. Hence, there is not a fit between the shame the victim feels and the 
situation from which the shame originated. 
Secondly, the emotional strength in the shame response needs to be 
calibrated to the situation at hand. If the emotional response is so strong 
that it overwhelms the agent in a situation where he or she is guilty of only 
a minor violation, it does not serve a moral purpose because it misleads 
the moral judgment emotionally. Thus, shame – like the feeling of guilt – 
needs to be contextually calibrated to serve a moral function.76 Finally, 
shame needs to activate appropriate action in the situation at hand. If 
the emotional response is too strong and uncalibrated, it may activate 
73 This is a central topic in contemporary shame research, and we will return to it in a later chapter.
74 Helene Flood Aakvaag, Hei, Skam: En Bok Om Følelsen Skam, Hvorfor Den Oppstår Og Hva Den 
Gjør Med Oss (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2018).
75 Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep, 97.
76 For further introduction to the calibration of the emotion of guilt, see Herant A. Katchadourian, 
Guilt: The Bite of Conscience (Stanford: Stanford General Books, 2010), 21ff. We want to raise the 
question, though, if one can calibrate feelings of shame in the same way that one does with guilt? 
The global character of shame seems to make it difficult to think of it as fully parallel. See our 
previous discussion of shame vs. guilt above, pp. 47–51. 
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inappropriate behavior such as, for example, avoidance or anger, which 
will widen and/or fortify the moral gap. However, a morally relevant 
shame response may remind us that our action(s) has put our self-image 
and social position at risk, which calls for strategies of repair. But such 
repair has its moral limitations. It is the nature of shame, as mentioned 
above, that it is self-oriented, and not other-oriented. Thus, even though 
shame may be a response to wrongdoing that spurs actions of moral 
repair, the focus is not primarily on the welfare of the offended but on the 
welfare of the one committing the offense.
Recent studies within social psychology suggest a differentiation 
between heavy shame responses that damage the whole self-image, render-
ing it unrepairable and without other strategies than avoidance behavior, 
and lesser shame responses that only damage part of the self-image, and, 
accordingly, present strategies of repair as viable options.77 Furthermore, 
the differentiation between the self-image that can open up for repairing 
strategies, and the social-image that seems to render no strategies except 
for protective ones will, when read together, contribute to help iden-
tify and describe the conditions under which shame may serve a moral 
function. However, they need to be elaborated further to present a more 
detailed understanding of the possible moral functions of shame, espe-
cially as they relate to the interrelated cluster of cognitive and emotional 
capabilities. As an example, what role do our cognitive or our relational 
capabilities have in the necessary calibration of our shame responses if 
they are to serve a moral function? We will address these questions in a 
later chapter. Suffice to say at this point that although shame may serve 
a moral purpose, its moral value is relatively limited compared to the 
feeling of guilt.
77 Gausel, “Self-Reform or Self-Defense? Understanding How People Cope with Their Moral Fail-
ures by Understanding How They Appraise and Feel About Their Moral Failures”; Gausel and 
Leach, “Concern for Self-Image and Social Image in the Management of Moral Failure: Rethink-
ing Shame”; Leach and Cidam, “When Is Shame Linked to Constructive Approach Orientation? 
A Meta-Analysis”; Ilona E. De Hooge, Seger M. Breugelmans, and Marcel Zeelenberg, “Not So 
Ugly after All: When Shame Acts as a Commitment Device,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 95, no. 4 (2008); Ilona E. De Hooge, Marcel Zeelenberg, and Seger M. Breugelmans, 
“Moral Sentiments and Cooperation: Differential Influences of Shame and Guilt,” Cognition and 
Emotion 21, no. 5 (2007); De Hooge, Zeelenberg, and Breugelmans, “Restore and Protect Moti-
vations Following Shame”; “A Functionalist Account of Shame-Induced Behaviour.”
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Strategies for transporting or transforming shame
We have suggested above that shame is sometimes transported to the vic-
tim from the one who ought to feel ashamed, namely the perpetrator. 
In this section, we want to mention some of the strategies that shame 
seems to engender, and which are employed by the shame-feeling indi-
vidual in order to overcome, transform, and/or avoid shame and resti-
tute his or her agency. Some of these strategies are transporting shame to 
others, whereas others imply a transformation of shame. These strategies 
are, nevertheless, all attempts to defend oneself against the experience of 
shame. 
A child who experiences contempt from a parent, given specific, unfa-
vorable conditions, may transform the shame he or she feels in facing the 
parent’s contempt into self-contempt. Whereas shame is an ambivalent 
experience, because the self still longs for reunion with the self or the 
significant other, in contempt, “the object, be it self or other, is completely 
rejected.”78 Kaufman points to how the transformation of shame into 
contempt in the long run may establish deep and enduring traces in the 
conditions for interpersonal relationships, because it is a way of putting 
oneself above others. “In the development of contempt as a characterolog-
ical defending style, we have the seeds of a judgmental, fault-finding, or 
condescending attitude in later human relationships. To the degree that 
others are looked down upon, found lacking, or seen as somehow lesser 
or inferior beings, a once-wounded self becomes more securely insulated 
against further shame, but only at the expense of distorted relationships 
with others.”79
Rage as a defense mechanism is an emotional response directed against 
oneself or another, and it precludes from feeling shame because it cov-
ers or serves to impede the shame feeling. It serves to keep others away. 
When directed towards others, it can take different forms, from aggres-
sive outbursts, via hatred, to the scolding of others. The revered minister 
caught in a shameful scandal may direct, or project, his rage towards oth-
ers to escape his shameful position. As such, rage helps to avoid shame, 
78 Gershen Kaufman, Shame: The Power of Caring (Rochester, Vermont: Schenkman Books, 
1992), 84. 
79 Ibid., 85.
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although fundamentally, it is caused by shame and cannot be understood 
as totally separated from it.80 Thus, shame is usually transported to some-
one more vulnerable than yourself – someone who is subjected to your 
actions, or below you in the pecking order. It can happen in a deliberate 
way (by blaming someone), or it can happen as an “unconscious transfer 
from one person to another without any action being necessary to effect 
that transfer.”81
To strive for power is another strategy: here, the individual seeks 
control over those conditions that may cause him or her to feel shame 
through withdrawal to a context that is easier to control or hold power 
over, or by adopting a more authoritarian control over the given context. 
However, the strategy of authoritarian control seems the most likely to 
fail as it does not prevent other people from seeing what is shameful, even 
though they do not have the power to voice their critique. Thus, when the 
shamed CEO withdraws from his position and isolates himself, he is in a 
better position to control the conditions that cause shame than the CEO 
that strives for more power in the given context to eliminate the possibil-
ity of further critique and shame.
When this strategy is successful, it makes one less vulnerable and, 
hence, also less prone to shame. The struggle for power to overcome or 
control shame may be apparent, or it may be invisible at first sight. For 
some, this struggle may determine their whole way of life. Thus, “power 
becomes the means to insulate against further shame.”82 It becomes a 
means for security, but like the previous strategies, when it becomes pre-
dominant, it may destroy the conditions for human relationships. 
An obvious response to shame is to strive for perfection, since to 
achieve perfection is a way to compensate for an underlying sense of 
defectiveness, and thereby avoid further chances for experiencing shame. 
A doctor struggling with shame after being responsible for medical errors 
may promise himself never to commit such errors of judgment again, and 
80 For a more extensive analysis of the mechanisms that causes rage, see the section on Shame and 
narcissistic rage in Chapter 3 below. 
81 Cf. Kaufman, Shame: The Power of Caring. 82. The following paragraphs are inspired by 
Kaufman’s identification of such strategies, but are only loosely based on his analysis. 
82 Ibid., 86. 
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attempt to compensate by becoming the best doctor he can. Neverthe-
less, it is a rather futile strategy. Firstly, because errors may be committed 
by even the best clinician. Secondly, because it aims at the impossible: 
to eliminate shame once and for all. It can, nevertheless, still have posi-
tive effects in terms of accomplishing moral improvement or temporarily 
overcoming an underlying sense of defectiveness. Kaufman writes: 
The quest for perfection itself is self-limiting and hopelessly doomed both to 
fail and to plunge the individual back into the very mire of defectiveness from 
which he so longed to escape. One can never attain that perfection, and aware-
ness of failure to do so reawakens that already-present sense of shame. It is as 
though one sees the only means of escaping from the prison that is shame is 
erasing all signs that might point to its presence.83 
Thus, the struggle for perfection may involve the self in a perpetual game 
of comparison with others, in which the individual is always at risk of 
losing. Moreover, it can lead to unhealthy forms of competitiveness, 
which, in turn, may have devastating consequences for relationships 
with others. A strategy that is both obvious and known to most is the 
transfer of blame. It can take many forms, from accusing others of being 
the real cause of one’s own failure to more elaborate forms of scapegoat-
ing at a societal level. As for the latter, anthropologist Rene Girard84 has 
developed a comprehensive theory about how societies can use modes of 
scapegoating to regain order (or in our notion: conditions for commu-
nal and coherent agency) by separating someone as the victim that is to 
blame. Girard’s analysis, in which he is not very explicit about shame, can 
be applied to at the societal level as well, for example, in the response of 
Germany to the Versailles Agreement (which initially caused shame, and 
then, later on, aggression85); or the Irish feeling of inferiority in relation to 
England (which resulted in abhorrent strategies for moral perfection in a 
83 Ibid., 87. 
84 See René Girard, The Scapegoat (London: Athlone Press, 1986); René Girard and Patrick Gregory, 
Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
85 Cf. Kaufman, Shame: The Power of Caring, 227ff.
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close cooperation between the authorities, the Catholic Church, and the 
smaller, local communities.)86 
Finally, internal withdrawal is also a strategy that can transfer or trans-
form the subject of shame from one context to another, in which the lat-
ter (the internal world) is one in which he or she is not susceptible to 
shame to the same extent as in the social dimension. This strategy has 
similarities with the strive for power. When a child experiences shame 
as caused by a significant other human in a relationship, it may engage 
this strategy for coping with the painful experience at hand. “The self 
withdraws deeper inside itself to escape the agony of exposure or the loss 
of the possibility of reunion.” In the inner world, the child can “engage in 
internal fantasy and imagery designed by him to restore his good feelings 
about himself.”87 
All the above strategies imply some form of transportation and/or 
transformation of shame. They must be seen as defense mechanisms 
against the painful experience that shame often is. Most of them are out-
wardly-directed, whereas some may also impact on the architecture of 
the self, such as when rage, blame, or contempt are directed against the 
self. No matter who they are directed towards, they can all have a nega-
tive impact on the conditions by which the self can develop relationships 
with others. They also create problems for the development of a coherent 
agency, because they emerge as interruptions of the normal agency when-
ever the individual needs to defend herself from the experience of shame, 
be it consciously or at an unconscious level. 
Circumscribing shame as disruption: 
components of and types of shame
Shame as loss of positive self-experience
To feel shame, you need to have at least a rudimentary sense of yourself 
as distinguishable, although not necessarily fully separated, from others. 
This sense of self can be pre-subjective (as in infants) or part of a more 
86 Cf. Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female Sexuality, passim. 
87 Kaufman, Shame: The Power of Caring, 95. 
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clearly developed sense of subjectivity. In both cases, this sense of self 
is developed, explored, and articulated through agency. Agency is the 
capability to act according to chosen objectives, such as specific aims, 
qualities, or values. As fathers, we may, for example, express our agency 
by both sharing and adhering to aims, qualities or values for good par-
enting. This relation between a sense of self and the chosen objectives in 
question is important. There is a reciprocal dynamic between the content 
of the self and the chosen objectives.
One the one hand, through agency the self chooses, articulates, and 
develops these objectives and manifests them through action. We choose 
values or standards we want to live by as parents, as citizens and as fellow 
human beings. Ultimately, through a responsible agency we try not only 
to adhere to these standards but also to act them out, as examples of who 
and what we are and what we choose to believe in. 
On the other hand, the content that the self achieves and manifests 
implies that the self will experience itself as connected to these quali-
ties, and entitled to recognition or respect for the choice of objectives and 
values, and, ultimately, to the sense of self these objectives and values 
mediate. This point is of the utmost importance to the way we will under-
stand the conditions for shame later on: such assumptions of recognition, 
respect, or affirmation make it possible to experience oneself as part of a 
world one shares with others, and which can be described as a common 
context of agency, whether it is as a citizen, a colleague or a family mem-
ber. It is when one realizes that one no longer partakes in such a shared 
context of agency that shame may occur. As long as there is an uninter-
rupted relation between the sense of self and the objectives by which it 
defines itself, there is little room for a sense of shame, and agency can go 
on in ways that confirm the self ’s perception of being in a world where it 
shares the values or intentions of others and is recognized by them. As we 
shall argue, it is when this shared context of agency is no longer present 
that the conditions for shame present themselves most strikingly. 
This analysis does not imply that shame is absent when an uninter-
rupted coherence between the self and its projects, as the sum of its cho-
sen objectives, is the case. Even when one is absolutely convinced of the 
choice of one’s values, and experiences the acting out and the receiving 
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of both self-assurance and self-worth as a reciprocal consequence, shame 
may occur. One can picture a shameful situation where others, who do 
not share either our objectives or conditions for agency, ridicule or mock 
them despite our conviction about doing the right thing. A convinced 
anti-abortion protester standing outside a hospital may feel shame when 
passing men and women, patients and staff, laugh and ridicule his views 
and his one-man protest. Accordingly, there is always a social dimension 
to the experience of the self, where loss of recognition can be experienced 
as shameful. That does not diminish the strong tie between sense of self, 
its objectives and its agency. Ultimately, it is this self-experience that is 
interrupted by shame. 
However, shame seems to be connected to a varying degree of loss in 
this continuous, positive self-experience. As humans, we continuously 
need to develop and maintain a sense of self, and appear to ourselves and 
others as worthy of recognition. Such sense of self is the result of our long-
term attempts to achieve coherent agency, in which we pursue a sense of 
self through the goals we have set before us. Shame can interrupt these 
intended struggles to achieve or maintain this sense of self. Thus, with 
shame the grip and self-control can be diminished or put under pressure. 
In severe shame, there is not only an interruption in coherent agency, that 
is, stable intentions, actions and chosen values, interests, and so forth, but 
its actual outcome implies a rupture, a realization of the total discrepancy 
between actual intentions/values and those of a shared context of agency, 
values, and recognizable intentions. 
Hutchinson’s analysis of Hatzfeld’s book A Time for Machetes, about 
the Rwandan conflict,88 describes an interview conducted in prison 
with a perpetrator called Léopard. He had participated in the atroci-
ties. Hutchinson describes how Léopard’s shame emerges as he starts to 
acknowledge his crime and the gradual realization of how he, through his 
actions, violated the core values of both himself and humanity:
88 See Phil Hutchinson, Shame and Philosophy (New York: New Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 141ff.; 
Jean Hatzfeld, A Time for Machetes: The Rwandan Genocide: The Killers Speak: A Report (London: 
Serpent’s Tail, 2005), 154.
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However, he had turned away from, had denied, that which would force him 
to acknowledge his moral crime; he had denied, turned-away-from, that which 
would allow him to acknowledge the true meaning of his actions. Léopard de-
nied that in carrying out those actions he had not merely violated a code to 
which he was bound by an external authority, but that he had done violence to 
the very fabric of human existence (and, therefore, his own).89
When Léopard finally acknowledges this rupture between his actions 
and his own humanity, he realizes that the values he shared with his 
peers were not commonly accepted. Thus, he also needs to acknowledge 
another meaning of being human, and consequently, shame washes over 
him. The aims or qualities of being human are something he has not lived 
up to, and so to speak, by his own actions, he has denounced them. 
Another example of this interruption or rupture can be found in the 
nursing profession. Nursing research has shown that nurses who experi-
ence a gap between their nursing standards and ideals, and the standards 
they can manage to uphold in their daily practice, over time will accu-
mulate moral distress.90 Such distress can manifest itself through emo-
tions of both shame and guilt, as he or she has to administer suboptimal 
care due to limitations that he or she does not control, such as lack of 
resources.
In other words, the feeling of shame also entails an experience of expo-
sure to something outside one’s desires and control, such as when our 
objectives are put under pressure and/or downgraded. The more depen-
dent the self is on others for recognition, and the weaker its independently 
established self-esteem accordingly is, the more it is prone to the inter-
ruptions or rupture of shame.91 On the other hand, the less it is dependent 
89 Hutchinson, Shame and Philosophy, 142.
90 Sofia Kalvemark et al., “Living with Conflicts – Ethical Dilemmas and Moral Distress in the 
Health Care System,” Social Science & Medicine 58, no. 6 (2004); Sture Eriksson, Ann-Louise 
Glasberg, and Astrid Norberg, “Burnout and ‘Stress of Conscience’ among Healthcare Person-
nel,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 57, no. 4 (2007); Ann-Louise Glasberg, Stress of Conscience 
and Burnout in Healthcare: The Danger of Deadening One’s Conscience (Umeå: Umeå University, 
2007).
91 To what extent such recognition is lacking is due to how well the child has been met, confirmed 
and guided safely in its earlier years – also in ways that imply a certain frustration of its inborn 
tendency towards grandiosity. This links shame to what we, in the present context, call the nar-
cissistic complex. More on this below. 
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on others for continuous recognition of sense of self-worth, the less the 
self is prone to shame, and the more he or she is resilient to shaming. Still, 
shame can hit the self in both cases, and with disastrous effects. Thus, one 
tenet in a preliminary definition of shame can be described as:
a negative and emotionally charged interruption of the positive sense of self that 
one needs to have in order to experience oneself as good and one’s actions and 
intentions as meaningful and worthy of recognition by others, as when (actual 
or imagined) ridicule or rejection by (actual or imagined) peers take place. 
This experience of emotional interruption or rupture means that the eval-
uation of oneself or of others suddenly changes and downgrades a previ-
ously existing, positive sense of self, no matter how weak or strong this 
sense may be. This point also suggests that shame, for the most part, is a 
retrospective response. It also implies a double movement: one withdraws 
from others while, simultaneously, also wanting to recover one’s posi-
tion among those to whom one feels shamed. Thus, shame describes the 
emotional and existential dilemma of a double movement, in which the 
first step is movement away from the other when the movement towards 
others is somewhat thwarted and our vulnerability is exposed. The sec-
ond movement is relational and social – a moving towards the other to 
become part of the community again – which is one of the reasons why 
shame is so effective in social disciplining. 
However, the desire to return to the community or group may not 
always be present; another tenet in the understanding of shame comes 
into play when it is not the boundary of the emotional self that is dis-
turbed, shattered or violated, but one’s physical integrity, as in violence 
or sexual abuse. Then, the need to retract from those or that which causes 
shame may be permanent, and there may be no need for reconciliation 
with the one who caused shame. Accordingly, shame may manifest a sit-
uation in which the relationship to others is severed permanently – and 
for a good reason. However, such severing of bonds may not necessar-
ily alleviate the experience of shame, although it may contribute to its 
weakening.
Thus, simplified: shame is what happens when the positive sense of self 
is interrupted in a way that makes the self realize that it is not living up to 
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or achieving the intended goals or values that others and/or the self deter-
mine it by. This interruption is caused by an experience of dissonance. It 
means that the initially positive disposition to feel good about oneself, 
manifested in one’s intentional being, is no longer present and becomes 
disturbed and confused. The interruption can happen in different ways: 
through words that interrupt, through ways of relating to it that makes 
it feel excluded and not recognized, through a realization that one is cut 
from the same cloth as one’s tormentor, or, as mentioned, through physi-
cal threats or actual violence, as well as overstepping the boundaries that 
secure one’s sexual integrity. In all of these instances, the self is exposed 
in ways that makes it feel bad about itself and having lost a grip on what 
was hitherto the basis for its coherent intentional agency in the world. 
Shame is not only related to actual occurrences of interaction with oth-
ers or tied to cultural expectations (see below). Shame is also something 
that the self may be made prone to experience in contexts and situations 
that would not instigate such experiences in others.92 Self-acceptance and 
self-insecurity are two crucial factors. Thus, in order to understand the 
mechanisms that may engender shame, we need to develop a psychologi-
cal account of its conditions. This will be developed in one of the follow-
ing chapters. 
Gilbert’s circumscription: five components
In the circumscription above, shame emerges as a powerful, dynamic and 
elusive experience that at the same time is difficult to identify and artic-
ulate. These many faces of shame have spurred research from a host of 
perspectives and disciplines. Paul Gilbert describes the many approaches 
to shame: 
92 We will not go into the discussion of shame-proneness and guilt-proneness, or the balancing 
of, on the one hand, a person’s proneness and on the other hand, the contextual elements that 
together generate shame reactions. For further reading on the topic, see June Price Tangney, 
Patricia Wagner, and Richard Gramzow, “Proneness to Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psycho-
pathology,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 101, no. 3 (1992); Tangney and Dearing, Shame and 
Guilt.
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Not only are there different schools and theoretical approaches to shame, but it 
can also be conceptualized and studied in terms of its components and mech-
anisms (Tangney, 1996). It can be examined in terms of emotion (e.g., as a pri-
mary affect in its own right, as an auxiliary emotion, or as a composite of other 
emotions such as fear, anger, or self-disgust); cognitions and beliefs about the 
self (e.g., that one is and/or is seen by others to be inferior, flawed, inadequate, 
etc.); behaviors and actions (e.g., such as running away, hiding and concealing, 
or attacking others to cover one’s shame); evolved mechanisms (e.g., the expres-
sion of shame seems to use similar biobehavioral systems to those of animals 
expressing submissive behavior); and interpersonal dynamic interrelationships 
(shamed and shamer; Fossum & Mason, 1986; Harper & Hoopes, 1990). Shame 
can also be used to describe phenomena at many different levels, including in-
ternal self-experiences, relational episodes, and cultural practices for maintain-
ing honor and prestige.93
This long quote does not offer a taxonomy of shame. Rather, it presents 
a set of interweaving perspectives that express shame, and, thus, can be 
examined as such.94 It includes emotions, cognitions and beliefs, behav-
iors and actions, evolved mechanisms, and, lastly, interpersonal dynamic 
interrelationships. Put into our terminology, components and mecha-
nisms of shame manifest themselves in different dimensions of experi-
ence, such as emotion (primary, auxiliary or composite), or cognition in 
the inner dimension of experience, or evolved mechanism in the natural 
dimension, or as behavior or action, or as interpersonal relationships in 
the social dimension. 
Gilbert also describes the different conceptualizations and debates 
on what constitutes a shameful experience.95 He describes shame basi-
cally as a complex set of feelings, cognitions and actions, although its 
93 Gilbert, “What Is Shame? Some Core Issues and Controversies,” 3–4.
94 Hutchinson, Shame and Philosophy, 138–39.
95 Paul Gilbert, “Body Shame: A Biopsychosocial Conceptualisation and Overview with Treatment 
Implications,” in Body Shame: Conceptualisation, Research and Treatment, eds. Paul Gilbert and 
Jeremy Miles (Routledge, 2002), 2–3. For further reading on the conceptual issues regarding 
shame, and also shame versus guilt, see for example, June Price Tangney, “Conceptual and Meth-
odological Issues in the Assessment of Shame and Guilt,” Behaviour Research and Therapy 34, 
no. 9 (1996); Linda McFall, “Shame: Concept Analysis,” Journal of Theory Construction & Testing 
13, no. 2 (2009); Alon Blum, “Shame and Guilt, Misconceptions and Controversies: A Critical 
Review of the Literature,” Traumatology 14, no. 3 (2008). 
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manifestations can vary considerably. He underscores an important 
point regarding the relation between shame and morality (which we 
will return to later): Shame “is an experience that is self-focused how-
ever, dependent on the competencies to construct self as a social agent.”96 
Although shame is self-oriented, in contrast to the feeling of guilt that 
is often other-oriented (as described above), both are dependent on the 
signs and symbols of the social dimension in order for someone to con-
struct themselves as shameful or feeling guilty.97 As we pointed out above, 
our capacity to identify, articulate and understand shame depends on the 
semiotic resources we have learned from others. Gilbert elaborates these 
features further by differentiating between five aspects and components 
of shame.98 
The first component, a social or external cognitive component of 
shame, manifests itself through automatic negative evaluative thoughts 
about others who see the self as inferior, bad, inadequate and/or flawed. 
It is worth noting the automatic component here: shame is not the result 
of pondering or reflection, but the immediate experience that “others are 
looking down on the self with a condemning or contemptuous view.”99 
Such shame can also be linked to various forms of stigma, self-con-
sciousness caused by illness, the disfigurement of the body, etc. In other 
words, shame links the social and the inner dimensions of experience. 
Furthermore, the self-conscious element of shame adds a complexity that 
is also present in the way it is made manifest in the world. The cognitive 
96 Gilbert, “Body Shame: A Biopsychosocial Conceptualisation and Overview with Treatment Im-
plications,” 6. Cf. also the description by G. Kaufman: “Shame itself is an entrance to the self. It is 
the affect of indignity, of defeat, of transgression, of inferiority, and of alienation. No other affect 
is closer to the experienced self.” Kaufman, Shame: The Power of Caring, xix. 
97 We briefly discussed above the relationship between shame and its neighboring concepts, such 
as guilt/feelings of guilt. The distinctions in real life are somewhat blurrier than what is put forth 
here. See also June Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig, and Debra J. Mashek, “Moral Emotions and 
Moral Behavior,” Annual Review of Psychology 58, no. 1 (2007).
98 Gilbert, “Body Shame: A Biopsychosocial Conceptualisation and Overview with Treatment Im-
plications,” 5–6.
99 Paul Gilbert and Jeremy Miles, Body Shame: Conceptualisation, Research and Treatment (Hove: 
Brunner-Routledge, 2002), 5. 
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component allows for a more deliberate processing and also a more fre-
quent use of language when we communicate and handle shame.100 
The second component is that shame is internally self-evaluative. This 
has been the focus of much research and specifies the nature of the cog-
nitive component above.101 Thus, shame is a negative evaluation of the 
global self. As such, it differs from the feeling of guilt, which, as shown 
above, normally does not include the global self, but is merely a negative 
evaluation of a specific action. Shame as a global negative self-evaluation, 
for example, when experiencing oneself “as bad, inadequate and flawed”, 
is not only an expression of negative automatic thoughts about the self. 
It implies an active expression of self-critique and self-attack. Such self- 
devaluations and internally shaming thoughts mean that the presence of 
actual others is not always necessary in order to feel shame.102 In a specific 
situation, it is not necessarily the presence, or even the imagined pres-
ence, of an audience that activates shame. The revered minister giving 
in to his desires in ways he struggles to avoid may certainly feel shame 
for his weakness even when others do not see him. Thus, shame becomes 
internalized.
The third component is that shame often manifests itself as emotion. 
As such, shame can be an affect associated with the interruption and 
sudden loss of positive affect, such as pride or honor.103 Shame invades 
and activates other emotions as well: anxiety, anger, disgust in the self, 
100 Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, “The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions. A Cognitive 
Appraisal Approach,” in The Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research, eds. Jessica L. Tracy, 
Richard W. Robins, and June Price Tangney (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 7.
101 See Gilbert, “Body Shame: A Biopsychosocial Conceptualisation and Overview with Treatment 
Implications.” 
102 This discussion of the presence of an audience in order to experience shame reaches far. Em-
pirical studies in victimology, especially Holocaust studies, have documented that survivors of 
atrocities can feel both shame and guilt when they realize the atrocities that were inflicted upon 
them, and that they are alive when so many others perished. See, for example, Tzvetan Todorov, 
Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps (New York: Metropolitan, 1996); 
Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009); Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (New 
York: Vintage International, 1989); Hutchinson, Shame and Philosophy. Hutchinson describes 
the same when he analyzes Jean Hatzfeld’s book on the Rwandan genocide. The shame of the 
perpetrator emerges as acknowledgment of the crime sinks in, even though there is no audience.
103 See above. Cf. for example, Chapter 5 where this interruption is visible in relation to the wish for 
celebration. 
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self-contempt and inner deflation or dejection. In their analysis of the 
self-conscious emotions, such as shame, guilt, pride, and embarrassment, 
Tracy and Robins identify five major features that distinguish them from 
non-self-conscious emotions:104 
• self-conscious emotions require self-awareness and self-representa-
tions 
• these emotions emerge later in childhood than basic emotions 
• they facilitate the attainment of complex social goals 
• they do not have discrete and universally recognized facial expressions 
• they are cognitively complex 
Even though these are features of a whole set of self-conscious emotions 
and therefore lack the specificities of a single description, we recognize 
these as features of shame. Hence, we agree that shame both critically 
involves the self and is complex, as we have mentioned above. How-
ever, there is a difference between claiming that shame is (only) a self- 
conscious emotion (Tracy and Robins), and that shame displays or man-
ifests itself as a self-conscious emotion (Gilbert). As it will be shown later 
in this work, this is an important distinction. In order to describe both 
the function and the many faces of shame, we need a theoretical model 
that opens a larger space in the architecture of the self for shame as more 
than only an emotion. Whereas the emotional character of shame is cer-
tainly a necessary and very prominent feature in any definition of shame, 
we will argue that shame is a complex phenomenon both through its 
manifestations and its functions in human life. On the one hand, displays 
of shame can be analyzed as consequences of the specific interconnected-
ness between the natural, social and inner dimensions of the experience 
of a specific situation, such as if we blush with shame when being caught 
in a compromising situation. On the other hand, shame is more than 
an emotional consequence of such instances – it has consequences for 
agency. 
104 Tracy and Robins, “The Self in Self-Conscious Emotions. A Cognitive Appraisal Approach,” 
5–7. For further discussion, see Jessica L. Tracy and Richard W. Robins, “Putting the Self into 
Self-Conscious Emotions: A Theoretical Model”, Psychological Inquiry 15, no. 2 (2004).
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The point about consequences for agency is also demonstrated in 
Gilbert’s fourth component, where he shows that shame has a behav-
ioral component. Shame, or more precisely, the handling of shame, 
often includes retractions or other defensive action to remove the threat 
of exposure.105 When one is ashamed, one avoids looking others in the 
eye, and one can feel behaviorally inhibited or engage in submissive- 
defensive behaviors. Furthermore, one can behave in ways that mean 
acting out in anger, based on “the desire to retaliate or gain revenge 
against the one who is ‘exposing’ the self (as inferior, weak or bad).”106 
Thus, the need for deliberate defensive and/or evasive actions, such as 
moving away from the scene where shaming took place underscores 
the interdependency between the above-mentioned inner and social 
dimensions of the shame experience. However, not all action is delib-
erate. As mentioned, automatic actions, such as eye aversion, sudden 
anger, or the reflex to quickly evade shameful situations, also seem to 
be a behavioral feature of shame.
The fifth component is physiological. Shameful experiences can acti-
vate stress responses in the body, by heightening the parasympathetic 
activity to a varying degree. One obvious example is how a sudden expe-
rience of shame can manifest itself through blushing, a heightened pulse, 
or a lump in the throat. Another and more severe form of physiologi-
cal manifestation can take place when toxic shame over time forms and 
shapes both body posture and body movement.
In sum, Gilbert’s distinction between the five components shows the 
complexity of the phenomenon of shame, and the concomitant need for 
attempting an interdisciplinary description. In the subsequent chapters, 
we attempt to integrate and unravel these different components or per-
spectives through our analysis of how shame’s different dimensions are 
articulated in different arenas of social life. 
105 Gilbert, “Body Shame: A Biopsychosocial Conceptualisation and Overview with Treatment 
Implications,” 10–16.
106 Gilbert and Miles, Body Shame: Conceptualisation, Research and Treatment, 6. 
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Types of shame: contextual demarcations
In the following, we will attempt to sort out the most important forms 
of and perspectives on shame in order to demarcate their role in human 
experience. These demarcations are essential for the later analysis, espe-
cially in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.107
Discretionary shame
Given that shame may not only be related to what we do, but often to who 
we are, shame can be difficult to manage, because it cannot be controlled 
by adapting to others by means of what one does and does not do. We 
have seen that shame manifests itself as an experience of the self, and 
as such, it manifests a sense of self that is not desired, and which signi-
fies that “I am not what I should be.” The experience of shame may then 
generate two opposing impulses: on the one hand, the desire to flee from 
those who are your peers, and on the other hand, the desire to regain 
community with them by overcoming the causes of your shame. 
In the literature on shame, there is a decisive and important dis-
tinction between two forms of shame that may help us to access some 
relevant nuances related to later development as well. There is what we 
suggest calling discretionary shame; and there is what we suggest call-
ing, disgrace shame. This important distinction was described as early 
as 1977 by Schneider in his book Shame, Exposure and Privacy.108 Schnei-
der describes man as “the creature that blushes.” Discretionary shame 
protects our vulnerability to violation.109 Thus, discretionary shame may 
107 There are other ways of classifying shame, and also forms of shame, than those we point to 
here. However, the forms we develop in the following occupy our focus as they all testify to a 
pluralist approach to shame with regard to conditions, causes, functions and consequences, and 
in a way that also includes the often-neglected topic of shame in a Western religious context. 
For a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of different forms of shame with a clear therapeutic 
scope, see Marie Farstad, Skammens Spor: Eksistens, Relasjon, Profesjon (Oslo: Cappelen Damm 
Akademisk 2016).
108 Carl D. Schneider, Shame, Exposure, and Privacy (London: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977).
109 Ibid. Cf. Francis J. Broucek, Shame and the Self (New York: Guilford, 1991), 5ff; Thomas J. Scheff 
and Suzanne M. Retzinger, “Shame as the Master Emotion of Everyday Life,” Journal of Mundane 
Behavior 1, no. 3 (2000).
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also be part of a sound self-perception, as it does not necessarily jeopar-
dize the basic trustful relationship that a self may have towards the self 
and the world. This kind of shame may, on the contrary, even contribute 
to the self-other relationship: it may provide a relationship with a protec-
tive discretion, tact and sensitivity. When you accidently barge in on a 
compromising situation that puts the vulnerability of others at risk, you 
may feel discretionary shame. Such shame may therefore also imply that 
one has internalized respect for others and their values. 
As we saw above, Scheff and Retzinger criticize any attempt to individ-
ualize shame by pulling it out of the social matrix. Shame is more than a 
reaction to personal failure to live up to one’s ideal:
Shame arises in an elemental situation in which there is a real or imagined 
threat to our bonds; it signals trouble in a relationship. Since an infant’s life is 
completely dependent on the bond with the caregivers, this emotion is as prim-
itive and intense as fear. The point that shame is a response to bond threat can-
not be emphasized too strongly, since in psychology and psychoanalysis there is 
a tendency to individualize shame, taking it out of its social matrix. Typically, in 
these disciplines, shame is defined as a product of the individual’s failure to live 
up to her own ideals. But one’s ideals, for the most part, are usually a reflection 
of the ideals of one’s society. Mead’s idea of the generalized other captures this 
notion perfectly. If one feels that her behavior has been inadequate or deviant, 
not only an internal gap has been created between behavior and ideals, but also 
a gap between group ideals and one’s self, a threat to the bond. The sociological 
definition of the source of shame subsumes the psychological one, pointing to 
the source in shared ideals.110
Thus, discretionary shame may strengthen the bond between the indi-
vidual and the community to which he or she belongs.111 James Fowler 
describes this as a type of shame that protects the elements that provide 
the basis for a person’s worth in the eyes of others, and for his or her pos-
itive sense of self-worth and pride.112 It is not difficult to see this type of 
110 Scheff and Retzinger, “Shame as the Master Emotion of Everyday Life,” 5. 
111 James W. Fowler: Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life (Nash-
ville: Abingdon 1996), 104. 
112 Ibid., 105. 
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shame as developing out of a nuanced and balanced interaction between 
the self and its primary caretakers, who are able to mirror the child suf-
ficiently to develop his or her basic self-trust, while also being able to 
provide the necessary frustration for relating more realistically to the 
challenges and demands of others. In this way, shame may even be seen 
as the result of the monitoring and regulating of some of the important 
boundaries between self and other. 
Shamelessness and possible consequences
Shamelessness is the opposite of discretionary shame. The shameless 
comes close enough to see both the vulnerability and the compromised 
situation of the other but does not have the moral sensibility or the moral 
standards to act accordingly, for example, by retreating in order to pro-
tect. The shameless have no regard for the boundaries of the other, and/
or the moral sensibility that is activated when the boundary is broken. 
Rather, the shameless seeks fulfillment of her own needs and desires 
without reflecting on the other. As such, both shame and shamelessness 
are opposing features of the self that are closely tied to varying degrees 
of positive mirroring and self-experience in early childhood, and later 
manifested through differences in way of interacting with others. Thus, 
they are phenomena with strong relevance for morality – and we discuss 
them further in Chapter 6.
Shamelessness is especially recognizable in acts of violence. That is 
not surprising. As suggested, the shameless possess neither the ability 
to see nor respect the boundaries of the other. We saw earlier how the 
Rwandian citizen Léopard experienced shame when he saw that his own 
actions denied others the rights and recognition of being simply human. 
To be able to recognize one’s shameful and violent acts presupposes an 
ability to both identify and respect the boundaries of the other. It takes 
a moral person to retreat in shame when faced with his own immoral 
actions. The more room a person can establish between themselves and 
the victim, the easier acts of violence become. As the face and the bound-
aries of the other becomes blurred, readiness for violence may increase. 
Thus, violence correlates with the social, geographical space between vic-
tim and offender. It is far easier to push the button and open the trapdoor 
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to the bomb bay than to kill face-to-face. It is also far easier to kill the 
ones we have dehumanized through language and ideology.113 There is far 
less shame in wreaking havoc in villages of Rwandian “cockroaches” and 
faceless families of Vietnamese “gooks”, than to faces where we recognize 
our own humanity. The strategies for evading responsibility, guilt and/
or shame are plentiful, as soon as the moral person has established some 
form of distance. But it is far more complicated to escape the shame of 
one’s actions when we come within the reach of empathy.
However, it is not only in violence that shamelessness can be found. In 
recent times, the emergence of social media has led to a prevalence of both 
verbal abuse and attempted shaming of others from behind the curtain of 
anonymity. It is far more difficult to remain shameless when one is con-
fronted with one’s actions by having to face others. In the Scandinavian 
countries, journalists have confronted people who have “trolled” others 
online, and the result has mostly been a reaction of shame and remorse. 
This is an indication of the validity of the point above: shamelessness is 
easier to maintain when you are not confronted with the face of another, 
who represents other values and who questions your belonging to a com-
munity of shared values and qualities. 
Nevertheless, as we mentioned above, not all perpetrators retreat in 
shame even though the vulnerability of the other is all too clear. The 
Norwegian philosopher A. J. Vetlesen comments: “What we need to rec-
ognize is that, in certain circumstances, evildoing thrives in proximity. 
Evildoing, be it modern or postmodern, be it ideologized along racial, 
nationalist, religious, or ethnic lines, does not depend on distance, invis-
ibility or anonymity.”114 
113 For an introduction to this discussion, see, for example, Erwin Staub, The Roots of Evil. The 
Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); 
Arne Johan Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing, Cambridge 
Cultural Social Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Zygmunt Bauman, 
Modernity and the Holocaust, (Cambridge; Maldon: Polity Press, 2007); Arthur G. Miller, The 
Social Psychology of Good and Evil (New York: Guilford Press, 2004); Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi 
Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide.2000 ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).
114 Arne Johan Vetlesen, “Det Er Ofrene Som Skammer Seg,” in Skam: Perspektiver På Skam, Ære 
Og Skamløshet I Det Moderne, ed. Trygve Wyller (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2001), 31ff.; See also 
his Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing.
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Many victims of child sexual abuse (CSA) describe the particular 
shame tied to the shamelessness of the abusive close other.115 A child nat-
urally expects to be safe, to experience trust and recognition in the close-
ness of the other. A safe and nurturing relationship is the place where its 
vulnerability is both allowed, recognized, and met with empathy. But in 
instances of CSA, many children are met instead with the opposite: with 
violence and degradation. It happens without any sign that the offender 
recognizes the obvious vulnerability of the child and reacts to it with at 
least a hint of compassion that slows down or holds back the abuse, or 
a sign of the offender feeling remorse, guilt or shame over his shameful 
actions. The shame of the abuse is not picked up by the offender, but is left 
with the abused child, generated by the shameless exploitation of trust. 
It is a shame over being reduced to a sexual thing to be exploited, over 
the total lack of recognition of the self in the eyes of the other.116 It is the 
shame of not being recognized as a vulnerable person even within the 
reach of empathy. 
In his book Facing the Extreme, the philosopher Tzvetan Todorov ana-
lyzes the shame in Holocaust survivors, especially Jean Améry:
The shame of the camp survivor has several components, the first being the 
shame of remembering. In the camps, the individual prisoner is deprived of his 
will. He is made to perform acts that he not only disapproves of but also finds 
abject, that he does either because he is ordered to or because he has to so as to 
survive. Améry compares this feeling to that of a victim of rape; logically, it is 
the rapist who ought to feel shame, but in reality, it is the victim who does, for 
she cannot forget that she was reduced to powerlessness, to a total dissociation 
from her will.117
Violence is the severing of any positive intentions in the victim. Vio-
lence within the boundaries of empathy thus negates the very essence 
of human constitution; the vulnerability and interdependence of the 
self. Therefore, shameless violation leaves the victim with the deepest 
sense of shame: shame over not being recognized as a vulnerable and 
115 Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep, 117ff.
116 Vetlesen, “Det Er Ofrene Som Skammer Seg,” 124.
117 Todorov, Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps, 263.
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interdependent person recognized and affirmed in her own being and 
intentional agency. 
To sum up, the shameless carries no discretionary and protective 
shame but may leave the offended or the victim with a deep and toxic 
shame that signals the dangers inherent in losing the self when facing the 
shameless other. The shameless acts without recognition of the subjectiv-
ity of the other. Instead, the other is made into an object with no inde-
pendent existence. Another interpretation of the shameless is that he acts 
only as an object by having failed in developing a proper sense of self-
hood. In that sense, an emerging presence or recognition of shame may 
provide possibilities for proper individuation, for developing autonomy 
and selfhood, and for mutual subject-object relations.118 
Disgrace shame
The above description of discretionary shame provides us with a suffi-
cient basis for understanding so-called disgrace shame. Disgrace shame 
manifests itself in varying degrees, from strong but passing instances of 
shame that interrupts what we have called coherent agency, to the par-
alyzing, toxic and pathological shame that creates a permanent rupture 
in coherent agency and leaves the subject outside the boundaries of the 
community. Disgrace shame entails the loss of respect, honor or recog-
nition by others from whom this was considered important, relevant and 
desirable. The examples may be many, from being rejected by a former 
friend or a lover, to the toxic shame of abuse, which we shall elaborate on 
below.
Consequently, disgrace shame also leads to the experience of being 
placed outside a community in ways that distort self-development by 
compromising the unavoidable and constitutional vulnerability of the 
self. It may emerge when one experiences oneself as someone other than 
the ideal, due to the perception of how (one believes that) others expe-
rience oneself. As related to others, we are vulnerable and not immune 
to others’ perceptions of us. Such shame may be culturally conditioned, 
118 Stephen Pattison, Shame: theory, therapy, theology (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 79f.
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for example, by how one (and others) perceives oneself as ill, disabled, 
imprisoned or unemployed.119 This shame may accordingly emerge out 
of the self ’s inability to live up to socially and culturally mediated ide-
als. It may also arise from warranted or unwarranted disappointment in 
oneself or others, in ways that make the discrepancies in self-perceptions 
between the ideal and reality more salient, and that may have an impact 
on social relations.120 Sometimes one has to live with such shame, while 
at other times, one needs to develop a different self-perception in order 
to free oneself from this emotion. It is in this context that the ability to 
develop relations to others that can provide alternative self-perceptions 
becomes important. 
Pathological shame
Not everyone who experiences variations of what we have described as 
disgrace shame finds themselves in a toxic and pathological condition. 
This severe mode of shame, which we will unfold in the following, is one 
that temporarily or even permanently seriously jeopardizes relationships 
with others and with the community. 
Toxic or pathological shame has at least two forms. The first form of 
pathological shame has its origin in long-term dysfunctional relations 
between the self and (proximate) others, and we will unfold this form 
of shame in the following. The second form of shame can be found, for 
example, in the effects of traumatic violence and abuse. Especially sexual 
violence can sometimes generate a deep and toxic disgrace shame that can 
lead to a full rupture between the needed positive sense of self, in order to 
experience oneself and one’s actions as good and worthy of recognition, 
and a destroyed and shattered self-image, with the concomitant impeded 
intentions and aims, and sometimes also destroyed social image. This 
type of shame holds the power to negatively shatter and reconstitute the 
architecture of self in ways that permanently damage social functioning. 
119 Accordingly, sometimes the standards that condition such shame may be generally approved, 
i.e., regarding greed, while on other occasions, one may question the standards (i.e., not being 
slim enough, or not wearing the right clothes in the schoolyard).
120 In the words of Donald Capps, The Depleted Self: Sin in a Narcissistic Age (Minneapolis, 1993), 89: 
“The idealizing self experiences shame when it is rejected or disconfirmed.” 
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The pathological condition of shame is characterized by how it affects 
the self ’s ability to be part of, relate to, and find fulfillment in a commu-
nity with others. Such shame impedes the potential for a fulfillment that 
is shaped by a sense of self-worth and a genuine concern for others. It 
therefore differs from discretion (concern for others) or an awareness of a 
serious mistake or problem in one’s own life (which is also constituted by 
a different role of others in the self). Instead, pathological shame is serious 
and destructive because it builds on a fundamental experience of being 
placed outside of the community of one’s peers, of lacking self-esteem, of 
being assigned a lower value than others, or even a non-existing value. 
Thus, a primary mark of such pathological shame is the self ’s inability 
and lack of potential to maintain self-respect and a sense of self-worth 
when faced with (imagined) others. The presence of (perceived) others 
in the self instigates this experience, and hence, every instance in which 
others are present may appear as problematic and may throw the self back 
onto herself. Pathological shame manifests itself in the perception that 
there is absolutely no basis for self-appreciation or self-worth. 
Accordingly, this type of shame does not contribute positively to the 
self-other relationship. Thus, it stands in contrast to what discretionary 
forms of shame may do, as these may even serve to uphold positive rela-
tions with others.121 Pathological shame may make relations appear toxic, 
simply because they feed the feeling of a lack of self-worth even more 
when the individual remains in such relations than when he or she or 
has withdrawn from them. Accordingly, it is not the result of individual 
dispositions but emerges from specific forms of interpersonal relations 
that have severely affected the architecture of the self, more specifically 
the self-other constitution. This is of the utmost importance for the self ’s 
identity, because it means that the self ’s potential to experience itself in a 
positive manner is severely constricted. Thus, we can define pathological 
shame as an expression of destroyed and dysfunctional relations between 
the self and its (symbolic) others. 
121 Cf. James W. Fowler, Faithful Change: The Personal and Public Challenges of Postmodern Life 
(Nashville, 1996), 107.
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The most important implication of this definition from a theoretical 
point of view is that pathological shame affects the architecture of the 
self, that is, how the fundamental features of one’s experience of self and 
agency are constituted. This shame does not have to emerge out of the 
self ’s ability to thematize itself by means of symbols or language, nor does 
it have to be a product of how the self has conducted itself as an agent in 
the world. Its origin can be placed within the dimension of self that must 
be described as pre-subjective, and thus affected by the early development 
of the child. Accordingly, in a crucial sense, this shame conditions the 
self ’s capabilities to be in the world, to experience and thereby to be, or to 
regain, a self at all.122 
Pathological disgrace shame and the pre-subjective
Some kinds of shame may result from narcissistic deprivation or narcis-
sistic wounds, a topic we will go deeper into later.123 Thus, shame is the 
result of interruption of interests or desires. These occur when the infant 
is deprived of his or her opportunity to develop in an emotionally healthy 
direction, because caretakers mainly relate to the child on the basis of 
their own emotional needs and concerns. Because lack of care disturbs 
the child’s need for affirmation and mirroring, the intentions that search 
for such recognition are impeded and may cause shame. Hence, we can 
speak here of shame as a pre-subjective element that contributes to the 
shape and content of the emerging subject’s self-experience. Shame is, 
in the pre-subjective context, the result of the child not being given a 
sufficient opportunity to be affirmed and recognized as valuable and lov-
able in his or her own capacity. Instead, the child’s self-worth becomes 
122 We use the notion of pre-subjectivity here because it identifies the conditions for self-perception 
even before one becomes capable of articulating oneself as a subject by means of thought and 
language. There are some given pre-subjective conditions that are part of psychology as well as 
personality: desire, body, relations with others, vulnerability, and dependence are all such condi-
tions that exist prior to and partly also outside of the subject’s ability to control them. At the same 
time, they are elements that the subject may have to appropriate in a specific manner in order to 
become a more qualified subject. 
123 Cf. Fowler, Faithful Change. For a similar approach, see also J. Patton, referenced by Pattison, 
Shame, 199, pointing to how shame is basically a response to a narcissistic wound, including the 
responses of rage and power, self-righteousness etc., which cuts off the self from re-establishing 
relations with others.
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permanently dependent on who he or she is in the eyes of the parent.124 
He or she is referred to the insecure state manifested by and within rela-
tionships with other subjects who are not able to take care of him or 
her sufficiently. Lack of self-confidence may then substitute the trusting 
self-relation the child needs and increase the child’s vulnerability, anxi-
ety, and lack of self-worth – as well as his or her dependency on others for 
affirmation.125
Instances of such shame imply that a dysfunctional relation is 
expressed not only in the child’s inability to experience himself or her-
self as appreciated and affirmed, but also in the fact that the presence of 
such shame emotions deprive the child of the possibility to differenti-
ate himself or herself emotionally from the parent in a healthy manner. 
Accordingly, the child is thrown into a process in which he or she must 
constantly consider his or her own identity in relation to others, and how 
the implications of what he or she does impacts their emotional status. 
Thereby, the other is integrated into the self in a way that does not allow 
for a sufficiently differentiated self. The lack of differentiation may keep 
the child permanently aware of its inability to live up to the expectations 
of his or her (m)other, and thereby contribute to a constant condition of 
shamefulness.
Winnicott’s understanding of the false self may shed some light on 
shame as emerging out of a similar kind of relationship: when faced with 
a parent who is not good enough, some infants become compliant and do 
everything to please them without considering their own needs, feelings 
or desires in a sufficient manner, or rendering them as unhelpful for the 
relation. The unacceptable feelings and energies that constitute the “true 
self” are thereby denied and regarded as unwanted. As a result, the child 
may lose its sense of individuality and be deprived of a properly separate 
existence.126 
Shame that originates as a pre-subjective phenomenon therefore 
determines the self-relation in ways that profoundly affect relations 
124 Fowler, Faithful Change, 108.
125 Ibid.
126 Pattison, Shame, 101, referring to Phil Mollon, The Fragile Self (London, 1993), 45f. 
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to others as well. Such shame is constituted by passivity, that is, the 
present architecture of the self is the result of others’ actions or lack 
of action towards her. The result is not due to what he or she has done 
or not done, but due to what others have made him or her. This pre- 
subjective character of pathological shame implies that it can be expe-
rienced as uncontrollable. Thus, it is much more than an emotion that 
we can strive to control, it is a component in the way the self is orga-
nized and works – what we have called the architecture of the self. 
Healing from such shame can only take place if one engages in a ther-
apeutic process that interiorizes a different self-other system than the 
one that has been instigated by the primary caretakers. This new sys-
tem or architecture must provide the ability to differentiate both emo-
tionally and cognitively between the self and others. Only in this way 
will the self be able to experience shame as something that the self has 
not caused. However, the reinstatement of such a new self-other system 
may be a long process.
Shame: attempting a comprehensive 
phenomenological description
Towards a preliminary comprehensive definition
Shame is rooted in the specific relational mode of being-in-the-world 
where humans exist as intentional beings. Shame is a composite phenom-
enon that involves an inner, a social and an embodied experience of self. 
We therefore recommend that one sees shame as more than an emotional 
reaction to one clearly delineated set of conditions. Shame is the result of 
a diversity of types of interplay between different experiential dimensions 
in which an agent participates. 
In this section, we aim at providing an overarching description of what 
shame entails and implies when it comes to self-experience, and do so 
in a way that builds on, summarizes, and develops further some of the 
observations already presented. The section intends to highlight some of 
the diverse elements that shame entails to show that it is more than an 
emotional response. We shall provide examples in the end in order to 
contextualize our description.
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Shame and intentional investment or engagement
Let us try to elaborate the aforementioned complexity from a phenome-
nological point of view. Because human beings are intentional, they are 
directed towards others, towards the world, and are involved in differ-
ent kinds of projects. These projects are related to their self-image and 
their social image, and reflect these images to a lesser or greater extent – 
although the self-image and the social image behind intentional projects 
need not correspond. The notion “projects” is important here, since it 
captures the intentional and projective character of the self as one who 
always engages in the world and with different objects or aims that it 
wants to achieve or accomplish, which have some kind of value or attrac-
tion for it. Intentionality is expressed as orientation towards something. 
Concomitantly, it has to do with how the self manifests an interest that 
is directed by and shaped by the relation to this something.127 The inten-
tional and projective character of being (which Heidegger calls Da-sein, 
or “being-towards”) is not based exclusively on intellectual deliberations. 
It may also be rooted in instinctual elements (as in the infant seeking the 
breast for food) or in desires that emerge as the result of interactions with 
others (as in Girard’s mimetic desire, which implies, for example, that an 
infant wants to have what another has, simply because the other has it).128 
127 Another way to express this intentionality is by means of the notion “interest”. In her book on 
shame, Probyn comes close to the description we develop here, especially with regard to rela-
tionality and interruption: “Interest constitutes lines of connection between people and ideas. 
It describes a kind of affective investment we have in others. When, for different reasons, that 
investment is questioned, and interest interrupted, we feel deprived. Crucially, that’s when we 
feel shame. That little moment of disappointment – ‘oh, but I was interested’ – is amplified into 
shame or a deep disappointment in ourselves. Shame marks the break in connection. We have 
to care about something or someone to feel ashamed when that care and connection – our in-
terest – is not reciprocated.” Elspeth Probyn, Blush: Faces of Shame, (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2005), 13. 
128 When Merleau-Ponty understands consciousness as a kind of bodily understanding, it can be 
related to the idea of intentionality’s relation to shame that we sketch here. He argues that our 
exploratory and goal-directed movement constitutes a way of being conscious of things, and 
is a form of understanding what is perceived that is not derived from activities of conceptual 
categorization and inference (which belong properly to the intellect). Thus, the organization and 
adjustment of movements involved in bodily understanding, though norm-guided and experi-
enced, must not be regarded as always chosen – our moves are objects of personal choice only 
when specifically endorsed for reasons. Cf. Charles Siewert, “Consciousness and Intentionality,” 
in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research 
Lab, Stanford University, 2017). 
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Intentionally-based agency is simply the human mode of being-in-the-
world, and is therefore the contextual frame of any modality of shame.
These projects entail personal investment, and we hold that this invest-
ment is also a part of the contextual framework of shame. Therefore, we 
hold that the instinctual and/or desire-based intentions are not only an 
expression of the embodied self, but that the embodied mode of intention-
ality and “directed-towards” that is articulated in the self ’s projects and 
projections are of crucial importance for understanding shame. How?
The intentional projective mode of being implies that the self always 
understands itself in relation to something that is of importance or value 
to it to a varying degree, something it wants to achieve to a varying 
degree. What it seeks to achieve is not simply external to it or of merely 
instrumental value but is linked to its sense of self and the way that self 
expresses itself in the world through agency. Thus, it invest itself in these 
projects and the projects become expressions of its intentions: it may 
want to be fed, sexually satisfied, recognized as the bearer of a specific 
status, admired, considered as skilled, worthy of recognition, etc. All of 
these elements also imply some (albeit sometimes tacit) participation in 
a world with others. Often, such projects turn out to be successful, or 
at least partly successful, as different contextual elements make possible 
and delimit its way of expressing itself through agency. Some projects 
may be of great importance and demand a large personal investment. 
But some projects may also be of lesser importance and, accordingly, 
require a smaller personal investment. Although the importance of the 
intentionally based projects may differ, as well as the amount of personal 
investment in them, the human relational mode of being is never non- 
intentional and without some sort of invested interest expressed through 
some sort of action. Shame manifests the unwelcome interruption of these 
intentional projects both cognitively, emotionally, socially, and bodily. 
Shame as disruption, rupture, or impediment  
of coherent agency
Shame may occur when there is some sort of disturbance in, disruption of, 
or full-blown rupture between, intentions, desires and the projects they 
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engender and the possibility of expressing these in the world through 
agency. Thus, shame can manifest itself in the lack of the personal ability 
to fulfill the intended project or achieve the desired aim. It can also man-
ifest itself through contextual restraints, such as when the social struc-
tures or the internalized normativities within which an agent conducts 
agency impede or block the possibility of expressing certain personal 
projects in a coherent manner, because they are deemed undesirable in 
the context.129 Similar suggestions can be found in the understanding of 
shame as “an awareness of a distinctive inability to discharge a commit-
ment that goes with holding self-relevant values.”130
Interruption also occurs when a person realizes that their context of 
agency is not shared by others, and that the others’ context of agency 
and conditions are not in consonance with their own. Then we can speak 
about shame as emerging from the clash between contexts of agency. 
This is often expressed as becoming aware of the other’s (disapproving) 
gaze at you or your actions (be it imagined or real). The expansion of the 
context of agency from the immediate and personal towards a broader 
context where others are involved causes an interruption and the poten-
tial impediment of the original intentional orientation. This impediment 
throws the self back at itself in a way that makes it aware of itself from 
another perspective than the one manifested in the original intentional 
129 Silvan Tomkins describes shame on the basis of affect theory, as “inevitable for any human be-
ing insofar as desire outruns fulfillment sufficiently to attenuate interest without destroying it. 
The most general sources of shame are the varieties of barriers to the varieties of objects of 
excitement or enjoyment, which reduce positive affect sufficiently to activate shame, but not so 
completely that the original object is renounced: “I want, but –” is one essential condition for the 
activation of shame. Clearly not all barriers suspend the individual between longing and despair. 
Many barriers either completely reduce interest so that the object is renounced or heighten inter-
est so that the barrier is removed or overcome. Indeed, shame itself may eventually also prompt 
either renunciation or counteraction inasmuch as successful renunciation or counteraction will 
reduce the feeling of shame. We are saying only that whatever the eventual outcome of the arous-
al of shame may be, shame is activated by the incomplete reduction of interest – excitement or 
enjoyment – joy, rather than by the heightening of interest or joy or by the complete reduction 
of interest or joy.” See Silvan S. Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness.: The Complete Edition, 
electronic resource, Ebook Central (New York: Springer Publishing, 2008). Book 2, Vol. 1, 388.
130 Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, “The Self of Shame,” in Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity, 
eds. Mikko Salmela and Verena E. Mayer, (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publish-
ing Company, 2009), 33, cf. 34. 
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project. Thus, the ability to act in coherence with the original intentions 
is compromised. 
Here coherence means that there is a certain consonance between 
intentions and desires, actions, values, and the expressed results of these. 
Thus, shame is specifically linked to projects where lack of consonance, 
especially for moral reasons, reflects negatively on the self. This approach 
implies that shame does not occur when projects do not reflect negatively 
on who we are and on our sense of self. The significance of lacking coher-
ence correlates both with the degree of perceived importance for the agen-
titself, and its investment in the project, as well as with its ability to cope 
with such a lack. Thus, the (mode of) reciprocal dynamics between the 
sense of self and the possibility of coherent agency mirrors the solidity of 
the self. Its ability to handle both external and internal pressure without 
reverting to shame is dependent on the extent to which it can maintain a 
coherent agency when it comes to fulfilling its intentional projects. 
The problematizing interruption of the intentional project and the 
investment therein is, as mentioned above, not necessarily mediated by 
the intervention of others; it may be that the person in question realizes 
that he or she is not competent to fulfill the intentions or may come to 
see that the project implies a way of appearing that is not desirable after 
all. This realization may be based on his or her self-image or social image. 
But it may also be that others react to the project in ways that engender 
shame, as when the infant is rejected in its intention to be fed, or when 
one realizes that the project one is investing in is considered by others to 
be morally repugnant (such as stealing or committing adultery). 
The interruption of the intentional project that engenders shame is, 
therefore, more than an experience of failure to achieve the desired good, 
no matter how much or how little it is cognitively articulated. It may also 
comprise an experience of failure or the lack of ability to act in ways that 
can lead to the desired result, or it may entail an experience of the desire 
or intention itself as failed, impeded, or considered by others as objec-
tionable. The frustration of the desire that leads to the intention is among 
the elements that allow us to see shame as an embodied phenomenon: 
shame could not occur unless an agent, which had intentions fueled by a 
desire for an assumed good, had been denied. 
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Shame as a mediator of self-experience
We can develop and substantiate our phenomenological account of shame 
further by addressing elements in Dan Zahavi’s work. He takes issue with 
other important analyses of shame, including those that exaggerate the 
need for an actual audience in order for shame to occur, and those that 
downplay the importance of sociality for the same reason. Building on 
Sartre’s analysis of shame, Zahavi first points to how shame is a form of 
intentional consciousness.131 Shame implies an apprehension of self and, 
therefore, it exhibits a certain mode of self-relation. However, shame is 
not primarily and initially a phenomenon of reflection.132 
Moreover, Zahavi’s analysis underscores our previous point about shame 
as linked to interruption. It appears as “an immediate shudder which runs 
through me from head to foot without any discursive preparation.”133 It is 
the result of one’s experience of oneself in relation to someone else who 
interrupts one: “It presupposes the intervention of the other, not merely 
because the other is the one before whom I feel ashamed, but also and more 
significantly because that of which I am ashamed is only constituted in 
and through my encounter with the other.”134 Accordingly, Zahavi main-
tains “that shame contains a significant component of alterity.”135 This point 
corresponds to what we wrote above about the sudden expansion of the 
context of agency, which we can now see as constituted by the (imagined) 
presence of the other. 
Zahavi’s account of shame offers a profound explanation of why we 
can see shame as an experience of the self, and not only of a situation, 
an act, or something else; shame is a mediated mode of self-relation. 
The other serves as a mediator of this experience of self, and this mode 
of being. Thus, shame “reveals our relationality, our being-for-others.” 
131 Dan Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 212.
132 Ibid., 213. “I can reflect upon my failings and feel shame as a result, just as I might reflect upon 
my feeling of shame, but I can feel shame prior to engaging in reflection.” 
133 Jean-Paul Sartre, quoted by Zahavi, ibid.
134 Ibid., 213.
135 Ibid., 239. Italicized by us. 
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Accordingly, as we have already pointed out, shame is both a self- 
conscious emotion and a social emotion.136 
Above, we suggested that shame is the result of a clash between two 
different contexts of agency and evaluation. This description fits well with 
how Zahavi points to how “shame makes me aware of not being in con-
trol and of having my foundation outside myself.”137 It presents one with 
an immediate experience of powerlessness when one is faced with the 
context that clashes with one’s immediate intentionality in agency, and 
the previous immediacy is substituted with a sense of becoming an object 
for one’s own consciousness. This objectification may itself be shame- 
inducing, and it is also part of the interruptive character of shame, in 
which the subject changes position, or realizes that his or her agency 
clashes with that which others can or will recognize. However, “although 
the feeling of shame reveals to me that I exist for and am visible to others, 
although it reveals to me that I am (partly) constituted by the other, and 
that a dimension of my being is one that the other provides me with, it is 
[…] a dimension of myself that I cannot know or intuit in the same way 
as others can.”138 Consequently, this situation also involves an aspect of 
alienation from the immediate self which is articulating itself through 
intentional agency.
Accordingly, Zahavi sees it as insufficient to analyze shame only “by 
focusing on the fact that the shamed subject is thrown back upon itself.” 
Instead, he subscribes to the idea that the subject, when shamed, is both 
“entirely self-present” and “beside itself.”139 Thus, shame involves an exis-
tential alienation: 
In some cases, the alienating power is a different subject […]. In other cas-
es, the feeling of shame occurs when we sit in judgement on ourselves. But 
in this case as well, there is a form of exposure and self-alienation, a kind of 
136 Ibid., 213.
137 This point can also be substantiated by Gabriele Taylor’s analysis, according to which “shame is 
crucially related to a shift in the agent’s perspective on himself or herself – a shift that specifi-
cally occasions the realization of an adverse discrepancy between the agent’s assumptions about 
himself until now and the perspective offered by a more detached observer.” See Gabriele Taylor, 
Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 66. 
138 Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, 213–14.
139 Ibid., 238.
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self-observation and self-distancing. To put it differently, in the company of 
others the experience of shame can occur pre-reflectively since the alien per-
spective is co-present. When alone, the experience of shame will take a more 
reflective form, since the alien perspective has to be provided through a form of 
reflective self-distancing.140
Zahavi further nuances the other-based experience of shame by claim-
ing that “there is a self-directed form of shame which is just as funda-
mental as the shame one can feel in the presence of others, and […] 
the core feature of shame is that it points to the clash or discrepancy 
between our higher spiritual values on the one hand and our animal 
nature and bodily needs on the other.”141 Thus, shame becomes a specific 
reaction in the human sphere because humans can always consider or 
contemplate different ways of being than those present. As such, shame 
belongs to the human condition, a point that also has been developed in 
Martha Nussbaum’s analysis of the phenomenon. She sees it as an emo-
tional response to the uncovering and display of our weakness, our 
defects, and our imperfections.142 We shall see how this point is elabo-
rated in a later chapter. 
Shame as the result of lack of recognition  
or humiliation
Zahavi develops his final point, on how interruption mediated by the other 
may occur, via Axel Honneth’s understanding of the role of recognition 
in the development of a child’s perception of its own agency. “Honneth 
points to infancy research that suggests that there is a range of adult facial 
expressions such as the loving smile, the extended hand, the benevolent 
nod, that will let the child know that he is the recipient of attention and 
devotion, and then argues that the child, by being the recipient of such 
pre-linguistic expressions, becomes socially visible.”143 These elements, we 
140 Ibid., 238–39.
141 Ibid., 215–16. Here, he builds on Max Scheler. 
142 Martha C. Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 173, 85. See for example Nussbaum’s account in Chapter 3.
143 Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, 224.
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would argue, support the child’s immediate performance of its agency. It 
does so in ways that affirm it and allow it to go on without interruption. 
However, when the child is intentionally ignored and becomes aware of 
this, or is humiliated, it causes a negative mode of disruption of agency 
that not only concerns the child in his or her early years. It can also cause 
the adult to stop up and consider his or her actions. To make any person 
socially invisible is to deny him or her opportunities for recognition and 
to place him or her outside the human community – a feature that we 
also see as important for the experience of shame.144 This experience is, 
therefore, also one of interruption, and one that may cause shame. There 
is a significant relation between shame and the need for and perceived 
absence of recognition, a point that we will develop further in Chapter 3. 
The absence of approving reciprocity may engender shame and make one 
more prone to it. 
A few illustrations of the above position
Finally, let us briefly consider some examples that can illustrate the 
understanding of shame we presented above: 
A special case here concerns the victims of violence or sexual abuse. 
For them, shame is the result of the experience of not being worth any-
thing – and being totally under the control of someone else’s agency. Such 
violence and abuse takes away the necessary sense of being at the center 
of one’s own actions, as an agent that is in control. The deprivation of 
agency here, as well as the impediment of one’s perception of what should 
be the desired qualities of one’s life, results in shame. Victims of rape or 
other types of violence may, therefore, experience shame because of their 
intentions of achieving something good in the world. Their ability to be 
embodied agents in control of themselves has been impeded by the attack 
to which they were subjected. They lose (at least for some time) their abil-
ity to be in control of their actions and realize their own goals. Their 
144 Axel Honneth and Avishai Margalit, “Recognition,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Sup-
plementary Volumes 75 (2001). Cf. Zahavi, Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and 
Shame, 224.
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sense of self (including the embodied self) becomes so shattered that it 
is hard to experience any kind of trust that can sustain the confidence in 
further positive projects that are guided by intentions to realize valuable 
aims. Shame is then not only the reaction to not being recognized as wor-
thy of respect in the eyes of the offender, but also the emotional strategy 
of withdrawal, in order to protect oneself, into a state with a restricted 
will to perform agency. Since such offenses imply a transgression of the 
boundaries of the self, it also means that the structure of desire in the 
victim has been violated. His or her further intentions do not remain 
as reliable as earlier, and he or she cannot be confident that he or she 
has the respect of others any longer. Here shame is not due to how he or 
she is perceived by his or her actual peers, but the result of the offend-
er’s inscription of himself/herself in his or her sense of self in a way that 
makes him or her perceive himself or herself as unworthy. Concomitant 
to this mental intrusion of the violator may be the lack of control of one-
self and one’s projects. 
Another example: The new boy at school wants to be recognized and 
included by his peers and accordingly, he invests in that project. When 
they ridicule him for his clothing or his dialect, he experiences the failure 
of his project and the frustration of his intentions. His desire for recog-
nition is not fulfilled. His retraction from the others is a response aimed 
at shielding or defending himself further from the exposure that perpet-
uates this experience of failure. This retraction will often have a physical 
component, such as turning away, walking away, looking down, etc. It 
is likely that people who feel shame due to illness or physical disabili-
ties or psychological challenges may have similar desires for the value of 
inclusion that are frustrated. Intentions for agency are changed, and the 
experience of shame also creates a sense of being placed outside the com-
munity of shared values, intentions, and qualities. Shame need not be the 
result of violence or immoral behavior, though. 
Moreover, we have had students from other parts of the world who 
were unable to realize their expectations of getting an “A”, and who there-
fore felt shame on returning to their home country with a less honorable 
grade. Their desire to bring honor to themselves and their families turned 
out to be impossible to fulfill. This form of shame is one that has to do 
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with the shared understanding within a certain group or community 
about what is considered honorable – and one is excluded from the group 
due to lack of sharing the traits required for that. Here, shame is also the 
result of failed intentional projects, but the interruption of the project is 
because of a personal lack of capacity rather than the result of a rebuke or 
the rejection of others. 
Shame as an individual experience:  
why does it differ?
People are prone to shame to different degrees.145 Some, who have 
developed a solid sense of self and concomitant independence and self- 
reliance, may be less prone to shame than those who have learned that it 
is how you appear in the eyes of others that matters. We will come back to 
this point in the next chapter on the psychology of shame. Here we only 
want to point to how the different variables that actually cause shame 
work in tandem with the extent to which the person is prone to shame, 
and that this proneness may vary considerably in different individuals. 
Furthermore, this point makes it important for us to not only under-
score the ambiguities of shame, and the fact that shame comes in many 
different forms. It also points to the reason why shame may be experi-
enced to different degrees, as strong and debilitating, or as a reaction 
that passes away more or less quickly. The variations in the experiences 
of shame may thus not only rely on the degree of personal investment, or 
on proneness to shame, but also on the access one has to the resources for 
overcoming it. 
In the following chapter, we shall address in more detail how shame as 
a pre-subjective state manifests itself in how the lack of trust in oneself 
is the result of a lack of integration of a sense of self that can put trust in 
one’s own agency. The result of early relational distortions contributes to 
the infant being prone to shame, lacking trust in itself and pride in what 
it is doing. Agency becomes fragmented, and there are less chances for 
145 For an introduction to the discussion of shame-proneness, see Tracy, Robins, and Tangney, The 
Self-Conscious Emotions: Theory and Research; Tangney, Wagner, and Gramzow, “Proneness to 
Shame, Proneness to Guilt, and Psychopathology”; and Tangney and Dearing, Shame and Guilt.
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coherent and self-directed agency. Here, we only want to draw attention 
to the fact that these conditions are related to shame-proneness. 
Related to this is shame as the result of actual or imagined rejection 
because of one’s actions or features. This goes for anything from expo-
sure of handicaps or disease, ridicule because of being naked, or when 
one is exposed as vulnerable in a sexually-charged situation. Discretion-
ary shame works here in a similar manner to other types of shame – as 
an interruption that leads to withdrawal and protective actions. Again, 
projections or intentions are interrupted by something occurring in the 
situation as the cause of shame. Such experiences of shame need not be 
instigated by actual others but can just as well be a manifestation of an 
internalized inferiority feeling. Hence, shame is often, but not always, a 
manifestation of actual social relationships, but it can be the result of not 
being able to achieve one’s own goals or aspirations – even when no one 
else knows, sees, or cares. 
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chapter 3
Shame from a Psychological Point of View
Starting point: shame and the architecture  
of the Self
It should be apparent from our description so far that we see shame as 
deeply rooted in complex psychological conditions and the concomitant 
architecture of the self. Shame can be related to intentions, desires, aspi-
rations, and the need for acknowledgment and recognition, as well as 
frustration, disappointment, exclusion, violence, and a sense of failure – 
all of which may be caused by others or by one’s own responses or assess-
ments. Thus, shame is a relational phenomenon, and as such, it often 
occurs in, or as the result of, interaction and interpersonal exchange. 
In this chapter, we will elaborate further on the underpinnings of our 
initial description, with the help of elements in the self-psychology of 
Heinz Kohut and other theoretical approaches that supplement the per-
spectives it offers.146 
The analyses in this chapter take as their point of departure an under-
standing of how the self ’s “architecture” is constituted relationally. It is 
conditioned by the interaction between the biological and social condi-
tions, and the subjectivity of the (emerging) individual. The structure of 
the self (the self ’s architecture) develops through the interaction between 
two sets of conditions: the biological makeup and the psychological, 
social, and material conditions in which the self participates. Accord-
ingly, the development of the self is always vulnerable, and the self is 
146 We have chosen self-psychology as the main theoretical approach because of its fundamentally 
relational understanding of the development of the self, which allows for perspectives that are 
not present in traditional psychoanalytic theory, and which go beyond understanding shame as 
a mere affective response. 
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always potentially exposed, because it is subjected to conditions that 
can both promote and restrict the possibilities for self-affirmation and 
self-realization.
Shame is not only a complex emotion, but the different types of 
shame can be seen as engendered by intentions all of which are guided 
by aims and desires. When these are impeded, for whatever reason, 
shame may occur. The ideals and aims that guide and inform our 
intentional projects and aspirations are constituted in part by what we 
learn about what matters and what needs to be done when we are in 
relationships with others from early on. Shame’s complicated character 
is fundamentally related to how it arrives early in human life – usually, 
before infants have language. And as mentioned, one’s proneness to 
shame may, therefore, also be dependent on how relationships with 
others make one more susceptible to criticism and shaming, or the 
opposite: more self-reliant, with more self-esteem and pride in what 
one does. 
Heinz Kohut and the development of the self
Mirroring and idealization
Heinz Kohut’s work on the development of the self stands out among the 
psychologists who have worked with notions of the self that are relevant 
to our purposes. In the following, we draw on those parts of his theory 
that may be of relevance for understanding the dynamics that result in 
shame. Accordingly, we do not develop a comprehensive presentation of 
all the different elements in his theory of the self. 
According to Kohut, the self is initially fragmented, and its experiences 
are not in any way related to a clear sense or feeling of being a unified 
self. It is by interacting with others that a unifying feeling or experience 
of self and world can be developed, and the different experiences become 
integrated with something that is a sense of self. Hence, interaction with 
others who can mirror the child and thereby provide it with something 
that grows into a more or less stable self-experience is crucial. Thus, the 
self becomes both more cohesive and more enduring than at the previous, 
fragmented stage. 
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This self develops in relation to two poles.147 The first pole finds expres-
sion in the infant’s need to be emotionally affirmed and encouraged in its 
authentic being and its own achievements (the mirroring pole). This need 
directs the infant towards the caretaker, who is then also the one upon 
whom the development of the self becomes dependent. Kohut calls the 
process of confirmation that takes place “mirroring,” and it both affirms 
and guides the child in discovering who it may be. In the process of being 
seen for what it truly is, the child may then be able to realize its own 
potential. Thus, this process “leads the child to a sense of enjoyment of 
his or her own capabilities, fuels self-esteem and a sense of worth, and 
forms a basis for developing ambition and a sense of self-pride.”148 Thus, 
the child’s in-born narcissistic grandiosity is here both confirmed and 
adjusted in the process of mirroring.149 Part of its experience of its agency 
is, therefore, dependent on its relation to the other who represents this 
pole, and the more consistent the response is, the more firm is the basis 
for the self. Stated in the terms that we have used earlier: The embod-
ied intentional mode of being-in-the-world is recognized, and thereby 
also contributes to a stable sense of self to the extent that it is validated, 
affirmed, or recognized. 
However, if the mirroring pole (the parent) does not contribute to this 
type of stable affirmation, the child’s chances decrease for developing 
a more self-reliant attitude to the world and a more stable self. Never-
theless, the need for confirmation remains, and the child becomes more 
dependent on others for mirroring, due to the insecurity that it experi-
ences because of this lack. Thus, the lack of a stable response from a sig-
nificant other implies that it becomes more uncertain about the abilities 
of its agency, and concomitantly, may become more prone to shame. In 
our previously established terms: insecurity leads to an awareness that 
its context of agency is not necessarily shared by others and may make 
147 The résumé of Kohut is based on the following texts: Heinz Kohut, The Analysis of the Self: A 
Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders (New 
York: International Universities Press, 1971); The Restoration of the Self (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1977); Kenneth Bragan, Self and Spirit in the Therapeutic Relationship (Lon-
don; New York: Routledge, 1996).
148 Self and Spirit in the Therapeutic Relationship, 5. 
149 For more on narcissism and shame, see below. 
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it more susceptible to how others consider it – but not in an approving 
manner.
Failure to receive an adequate response is crucial in understanding 
Kohut’s interpretation of the origins of narcissistic disturbances in the 
formation of the self. This point is also of great importance to the under-
standing of shame. If we relate it to what we have sketched in the previ-
ous chapter, it means that the infant’s intentions and desires lack a firm 
basis and may more easily become interrupted by the experienced lack of 
confirmation by others, no matter if this is expressed openly to, or just 
assumed by, the insecure self. We will return to the topic of narcissism 
later. 
The infant’s need to gain strength from feeling a part of, or being iden-
tified with, someone or something which is experienced as strong and 
reliable, manifests in its search for another pole of identity formation. 
This pole contributes a fundamental sense of safety and security, which 
is the basis for developing trusting relationships. Hence, this may also be 
called the idealizing pole:
Idealization is the process by which the child at first is comforted and reassured 
by being held in mother’s arms, and later finds strength by identifying with an 
idealized other or with idealized values and aims. This pole of the self gives 
life direction and structure, knowledge of right and wrong, and a sense of self- 
control. Deficits result in feelings of weakness, aimlessness and not being in 
charge of one’s life.150 
The image of the idealized parent originally constitutes the idealized 
pole, but later on, other idealized persons or entities may also serve as 
objects which the self, through a process of identification, can experi-
ence as contributing to its own feelings of strength and capability. Thus, 
idealization is the other important element in what constitutes the content 
and coherent direction of intentional agency. Unclear or blurred ideals 
may, therefore, make the person more prone to shame because they may 
more easily run into conflict with each other. The idealization process is 
150 Bragan, Self and Spirit in the Therapeutic Relationship, 5. Note how this idealization also plays a 
role in the development of religion – a point we will return to in Chapter 5. 
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of crucial importance to the formation of intentions, desires, aims, and 
projects that the self finds important to pursue, as well as the values on 
which it bases its assessments of the achievements they result in. Accord-
ingly, we can identify here the origin of the ideals and values that may 
cause experiences of shame when not lived up to as well. The idealizing 
pole is thus both internally and externally based – as is shame and its 
conditions.
We are now in a position where we can define more specifically what 
makes a person prone to shame from Kohut’s point of view: As the above 
presentation suggests, when the child is not sufficiently cared for and not 
provided with sufficiently stable relationships that mirror or guide it, a 
sense of weakness and of not being in charge may be the result. Hence, 
the child’s perception of its agency competence is not solidified and intro-
duces it into a constant quest for recognition – which, in turn, also entails 
narcissistic traits. Thus, lack of care makes the infant or child more prone 
to shame because it weakens the child’s capacity for agency and self-di-
rection. The blurred boundaries between self and other thus reflect in 
a proneness to shame. Shame is, therefore, not only the result of failed 
agency but also the result of not being able to hold a secure position where 
one can be self-reliant and feel that one is in charge. Accordingly, shame 
is related to the experience of weakness and vulnerability – a topic we 
explore further below. 
Optimal frustration shapes a solid self
We can now understand how what the child learns through affirmation 
and mirroring is relevant to how it comes to see its own skills and talents, 
and thereby, its self and potential for agency. To develop a self is related to 
a learning process where one is both subject and object. This learning also 
implies experiences of what Kohut calls optimal frustration. Such frus-
tration is the means by which one can have non-traumatic experiences 
of whom one may potentially be and not be.151 It provides opportunities 
151 Heinz Kohut, Arnold Goldberg, and Paul E. Stepansky, How Does Analysis Cure? (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 102–103.
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for a more realistic self-understanding and appreciation of capacities 
and limitations. Consequently, as the result of such optimal frustration, 
one becomes increasingly able to differentiate oneself from the idealized 
object, as well as achieving a more nuanced understanding of the limits 
of one’s own grandiosity. The outcome of this process is a mature and 
integrated self with a solidified psychic structure that can provide itself 
with a sense of cohesion and continuity, and does not need to look out-
side itself to achieve this sense. The self which results from a process of 
optimal frustration and adequate mirroring and mature idealization is, 
in our view, therefore less prone to shame because its structure, or archi-
tecture, has developed into a more solidified self. 
The ability to distinguish between fantasy and reality is a crucial con-
dition for successful agency. Therefore, optimal frustration by which 
the self is neither over-stimulated (if it meets only affirmation, this will 
foster the continuation of an immature, grandiose self) nor under- 
stimulated (a process that would force the self into a constant quest for 
further affirmation, while trying to conform to the demands that may 
help to achieve it) is a device that can contribute to making the child less 
prone to shame. A self which is insecure concerning its ideals or capaci-
ties may be more prone to shame than one which has developed a realistic 
sense of its capacities and its accompanying ability to be self-reliant about 
the judgments and ideals that direct its intentions, projects, and desires. 
Consequently, such self-reliance contributes to a more coherent agency 
and to ideals that are in consonance. Furthermore, the individual’s 
agency is then not only oriented towards assurance from others that offers 
compensatory mirroring but towards internalized aims and objects of a 
more stable character. 
Selfobjects
From the processes of mirroring and idealization emerge a specific type 
of experience of elements that are of vital importance to the sense of self 
in its development. Kohut calls these elements (or objects) selfobjects. A 
selfobject is not a part of the objective world but is a part of the inner 
world: it belongs to the space of the self. Bragan sums it up thus: 
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Any person or object experienced as having a self-discovering, self-promoting 
or self-strengthening function is a selfobject. However, it is the experience of 
the object that matters, not the external reality, not the actuality, and selfobjects 
must be clearly distinguished not only from the external objects that are the fo-
cus of the experience but also from internal representations of objects and from 
self-representations. The concept is difficult to grasp because it is purely subjec-
tive. Its reality is in the inner world, and it is best to think of it simply as how an 
object is experienced. Selfobjects are the self-fortifying internal reflection of the 
outer world, the internal soil in which a cohesive self can grow.152 
According to this understanding, selfobjects provide the necessary means 
by which the self is able to experience itself as someone. Furthermore, sel-
fobjects are objects of emotional or libidinal investment. They may also 
develop in ways that give them compensating functions, for example, 
due to a lack of care. Since selfobjects are fundamental building blocks 
of the self, they may exist in rudimentary and undifferentiated forms in 
the archaic self, or as more mature, differentiated, and symbolic forms in 
mature versions of the self. Furthermore, they have cognitive as well as 
emotional aspects. These self-objects that guide action, shape experience, 
and represent personal investment, intentions, and desires, may condi-
tion the individual to experience varying degrees of shame. The more 
compensatory the selfobjects appear in relation to the lack of ability to 
build a solid self, the more prone the self may be to shame. The need for 
compensating strategies when mirroring and idealization has been inad-
equate testifies to how the self ’s lack of independence from others makes 
it prone to shame: it increases the need for immediate recognition by oth-
ers, and makes the self less reliant on its own sense of self and the inter-
nal resources that guide agency. However, the extent to which the self is 
insecure and reliant on others may vary in different contexts of agency. 
Kohut’s notion of selfobjects circumscribes the function that other 
people may have in a person’s experience of harmony, strength, firmness, 
vitality, responsiveness, and creativity. A solid self can be more vital and 
creative simply because it can direct more energy towards such projects 
152 Bragan, Self and Spirit, 6. 
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instead of using it for compensatory projects aimed at recognition and 
safety. The weaker the conditions for these experiences are, the more we 
think the subject is prone to shame. It is due to one’s relationships with 
others that one gains access to the necessary resources for experiencing 
oneself as a person in control and with a coherent agency. It is worth not-
ing here that real creativity requires that the self is no longer inhibited by 
the demands that were present in the archaic self and its struggle for suc-
cess and admiration. As one becomes more self-reliant and less depen-
dent upon others, this may increase the flow of creativity and reduce the 
proneness to shame. 
Shame, vulnerability, and narcissistic rage
The processes described above are the backdrop for understanding 
Kohut’s approach to the connection between narcissism and shame: a 
natural tendency in infants is to act in ways that seek mirroring. Infants 
are narcissists by default. Such “natural” narcissism is not the result of a 
lack of care, but the way in which the infant relates to the world. However, 
as the child grows, and learns to see the other as independent, and not 
only as an extension of itself (a process that may also imply frustration), 
it can become more aware of who it is in relation to the other, and the 
archaic form of narcissism may recede. Then, it may be transformed into 
a kind of creativity in which the child matures and become increasingly 
more reliant on itself instead of on others – partly because it has become 
liberated from the need to struggle for recognition and acceptance con-
stantly. Thus, a more autonomous mode of acting overcomes narcissism. 
It is when the differentiation process between self and other does 
not run its normal course that the self may develop more problematic 
narcissistic traits and the insatiable “object hunger” for that which can 
provide it with some sense of self-worth and safety. Then the self is set 
on a life-long quest for affirmation and safety. Accordingly, Kohut sees 
narcissistic distortions as caused by instances when the two poles of the 
self are not experienced and integrated as an adequate response from a 
person to whom the self is close. Because such experiences are vital to 
developing a firm sense of self-confidence and self-worth, the narcissistic 
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disturbance not only implies lack of self-esteem (although this may be 
present, but is often hidden or covered up). It also impedes the ability to 
engage empathetically with other people. Kohut sees defects in empathic 
engagement as caused by the absence of, or inadequacy of cooperation 
with, early caretakers. It leads to a mechanic and lifeless understanding of 
the inner reality of the self and others. The selfobjects in such an imma-
ture or arrested self may, therefore, contribute to the petrification of a 
narcissism that makes the self unable to transcend its captive state. At 
times, it may imply that it can, when frustrated, develop a narcissistic 
rage that is directed outwards toward others.153 This rage is also related to 
shame. How should we understand this relation? 
Narcissistic rage is related to the omnipotent demand for control 
(power) in the grandiose but immature self. It emerges from feelings of 
frustration and insecurity that are the result of a lack of such control. 
It is directed towards the features that threaten and frustrate the nar-
cissistic self. Kohut sees shame as emerging out of the concomitant and 
denied demand for admiration and affirmation. Usually, by engaging 
with selfobjects that may help to meet this demand, the self can mobilize 
its libido so that it is ready to express itself when it receives an affirming 
and admiring response from the environment. However, when the antic-
ipated answer does not appear, or the intentional object does not appear, 
the self can no longer unfold itself in the same process.154 Shame is the 
result, as rage may also be. Furthermore, rage may cause shame, or shame 
may cause rage – it can go both ways. Hence, the narcissistic process is 
back to square one, and the self has to find new ways to affirm itself. In 
other words: shame and rage may emerge as a result when the intention is 
impeded or interrupted, so that the self loses control over the intentions 
and purposes in which it has invested itself and its agency. 
Shame and rage are, therefore, according to these perspectives, the 
results of inadequate attuning in the self-selfobject relation, that is, the 
relation that the self has to its image of itself (itself as self-object), and 
153 Cf. what we said in the previous chapter about transportation and transformation of shame, 
pp. 51–57.
154 Sigmund Karterud, Fra Narsissisme Til Selvpsykologi: En Innføring I Heinz Kohuts Forfatterskap 
(Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 2009), 93. 
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which consequently allows it to experience itself. A self-self-object that 
never allows the self to appear in its own eyes as accepted and valuable 
may become strongly prone to the development of shame. A self that has 
never been allowed to overcome its insecurities by forming an alliance 
with idealized others, or feel affirmed by such selfobjects, may continue 
its grandiose struggle for control to overcome these insecurities.
According to this analysis, shame-proneness derives from serious 
defects in the self that prevent a firm sense of cohesiveness and self- 
esteem.155 Thus, shame-proneness seems to be correlated with the vulner-
ability that is enhanced through this process: 
Shame-prone individuals are more vulnerable than most to experiencing even 
ordinary criticism as devastating. Thus, when either chronic or traumatic inju-
ries occur to the already fragile self, the person becomes shamed in his or her 
own eyes and may then use strategies such as substance abuse, delinquency, or 
suicide to escape the pain and thereby prevent further deterioration of the sense 
of self.156 
Against this backdrop, it is possible to identify four pathological syn-
dromes of self-development that may be accompanied by debilitating 
amounts of shame for differing reasons. These are: 
a) The understimulated self is a condition resulting from chronic, 
inadequate responsiveness of the individual’s selfobjects during 
childhood.157
b) The fragmenting self is a condition that results from the inconsis-
tent and capricious responsiveness of selfobjects and their failure 
to respond to the developing adolescent as a total individual. As 
a result, the individual never develops a truly cohesive sense of 
155 Cf. Barry W. Shreve and Mark A. Kunkel, “Self-Psychology, Shame, and Adolescent Suicide: 
Theoretical and Practical Considerations,” Journal of Counseling & Development 69, no. 4 (1991): 
308. The following builds on their summary. 
156 Ibid. The point here of numbing one’s pain by substituting another will occur also later in the 
present treatise. 
157 Ibid. They describe the outcome of this thus: “An adolescent in the understimulated selfcon-
dition may exhibit behaviors such as compulsive masturbation, recklessness, promiscuity, and 
drug and alcohol abuse. Such behaviors may be construed as an attempt by the adolescent to 
defend against unbearable feelings of emptiness and depression.”
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identity.158 Although these elements may occasionally be some-
thing that most adolescents experience, they are usually “neither 
overwhelming nor debilitating to any significant degree. But for the 
vulnerable fragmenting self, lack of internal cohesiveness is power-
ful and potentially overwhelming and necessitates the activation of 
additional defensive or compensatory actions.”159 
c) The overstimulated self, which results from phase-inappropriate, 
excessive responses from the adolescent’s selfobjects. The individual 
who ends up in this condition avoids any possibility of becoming 
the center of attention or avoids contact with potentially admira-
ble selfobjects, or both. This condition has severe consequences for 
the subject’s sense of agency: “feelings of a lack of drive, a sense of 
having nothing or no one to look up to, and a sense of isolation” is 
common in this case.160 
d) The overburdened self is the result of prolonged emotional depri-
vation. When the developing self has not had the opportunity to 
partake of the quieting, soothing experiences that comes with the 
subjective merger with the omnipotent selfobject, it results in “an 
individual who is unable to maintain a sense of inner control over 
his or her emotional state, one who is unable to maintain emotional 
equilibrium in a threatening and potentially hostile world.”161 
Shame may be the result when a person is not able to deal with the 
stress caused by any of these conditions. It may have different causes. It 
may come from an inner sense of emptiness, from a fear of being over-
whelmed, from feelings of inadequacy, or from the risk of public expo-
sure of an individual’s lack of cohesiveness. “For each of these forms of 
158 Ibid. The description they offer of this mode is much in consonance with what we have previous-
ly suggested by the notion of interruption: “Commonly encountered adolescent expressions of 
this experience are the feeling of being ‘scattered,’ the feeling of ‘not being in the flow,’ and feeling 
‘like I’m coming apart at the seams.’”
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid. “Understandably, defense mechanisms tend to be more active and externally directed for 
this type of person. When reacting to perceived threats, such an individual will tend to lash 
out first rather than trust either in the other or in his or her own inner ability to deal with the 
emotions that may be aroused.”
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   101 2/25/2021   4:38:37 PM
c h a p t e r  3
102
self-pathology, shame is a possible result of the failure of defensive or 
compensatory maneuvers.” Shreve and Kunkel conclude: 
The failure of the maneuvers for the vulnerable self may result in the activation 
of powerful, archaic fears. The understimulated self fears exposure of his or her 
essential emptiness, the fragmenting self fears the exposure of his or her lack 
of cohesion, the over stimulated self fears the exposure of his or her need to be 
distant from others, and the overburdened self fears the exposure of his or her 
inability to maintain internal emotional equilibrium. One by-product of these 
fears is the development of the feeling of shame.162 
The advantage of this approach to shame thereby becomes fully observ-
able: shame is not merely a result of failure to perform a specific form of 
intended agency, but is also the result of the relational conditions that 
shape the individual who is a potential agent. Thus, shame is the result of 
the interaction between the individual and her peers and how the self has 
been psychologically shaped (what we have called the architecture of the 
self) by parents and other significant others from early on. This analysis 
points to a more nuanced role for the social environment of the one who 
feels shame: 
The adolescent who feels threatened and vulnerable as a result of not experienc-
ing empathy will naturally turn for support to those selfobjects that have been 
most recently supportive. In adolescence, the turning is most frequently to the 
alter ego self objects as represented by the peer group. A failure of this support at 
this crucial time is frequently cause for an increased sense of futility, vulnerabili-
ty, and shame. The shamed, vulnerable adolescent becomes a distant and elusive 
figure, severing what relationships he or she may have left that could possibly 
serve as future supports. This pattern of behavior increases as the adolescent be-
comes more sensitive to and expectant of negative evaluations from others. As 
the adolescent becomes more isolated, old relationships atrophy and new ones 
are avoided, and it is precisely this severing of significant self-selfobject relations 
that often results in the profound sense of shame, despair, and withdrawal pre-
ceding many adolescent suicides.163
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid. 
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Thus, we find a much deeper understanding of shame here than we do 
when we simply see it as the result of moral failure or as instances of 
embarrassment. In the last sentences of the quote just cited, we also see 
how shame and the rage that can result from it may be directed in fun-
damentally destructive ways towards the shame-bearing self. Hence, we 
have developed an argument for rejecting shame as a positive factor in 
the building-up of the self, apart from what it supplies in terms of frustra-
tion that is necessary for biological/neurological development.164 
Martha Nussbaum: Psychological considerations 
within a philosophical framework 
In her philosophical approach to shame in Hiding from Humanity, Mar-
tha Nussbaum makes several important observations that can help us to 
understand the ambiguities of shame further. Her analysis combines psy-
chological insights with normative elements, and thus, she is able to show 
how shame is not a neutral phenomenon, but points towards and even 
implies normative considerations and assessments. Therefore, her contri-
bution may serve as a bridge between what we present as the psycholog-
ical background of shame, on the one hand, and how we understand the 
role that shame may and may not play in relation to ethics, on the other 
hand. Ethics will be a topic in one of the subsequent chapters.
Primitive shame 
Although she carefully underscores how shame can take on a positive role 
“in development and social life, in connection with valuable ideals and 
aspirations,” Nussbaum nevertheless makes it clear that not all the roles 
that shame plays in life are positive. Its ambiguity appears from early on, 
as is visible in the version of shame she calls “primitive,” on which she 
bases much of her deliberations. Primitive shame is “closely connected 
to an infantile demand for om nipotence and the unwillingness to accept 
164 Cf. p. 23, on how the frontal cortex depends on shame experiences for its development. 
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neediness.”165 It emerges out of the primary narcissism of a typical human 
infant, and it “gives rise to a particularly primitive and pervasive type of 
shame, as the infant encounters inevitable narcissistic defeats.”166 In other 
words: such defeat causes shame. The infant that realizes it is dependent 
on others, “and is by this time aware of itself as a definite being who is and 
ought to be the center of the world” feels primitive shame due to the “real-
ization that one is weak and inadequate in some way in which one expects 
oneself to be adequate. Its reflex is to hide from the eyes of those who will 
see one’s deficiency, to cover it.” Thus, “all infant omnipotence is cou-
pled with helplessness.”167 Against the backdrop of our previous attempt 
to describe shame, this makes perfect sense: the realization of lack, vul-
nerability or deficiency makes it apparent that the intentions which one 
immediately enters the world with, cannot be fulfilled or realized. This 
realization might lead to shame, but it need not do. To what extent it does 
depends on a wide variety of variables, not least how one is guided in 
tackling such interruptive realizations. 
The normative implication of the understanding of shame sketched so 
far is that on these premises, it is an irrational emotion.168 Why is that? 
Because the wish to be omnipotent and without need is to wish for some-
thing that cannot be. Moreover, shame is therefore also an unreliable 
emotion: as we have already pointed to earlier, it does not inform us prop-
erly or adequately about how others are and why they react as they do. 
Shame is, namely, often bound up with narcissism and “an unwillingness 
to recognize the rights and needs of others.”169 When shame is combined 
with this lack of empathy, it is possible to see it as related to the narcissism 
that is a consequence of being subjected to a lack of care – a point that 
we saw that also Kohut emphasizes. It follows from this point that people 
165 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 15. 
166 Ibid., 184. The features that Nussbaum elaborates on here have been analyzed in more detail in 
the section above on Kohut’s self-psychology. 
167 Ibid., 183. We find reasons here to note also how this withdrawal severs the bonds to others. The 
intentional and immediate desire for realization of oneself in the eyes of others (desire of recog-
nition) is frustrated or impeded. 
168 To what extent shame is irrational is a topic we will return to repeatedly in different contexts. 
169 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 15.
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who feel shame may be impeded in their capacity to relate with empathy 
towards others – a point that is not without relevance for moral agency. 
Shame, self-perception and agency
Nussbaum argues against Silvan Tomkins’ understanding of shame as 
an affect. He understands shame as “a painful affect resulting from any 
interruption of pleasure and expectation, as when the infant ex pects a 
pleasurable feeding, and that does not take place”170 and situates it in a 
comprehensive-affects theory.171 Accordingly, Tomkins does not presup-
pose any cognitive content as necessary for feeling shame, whereas Nuss-
baum, who develops her notion of shame from a more object-relational 
point of view, thinks that some rudimentary cognitive content is a nec-
essary requirement for shame – at least in humans.172 Nevertheless, they 
both seem to be open to the idea that shame implies some kind of inter-
ruption of intentional agency. From Nussbaum’s point of view, though, 
she argues for this agency as dependent on, or at least possible to articu-
late as conditioned by, some cognitive content, and a rudimentary sense 
of self: 
Emotions, of course, may involve thoughts that are primitive or archaic. One 
may have a kind of rudimentary fear, for example, even before being securely 
aware of the distinctness of one’s own body from the caretaker’s body, and I have 
suggested that young infants do have such rudimentary emotions. Nonetheless, 
shame does require at least an incipient sense of one’s own being, and an incip-
ient sense of the distinctness of the helpless being that one is from the sources 
of comfort and nourishment.173 
170 Ibid., 183.
171 Tomkins also writes, aptly, how “shame may be evoked by a complete rejection of any affect, 
including shame.” See Silvan S. Tomkins and E. Virginia Demos, Exploring Affect: The Selected 
Writings of Silvan S. TomkinsWhat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 405.
172 “At least in humans” is added here because there seem to be some elements that are shame-like 
also in dogs that have done things that are forbidden, or in other species that have experienced 
defeat in their competition for a mate (moose). Such examples suggest that even animals may 
have some experience of interruption of their agency – what we in humans describe as shame. It 
is hard to know, however, if these responses are similar to human responses, and to what extent 
they manifest (rudimentary) self-consciousness. 
173 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 183–84. 
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Here, Nussbaum makes two crucial points concerning the conditions for 
shame: first, shame seems to presuppose some ability to differentiate (at 
least partly) from the mother. Thus, shame means that the symbiosis is 
dissolved, or in the process of dissolving. However, in Nussbaum’s view, 
this symbiosis should not be taken to indicate that everything is blissful 
and unproblematic until the differentiation process starts. She holds that 
“the world was never really blissful at any time after birth: infants expe-
rience an alternating absence and presence of good things as soon as they 
have experience, and gradually develop awareness of their powerlessness 
to control those good things.”174 This view entails that we can see shame 
as something that “emerges gradually over the course of the first year of 
life, per haps becoming the full-fledged emotion only after a sense of one’s 
own separateness is achieved.”175 
To see shame as the result of being able to differentiate between one-
self and others seems obvious, but it is nevertheless an important pre-
supposition for all experiences of shame – not only for what Nussbaum 
calls primitive shame. Against the backdrop of our phenomenological 
description of shame, we can understand the role of this differentiation 
more precisely: We can now see shame as a specific emotional manifesta-
tion of the relational character of being, in which the separation between 
self and other appears as painful and problematic and contributes to the 
experience that the intended goodness is impeded and the chances for its 
realization interrupted. The separation is, in turn, a precondition for how 
we see shame as the result of clashing contexts of agency that leads to 
disruption and lack of agency coherence. 
Before we proceed with our analysis of Nussbaum’s position here, we 
can benefit from Helen B. Lewis’ analysis of shame and agency from a 
more emotional point of view. Her classic analysis underscores our 
point about shame as the result of a clash between contexts of agency. 
She sees it as the result of a conflict – a conflict that, to a large extent, 
mirrors the phenomenological description we developed in the introduc-
tion, although she works from a psychological angle. However, whereas 
174 Ibid., 184. 
175 Ibid., 184. 
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Zahavi’s analysis of shame pointed to the mediated experience of the self 
via the other, Lewis develops the conflict and the components in this 
“clash” further. She points to how “the divided functioning of the self 
in relation to the ‘other’ – its being in two places at once – and the ‘split’ 
between cognition and affect, together with the global nature of the whole 
self as the target of hostility from the field, make shame a difficult expe-
rience to rectify.”176 Thus, shame might imply a separation between cog-
nition and affect. Furthermore, her focus on the latter also opens up for 
a broader understanding of shame than one that focuses on moral trans-
gressions. She describes what we have metaphorically termed as a “clash” 
as a “failure by comparison with an internalized ego ideal”177 which may 
comprise of other components than those circumscribed by moral stan-
dards and norms. This clash implies what we are addressing when we say 
that shame implies a double perspective on the self: the immediate, and 
the other-mediated. 
Lewis also relates experiences of self to the experience of one’s own 
agency in a way that underscores why self and shame are so closely related. 
Self as registration of identity is mediated by agency. “The self is, first 
of all, the experiential registration of the person’s activities as his own. 
This registration of activities may, and most often does proceed silently 
and automatically, i.e., without the person’s awareness of his registration 
mechanism.” Here, we claim, she describes what we have defined as the 
immediate character of agency before the interruption of the shaming 
“other.” She continues, in a way that also supports our initial analysis fur-
ther, by pointing to how “instances of the failure of automatic registration, 
such as depersonalization and estrangement, make clear by contrast how 
much of the registration of activity as one’s own is taken for granted.”178 
Shame suspends this “taken-for-grantedness” in one’s experience, and 
thereby, it suspends agency’s immediacy. The mediation of shame by 
the presence of the other is, in her view, not only a cognitive effect but 
relies on the “emotional relationship between the person and the “other” 
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such that the person cares what the other thinks or feels about the self. 
In this affective tie, the self does not feel autonomous or independent, but 
dependent and vulnerable to rejection.” Lewis can, therefore, also say that 
“shame is a vicarious experience of the significant other’s scorn.”179 Con-
sequently, the actual presence of the other is not necessary to experience 
shame. 
Shame and imperfection 
Nussbaum makes a further point that underscores shame’s ambiguous 
character: The painful experience that shame contributes to implies more 
than a simple diminishing of self-regard. Shame emerges only against the 
backdrop of some kind of already existing self-regard. “It is only because 
one expects oneself to have worth or even perfection in some respect 
that one will shrink from or cover the evidence of one’s non-worth or 
imperfection.”180 Expectations like these do not appear out of thin air but 
are themselves the result of interactions with others – an insight that, in 
turn, underscores the relational conditions of selfhood in general, and 
the conditions for shame more specifically. Against the backdrop of our 
suggestion for seeing shame as the interruption of intentional personal 
investment, this feature makes sense, since that which is interrupted can 
be identified as the positive and immediately present regard of oneself in 
its concrete manifestation of agency. We can elaborate this point with an 
example:
Consider the case of a boy who thinks that he is good at skiing, because he 
has never had the chance to think otherwise. Then there is a ski-contest at his 
school and, like the other pupils, he signs up. He has no idea of how good he 
is or not, but he thinks that he is just as good as the others in his class, at least. 
He participates in the competition like his peers and feels good about himself 
for doing so. However, when the results are announced, he sees that he is at the 
end of the list – significantly behind all the others. For him, this is a shameful 
experience. He feels bad about himself and wants to hide. 
179 Ibid., 42.
180 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 184.
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Children’s need to perform and to feel good about themselves for per-
forming well may often end with this type of frustration – which we may 
call the frustration of the desire for recognition by achievement – a recog-
nition that is crucial for the development of positive self-esteem. The case 
above illustrates both of Nussbaum’s points: How the child can differen-
tiate between himself and the others, and how it is that he has an initial 
positive feeling about his performance – perhaps assisted by parents who 
have given him no opportunity for a reality check that could help him 
make an adequate assessment of his skiing skills. 
In the example given, shame is a “painful emotion responding to a 
sense of failure to attain some ideal state.”181 It affects the whole experi-
ence of self, and not only the specific act. The boy did not only feel bad 
about his skiing skills – his whole self-perception as an excellent skier 
was crushed. “In shame, one feels inadequate, lacking some de sired type 
of completeness or perfection. But of course one must then have already 
judged that this is a type of completeness or per fection that one rightly 
ought to have.”182 The other side of this point is that shame can be dimin-
ished if one can operate with more realistic ideals of who one can and 
should be; be it in the eyes of oneself or the eyes of others.183 However, this 
way of handling potential shame does not exclude the possibility for a 
continuous influence of the primitive type of shame later on in life: shame 
may follow whenever the subject suffers a narcissistic defeat and realizes 
that he or she is not uniquely special in some way. Therefore, Nussbaum 
concludes that “the primitive shame that is connected to infantile omnip-
otence and (inevitable) narcissistic failure lurks around in our lives, only 
partially overcome by the later development of the child’s own separate-
ness and autonomy.”184 
It is worth noting here that shame seems to stand in a certain opposi-
tion to, and may even at times compromise, autonomy – a point that will 
be discussed in Chapter 6 on shame and morality. But this point is not 
181 Ibid., 184. 
182 Ibid., 184. 
183 We want to stress here that this strategy for diminishing the potential for shame is conditioned 
on developing a more realistic basis for self-esteem, and not on the strive for perfection, which 
can never help one overcome what caused shame in the first place. 
184 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 184–85. Quote 185. 
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only relevant for ethics. From a psychological point of view as well, auton-
omy is at risk. Even when one has developed a sense of self and the psy-
chological maturity that results in self-reliance, shame may appear. What 
Nussbaum calls the “narcissistic defeat” is, therefore, not necessarily the 
result of a negative or immature attitude: it can happen when the invest-
ment of desire, creativity, or struggle for recognition that all humans 
articulate, in some way or another becomes frustrated or impeded. Such 
investment need not be a manifestation of unrealistic grandiosity: it 
might just as well be the result of the natural struggle for recognition and 
self-articulation that every human being exhibits. 
Shame as a social and relational phenomenon
As indicated, the need for being recognized as unique, and the feeling 
of grandiosity that one may feel the need for in comparison with others, 
testifies to the profoundly relational character of being human. These 
narcissistic traits, with their potential risk of failure and concomitant 
effect in the experience of shame, need not necessarily mean that shame 
is a social feeling in any qualitative sense of the word. Instead, we may 
say that it is an emotion that separates one from others and contributes 
to a feeling of being set apart or isolated from them, when one is, in the 
default position, related to them. Thus, an experience of shame would 
not have been possible unless there was already some form of relational 
self-understanding present. We argue, therefore, that shame is among 
those emotions that make it necessary to establish a distinction between 
a relational and a social character. To speak of an emotion as social 
implies that the one who harbors it feels a (deep and positive) connec-
tion with others, whereas the one who feels shame has an experience of 
this connection as severed, as lacking, or as manifested only negatively. 
Accordingly, shame as an emotion separates one from the community 
with others and dissolves the experience of social belonging. (This is 
probably also the reason why shame is so often used for punishing oth-
ers or for disciplining them). Hence, it entails a movement away from 
others, as well as away from one’s previous and immediate experience 
of oneself. 
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Accordingly, we can see shame as the possible (but not a necessary) 
result of an interruption or even a breakdown in self-relation via relation 
to others that is usually expressed in forms of self-esteem and the experi-
ence of belonging to a community of peers. Thus, shame articulates “an 
awareness of inadequacy that pre cedes any particular learning of social 
norms” – a point that is important to note since it makes shame far more 
about self-relation than relation to others. Thus, it can exist before any 
capacity for subjectivity and self-reflection is fully developed. Nussbaum 
nevertheless holds that this (to our notion, pre-subjective) experience of 
shame does not rule out “that in later life it will become inflected with 
social learning.”185 
Furthermore, when Nussbaum sees the primitive form of shame as a 
breakdown in self-relation as self-esteem, it does not require that the one 
who is ashamed experiences the presence of a more general audience.186 
The qualitative state of shame comes to expression in shame as the expe-
rience of being disconnected from that which one holds to be the source 
of good, and this need not be a general audience or a specific group, but 
only that or those in which one’s self-esteem is grounded (or, in our mode 
of expressing it: that towards which one’s agency is intentionally directed), 
be it one’s own self-conception or the relation to the admiration and rec-
ognition of the other/others. Nussbaum refers to Piers’ analysis of shame 
as “connected to a fear of abandonment by the source of good; its pain is 
felt pri marily in relation to an ideal state that one fantasizes oneself, not, 
at least in primitive shame, in relation to the group as such.”187 This fear 
of abandonment by the good is, accordingly, part of what can interrupt 
the intentional agency and cause shame. The relation to the good is also 
among the elements that we see as relevant for identifying shame as an 
embodied phenomenon that originates out of frustration of desire (since 
desire is always, at some level, the desire for the presumed good). 
185 Ibid., 185. 
186 Here, she comments indirectly on a topic that we shall discuss further in the Chapter 6 on shame 
and morality, namely what Dionna, Rodrigo & Teroni call the “socialist dogma” for understand-
ing shame. See below, pp. 286–292.
187 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. 185. Note here how her analysis 
underscores the initial and immediate experience of social relation that is a presupposition for 
agency that seeks recognition in the eyes of others or oneself. 
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We should also note here how the above analysis testifies to the com-
posite character of shame and the various dynamics in which it can 
manifest itself. Because shame is rooted in the disruption of positive 
self-esteem, it is, as indicated, of crucial importance to consider what 
constitutes the sources of this self-esteem. The variety of ways in which 
shame functions in the social arena, therefore, makes it a rather dynamic 
emotion. Nussbaum points to how, in our minds rightly, “societies have 
a good deal of room to shape the experience [of shame] differently, both 
by teaching different views of what is an appropriate occasion for shame 
and by linking shame differently with other emotions.”188 Hence, what 
counts as shameful to “the shameless Arabian daughters” may be totally 
different to what is shameful for a young woman who posts pictures of 
herself on Instagram. 
Nussbaum holds that primitive shame can be transcended. However, 
as we have seen, she is also well aware that this does not always happen. 
She holds that “all human beings very likely carry a good deal of prim-
itive shame around with them, even after they in some ways transcend 
it.”189 We would argue that the universal potential of primitive shame 
to reappear and be present makes it difficult to see it as something 
that can be reliable in public life as a device for normative guidance. 
Nussbaum holds that, to the extent that there is any cognitive content 
in “primitive shame,” it has a negative content for the self and is not 
likely to serve any apparent positive purpose in society. However, she 
is realistic in thinking that it would be hard to eliminate shame from 
human life since primitive shame is so deeply rooted in the structure 
of life itself. Thus, her normative assessment is that shame neither can, 
nor even should, be eliminated from human life. Shame is one of the 
ways “in which we negotiate deep tensions involved in the very fact of 
being human, with the high aspirations and harsh limits that such a 
life in volves.”190 
188 Ibid., 185. 
189 Ibid., 15. 
190 Ibid., 70. 
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Shame and individuation: overcoming narcissism 
We need to add a further point, that builds on the previous ones, to the 
above analysis. It concerns how psychological conditions contribute to 
developing what is required for a mature and moral relation to others 
and the world. Thus, we need to repeat some of the points in the previous 
analysis with regard to their significance for moral maturation and moral 
relationships. This section is, therefore, also relevant as a backdrop to the 
forthcoming chapter on morality and shame. 
When the infant’s narcissistic grandiosity engages it in the world in 
modes that lead to (optimal) frustration, the subsequent result is individ-
uation. As already seen, it is when the child is sufficiently affirmed, and its 
feelings and achievements recognized that it slowly develops the ability to 
exist as separate from the caretaker and gain a sense of self with a distinct 
self-experience and world-experience. Then it also becomes increasingly 
more able to see the caretaker as a person with distinct needs and activ-
ities. Furthermore, “the parents’ (or other caregivers’) ability to meet the 
child’s omnipotence with suitably responsive and stable care creates a 
framework within which trust and interdependence may thus gradually 
grow: the child will gradually relax its omnipotence, its demand to be 
attended to constantly, once it understands that others can be relied on 
and it will not be left in a state of utter helplessness.”191 Due to this process 
of individuation, the child also becomes better able to deal with the com-
posite character of its feelings and regulate them better: it can see that the 
relationship to (m)other is ambiguous, meaning that it comprises both 
negative and positive elements: Nussbaum refers to Fairbairn’s account of 
how the child develops a moral defense that makes it possible to relate to 
its own feelings without being crushed by them: 
The idea is that the child who recognizes that it wishes to destroy the parent 
whom it loves feels threatened with a sense of limitless blackness in itself. It 
sees that it has badness in itself, and feels that perhaps it is all bad. But by now 
the child is capable, in a rudimentary way, of understanding the distinction be-
tween the self and its deeds. It can seek atonement for bad acts without feeling 
191 Nussbaum, 187. 
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altogether lost. Morality comes to the rescue, in the sense that it is able (with 
help from others) to understand that doing bad, and even wanting bad, are not 
the same as being bad through and through.192
When the child gradually becomes able to renounce its demands for 
complete control over the caretaker, by seeing these demands as inappro-
priate, it is experienced as a loss. However, Nussbaum underscores, with 
Melanie Klein, that “it will also be attended by creativity, as the child 
learns that it can atone for bad wishes and deeds with good wishes and 
good deeds.” She goes on, writing: 
It now sets about doing things for others, showing that it recognizes that other 
people too have a right to live and have their own plans. In general, the child 
learns to live in a world of individuals, in which others have legitimate claims 
and separate purposes, and in which respect for those claims limits the inor-
dinate demands of the self. Love is increasingly understood in terms of inter-
change and reciprocity, rather than in terms of narcissistic fusion and the rage 
for control; the self is increasingly understood, and accepted, as human, in-
complete, and partial, rather than as grandiose and demanding completeness.193
As we have seen, when the child’s emotions are not affirmed and/or con-
tained by the (m)other, it remains dependent on others for a sense of self 
that allows for self-esteem and safety. Moreover, the child finds itself 
captured in a tension between having the need for the other, whereas 
this other for which it has the need is never going to give it access to 
the resources it needs for becoming self-reliant. The parent who attends 
insufficiently to the child keeps it in a continuous craving for response 
and thus contributes to maintaining its narcissistic orientation towards 
the world. 
The precondition for developing a mature self is therefore to provide 
care that can overcome such narcissistic delusions and establish a more 
adequate self-perception. This can only happen if consistently affirmed 
and offered ideals that enable the development of other-oriented empathic 
interpersonal interaction. A fundamental outcome of this development is 
192 Ibid., 187–188. 
193 Ibid., 188. 
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the basic trust with which the child can meet the world.194 This trust, is, as 
we shall develop in the final chapter of this book, among the prerequisites 
for avoiding or overcoming shame. Trusting and empathic interaction 
not only allows oneself to function better, but it makes it possible to over-
come some of the causes of shame. Hence, we argue, shame is rooted in 
conditions that one should try to work against or overcome by improv-
ing the conditions for emotional and cognitive interaction in the social 
dimension of existence. This is most vividly apparent in how shame can 
be avoided by having more adequate expectations about one’s achieve-
ments and limitations. In reality, we are not omnipotent, and since we 
are dependent on others, primitive shame represents a significant emo-
tional response to the disruption of this self-delusion. It does, in a signif-
icant manner, represent the emotional response to the disruption of this 
self-delusion. Thus, to overcome shame, one needs to come to terms with 
one’s vulnerability.
Emerging features in the philosophical 
discussion of shame
Shame and vulnerability
We have suggested that shame is linked to the vulnerable state of being 
human. Shame is the result of the experienced exposure to others of our 
vulnerability, which can lead to exposure to others in (deeply) emotion-
ally charged situations and relations. Shame may thus also be seen as one 
of the ways in which we respond to our vulnerability, in movements of 
withdrawal, reclusion or isolation. All of these responsive movements 
suggest that we try to shield ourselves from further exposure. Thus, the 
way we deal with vulnerability can explain how there is a connection 
between shame and hiding, shielding oneself from the gaze of others, or 
looking away oneself. This withdrawal can be understood as the result of 
recognizing that one’s intentions or projects imply a failure or are scorned 
194 For the psychological basis of such trust, see Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, Revised 
edition. (London: Triad/Paladin, 1977).
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by others, and accordingly, expose oneself to the vulnerability of one’s 
intentions and agency.
In the above analysis of the relationship between shame and narcis-
sism, we have seen that narcissism comes in both healthy and patholog-
ical variants. Positive and “natural” narcissism is conceived of as “any 
mental activity which serves to ‘maintain the structural cohesiveness, 
temporal stability, and positive affective coloring of the self-represen-
tation.’”195 Thus, we see narcissism “as a continuum phenomenon, from 
healthy and adaptive at one end of the spectrum, to pathological and 
severely maladaptive at the other.”196 Kealy and Rasmussen describe the 
problematic sides of narcissism as not originating out of grandiosity as 
such, but as a result of “the veiled and vulnerable counterpart to gran-
diose display.” Accordingly, “[t]he self-regulatory deficit of pathological 
narcissism is not the grandiosity itself, but a secret fragile core that must 
be warded off from conscious awareness and prevented from discovery by 
others – and indeed from the self.”197 Given our previous understanding 
of the self which experiences shame as dependent on others and lacking 
the self-esteem or self-reliance that can supply autonomy and indepen-
dence from the gaze of others, this approach seems to underscore further 
the role shame plays in the psychological complexities that come to the 
fore in narcissistic individuals. Shame can then be seen as an immediate 
response to instances when the self suddenly experiences itself as vul-
nerable and exposed – experiences that are more than likely to occur in 
a narcissist that is not assessing its capacities, abilities, and concomitant 
projects in an adequate manner. 
The “vulnerable theme” that occurs in narcissism “refers to feelings 
of helplessness, suffering, and anxiety regarding threats to the self, and 
reflecting inner feelings of inadequacy, emptiness, and shame. These phe-
nomena we have already touched upon in both Nussbaum and Kohut 
above. Narcissistic vulnerability involves “hypervigilance to insult, and 
195 David Kealy and Brian Rasmussen, “Veiled and Vulnerable: The Other Side of Grandiose Nar-
cissism,” Clinical Social Work Journal 40, no. 3 (2012), 357, with reference to Robert Stolorow, 
“Toward a Functional Definition of Narcissism,” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 56 (1975).
196 Kealy and Rasmussen, “Veiled and Vulnerable: The Other Side of Grandiose Narcissism”, 357.
197 Ibid., 358. 
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excessive shyness or interpersonal avoidance in order to retreat from 
perceived threats to self-esteem.”198 We have already indicated that the 
vulnerable condition may be either overtly or covertly expressed. We see 
this as one of the possible psychological reasons for why people may feel 
ashamed for being ashamed: the display of shame implies an admission 
of vulnerability that only makes one even more vulnerable.199 It allows us 
to see grandiosity as an attempt to defend and compensate for the experi-
ences of chronic shame and vulnerability.200 
If we, furthermore, consider the origin of shame from the point of view 
of attachment theory, children whose parents are narcissistically preoc-
cupied may suffer from a lack of affirming responses to their unfold-
ing self because the parents are too self-occupied. This lack of adequate 
response “has a traumatic effect, generating chronic feelings of shame 
and emptiness, from which an escape is sought via grandiose fantasies 
and self-enhancing behavior.”201 In other words: narcissism begets narcis-
sism. Attachment theory identifies this as a condition in which the child 
lacks a ‘secure base.’ Accordingly, it develops “an insecure internal work-
ing model of the self, propelling maladaptive searching for security and 
validation.”202 
If we look at this analysis from some distance, we see then that shame 
belongs to the emotions and psychological conditions in which the self 
198 Ibid. 
199 Cf. also David Kealy and Johns Ogrodniczuk, “Pathological Narcissism: A Front-Line Guide,” 
Practice 24, no. 3 (2012), 164: “Narcissistic vulnerability refers to feelings of helplessness, suf-
fering and anxiety regarding threats to the self, reflecting inner feelings of inadequacy, empti-
ness and shame. Interpersonally, narcissistic vulnerability involves hypervigilance to insult, and 
excessive shyness or inter-personal avoidance in order to retreat from perceived threats to 
self-esteem. As useful as sub-typing may be for heuristic purposes, grandiosity and vulnera-
bility likely do not exist in pure form. Instead, some degree of fluctuation between grandiose 
and vulnerable elements is likely to occur for most clients with narcissistic problems. Indeed, 
these themes may simply be two sides of the same coin, with grandiose features serving to mask 
underlying self-esteem deficits.”
200 Ibid., 164.
201 Ibid., 165. Cf. C. A. Gross and N. E. Hansen, “Clarifying the Experience of Shame: The Role of 
Attachment Style, Gender, and Investment in Relatedness,” Personality and Individual Differ-
ences 28, no. 5 (2000), who also find that secure attachment is negatively associated with shame 
while preoccupied and fearful attachment are positively correlated. In a similar vein also are the 
results in Alessia Passanisi et al., “Attachment, Self-Esteem and Shame in Emerging Adulthood,” 
Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences 191 (2015).
202 Kealy and Ogrodniczuk, “Pathological Narcissism: A Front-Line Guide.” 165.
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is mainly preoccupied withitself. This self-occupation also means, as we 
have briefly touched upon earlier, that one becomes less able to respond 
empathically to the state of others. The reasons for this lack of attunement 
to others can be found in the attachment trauma just mentioned: such 
trauma inhibits the development of mentalization, which is “the capacity 
to reflect on mental processes in oneself and others.”203 This point is of 
relevance to the present treatise because it points further to the unreliable 
relationship that shame and processes leading to shame display, when 
it comes to how one relates to the world and to oneself. The traumatic 
attachment provides the self with fewer chances for self-transparency, 
and offers less understanding of what the real responses, attitudes, and 
minds of others are: 
Mentalization is fostered within secure attachment relationships in 
which the child experiences his or her mind being reflected and repre-
sented by attachment figures. This process essentially affords the indi-
vidual a theory of mind in which behaviors and emotions can be thought 
about beyond their face value. Impaired mentalization involves a lack of 
flexibility in interpreting mental experiences: the individual’s interpreta-
tion is the interpretation. For example, when confronted with situations 
that trigger shame and insecurity, the client with narcissistic problems 
may have great difficulty in taking a step back to consider potential alter-
native perspectives or responses.204 To summarize the above in straight-
forward terms: severe shame seems to be among the modes of being in 
which the individual manifests how it is captured in the prison of its own 
self, or, at least, how shame impedes its chances for developing into a free, 
creative, spontaneous and self-reliant individual.205 
Shame: self-esteem and self-respect 
We now need to take a closer look at the relation between self-esteem, 
self-respect and shame, because shame seems to impact these ways of 
203 Ibid., 165.
204 Ibid., 165.
205 The notion of captivity we have chosen here is not arbitrary: the withdrawal to the inner self as 
a prison can also provide a shelter for the shamed self. 
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relating to oneself. We do this in two steps: first, by discussing some ele-
ments of the understanding of shame in Deonna et al.,206 and then by 
looking into a thorough discussion that points towards elements in moral 
theory as well, by John Deigh.207 
Deonna et al. make a distinction between self-respect and self-esteem. 
It serves to address the conditions for shame in the identity of the person 
in question more specifically. Deonna et al. hold that the identity that is 
relevant for shame must be internally specified “in terms of the subject’s 
failures with respect to values to which he has a particular attachment.”208 
Hence, they see shame as related to values, and we argue that values are 
always, in some sense or another, among the basic conditions for agency, 
even when they are not recognized or cognitively acknowledged. 
Deonna et al. problematize the Rawlsian idea that shame is a blow 
to self-esteem, and they support this position by referring to Gabriele 
Taylor, who holds that the Rawlsian view of shame misconceives the rela-
tion of the subject to its values. Taylor, on her part, offers an account in 
which shame is correlated to self-respect rather than self-esteem.209 This 
approach allows us to see what is at stake in terms of expressions of iden-
tity in the type of projects and agency that may cause shame when they 
are interrupted. 
According to Taylor, self-esteem means that one takes a favorable view 
of oneself, whereas lack of self-esteem means that one takes an unfa-
vorable view of oneself. However, Taylor holds that one can maintain 
self-respect even when one does not take a favorable view of oneself in 
concrete situations where one loses one’s self-esteem. Furthermore, this 
point implies that self-respect is a precondition for an uninterrupted and 
trustful engagement with the world, since there is no disturbance to one’s 
intentions and accompanying expectations. “To respect oneself is to have a 
sense of one’s worth that goes together with having certain expectations.” 
206 Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an 
Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
207 John Deigh, “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique,” Ethics 93, no. 2 (1983).
208 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 94.
209 Not all authors who work on shame follow suit here. There are several authors that we present in 
the following who see shame as related to self-esteem. 
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It is when these expectations are not met that shame kicks in: shame is 
the emotional reaction to “injuries, lack or loss of self-respect.”210 
In shame, then, we assess situations in terms of their impinging upon our 
self-respect, where self-respect has nothing to do with having a favorable 
opinion of ourselves. Self-respect, we may add, cannot, unlike self-esteem, be 
fruitfully viewed as varying along a continuum; it has, rather, an all-or-nothing 
character: you either have self-respect or you have lost it. Providing a positive 
characterization of self-respect will, thus, allow us to see what is distinctive 
about shame.211
Here, Taylor links shame to a disturbance to that which constitutes the 
subject’s central commitments, as these are in some way or another cru-
cial to the life that he or she envisages him or herself as leading, and 
thereby to his or her identity. When these commitments are successfully 
realized, they not only result in self-respect. They may also be seen as 
manifestations of it. In other words, shame is the result of shortcomings 
regarding our central and self-defining commitments. “In shame, we 
evaluate ourselves as going against our central commitments” and expe-
rience our integrity as threatened.212 
Deonna et al. recognize important elements in Taylor’s approach that 
are in accordance with our previously presented understanding of shame. 
By connecting shame with self-respect understood as an all-or-nothing 
affair, we see how shame implies a severe evaluation, and not only a shift-
ing or variable mood. Furthermore, Taylor’s approach opens up to the 
culturally and socially relative conditions of shame, as it sees it as con-
nected to the different values to which individuals may be attached. Thus, 
“Taylor’s account is agreeably pluralist, in the sense that it acknowledges 
and accommodates the fact that different people, at different times and 
places, have different values that might all become relevant for shame.”213 
What she does not seem to be able to take into account with this approach 
210 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 95. With reference 
to Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, 131.
211 Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 95.
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid., 96.
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   120 2/25/2021   4:38:38 PM
s h a m e  f r o m  a  p s yc h o lo g i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v i e w
121
is that shame may not only occur when central commitments are jeopar-
dized. One can also feel shame for scolding one’s neighbor for not mow-
ing his lawn often enough, or one’s daughter for not doing the dishes as 
fast as one would like. 
Deonna et al. also see similar problems as we do with relating self- 
respect (and its eventual failure as manifested in shame) exclusively 
to central self-commitments. They argue that Taylor’s model fails to 
shed light on many episodic appearances of shame, especially the less 
dramatic ones. We may also feel shame concerning commitments that 
are not self-defining. Accordingly, they argue for understanding shame 
along a spectrum in which not all occasions for shame are constituted by 
a failure to live up to one’s central commitments. 
At this point, our suggestion for understanding shame may prove 
helpful. Instead of seeing shame exclusively as the result of one’s cen-
tral commitments, we can see such commitments as a subcategory of 
what we have called the intentional projects in which the person invests 
themselves to a greater or lesser degree. Some of these projects may be of 
greater importance than others to the individual’s overall commitments. 
However, the failure of “smaller” or more limited projects may also cause 
shame, simply because one at a given time invested some of one’s own 
desires, expectations, aspirations, or creativity in them with the hope 
of success or fulfillment. Then they were obstructed in some way. Thus, 
although Taylor has identified important relations between shame and 
self-respect, we still find reasons to maintain that shame needs to be seen 
as related to conditions of both self-respect and self-esteem, since there 
may be instances in which our self-esteem is affected by shame without it 
affecting our fundamental self-respect. 
Deigh on conditions for agency and shame: shame 
is not necessarily the loss of self-esteem 
John Deigh has also criticized the Rawlsian understanding of shame as 
the result of the loss of self-esteem in ways that are somewhat parallel to 
those of Deonna et al. Rawls “explains self-esteem in terms of the goals 
and ideals one incorporates into one’s life plans.” Although Rawls focuses 
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on the conditions of the moral personality, he identifies shame in general 
as the result of failure to achieve a goal or an ideal that is integral to one’s 
self-conception. Shame thus involves a sense of personal failure, he holds. 
We would add: it is also caused by our perception of the vulnerability 
that affects and restricts our agency. This failure is conditioned by the 
personal investment which has been carried out and correlated with the 
strength or power of this investment.214 According to Rawls, shame is felt 
over shortcomings, whereas guilt is felt over wrong- doings.215 
Deigh expands and adds to the Rawlsian account in different ways. 
First, he claims that shame involves a certain amount of loss of self- 
control, a point that underscores the character of rupture and interrup-
tion of agency associated with shame. This loss implies an “experience 
of discomfiture, a sudden shock that short-circuits one’s composure and 
self-possession.”216 
Moreover, Rawls seems to hold that shame affects one’s sense of worth: 
In shame, the positive self-image is replaced by a negative one that implies 
a loss of self-esteem. Self-esteem is then correlated with the evaluation of 
one’s achievements and with one’s sense of success: high self-esteem is 
the result of a positive judgment of success, whereas low self-esteem is the 
result of one’s sense of failure.217 However, Deigh finds this approach unsat-
isfactory. He questions the central idea that shame signifies loss of self- 
esteem.218 This Rawlsian understanding of self-esteem links it primarily to 
one’s own mood and the given activity that one has undertaken within a 
given period, and which is then the basis for one’s self-assessment. Fur-
thermore, the relevant activities must be qualified as expressing a direction 
in order to be conditions for positive self-esteem. “They must be chan-
neled into pursuits or projects and reflect one’s goals and ideals,” Deigh 
writes, thus underscoring the personal investment we have made part of 
our understanding of the conditions for shame.219 This investment and its 
214 Deigh, “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique,” 225. This correlation may not always be the case, 




218 Cf. ibid., 226. 
219 Ibid., 227.
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relation to central goals and ideals is also highly relevant for understand-
ing the conditions for what we have called coherent agency: 
Self-esteem is had by persons whose lives have a fairly definite direction and 
some fairly well- defined shape, which is to say that self-esteem requires that one 
have values and organize one’s life around them. One’s values translate into one’s 
aims and ideals, and a settled constellation of these is necessary for self-esteem. 
[…] Arguably, someone who has no aims or ideals in life, whose life lacked the 
direction and coherence that such aims and ideals would bring, would be nei-
ther an appropriate object of our esteem nor of our disesteem.220
Deigh introduces an essential distinction in order to understand the 
causes for lack of coherence and for the concomitant problems related 
to lack of self-esteem and shame for what one has done. His distinction 
between ownership and authorship makes it possible to interpret a situ-
ation in which one acts in conflict with one’s aims and ideals. The agent 
may explain this lack of coherence with one’s basic values for agency as 
the result of having been overpowered by some contingent desire. Thus, 
one’s agency would be attributed to powers of which one is the origin 
(ownership), but one can distance oneself from these by rejecting these as 
something one would own as a basis for further agency (authorship). An 
example of this would be the case mentioned in Chapter 2, where nurses 
act against their best conscience due to a lack of resources. 
Deigh employs this distinction to show how agency can generate sub-
jective conditions for self-esteem in a way that allows for different types 
of self-relation. “When one has a settled constellation of aims and ideals, 
then one distinguishes between the acts of which one is the author and 
those in which one serves as an instrument of alien forces. Without any 
such constellation, one is never the author of one’s actions, though many 
times the instrument of alien forces that act on one, triggered by external 
events.”221 Accordingly, authorship means having a settled constellation 
of aims and ideals as a precondition of self-esteem. It comes from “a good 
opinion of oneself as the author of one’s actions, more generally, one’s 
220 Ibid., 228. 
221 Ibid., 228.
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life.”222 Thus, authorship may be conditioned by a positive development 
of the self in relation to stable and orienting values and ideals.223 Or, to 
state it in accordance with G. Taylor: It is the distinction between author-
ship and ownership that allows for having self-respect even when one can 
occasionally have low self-esteem. 
According to this analysis, self-esteem depends on two related fac-
tors, which both condition the agency that leads to the positive outcome 
it represents: it implies “a favorable regard for one’s aims and ideals in 
life and a favorable assessment of one’s suitability for pursuing them.”224 
When self-esteem is not present, it is either because the aims and ideals 
on which one acts are considered base, or because of lack of “talent, abil-
ity, or other attributes necessary for achieving them. Either would mean 
that one lacked the good opinion of oneself that makes for self-esteem, 
and either would explain the dispirited condition that goes with one’s 
lacking self-esteem.”225
Hence, the conditions for what we have called coherent agency, of 
which shame is the manifestation of its impediment or interruption, 
require, first, that “one regards one’s aims and ideals as worthy and, 
second, one believes that one is well-suited to pursue them.”226 The first of 
these conditions is a prerequisite for a sense of life as having a meaning, 
whereas the second relates to the “confidence one has in the excellence 
of one’s person.”227 Together, these conditions can shape the direction 
and orientations of the projects in which we invest in a coherent manner. 
Referring back to the earlier discussions in this chapter, we would add 
that the extent to which one can develop such a positive orientation and 
direction is usually dependent on one’s initial interaction with significant 
others. 
These conditions are significant for the occurrence of shame insofar as 
they suggest that loss of self-esteem is caused by “a change in either one’s 
regard for the worthiness of one’s aims and ideals or one’s belief in one’s 
222 Ibid., 229. 
223 Cf. p. 121 above.
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ability to achieve them.” “The loss here is the loss of a certain view of one-
self,” Deigh writes.228 Thus, here idealization and mirroring, as described 
by Kohut, seem to work in the negative. So far, we have characterized 
this loss by means of notions such as rupture or interruption. The previ-
ously held self-esteem and the good opinion one had of oneself become 
exchanged for an unfavorable judgment that destroys this view. Lack of 
positive self-esteem is the result. In the Rawlsian account, 
… shame is the emotion one feels when such loss occurs. Moreover, shame is 
to be understood as signifying such loss. Shame on this characterization is the 
shock to our sense of worth that comes either from realizing that our values are 
shoddy or from discovering that we are deficient in a way that had added to the 
confidence we had in our excellence.229
However, Deigh finds this view insufficient. He points to several exam-
ples that the Rawlsian account seems to have trouble covering in order to 
make his position clear in detail: “First, there are cases in which one can 
experience lack of self-esteem, but not shame, such as when one becomes 
aware of the limitations of one’s capacities or skills. Then, we simply 
establish a more adequate assessment of our competences.”230 Thus, it is 
possible, for example, to have a low sense of esteem regarding one’s skiing 
ability without feeling shame. 
The second example is when shame is felt over something one did not 
believe affected one’s excellence, because one does not regard it as a fault 
in oneself. Examples here cover everything from when one feels shame 
for one’s accent or dialect or hair color when others ridicule it, to more 
severe cases where ethnic origin becomes a case for discrimination. From 
our point of view (not Deigh’s) this may be a case in which the intentions 
one has for relating to and engaging with others are interrupted by their 
response. Thus, the response hampers one’s intentions for full and equal 
participation with one’s peers. In this sense, other people always matter 
to one because they are the ones in whose faces and in whose actions one 
can read one’s own value as subjects.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Cf. ibid., 230ff.
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Deigh, nevertheless, makes some important comments regarding such 
cases, which point to the conditions for shame in the social and cultural 
realms of experience. He points to how self -esteem depends to some extent 
on the esteem others accord oneself. Furthermore, the impact of their 
assessment is correlated with the dependency that the person in question 
feels towards them: “The greater that dependency, the more readily one 
will feel shame in response to any deprecatory judgments they express.”231 
In other words, there are cases in which social action constitutes shame 
and in which it is not one’s abilities or ideals that are the cause, but the 
interruption by others of one’s agency and unproblematic self-assessment. 
Deigh considers this case as problematic from a Rawlsian point of view 
because sometimes one may feel shame due to another’s criticism or rid-
icule, even when one does not accept the other person’s judgment of one-
self. Such cases show that shame is often more of “a response to the evident 
deprecatory opinion others have of one than an emotion aroused upon 
judgement that one’s aims are shoddy or that one is deficient in talent or 
ability necessary to achieve them.”232
Young children who feel shame represent another problem for the 
Rawlsian account. Children at the age of four or five usually do not have 
a well-defined self-conception, nor do they organize their life “around 
the pursuit of certain discrete and relatively stable aims and ideals” by 
which they measure themselves by the “standards of what is necessary 
to achieve them.”233 Accordingly, children at this age do not relate to the 
conditions that Rawls considers necessary for self-esteem – and we nev-
ertheless consider them as subjects of shame. In other words, a child at 
this age, though capable of feeling shame, does not have self-esteem. The 
shame they experience must be attributed to other factors than the loss of 
self-esteem that Rawls talks about.234
231 Ibid., 233. 
232 Ibid.
233 Ibid., 234.
234 Ibid., 234. At this point, Kohut’s and others’ descriptions of the child’s need for recognition in 
mirroring may be a more adequate way to describe what happens: it is the project of acquiring 
self-esteem through the mirroring of one’s achievements that is rejected here, not an already 
existing self-esteem. 
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The final case that Deigh refers to as a problem for the Rawlsian 
account of shame is related to a distinction between an achievement ethic 
and an aristocratic ethic. Thus, his remarks on this topic are relevant for 
the forthcoming chapter on ethics and morality as well. Rawls’ position 
is based on the former, which emphasizes making something of oneself 
and achieving success. However, Deigh holds that “some experiences of 
shame reflect an aristocratic ethic; one feels shame over conduct unbe-
coming a person of one’s rank or station.” Shame that is a response to an 
achievement ethic is caused by the realization that one has not lived up to 
one’s aims and ideals, or the standards of excellence one holds for oneself. 
However, in shame that occurs on the basis of an aristocratic ethic, “the 
subject’s concern is with maintaining the deportment of his class and not 
necessarily with achieving aims and ideals that define success in life. He 
is concerned with conforming to the norms of propriety distinctive of 
his class and not necessarily with achieving aims and ideals that define 
success in life.”235
Nevertheless, we need to ask: would not also the latter, that is, failed and 
unsuccessful conduct that falls short of given aims and ideals, be possible 
to interpret as causing shame? One way to get around the problem would 
be to say shame here occurs because one fails to conform to ideals instead 
of realizing them. However, Deigh argues that something gets lost in this 
re-description: there is a shift in focus here from the one who one is (iden-
tity) to the way one conducts one’s life (agency) that is of importance. The 
Rawlsian account does not register this shift adequately: his view allows 
the person’s membership of a certain group or class to recede into the 
background as a determinative factor. But it is not insignificant as such, 
which is the reason why we treat this case in the context of psychology 
and not ethics. Although membership or belonging is the source of the 
ideals, the Rawlsian account does not ascribe any further significance to 
it. But it has significance because it is this membership that is the cause 
235 Ibid., 234. As the observant reader will see, the connections we make between shame and agency 
here place our treatment close to the topic of ethics, which is treated more extensively in the next 
chapter. Here, we just want to observe that Deigh’s understanding of aristocratic ethics seems to 
have parallels with what Kohlberg calls the conventional stage. Thus, it need not only be based 
on a class-stratified society. 
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of shame, and since the person will have a sense of shame, or of having 
disgraced him or herself, due to his or her relationship with others. Rawls 
does not distinguish between questions of identity and questions of life 
pursuits.236
Accordingly, Deigh identifies nuances in the origins of shame that are 
related to more than the failure to realize one’s commitments. Social and 
cultural features may be more involved in engendering shame than what 
the Rawlsian approach can account for. That account works mostly for 
people who answer questions about who they are by reporting about the 
aims or ideals that guide them: 
This makes it an attractive characterization of the shame felt by persons who are 
relatively free of constraints on their choice of life pursuits owing to class, race, 
ethnic origins, and the like. For such persons tend more to regard their aims 
and ideals as constituting their identity and their ancestry, race, class, and so 
forth as extrinsic facts about themselves. So the characterization explains the 
shame they feel as including an acute sense of who they are.237
Deigh’s critique of Rawls’ thus rests on how the latter ignores the psy-
chological, as well as the social and cultural, conditions for shame. It 
is not only one’s failure in the struggle to achieve one’s aims and ideals 
through agency that condition shame. Rawls seems to focus too much on 
the active, modern person who is relatively free from the conditions set 
by their context, culture, and the history to which they belong. Deigh sees 
the limitations of this position as one that “restricts a person’s identity to 
his aims and ideals in life,” and therefore, “it fails to explain as including 
this sense the shame someone, living in a rigidly stratified society, feels 
when he does not act as befits a member of his class or the shame some-
one, living in a multiethnic society, feels when he acts beneath the dignity 
of his people.” However, even when a person recognizes that he or she is 
not up to the cultural standards that he or she is expected to follow, these 
ideals do not constitute his or her identity. “Hence, we fail to account for 
236 Ibid., 235. 
237 Ibid., 235f. 
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such shame if we describe it as being felt over one’s having fallen short of 
ideals that regulate one’s life.”238
Deigh’s conclusion about the requirements for a definition of shame 
can, accordingly, be summarized thus: 
• It must take into account the role that the concern for the assess-
ment of others has for experiencing shame.239 However, this con-
cern is part of the conditions that cause shame and not part of the 
definition itself.240 
• In Rawls, one’s sense of worth has two sources. One is the person’s 
conviction that he or she has a meaningful life, and the other is 
the assessment of his or her own excellence. This approach comes 
close to self-respect as defined by Taylor above. Against this back-
drop, shame is, from his point of view, “felt either upon a judgment 
that one’s aims or ideals are shoddy or upon a judgment that one 
is deficient in a way that makes one ill suited to pursue them.”241 
This experience represents a shock to one’s immediate sense of 
worth. Deigh nevertheless claims that the account of what causes 
this shock is insufficient. It omits important sources for our sense of 
worth, as is evidenced, for example, in the case of the child seeking 
recognition without having a clear set of aims and ideals for life 
guidance, or the aristocrat who feels shame over behaving like a 
plebeian. In these cases, the source is neither a conviction about the 
worthiness of ends, nor a belief about suitability to pursue them. 
Thus, aspects of our identity that contribute to our sense of worth 
independently of the aims and ideals around which we organize our 
lives are insufficiently taken into account.242 
• Concomitant to the previous point, a sense of worth (or, to use 
G. Taylor’s terms, self-respect) as well as shame may therefore 
have its origin in structurally different contexts: either the results 
238 Ibid., 235.
239 Cf. ibid., 238.
240 Ibid., 239. 
241 Ibid., 240. 
242 Ibid., 240.
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of agency, or in the status, belonging and position that one holds 
in relation to others. One can, however, have different assessments 
of how one’s conduct is, without it impacting on one’s self-esteem, 
depending on to what extent one sees oneself as the author of one’s 
actions or not.243 
The author theory about shame relates the sense of worth to one’s con-
duct, and sees agency as providing grounds for attributing that worth. On 
the other hand, a sense of worth that comes from status/nature reflects a 
concern with the congruency between one’s conduct or appearance and 
one’s real worth. In the latter case, it is the relation between appearance 
and reality that is important: behavior that is congruent with one’s worth 
is an occasion for pride, and behavior that gives the appearance of lesser 
worth is an occasion for shame.244 This approach also makes it easier to 
understand people’s sensibility to shame, because it can explain why one 
“restrains oneself when one verges on the shameful and […] covers up 
the shameful when it comes into the open. […] Having shame, that is, 
having a sensibility to shame, can be understood here as self-control that 
works to restrain one from giving the appearance of lesser worth and self- 
respect that works to cover up shameful things that, having come to light, 
give one such an appearance.”245
Accordingly, Deigh sees shame “as a reaction to a threat, specifi-
cally, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the 
appearance of someone of lesser worth,” and not as a reaction to a loss. 
Thus, it is a protective movement: “Shame serves to protect one against 
and save one from unwanted exposure,”246 and accordingly, it is also 
self-protective “in that it moves one to protect one’s worth.”247 Thus, he 
offers an additional element to the relationship between vulnerability, 
hiding, and shame to which we have already pointed. Furthermore, 
243 Ibid., 241f. 
244 Ibid., 242. 
245 Ibid., 242.
246 Ibid., 242.
247 Ibid., 243. 
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Shame inhibits one from doing things that would tarnish one’s worth, and it 
moves one to cover up that which through continued exposure would tarnish 
one’s worth. Less figuratively, we might say that the doing or exposure of some-
thing that makes one appear to have less worth than one has leaves one open 
to treatment appropriate only to persons or things that lack the worth one has, 
and shame in inhibiting one from doing such things and in moving one to cover 
them up thus protects one from appearing to be an unworthy creature and so 
from the degrading treatment such appearance would invite.248 
To understand shame as a self-protective emotion explains two import-
ant features: first, the liability to shame regulates conduct, since shame 
inhibits one from doing certain things. Second, shame manifests itself in 
acts of concealment.249 The Rawlsian approach to shame cannot explain 
the latter. Therefore, Deigh argues, it should be given up.250 
Deigh makes a convincing case that shame need not be connected to 
self-esteem, and that a conception of shame that only defines it from that 
perspective is inadequate. However, it does not necessarily exclude the 
fact that shame as a phenomenon can affect both self-esteem and self- 
respect. But it is not only due to the loss of these. To the extent that self- 
respect and self-esteem are emotional phenomena, they are both affected 
by experiences of shame. 
If we consider Deigh’s proposal against the backdrop of our under-
standing of shame as a reaction to interruption of personally invested 
projects, shame is the response of a self which finds itself and its condi-
tions for agency vulnerable in a situation where such interruption occurs. 
One way to react to this experience of vulnerability is to hide. Another 
can be to invest in a new, self-assertive project to regain control of one’s 
agency and re-establish coherent agency (and concomitant self-esteem). 
The latter would concur with Deigh’s proposal to the extent that it implies 
a regulation and adjustment of conduct. 
248 Ibid., 243.
249 Ibid., 243. 
250 Ibid., 244–245. 
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Preliminary concluding reflections
The analyses in this chapter take as their point of departure how the self ’s 
architecture is constituted relationally and conditioned by the interaction 
between the infant and the significant others in early childhood. We rec-
ognize that the development of the self takes place on vulnerable terms, 
to which the self is always potentially exposed. This recognition is an 
essential precondition for understanding the conditions for experiences 
of shame. As the social and material conditions for the self are themselves 
not stable or fixed, this fact exposes the self to various resources that have 
implications for its agency. Then intentions and projects through which it 
develops, articulates and affirms itself, are therefore also always marked 
by risk and vulnerability. 
It is against this backdrop that we can see the mechanisms behind 
shame as evolved. Shame is an evolutionary product just as much as a psy-
chological one. Shame’s evolutionary process continues in the individual 
when he or she grows up and becomes an adult. The process (be it sound 
or bad) is itself exposed and vulnerable because our genetic makeup is 
always filtered through the individual’s social and material conditions. 
Hence, social interaction and the various conditions for self-development 
and realization play a large part in the conditions for shame and for the 
extent to which the individual becomes prone to shame or not. It cannot 
be determined based on social or genetic elements only but is the result 
of the interaction between different variables. Similar things can be said 
about the self ’s capacities for trust, empathy, love, altruism, etc. 
We can now, therefore, unfold the complexity of shame through a 
threefold optic. The mechanisms of shame, that is, the biologically and 
intra-psychological workings of shame, such as the biologically evolved 
sense of shame, and also the epi-genetical structuring of our mind that 
allows for genes to be activated or not, are developed under a set of defin-
ing conditions. On a scale, these range from oppressive to liberating, such 
as relational interdependency (for example, discretionary shame), socie-
tal structuring (for example, religious or ideological norms) and mate-
rial conditions (for example, access to housing, food, cf. the shame of the 
poor, the hobos in American culture, beggars, etc.). Shame manifests itself 
phenomenologically in contextually dependent patterns. These patterns 
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allow for a retroductive argument that suggests how shame emerges out 
of the mild causality of the self ’s architecture in context. 
Some examples may illuminate the above theoretical description:
• A woman is part of a cult where her freedom is taken away (ideolog-
ical and material conditions). She is also frequently sexually abused 
by the leader/self-appointed prophet as part of the religious ideology 
(material conditions = rape, ideological conditions = religious ideo-
logy defending rape). Under such conditions, shame – as a biological 
and psychological mechanism regulating our mode of relating to 
others, may cause a permanent alteration in self-image and identity 
(through the shame of being nothing more than a sexual object). 
• A child that grows up under social conditions in a nurturing (social) 
environment that fulfills the basic (psychological and material) 
needs may develop a sense of discretionary shame (mechanism of 
shame) that (as a consequence) both protects the fragile relations to 
others as well as fortifying the self through coherent agency.
• When a psychiatrist gives in to his or her sexual desires and turns 
the therapy into a sexual encounter, his or her professional integrity 
and ethical standards will, most certainly, be questioned by many 
of his or her colleagues and probably also by him or herself. Shame 
reactions, such as professional isolation, anger, or cover-up strate-
gies may occur to offer protection from shaming by others.251 
To approach shame within this multi-layered context is what makes 
it possible to see its profound implications for the individual’s self- 
perception, projects, intentions, and social life. Moreover, it also means 
that we need to see shame within a context where the self ’s ability to 
make choices and to learn and unlearn ways of coping with shame 
provides a complex and dynamic understanding of how it expresses itself 
in human life. 
251 See, for example, Terje Mesel, Når Noe Går Galt. Skam, Skyld Og Ansvar I Helsetjenesten. (Oslo: 
Cappelen Damm Akademisk, 2014).
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In this chapter, we will discuss how shame and the body are connected. 
After a general introduction and discussion of our framework, we will 
turn to specific topics. To address body shame adequately, we will widen 
our phenomenological description by underscoring the impact that the 
contextual social and material structures have on the phenomenon of 
shame. The primary concern of this phenomenology is to identify and 
analyze the hidden universal features, capacities, or essences of the lived 
body. Social theory, however, explores the dynamic between context and 
agent from a variety of perspectives, such as gender, power, religion, and 
politics. Thus, the theoretical resources of social theory add valuable per-
spectives to the analysis of the shame of the lived body in various con-
texts. We shall not discuss the structures as such, but rather see how they 
complement our phenomenological analysis of embodied shame. The 
reason for this approach should be apparent: the body, as both a social 
and material construction, is both visible in and part of the dynamics 
of constructed reality. Thus, in order to give an in-depth analysis of the 
experience of the shameful body, we need to understand the social and 
material premises for the presence and the visibility of the body in the 
world.
As we stated in the introductory chapter, our access to and perspective 
on reality is dependent on our interpretative resources and competencies. 
Thus, the shame phenomenon is articulated and experienced on many 
levels of human experience. It can be experienced as a psychological 
phenomenon, it can be articulated and interpreted in the social world 
through the signs and symbols of language, and it can be articulated 
and experienced both in the body and by the body. Thus, the embodied 
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character of shame is complicated, because the shameful experiences 
that people have are manifested in, or tied to, the body in different ways. 
The body can, for example, present feelings, desires, or arousals that are 
socially unacceptable or looked down upon and scorned or demeaned 
when they are displayed through the signs and symbols of the body, or by 
language or action. 
Shame is related to the complex contextual situatedness of the lived 
body. As bodies, we partake in different and overlapping contexts and 
activities that may express complex normative expectations to the lived 
body, of which some may run contrary to each other or fail to fit with the 
social and/or moral hierarchy of expectations. Shame may also occur due 
to either the empirical or the logical impossibility of adhering to this com-
plexity of bodily expectations. For example, being the mother of an infant 
and a toddler, and also being the CEO of a successful company, entails 
normative expectations that the lived body may not be able to meet. The 
disparate expectations presented to the body of the caring mother who 
breastfeeds her child, and being the tough female CEO, may result in an 
unwelcome interruption of shame when the woman falls short of meeting 
the expectations or objectives in any or both of the contexts that the lived 
body inhabits.
A short look at historical change
The history of the body, of bodily functions or displays of sex, gender 
or, more specifically, the female body, may help to outline the histori-
cal topography of bodily shame.252 This topography also reveals the tight 
connection between the different philosophical, religious, political, and 
social constructions of functions and displays of the body. These are pow-
erfully tied to both power and dominance, as well as to stigma, desire, 
arousal, and sin.253 A telling example is the history of homosexuality. We 
need not go far back in our history to find that bodily articulated 
252 See, for example, Hans Peter Duerr, Myten Om Civilisationsprocessen: B. 2: Intimitet, vol. B. 2, 
Intimität (Stockholm: Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposium, 1996).
253 See, for example, Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female Sexuality. We will 
elaborate in further detail on this in subsequent chapters.
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expressions of homosexuality were considered by most as deeply trou-
bling and shame-generating.254 
However, bodily shame is not tied exclusively to sexuality. The disabled 
body can also be perceived as shameful. Historically, having a child born 
with bodily disabilities could be shameful, especially if the child displayed 
bodily signs of intellectual disability as well, such as Downs syndrome.255 
In Norway, we have a history where such children were stowed away or 
hidden from exposure to avoid shame on the family. This shameful part 
of history is sadly not specific to Norway. The history of what was pejo-
ratively called freakery is also an example of how fear, shame, but also 
curiosity, were tightly interwoven.256 
In our own time, the postmodern emphasis on the complex and embod-
ied social self has brought the experience of the visible and exposed body 
and body shame into a sharp and new focus. In contemporary society, 
body shame can, for example, be generated by disease or damage mani-
fested on the skin, such as severe psoriasis, acne, or burn scars. But it can 
also be a response to lifestyle issues such as obesity. People can experience 
these bodily issues as shameful stigmas in a culture that cultivates ideals 
of the perfect, groomed body and a healthy lifestyle and diet.257 
This renewed focus on bodily shame does not necessarily correlate to 
an increase in powerful and potentially shaming social expectations. It 
may also be tied to specific changes brought about by postmodern cul-
ture. The social predictability, stability, and protection of class, gender, 
and culture that were essential elements of modernity have been deval-
uated to a large extent. In modernity, the social, cultural, religious, and 
political disciplining was more explicit and more rigorously defined. 
Then, oppression and devaluation of those that did not easily fall into the 
defined categories, such as women fighting for equal rights, the disabled, 
254 See, for example, David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub, Gay Shame (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2009).
255 See, for example, David Wright, Downs: The History of a Disability (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011); and Michael Rembis, Catherine J. Kudlick, and Kim E. Nielsen, The Oxford Hand-
book of Disability History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
256 See Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body (New 
York: New York University Press, 1996).
257 See, for example, Amy Erdman Farrell, Fat Shame: Stigma and the Fat Body in American Culture 
(New York: New York University Press, 2011).
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the mentally handicapped and other undesirables, was practiced in ways 
that left them with the shame of being unrecognized outsiders. How-
ever, the emergence of a postmodern Western society entailed a critique 
of both social categorizations and cultural, religious, and social power 
plays, and the oppression inherent in these. New values, such as fluidity, 
change, and the freedom to construct and stage one’s life according to 
one’s own ideals, emerged alongside new ways of both constructing, con-
ceptualizing, and evaluating, for example, sex and gender, the individual 
versus the collective, and of desirables and undesirables.258
However, the social disciplining of the individual has not disappeared. 
It has only shifted and changed into greater complexity and unpredict-
ability. Thus, the experience of increased subjective freedom to stage the 
identity of the embodied self now comes at a price. In a fluid and shift-
ing society, the many options for identification may become blurred. The 
flip-side of increased subjective freedom may then turn into an experi-
ence of an increased lack of belonging and identity. The complexity of 
different and potentially shaming expectations can also be experienced 
as more difficult to handle in a fast and fluid society. The outcome of this 
is that the potential for shaming increases when social unpredictability 
increases. This point is closely linked to how we have described shame 
as a clash of contexts of agency: the insecurity about the extent to which 
you share the context and conditions for agency with others in a way that 
can recognize the intentional direction of your own projects and aims 
may grow.
Furthermore, the virtual society renders the vulnerable self exposed 
through social media and without protection. Through channels on the 
internet, snapshots of a teenage boy or girl in a compromised bodily situa-
tion may be globally shared, without consent or the chance to be retrieved. 
In the virtual society, the possibility of being bodily exposed and shamed 
is an ever-present disciplining threat. The recognition that, for example, 
compromising photos are “out there” represents a global restriction of 
the resources available for staging and controlling the embodied self and 
258 For an introduction to the fluidity of postmodern society, see, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, 
Liquid Life (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005); Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
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its place in the world. Social media represents possibilities for continuous 
exposure to social disciplining of the embodied self and renders it vulner-
able to unpredictable and severe demeaning, behaviour degradation, and 
shaming. Thus, the shame of being exposed, or being under the contin-
uous threat of being exposed, is very much present. Protective strategies, 
such as hiding from shame, are made more difficult in the virtual society.
Phenomenological characteristics
The movements of shame and the relational body 
In the following, we will briefly discuss the phenomenological character-
istics of different types of body shame. We will follow the optic presented 
above and distinguish between the mechanics of shame, the socio- 
cultural context of shame and, finally, the consequences of culturally 
embedded and embodied shame.
We have argued that shame is a part of a composite cluster of inter-
related affective, emotional, and cognitive abilities that makes possible 
the complexity of human identity, interactions, and relationships. This 
evolutionally developed and socially constructed architecture of the self 
expresses its desires, needs, and orientations through embodied agency 
within a complex web of material, social, and relational structures. Shame 
may be our response when our intentional agency, our way of expressing 
ourselves in the world, is interrupted by, for example, being restricted, 
scorned, devaluated or labeled as unwanted. In such cases, shame appears 
as a culturally formed protective response when the vulnerable self-de-
fining intentional agency is threatened in a specific cultural context. As 
such, it connects our personal, individual, and embodied experience with 
the social world in which we are embedded. 
Accordingly, the formation of embodied selfhood and identity through 
intentional agency entails both an unescapable relationality and sociality 
through embodied interactions with others. As we stated above, shame 
is a response that reveals the embodied self as fragile, vulnerable, and 
exposed to others. We cannot avoid being seen by others, and their eval-
uation of how we intentionally construe ourselves matters to us. When 
met with devaluation or scorn, a subject may certainly isolate itself from 
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others in shame, thus protecting the vulnerable self from further deval-
uation. However, such responses only reinforce our point: a shameful 
retreat is necessary because the gaze of the other matters to us. If it did 
not matter, protective measures would not be necessary. 
In other words, shame reveals dynamic and identity-structuring move-
ments of the lived body.259 As we have attempted to show above, the self 
is constituted and formed in a complex interplay between the subject and 
its relations. It is our way of becoming and being-in-the-world. Through 
sociality, by taking on different roles and partaking in different social 
groups, we seek to maintain and fulfil our basic need for relationality. The 
first movement revealed in shame responses reveals this need for relation-
ality and sociality. The interruption of shame through the experience of 
falling short in someone’s eyes reminds us that they are not indifferent to 
us. It is in this relation to the other that the lived body is constructed; we 
are because of the Other. Thus, shame is a reminder or an affirmation of 
the constitutive relationality and closeness of the lived body. The second 
movement entailed in shame is the sudden shameful interruption when 
we experience that our intentional agency somehow falls short under the 
gaze of those to whom we owe our existence. Here, the need for establish-
ing a protective distance is predictable. By moving away and establishing 
strategies of projection, hiding, or isolation, or just by living through the 
experience of shame, the embodied self can reaffirm itself as a valuable 
part of the relational web to which it belongs. 
The success of these movements of shame hinges, on the one hand, on 
the severity of the structural and social conditions that cause shame and, 
on the other hand, on the personal resources that a person has to cope 
with shame responses.260 As shown above, sometimes shame responses 
may become altogether toxic and incapacitating, freezing a person in a 
movement that makes him or her unable to handle shame in a way that 
can remedy and re-situate the lived body within a valuable and support-
ive relational and social network.
259 See, for example, Luna Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially 
Shaped Body, (Blue Ridge Summit: Lexington Books, 2015), xv f.
260 See on shame-proneness above pp. 88–89.
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Preliminary position: body shame
Luna Dolezal’s book The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism and 
the Culturally Shaped Body gives a valuable contribution to the under-
standing of body shame.261 Some of the themes she presents work well 
as a backdrop for the understanding of body shame we develop here. As 
a phenomenologist, Dolezal takes the lived body as her starting point. 
All forms of shame are manifested and experienced through the body. 
However, of particular interest to Dolezal are experiences of shame that 
explicitly arise as a result of how the body is perceived. This approach 
allows us to repeat an important distinction. 
As mentioned above, shame can be experienced through the body in 
many ways. As embodied selves, deeply seated in a contextual web of 
relational, social, and material structures, the body is simply our only 
way of experiencing or – for that matter – being-in-the-world. That does 
not mean that we are shamed because of the body; we only experience 
it through the body. When we feel ashamed because our lack of parent-
ing skills has become the talk of the neighborhood, it is not our body 
that is shamed, but our actions or skills. But as we meet our neighbor’s 
gaze in the street, we may experience the bodily manifestations of shame 
through our avoiding gaze and burning cheeks. 
However, shame experienced because of the body has an altogether 
different structure than the one just described. On the one hand, we can-
not escape experiencing shame through our bodies as embodied selves. 
To be ashamed because of how our body is socially perceived drives a 
wedge between our subjective bodily presence and the body as an object 
that falls short of, for example, aesthetic or moral value. It is essential to 
note the push and pull forces at play in bodily shame. We are our bodies; 
to be an embodied being constitutes what it is to be a person present in 
the world. Thus, the subjective experience of being embodied negates the 
traditional conception of body and mind as separate instances or entities 
and pulls them together as one experiencing entity. We simply do not 
exist in any other way than as experiencing bodily presences; we are bod-
ies among bodies. 
261 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body.
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On the other hand, body shame singles out the body as an object for 
evaluation. Thus, body shame pulls the body as an object away from the 
embodied self in a variety of ways. Sometimes, it is the very separation 
and objectification of the body that is perceived as a shameful loss of the 
self, as in the objectifying sexual gaze. At other times, it may be the sub-
ject itself that objectifies its own body because the shame of the body 
threatens to rupture the self through deep and toxic shame. Thus, shame 
manifests itself in various movements. Suffice to say, at this point, the 
wedge between the body as subject and object puts the experiencing body 
in a situation of opposing needs and concomitant movements: the need 
to be itself as embodied, and the need for distance to the shameful objec-
tified body.
Body shame and intersubjectivity 
Our definition of shame entails that shame – including body shame – is 
an interruption or a full rupture of the intended objectives of the self. Such 
interruption seems to rest on at least two premises. The first premise is that 
someone or something interrupts us. Accordingly, body shame entails 
both subjectivity and intersubjectivity: we are bodies among bodies. As 
embodied subjects expressing our intentional objects through agency, we 
are therefore always under the gaze of the other (actual or not). However, 
a subject may certainly be hindered or barred from realizing intentional 
objects through agency without being bodily shamed. Thus, different con-
textual restraints may lead to a redefinition of agency. 
The many years of imprisonment that Nelson Mandela endured on 
Robben Island made it difficult for him to exert agency according to his 
former objectives. But it is not likely that it led to shame. Although Man-
dela’s body suffered imprisonment, his black body became a symbol of 
the oppressive racial apartheid of South African politics. But it was not 
the exposure of his black body that was at fault. In the eyes of his peers, 
his black body symbolized the fight for freedom and justice. Similarly, 
the widespread “Black Lives Matter” campaign in the United States also 
uses the black body as a symbol in the struggle for equality. There is also 
a parallel to the aforementioned “shameless Arabian daughters” who 
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stood proud on Norwegian national television and exposed their faces 
without traditional Muslim headwear. In all three examples, the black 
or the unveiled face symbolizes the fight against shame. So, even though 
Mandela’s project had to be altered due to contextual restraints, his black 
body imprisoned by white men became a beacon of hope and provided 
motivation for continuing the struggle for equality and freedom in South 
Africa. Here, the lack of shame corresponds with the coherence between 
Mandela’s agency and that of his peers. This congruence shielded his 
imprisoned body from shame. 
In the case of Bill Clinton, however, the exposure of shame due to his 
sexual relations with the young intern Monica Lewinsky was something 
the whole world could follow on national television. His shame was, at 
least partly, tied to his bodily desires, as they were exposed and judged 
as leading to agency and actions not befitting a sitting president. The 
exposure of his infidelity, the unethical use of his power as president and, 
lastly, his lying on national television, stood in stark contrast to the com-
monly held expectations as to what kind of objectives are befitting for 
a person holding the most powerful office in the world. Clinton’s acts 
revealed a gap between contexts of agency: his acts, values, and lack of 
virtue cast doubt about the moral integrity required of a president. Thus, 
by giving in to his bodily desires, Clinton revealed a character that sug-
gested either a shameful lack of control over his bodily desires or simply 
that he did not adhere to common ethical standards of fidelity. Moreover, 
being exposed as a person who lied under oath and used power for his 
own pleasure enhanced the impression of incongruence. Being exposed 
on national television as a liar, in full contradiction with the values and 
virtues of his powerful office, released shame responses.
To sum up, the first premise of body shame presupposes that the 
agency of the lived body is always exerted in the context of other bodies 
within a network of normative frameworks. Shame emerges or appears 
when bodies exist in some kind of incongruence because intentionality is 
always embodied. 
The second premise is that the interruption or rupture of the intended 
objectives of the lived body is caused by someone who matters to us in 
some respect. As we suggested above, shame entails various movements; 
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it recognizes that we need the other. Therefore, we avoid, withdraw, or 
hide our shame from the other when our bodies, lives, or acts fall short 
and are experienced as incongruent with those of others. However, as 
contexts may differ, so will the many empirical manifestations of the 
movements of shame. Examples of intense body shame can, for example, 
be found in narratives from concentration camps during World War II. 
They describe the shame of being bodily degraded by a tattooed number 
on the wrist, to be exposed to the unfathomable suffering of fellow men, 
or to be the body that survived among the many dead bodies of women 
and children.262 For the victims of the Holocaust, it is probably absurd 
to claim that the Kapos and the soldiers mattered to them in a positive 
sense. However, it is in the identification of the others as lived bodies, no 
different from themselves, that shame can arise. If the abuse and brutal-
ity of Kapos and soldiers were the actions of “mad men” or “monsters,” 
shame would probably have had no place. Primo Levy struggled until his 
death with this question. In his final book, The Drowned and the Saved, 
he finally concludes, “They were made of the same cloth as we, they were 
average human beings, averagely intelligent, averagely wicked: save the 
exceptions, they were not monsters, they had our faces, but they had been 
reared badly.”263
Our point is that other people always matter to us because they are the 
ones in whose faces and in whose actions we can read our own value as 
lived bodies. Being reduced to undesirable objects that can be subjected 
to bodily punishment, torture, or death without consequence, is to be 
reduced to an object that holds no, or only negative, value. In this respect, 
being a body among bodies exposes both the vulnerability to be shamed 
and the power to shame. The acknowledgment of being a body among 
bodies, of sharing the faces of victims and oppressors, is, at the same 
time, an acknowledgment of the shameful possibility that the roles could 
have been reversed in a given context.
262 Todorov, Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps; Améry, At the Mind’s 
Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities; Levi, The Drowned and the 
Saved; Arne Johan Vetlesen, “A Case for Resentment: Jean Améry Versus Primo Levi,” Journal of 
Human Rights 5, no. 1 (2006).
263 Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, 202.
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Examples such as these raise an essential question: Is body shame 
always heteronomous, that is, does body shame always have its origin in 
the demeaning gaze of the other? We have already suggested that shame 
may occur even though the other is not present. Thus, the internalized 
gaze of the other may be felt even though there is actually nobody look-
ing. We have further pointed out that late-modern society may represent 
a disciplining panopticon that renders the body in a situation of constant 
threat and uncontrollable exposure, and thus makes hiding from the gaze 
of the other very difficult. 
Deonna et al. criticize the well-established hypothesis that shame is a 
heteronomous emotion.264 They define shame as the feeling of our being 
incapable of honoring even minimally the demands entailed by self-rel-
evant values.265 To restore the moral relevance of shame, they attempt to 
redeem the emotion of shame from what they call the two dogmas that 
paint shame as both a social and an ugly emotion.266 We shall not follow 
their arguments in detail here, as we will return to their argumentation 
in the chapter on morality and shame. Suffice to say, at this point, their 
analysis of heteronomous shame entails that such shame falls short as 
a moral response. At best, it may serve as a useful social sensibility.267 
Shame can only be a morally relevant response when we realize that we 
fall short of moral standards and values we have autonomously set for 
ourselves. Therefore, heteronomous shame falls short as a morally rel-
evant response because it is caused by a recognition of falling short of 
standards that others have impressed upon us. Dolezal rightly comments 
that Deonna et al. seem to have forgotten that values are embodied in a 
complex web of relations and values:
… there is no meaningful way to keep distinct what one feels and thinks in re-
lation to oneself without reference to the intersubjective realm and the broader 
milieu. Even though shame can arise in one’s own eyes, the primary locus of 
shame is social, as Charles Taylor argues. Values and norms do not appear out 
264 This question will be addressed further in the chapter on shame and morality.
265 Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an 
Emotion (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 125.
266 Ibid., 21–66.
267 Ibid., 35ff.
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of nowhere, they are constituted and continuously modified by relations of em-
bodied social interaction.268
The aforementioned dynamic movements of shame indicate that shame 
is always a movement towards or away from someone that somehow mat-
ters to us. It is also a movement towards or away within a specific consti-
tutive context that defines both the need for shameful movement as well 
as strategies for movement. The social value attributed to a specific body 
entails, for example, contextually defined and shared bodily ideals that a 
specific body is compared to, to which it is accepted as valuable or falls 
short. Hence, attempts to configure the body as an autonomous entity 
entail a reductionistic abstraction that loses sight of the complexity of 
embodied life. 
One may, nevertheless, argue that being contextually embedded does 
not entail the impossibility of setting your own values, or choosing to act 
accordingly or not, and therefore being ashamed of not living up to your 
own ideals. The ability to create such a room for the autonomous self is 
parallel to Elisabeth Benkhe who calls for kinaesthetic awareness as a 
way of finding ethically sound ways of bodily presence in the context of 
the other.269 Thus, it is not so much about finding an autonomous space of 
freedom between disciplining forces, such as nature and culture. Instead, 
it is about finding bodily awareness or ethical values to adhere to within 
the complex and heteronomous web of sociality. Accordingly, at this 
point, Deonna et al.’s claim about shame’s moral relevance holds some 
merit. However, it is an autonomy well-established and qualified within 
the borders of a heteronomous context. This obviously entails a redefini-
tion of the concept of autonomy that places it well outside, for example, 
the Kantian view of autonomy. Such a redefinition is not without merit 
and has been researched from several perspectives in the feminist tradi-
tion.270 We will return to some aspects regarding this topic in the chapter 
on shame and morality.
268 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, 5.
269 Elizabeth A Behnke, “The socially shaped body and the critique of corporeal experience,” in 
Sartre on the body, 231–255, ed. Katherine J. Morris (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
270 See Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, Relational Autonomy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
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Body shame: bodies among bodies 
Experiences of shame, both in the body and because of the body, artic-
ulate themselves in the context of others (actual or not) within com-
plex and normatively framed contexts. Experiences of body shame may, 
therefore, serve as a map of the relational and social topography between 
the embodied self and the context. According to Dolezal, reading the 
social manifestations of body shame may, for example, contribute to our 
understanding of how the phenomenological primacy of the lived body 
is shaped and formed into a social and political body by external forces 
and demands.271 Thus a phenomenological discussion of shame does not 
need to take into consideration only the trivial insight that the shame of 
any lived body is experienced in a specific context. It also needs to take 
into consideration the contextual complexity and pervasiveness of the 
shaping push and pull forces within which responses of shame manifest 
themselves. As we will show in the forthcoming chapter on religion, we 
see in shame responses the body withdraw, avoid, buckle, and change 
because of external pressure from powerful social, religious, cultural, 
and institutional norms and expectations. Thus, an empirically adequate 
phenomenology of body shame must balance between two pitfalls. First, 
a one-eyed focus on the essence of human bodily experience that loses 
sight of the imprint of history, culture, and sociality, and, second, a posi-
tion where the embodied self is locked in totalitarian contexts without 
opportunities to, for example, take back a body that is held hostage by 
toxic shame. 
An exclusive focus on essential bodily experience does not offer the 
necessary resources to explain the variations in shame experiences. It is 
by taking the situatedness of the shamed embodied self into consideration 
that the experience may be analyzed, but also remedied. For a young man 
to both understand and solve his experience of body shame because of 
his lack of a muscle-toned athletic body, knowledge of both the normative 
ideals of the body as well as the social mechanisms of body shame are 
necessary. On the other hand, when the emphasis on the context becomes 
too heavy or is the only one available, we lose the resources to explain 
271 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, IX.
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how even all-encompassing and toxic experiences of body shame can be 
resolved or worked on through individual effort. We believe there are 
ways out of body shame, even in the most toxic of contexts. It is the first 
premise of any therapeutic effort to support victims of abuse that have to 
deal with the experience of having a dirty and shameful body, that they 
possess personal resources that can help them cope with the situation. 
Overcoming shame is not only about facilitating shifts to more positive 
and liberating contexts. It is also about finding and believing in the tran-
scending powers of the embodied self itself within the limitations and 
potential of contextual situatedness, and engaging these powers in an 
ongoing process of complex contextual self-embodiment that can tran-
scend this shame.
Feminist phenomenologist Shannon Sullivan suggests a road between 
these pitfalls. She borrows the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey’s term 
transaction to unfold this co-constitutive relationship between entities 
entering into an exchange or a relationship.272 She aims to avoid atomistic 
and compartmentalizing conceptions that misconstrue the co-constitu-
tive and mutual impact that humans have on each other. Human trans-
actional corporeality includes the physical, the mental, the social, and the 
cultural dimensions of human life; it is open, permeable, and in constant 
shift. Thus, bodies are neither matter sealed off from culture or matter 
imprinted with the meaning of the surrounding culture. Bodies transact, 
they are activities co-constituted and co-existing in an open-ended and 
permeable dynamic relationship with context. Thus, there are no bod-
ies and no corporeality in itself. What is essential in our context is her 
insistence on the co-constitutiveness and mutual influence of bodies in 
context – in all dimensions. Thus, there is always movement and change.
The abovementioned phenomenologist, Elisabeth Benkhe, holds that 
by strengthening the awareness of the body, we will be able to establish a 
position of critique and reeducation of bodily experiences, such as body 
shame, within the shaping forces of nature and culture. It is not so much 
about creating a room of freedom as it is about strengthening the internal 
272 Shannon Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and 
Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1.
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shaping forces within the embodied self as a counterweight against the 
external shaping forces. Thus, bodily awareness helps us to identify, 
take back, and strengthen the internal forces in our ongoing embodied 
self-formation. According to Benkhe, the body is neither a ready-made 
natural physical object, nor a culturally fully defined object, but “… an 
ongoing style of kinaesthetic self-shaping and situational engagement.”273 
The way forward is to retrieve one’s kinaesthetic life from its anonym-
ity and take further responsibility for how our bodies are shaped; it is 
about reeducating and claiming new ownership of the body. Our habit-
ual way of making our bodies known in the world may, for example, be 
restricted because of the experience of shame. Through the movement of 
shame, we may take protective or evasive measures to protect our vul-
nerable embodied self from further exposure. Shameful bodies tend to 
hide and become small or invisible, or to hide behind aggressive or tough 
appearances. However, through kinaesthetic awareness, one may be able 
to establish a position where one can both recognize and even reeducate 
the strategies of the shameful body. Thus, self-awareness may enable us to 
identify protective bodily habits that function negatively or add to objec-
tification, either as a result of shame or as the reason for shame due to the 
inter-kinaesthetic dynamics between embodied selves.274 
Benkhe’s analysis of kinaesthetic consciousness and awareness may 
certainly play a role as a counterweight against the experience of embod-
ied shame. You may, for example, become aware of your kinaesthetic 
presence, the way your body shrinks back, withdraws, or closes off the 
intersubjective space in shame, for example, when listening to a colleague 
talk about being bullied in your workplace, when no one – including 
yourself – tried to stop it, and through bodily awareness, you may be able 
to find other forms of bodily presence that do not add to the hurt and 
isolation of the one telling the story. However, in her tentative phenome-
nological analysis of the socially shaped body, she does not take fully into 
account how the varying powers of external shaping forces may, at least 
to some extent, support or work against bodily awareness. It is important 
273 Behnke, “The socially shaped body and the critique of corporeal experience,” in Sartre on the 
body, 233.
274 Ibid., 247f.
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not to underestimate the specificity and complexity of the disciplining 
and shaping forces at play in body shame. The need for protective strat-
egies may be both imprinted in our DNA and embedded in culturally 
shaped responses. For the person who has been a victim of continuous 
bullying or abuse since childhood, the neurological and social imprint on 
kinaesthetic presence may be far more substantial, protective, and chal-
lenging to become aware of. It may also be far more difficult to interpret 
as having to do with, for example, shame, guilt, and fear, and, therefore, 
ultimately more difficult to understand and eventually reclaim and take 
control of. Thus, there is a certain correlation between the disciplining 
force of the contextual imprint, the personal resources of the self and 
other available resources, and the possibility of kinaesthetic awareness 
and what Benkhe calls kinaesthetic self-control. Thus, although a given 
context may both confirm and support an agent’s bodily awareness, 
intentions, and acts, another agent, with different intentions and acts, 
may find the same context as intimidating, oppressive and shame-induc-
ing as his or her intentions and acts are deemed as being without value. 
In the complex interplay of agents and contexts, we are disciplined as well 
as disciplining. 
The invisible flow of the lived body
The above discussion of shame and bodily awareness puts us in a posi-
tion to elicit another helpful distinction: body shame is tightly connected 
to both the visibility and invisibility of the body. This topic is also dis-
cussed by Dolezal and will be further elaborated in our discussion below 
on different forms of exposed bodies. Dolezal draws heavily on both 
E. Husserl and M. Merleau-Ponty when she stresses the body as a “double- 
sided affair.”275 According to her, Husserl identifies four characteristic 
traits of the lived body in comparison to other material objects. First, 
the body is both constituted and limited through its sensitivity. We sense 
heat and cold through our bodies, and this sensitivity is absent in other 
innate objects. Secondly, the body moves as a spontaneous organ of the 
275 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, 118ff.
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will. Thirdly, the body is the point from where all spatial movements are 
assessed. What is far away or close, large or small, has the spatial body 
as its point of reference. And lastly, the body is the organ of perception 
that makes the experience of the external world possible. Thus, through 
the body we experience the world as spatial objects in relation to our own 
bodies.
According to Dolezal, Merleau-Ponty adds significant insight into 
this Husserlian phenomenology of the body.276 What the above descrip-
tion leaves open is how intentional consciousness moves the body. If 
the lived body is constitutional for perception, action, and movement 
in the external world, the lived body is infused with consciousness 
and intentionality and cannot be restricted to cognitive processes. In 
a sense, the lived body is intentional: it always holds a stance or a pos-
ture towards what is going on in a specific context. Thus, the body as 
subjectivity, according to Dolezal, is always geared towards possible 
action and engagement in the world. Furthermore, the intentionality 
of the lived body, or what Merleau-Ponty calls motor intentionality, 
perceives the world around not only in spatial orientation but also in 
pre-reflective sense as part of the former experience of body-defining 
engagement and acts. The trained mechanic does not scrutinize a ten 
millimeter nut and cognitively decide to reach out for a ten millimeter 
spanner. He just reaches out and grabs the spanner. His body knows 
what to do. Further, he does not reflect over the fact that he holds the 
spanner in his hand and needs to turn it counterclockwise in order to 
loosen the nut. He just reaches out, attaches the spanner, and loosens 
the nut. Thus, through repeated experience, the body has developed a 
body schema: 
The body schema is a system of motor and postural functions that are in con-
stant operation below the level of self-conscious intentionality. In the most basic 
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Through repeated postures and motility, the lived body has developed 
tacit skills and techniques formed as habits in the body (habit body), 
that kick into action in a context where renewed engagement or action is 
possible. However, it does not only regulate actions. It also envelops and 
transforms external objects into extensions of the body. The spanner, an 
innate external object, becomes pre-reflectively an extension of the hand 
of the lived body. Thus, through repeated habitual action, the lived body 
not only forms schemes and habits that regulate posture, stance, and 
action towards external objects in the context. It is in constant relation to 
the external world and thereby dissolves the distinction between the sub-
jective and the objective, between external and internal world, through 
the incorporation of objects as extensions of the subjective, lived body.278 
Dolezal underscores that this is not a layer of ability, habitually formed 
skills, or series of cognitive choices of actions. Rather, it is a necessary 
permanent condition of being an embodied self in the world. Thus, the 
lived body is both available and invisible. It is available in the sense that 
it is the center for sensing, perceiving, moving, and acting in the spatial 
world. Further, it is also invisible, or absent, or transparent, as the body is 
not noticed when it interacts successfully with the world. When a skilled 
athlete throws a javelin in one fluid and successful motion, there is no 
consciousness or awareness of the movement of the body nor the javelin. 
There is just the “flow of equilibrium” with the surroundings.279 Or, in 
a more mundane sense, when we skillfully negotiate the morning traf-
fic while we are thinking through our schedule for the day, the steering 
wheel, the clutch, and the brakes become extensions of the unconscious 
flow of movements of the lived body.
Body visibility as dysfunction 
The habits of the lived body render both the body and its extensions invis-
ible for the subject as they recede from awareness and into the automated 
278 For more on the actual acquisition of habitual skills, se ibid., 23 f. and Hubert L. Dreyfus and 
Stuart E. Dreyfus, “The Challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment for 
Cognitive Science,” Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture (1999).
279 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, 25.
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body-flow of the skilled subject’s unconsciousness. However, the body 
may become visible or attract awareness again for several reasons.280 
The first and most obvious is the long and arduous process in which we 
acquire different skills. A young aspiring javelin thrower is very much 
aware of his awkward gait, the unfamiliar heft of the javelin, and finally, 
the unbalanced throw that sends him off balance. The same javelin 
thrower must bring to attention the different parts of the art of throwing 
a javelin in order to enhance his skills: the steps, the heft, and the snap of 
the body as the javelin is thrown. Already automated habits of the body 
can also be interrupted and made visible, both temporarily or perma-
nently. Temporary visibility occurs, for example, when the body becomes 
visible through some sort of failure to perform the habit in question. 
When the skilled javelin thrower feels the pain rip through his tendons 
and muscles, he certainly becomes aware of his shoulder not being up to 
the task until his injury is healed. Thus, body flow is interrupted as the 
body becomes a visible obstacle between the body and the external world. 
Permanent visibility occurs when former body habits become impossi-
ble. Chronic illness leading to a loss of formerly automated bodily func-
tions may serve as an example, although a change in body functions may, 
over time, lead to acquisition and automation of motor skills substituting 
the loss. However, permanent neurological changes severing and disrupt-
ing the possibility of former body habits, as well as the acquisition of new 
automated body habits, show how body fluidity is lost when one has to 
rely on cognition to control bodily motility. Thus, we can argue that cog-
nition introduces an alienating objectification that separates the external 
world and the self, especially when it is introduced to compensate for the 
loss of habitual fluid motility.281
280 Ibid., 27ff.
281 Of course, there is much more to be said about the specifics of the interruption of the invisible 
body. For further reading, see, for example, Drew Leder, The Absent Body (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1990). See also Debra Gimlin, “The absent body project: Cosmetic surgery 
as a response to bodily dys-appearance,” Sociology 40, no. 4 (2006), 699–716. The athlete’s art 
of working on the tasks at hand; to keep sharp focus on technique, body posture breathing, in 
other words separating the elements of fluid motion, necessitates a further differentiation of the 
concept of bodily visibility/invisibility. However, in this context, the above differentiation will 
have to suffice.
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Anthropologist Thomas Csordas distinguishes between the dis- 
appearance and the dys-appearance of the body.282 The intentional 
embodied self, is in a state of equilibrium with its surroundings, expe-
riences, moves, and acts through automated responses – at least to a 
certain extent. In this state, the intentional body is not interrupted or 
hindered through lack of ability or sudden contextual restraints that 
impede or block expressions of bodily habits. The body and the external 
objects through which these habits are expressed remain in a state of 
available invisibility. But when the habits of the body are interrupted, 
temporarily or permanently, the automated equilibrium between the 
embodied self and the external world is lost as we become aware of the 
failure of the body to perform as usual. Hence, the body dys-appears: it 
becomes visible in its dysfunction, either through lack of bodily ability 
or because external factors in some way or for some reason hinder or 
delimit habitual action. According to Dolezal, the body seeks equilib-
rium with its surroundings by constantly trying “to avoid the intrusion 
of the body into awareness through discomfort and pain.”283 How-
ever, this equilibrium is basically a state of affairs between the motor- 
intentionality of the embodied self and the external world. 
Body visibility and body shame 
The above paragraphs about body awareness provide a necessary back-
drop for understanding what is at play in body shame. The acquirement 
of skills and bodily responses is contextually tuned in order to reach 
the mentioned equilibrium. However, the dys-appearance and objec-
tification of the body is not necessarily caused by a dysfunction of an 
acquired body-habit itself. It may appear because the actual body habit 
in a specific context no longer serves to enhance equilibrium. Thereby, 
282 Thomas J. Csordas, “Introduction: The Body as Representation and Being-in-the-World,” in 
Embodiment and Experience: The Existential Ground of Culture and Self, edited by Thomas J. 
Csordas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8 ff. For a discussion of Csordas’ Mer-
leau-Ponty-inspired account of embodiment and an introduction to alternative accounts of the 
embodied self, see Charles Lindholm, Culture and Identity: The History, Theory, and Practice of 
Psychological Anthropology, revised and updated, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 187ff.
283 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, 29.
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the objectification serves to highlight the dysfunctionality of the bodily 
habit. Dolezal therefore claims, in our view rightly, that any phenomeno-
logical account of the body must take into consideration the context in 
which an embodied self is constituted and exists.284 
We have previously underscored that the social shaping of the embod-
ied self is constituted in a rather complex web of relations and social and 
material structures. As bodies, we are always seen or sensed by someone, 
and thus objectified, as we see, sense and objectify others. This objecti-
fication is part of our relational constitution as embodied selves; we are 
experiencing, perceiving, moving and acting bodies among other expe-
riencing, perceiving, moving and acting bodies. This fact does not have 
to entail body shame, but it is a fundamental premise for being able to 
experience body shame.285 
We have argued that body shame entails several movements – a move-
ment towards as a realization that others matter to us, and a movement 
away as we need to protect our body from being seen because others mat-
ter to us. To this point, we can now add the above insight that body shame 
entails a dys-appearance and objectification of the body. Our bodies, or 
parts of our bodies, are not merely our way of being-in-the-world. In sit-
uations of shame, they are objectified and seen through the eyes of others 
as violating spoken or unspoken standards, norms, or rules of aesthetic, 
social or ethical value, comportment, or action.286 Hence, it makes sense 
to speak of shame as related to the dys-appearance that is not tied to dis-
ruption of body flow only, but also to disruption of the social flow of the 
embodied subject.
Acute body shame as regulation 
The tension between the need for both closeness and distance can be 
solved in various ways, depending on the severity of body shame. One 
284 Ibid., 32.
285 We are aware of leaving out a far more detailed discussion at this point. Dolezal draws up a 
larger and more detailed map of these elements than we do here. For further references, see ibid., 
35ff.
286 Ibid., 41.
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can work through the experience of body shame and thus solve the ten-
sion and reaffirm and secure one’s standing. One may also move away 
and protect the body and the self through protective strategies, such as 
disguise or distance. However, all solutions may come at a price: hid-
ing through disguise or moving away may ameliorate the experience 
of shame. However, in a society where one is always under the threat of 
being bodily seen, such a strategy becomes less successful. Moreover, a 
strategy that disguises or removes the embodied self from the context 
where it belongs creates a protected gap between the actual self and the 
real self.287 Thus, hiding may end up being a strategy that only partially 
fulfills the intention but, far more seriously, it also moves the embod-
ied self into a position where the need to resolve and belong cannot be 
met. In order to hide, the subject ends up using resources to maintain the 
false self instead of developing the true self. Thus, the tension between 
the described opposing needs of closeness and distance is neither met nor 
solved. They are merely dealt with in a preliminary and possibly harmful 
way. 
In this context, Dolezal, like many others, draws a line between acute 
and chronic body shame.288 Acute body shame comes in many variations, 
often tied to how the body is comported or held, functions, or appears. 
Acute body shame may appear quickly and pass quickly. Losing your 
towel when changing to swimming trunks may, in some contexts and 
for some individuals, elicit an experience of shame over being seen in a 
compromising situation. An insecure teenager would probably experi-
ence it differently than a seasoned nudist. The shame experience may also 
vary due to context: if the unfortunate slip happened at a nudist beach, 
it would be different from the same thing happening by the swimming 
pool at your high school. Thus, acute body shame relates not only to the 
subject’s vulnerability to shame but also to the varying values or norms 
embedded in varying contexts. Acute body shame may, as other forms 
of acute shame, serve a disciplining and regulating role in upholding the 
rules and norms of society. 
287 Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep, 133ff.
288 Dolezal, The Body and Shame: Phenomenology, Feminism, and the Socially Shaped Body, 7ff.
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However, some factors may muddle the use of body shame for regu-
lating bodily behavior. Experiencing shame under the gaze of the other 
swimmers as you walk into a public pool without swimming trunks, acci-
dentally or as part of a bet with your school buddies, may remind you of 
having crossed a line for what kind of bodily behavior is expected in public 
pools. The chance is that you will adhere to these regulations in the future 
to avoid being shamed. Thus, it may serve to uphold the rules and affirm 
for the other guests that in a public pool, one does not swim naked. This 
example underscores our previous point about how contexts are deeply 
saturated with values and disciplining forces. Formal or informal regula-
tions may, on the one hand, serve to secure both freedom and protection 
against, for example, shamelessness. On the other hand, they may be tac-
itly oppressive and hinder or interrupt bodily agency by promoting body 
shame. Thus, if we view body shame as a way of regulating bodily behavior, 
functions, and ideals, without exposing these regulations to extensive 
critique, we may easily end up by using body shame as a means to exert 
implicit or explicit power or domination. In order to accept such regula-
tion, we need to both identify and discuss publicly whether we find these 
dimensions ethically sound. Let us exemplify: If a medical doctor or a 
medical student, due to religious regulations, is shamed by, and therefore 
refuses to treat, patients of the other sex, or patients with diseases related 
to sexual activity or substance abuse (such as gonorrhea, or cirrhosis of 
the liver), we find it unacceptable.289 Such shame is not valid for govern-
ing professional behavior. Even though we accept that some religious 
groups have a right to uphold regulations concerning sex and alcohol as 
part of their autonomy within a Western democracy, it is not applicable 
in the context of public health care, as it serves to enhance the body 
shame of patients that are already in a vulnerable and possibly shameful 
position.290 As citizens, we partake in many contexts, with both overlap-
ping and contradicting rules, values, and regulations. These, both tacitly 
and more explicitly, exert a socializing power on our bodies within these 
289 Sophie LM Strickland, “Conscientious objection in medical students: a questionnaire survey,” 
Journal of Medical Ethics 38, no. 1 (2012).
290 Our point is not to discuss the right of health personnel to make conscious objections, but to 
offer a relevant example for discussion. 
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contexts. Michel Foucault uses the concept panopticism as a metaphor for 
the organization of power in modern society: We are always seen, and the 
possibility of always being seen does something to us.291 The disciplining 
power of always being watched turns us into our own watchers. We are 
not only disciplined, but also tacitly carry with us the disciplining and 
internalized power of rules, regulations, and values. Foucault’s point is 
not that the modern organization of power is good or bad. He merely 
makes an observation about the panoptic mechanics of power in modern 
society. In a postmodern society, contexts, values, ideals, and regulations 
are individualized, pluralized, virtualized, and embodied (and thus seen) 
at an increasing pace. The ability to identify, morally as well as politically, 
and evaluate the inherent powers at play in the contextual map of which 
the postmodern embodied self finds itself thus becomes increasingly 
complex and challenging.
As mentioned above, since the social construction of the embodied 
self is an ongoing process, provisionality and permeability are existential 
characteristics of the embodied self: We live, breathe, think, socialize, 
develop and exert agency through our bodies and our skin.292 An embod-
ied subject’s vulnerability to this complexity of normative internal and 
external forces varies, due not only to their personal resources but also 
to the degree of formative and normative pressure these forces exert 
on the embodied subject. Thus, it is important to identify and evaluate 
these forces to understand the regulating functions of the experience of 
bodily shame. The often tacitly and inherently normative power struggle 
expressed through shaming has been a large part of the oppression of 
both the black body and the female body. In our earlier example, when 
the shameless Arabian daughters shed their veils on national television, 
it was a bodily protest against being shamed, because their unveiled faces 
did not adhere to the culturally and religiously defined Muslim rules for 
female bodily behavior in Norwegian society. 
Thus, even though our evolutionary account of shame suggests that 
it may serve a regulatory function, both the complexity and the possible 
291 Michel Foucault, “Panopticism” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, in Race/Eth-
nicity: Multidisciplinary Global Contexts 2, no. 1 (2008).
292 Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and Feminism. 
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structural oppressiveness inherent in postmodern society force a broader 
examination of the phenomenon. 
Chronic toxic body shame and the shamed body
We have earlier mentioned that both blushing and gaze avoidance can 
be understood as physiological displays of acute but passing shame. They 
may be examples of evolutionally developed and socially visible bodily 
manifestations of the shamed body. Such passing bodily manifestations 
may even serve useful social functions as they are signs revealing what is 
at play in a social group. 
However, there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the claim 
that severe body shame over time sets its mark on the body itself.293 Such 
chronic body shame is sometimes called pathological shame or patholog-
ical body shame. We prefer chronic toxic body shame for several reasons. 
First, pathological body shame suggests that the primary perspective is 
pathological dysfunction or maladaptation, either as a consequence of 
external pressure or as an inherent trait.294 However, even though the per-
spective of pathology may certainly add to our understanding of certain 
modes of body shame, we should not reduce it to pathology alone. We 
have suggested that body shame is, as all forms of shame are, an embodied 
experience rooted in the architecture of the self and manifested within a 
complex contextual web of structures and forces. Thus, the individual 
experience of body shame may certainly be maladaptive and isolate and 
break down the self in the long run. However, it is certainly a point for 
discussion if it is the subject’s emotional response that is pathological. It 
is also possible to analyze the consequences of the oppressive pressure of 
the subject’s context as pathological, as it impedes human growth, flour-
ishing, and sustainability. 
293 van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma; Kirken-
gen, Inscribed Bodies: Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse; Joseph Spiegel, Sexual Abuse 
of Males. The Sam Model of Theory and Practice (New York: Routledge, 2003); Mesel, Vilje Til 
Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep.
294 Cf. Tangney and Dearing. Shame and Guilt; Stephen Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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In our view, the use of the concept chronic toxic body shame rep-
resents a broader and more precise frame of reference for the analysis 
of body shame. The word chronic suggests that this kind of body shame 
is firmly established in the embodied self. Rather than being a specific 
and acute response in a specific situation, chronic toxic body shame 
becomes a more permanent modus for how the body is experienced. 
Moreover, the word toxic suggests that this form of shame exposes 
the subject to an environment or a state of being that, over time, poi-
sons and denies the subject the ability to realize chosen and intended 
objects through his or her personal agency. Thus, chronic toxic body 
shame does not merely interrupt agency through temporary interrup-
tions, such as when acute shame suspends agency in a specific context 
for short periods. Instead, chronic toxic body shame invades the self. 
To some extent, it subjects the self to a state of rupture and inability to 
realize intended objects through voluntary agency. Such internalized 
and enduring toxic shame may send the embodied self into a more or 
less permanent exile through strategies of disguise or isolation. Thus, 
the concept of chronic toxic body shame does not only fit better with 
our initial definition of shame, it also opens up a broader analytical 
backdrop for our understanding of both the reasons for and the mani-
festations of toxic bodily shame. 
Chronic toxic body shame may, for example, be observed in children 
who have been subjected to Child Sexual Abuse (CSA).295 In severe 
cases, such abuse does not only leave its mark on the body through 
permanent neurological changes that exile the embodied self from the 
contextual and relational resources needed to readjust and develop 
into a healthy self. It may also render the embodied self to a zone of war 
where heightened fight, flight and freeze responses become the social 
and psychological default setting. Sexual trauma often imprints both 
fear and deep toxic and chronic shame over being sexually dirty and 
destroyed. These imprints or self-evaluations are not easily lifted. The 
295 Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep; van der Kolk, The Body 
Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma; Kirkengen, Inscribed Bodies: 
Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse.
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chance is, instead, that the threat of being exposed pushes the embod-
ied subject into further exile. Thus, the more the abuse becomes the 
main frame of reference for the self-evaluation of the embodied self, 
the stronger is the chance that its consequences will manifest as per-
manent and universal traits. Such an embodied self is not a docile, dis-
ciplined body in a Foucauldian sense, but a fighting, frozen, or fleeing 
body: sometimes tragically disciplined – to the core of the central ner-
vous system – interpreting and scanning any context as a potentially 
hostile and dangerous environment. 
Thus, it makes sense to make a distinction between body shame and 
the toxic and all-pervasive shame of a shamed body. The shamed body is 
often experienced and perceived as being sexually assaulted, objectified, 
dirty, shameful, and always under the threat of being publicly exposed 
as damaged and morally corrupted. As such, child sexual abuse affects 
both the body and the self-perception of the body, inscribing this vio-
lent interruption of intentional agency not only as neurological imprints 
in the deeper layers of the brain but also in bodily responses such as 
body posture, reddening of the skin, eye movement, and fight, flight and 
freeze responses. Thus, the shamed body may be one of the manifested 
responses to pain or suffering when the body and the self are attacked 
severely. The experience and the memory of the other’s violent break-in, 
and the concomitant interruption and destructive rewriting of the vic-
tim’s original immediate agency as this rewriting is manifested in, for 
example, physical and psychological pain, dysfunctional sexuality, flash-
backs or memories that generate fear, guilt, and shame, may in itself gen-
erate further shame, thus fortifying the already toxic environment of the 
victim’s agency. Thus, within a phenomenology of the lived body, as men-
tioned above, bodily shame does not spill over to the self as if body and 
self were separate. They are intertwined entities in human life. Embodied 
life entails that we are bodies. Hence, body shame may develop into a 
shamed body.
Thus, in our analysis, we want to reserve the concept of the shamed body 
for the deeper and more troubling bodily imprint that chronic and toxic 
body shame may leave on an embodied self. In her disturbing book, Inscribed 
Bodies, Anne Louise Kirkengen describes the physical and neurological 
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imprint that CSA may leave on a victim.296 These imprints do not only affect 
the interpretative framework a child has for both restoring and developing 
a healthy self. They also affect how the body may freeze in the continu-
ous experience of being sexually dirty and scared, always objectified and 
exposed. These imprints, often forcing the victim into a tragic relational 
and social exile, not only affect somatic and mental health.297 They may also 
freeze bodily posture through constantly downcast eyes and bent body pos-
ture – always in hiding, in flight, or in submission. Thus, the manifesta-
tions of the toxically shamed body are not responses to a specific experience 
of being bodily shamed in a specific context. They are, instead, automated 
responses that reflect the experience of always being under the gaze of the 
other and always being exposed in a dangerous world. If the world was a 
dangerous place where relational and social safety and trust were not pos-
sible, this response would make sense. This is how it is experienced by the 
abused child or the victim of violence. Due to the traumatic effects of CSA, 
the child is, therefore, left in an unsustainable war zone. The movements of 
shame manifest themselves here as well: the child is left moving away from 
relationality and sociality with scant recourses for resolving the need for 
flight and hiding. Thus, the possible healing in moving towards relational 
safety, trust, and openness, are tragically denied for some. As such, CSA is 
both a physical and a psychological attack on the fragility and dependence 
of bodily human agency, especially in a child where the need for safety is so 
paramount for the development of a mature self. 
Body shame: differentiations
Bodies can be shamed for many reasons. First, one can experience body 
shame when the body does not meet standards of bodily perfection, for 
example, when the body displays features or forms that do not adhere 
to the prevailing trends and standards of a healthy and muscle-toned 
296 Kirkengen, Inscribed Bodies: Health Impact of Childhood Sexual Abuse.
297 See also Spiegel, Sexual Abuse of Males. The Sam Model of Theory and Practice; and van der Kolk, 
The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma, 143ff. for an overview 
of the extensive ACE (Adverse Childhood Experience) study carried out by Robert Anda and 
Vincent Felliti.
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body. As embodied selves, the body reveals who we are, and when 
our body falls short for some reason, our global self may fall short as 
well. 
Second, as a variation of the first, body shame can be tied to the body 
as a visual manifestation of assumed weakness. As embodied selves, the 
state of the body may be interpreted as our ability to fulfill our personal 
objectives and ideals through action. The fat, the unclean, or the self-mu-
tilated body may speak of a lack of self-control. Thus shame may be the 
response when the body is exposed and reveals a disruption between the 
assumed objectives that an agent supposedly holds – or should hold – and 
his or her ability to act accordingly.
Third, one can also experience shame when the body becomes an 
object for the sexual desire of a voyeur. Such a shame response seems 
to be tied to what may be called an objectification of the body. For the 
embodied self, the objectification of the body as a means of pleasure by 
the other may be experienced as a shameful loss of self, as the body is no 
longer under the subject’s control and determined by aims and inten-
tions chosen by him or herself. In the following, we will unfold these 
three main types of body shame. As the third differentiation is the most 
prominent cause of shame discussed in the research literature, we shall 
elaborate on this especially.
First differentiation: the lacking body as an 
existential reminder
The first form of body shame is, as mentioned above, tied to the expo-
sure of the, for example, disfigured, the aging, the incontinent, the 
disease-marked, or the scarred body. These bodies are not the result 
of personal choices or lifestyle issues. They are the result of accidents, 
diseases, or the inevitable bodily deterioration over time. These bodily 
presentations do not meet the current trends in cultural standards of 
bodily aesthetic perfection. Instead, they symbolize the opposite: the vul-
nerable and timeworn body, the damaged body, or the body marked by 
disease. As such, they might remind us of our own vulnerability, imper-
fection and mortality. According to Dolezal, in Western culture we have 
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celebrated the human transcendence over our body, and repressed our 
animal bodily nature: 
As such, shame about the body is particularly powerful in that it disrupts our 
illusion of transcendence – the notion that we are more than merely animals – 
and reveals our undeniable and imperfect corporeality. The body symbolizes 
our vulnerability, neediness and ultimate lack of control over our own morta-
lity. Hence it is not surprising that the body, especially when it falls ill or fails us, 
is a powerful source and site of shame.298 
Thus, the presence of the vulnerable, timeworn or sick body reminds us 
not only of our vulnerability and mortality, but it also reveals the impos-
sibility of current ideals of bodily perfection. It throws us back to the 
existential conditions of human life from which there is no escape and, at 
the same time, shows the futility of our attempts to escape. In a culture 
where these existential characteristics of being-in-the-world are shunned 
and stowed away, embodied manifestations of imperfection and mortal-
ity may undoubtedly be experienced as shameful. 
Philosopher and trauma theoretician Ronnie Janoff-Bulman sug-
gests that in order to protect our vulnerability from the horrors and 
tragedies of the world, we tend to uphold false assumptions of our 
safety in a world where accidents and violence may hit blindly.299 We 
assume that even though disasters happen all around us, they will not 
happen to us. Car accidents, our house burning down, or sexual abuse 
of our children cannot happen to us because we are somehow pro-
tected. Therefore, when others become victims of violence or abuse, 
we tend to rationalize it by creating narratives that can save these false 
assumptions: the raped girl has probably been promiscuous, or there 
is probably some dysfunctionality in the family of the suicide victim. 
Thus, the price for our need to resituate ourselves in order to estab-
lish social distance to those inflicted is often paid by those who have 
298 Dolezal, L. “The Phenomenology of Shame in the Clinical Encounter.” Medicine, Health Care 
and Philosophy 18, 567–576 (2015), 569.
299 Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions: Towards a New Psychology of Trauma (New York: 
Free Press, 1992); “Assumptive Worlds and the Stress of Traumatic Events: Applications of the 
Schema Construct,” Social Cognition 7, no. 2 (1989).
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already suffered the loss. When social distance is created through body 
narratives, as in the example of the raped girl, increased body shame 
may well be this added cost.
The functions and consequences of this social and psychological 
phenomenon have also been described in studies of child sexual abuse, 
especially sexual abuse of boys and men.300 It seems to be the case 
here that the abused victims that are already shamefully scarred are 
often the ones that pay the moral cost of our attempts to save our false 
assumptions of being protected in a dangerous and unpredictable world. 
Because being a male victim of sexual abuse does not fit the heteronor-
mative narrative of male sexual dominance, the added cost of increased 
body shame may be experienced through the social distancing and 
suspicious watchfulness of others. In other words, the victimized body 
of male sexual abuse falls shamefully short of the social depictions of 
what the normal dominant male body is. Thus, the stigma of the abused 
male is subtler than the stigma of the scarred or burned body, where the 
imperfection is visibly exposed. Rather, it is an invisible stigma based 
on the assumption that male sexuality is active and dominant. Thus, 
being the passive victim of sexual abuse becomes somewhat suspicious, 
as it runs contrary to this assumption. The stigma of abuse suggests that 
the victim must be responsible – at least partly – for the abuse, and as 
such reveals a possibly flawed moral character that may turn them into 
abusers themselves.301
Hence, a moral component is added to body shame. As the victim-
ized body reminds us of our existential condition, we may attempt to save 
our assumptions of being protected by morally staining the victim and 
both confirming and adding to the victim’s shame of being sexually dirty, 
objectified, and partly guilty.302
300 See Mesel, Vilje Til Frihet. En Manns Fortelling Om Barndom Og Overgrep.
301 Often referred to as the Vampire syndrome. See ibid., 124ff.
302 For further elaborations of this, we may point to studies that identify atrocities due to contempt 
for weakness and vulnerability, as in the work of the Norwegian philosophers Harald Ofstad and 
Arne Johan Vetlesen. 
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Second differentiation: when the body reveals  
the weakness of the will
As the human mode of being in the world is one of embedded and embod-
ied presence, we assert, express, and define ourselves through our bodies 
as the expressive space we hold in the world. As we saw above, we are bod-
ies that interact – or transact – in a complex web of other bodies, social 
and material structures, culture, and history.303 We construe and expe-
rience our bodies through habits and actions, both forming and being 
formed by the environment of which we are a part. Thus, our bodies tell 
our story, both through the habits of the body and through bodily actions. 
As bodies, we sing or dance, and we discuss and gesticulate. The cloth-
ing of our bodies signals who we are. Some bodies are sculpted through 
intensive body-work or cosmetic surgery. Some use their skin as canvases 
of art, telling stories of identity, belonging, or personal history. The ath-
letic and fit body dressed in a running outfit tells at least parts of the story 
the embodied self wants to be told. Hence, we interact, communicate, and 
interpret both our own objectives and the objectives of the other through 
our bodies. Our bodies are meant to be read because our bodies talk. But 
their talk is embedded, forming and formed in the social and material 
structures they are a part of. In this sense, the language of the body is 
articulated within liberating or repressing frames of context.304 The black 
body, the female or the male body, the sexually assertive or the sexually 
abused body, the slim or the fat body are all expressed within a context of 
aesthetic, social, and moral evaluation and ranking.
This contextually and culturally determined designation of social, aes-
thetic or moral value to the different bodily representations opens up for 
this second differentiation of body shame. Bodies talk, and body-talk is 
interpreted within specific frameworks. However, someone’s personal 
303 Sullivan, Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and Feminism.
304 In this sense, the language of the body is articulated within liberating or repressing frames of 
context. Emma Rees, Talking Bodies: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Embodiment, Gender and 
Identity (Springer, 2017); Michelle Mary Lelwica, Shameful Bodies: Religion and the Culture of 
Physical Improvement, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Katie Conboy, Nadia Medina, 
and Sarah Stanbury, Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997); Farrell, Fat Shame: Stigma and the Fat Body in American 
Culture. 
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objectives are not necessarily in accordance with others’ interpretations 
of what the body signals. An example may be the obese or fat body that 
signals a lack of self-control over bodily desires (to control eating). Nev-
ertheless, the interpretation of this as lacking self-control may be far from 
the objectives of the acting subject that has a severe weight problem. Thus, 
being bodily exposed as fat displays an interruption between the objec-
tives of the self and how it is contextually interpreted through the display 
of the body. In the aesthetic, social and moral hierarchy of body talk, both 
fatness and lack of control over bodily desires are negatively evaluated. 
Thus, obesity signals a collapse of one’s coherent agency. The ideals of 
slimness, healthiness, and self-control seem to be substituted with the 
opposite through overeating, lack of exercise, and lack of self-control, and 
so on. In other words, the shame of obesity is not only tied to aesthetic 
or social bodily undesirability. It is also tied to a negative moral evalua-
tion of not controlling but giving in to bodily desires – and thus, to an 
assumed weakness of the will. 
Third differentiation: in the eyes of the other in 
different contexts
Objectification as commodification 
The extraordinary or abnormal body draws our attention through mor-
bid curiosity.305 One example is the oppressive and sad construction and 
history of what was called freakery. Earlier, hairy bodies, giants, and little 
people were displayed as anomalies of nature. Still today, otherness draws 
the eye. The fact that our gaze is drawn to uncommon bodily features 
presupposes both a certain kind of objectification and otherness. It is the 
very act of constituting them as anomalies of nature that makes them 
accessible to us as objects to be curiously gazed upon.306 Such an objec-
tivization loses sight of the embodied presence of the other as a person. 
305 See Kevin Pinkerton and Shuhua Zhou, “Effects of Morbid Curiosity on Perception, Attention, 
and Reaction to Bad News,” The University of Alabama McNair Journal (2008); Suzanne Ooster-
wijk, “Choosing the Negative: A Behavioral Demonstration of Morbid Curiosity,” PLoS ONE 12, 
no. 7 (2017).
306 Thomson, Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body.
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Whether it is the abnormal or the scarred body that catches our attention 
or gaze, the mechanism of objectification is much the same. By constru-
ing it as otherness, these features are no longer a threat to our own vul-
nerability. The consequence, however, is that that the embodied self of the 
other is reduced to a mere object, exposed to the gaze of morbid curiosity 
or simply objectified indifference. Exposure of bodily otherness in a fluid, 
transparent, and unpredictable virtual society puts the exposed embod-
ied self in a fragile and vulnerable position likely to cause shame.
The history of freakery also reveals a possibility for handling such 
body shame. The freak of the travelling circus, whether it was the midget, 
the giant or the hairy one, went on stage to earn a livelihood. It may well 
have been the only employment possible. But for the sake of the argu-
ment, let us assume that he was a free person choosing the circus life. 
Accepting a contract where he was to be part of the program alongside 
tamed animals, clowns, and other circus artists, he also accepted a con-
tractual commodification of himself as a body to be gazed upon. Through 
his performance, he sells his best asset: his body. As an embodied self, he 
chose to objectify this asset as something of negotiable value. But when 
the circus lights died down and the spectators left, he walked back to 
his trailer no longer as a commodity but as an embodied self. Hopefully, 
he was treated as a person by his fellow circus artists, not as the com-
modified freak. One might ask when the vulnerability and possibility for 
shame would be most prevalent? It follows from the argument above that 
he would be more vulnerable to shame offstage, where his intended proj-
ect was no longer posing as a commodified freak to be gazed upon, but 
rather to be himself.
The point of this little prelude is not to give a simplistic and misguided 
version of the problematic history of what was pejoratively called freak-
ery. Rather, it is to identify and unfold a specific form of shame by linking 
the bodily commodification of the circus artist to a more present phe-
nomenon: the bodily commodification of selling sex. What we have so far 
called the objectification of the exposed body is one of the main causes 
of body shame, especially female shame. Selling sex may exemplify one 
important strategy for handling objectification. However, it is essential 
for us to make clear that this is only part of the picture. We do not take 
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into account the abusive backgrounds, the trafficking, the street violence, 
and the traumatizing effects of prostitution in the following analysis. 
Our point is merely to draw up an example to elicit the above-mentioned 
shame strategy. 
As already argued, objectification entails a reduction of the embod-
ied self. In one sense, being objectified is to lose some control over the 
embodied self – or the self as body. When a young girl has her digital 
photo taken in the shower without her consent, and it is distributed on 
Instagram or other SoMe channels, she loses control both of who sees it 
and how they see it. Thus, the photo, as an objectification of herself, can 
be the object of ridicule by classmates or used as a voyeuristic object for 
persons unknown to her. Others can now define her body as an object of 
ridicule, sexual object, or of no interest. 
Is it possible to take back control? Is there a strategy to reduce the 
shame of such objectification and self-loss? When a woman decides to – 
or is forced to – prostitute herself, she accepts/must accept that her body, 
as part of her embodied self, is commodified and commercialized as a 
sexual object. Then the buyer is given at least some control of her body 
within the frames of contractual boundaries related to what kind of 
sexual services he is offered. In other words, prostitution entails a sep-
aration of self and body through willing – or forced –possibly shameful 
objectification.
Maddy Coy addresses this topic in a research article that explores 
women’s accounts of prostitution, especially how they narrate their lived 
experience of the body.307 According to her study, there is great varia-
tion in how women selling sex manage the ownership over their body as 
well as the self/body relationship. This is predictable. One crucial prem-
ise for understanding these women’s negotiations of bodily ownership 
is that it often takes place within a context of violence, abuse, and drug 
addiction. In a situation where corporeal ownership is already taken away 
through abuse and or/forced prostitution or addiction, the negotiation of 
the value of the body as a sexual commodity can be construed as one way 
307 Maddy Coy, “This Body Which Is Not Mine: The Notion of the Habit Body, Prostitution and 
(Dis) Embodiment,” Feminist Theory 10, no. 1 (2009).
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of attempting to regain control over a body that is lost through earlier 
sexual objectification. To take control is to exercise a form of agency in 
which the embodied self accepts the objectification and commodification 
of the body. For many of these women, their living conditions have from 
early on been determined by child abuse, sexual objectification, degra-
dation, and loss of control over the body. Within this oppressive frame-
work, they have been treated and valued as sexual objects constituting 
harsh and restricted frames for exercising agency and forming habits of 
agency. According to Coy, many of these women have lost the percep-
tion of corporeal ownership through abuse and rape. By claiming some 
kind of control by being agents of sex work, they reposition, reassert, and 
exercise agency through the body as their expressive space. However, this 
attempt to reposition and reassert does not necessarily change either the 
oppressive framework or the habitual template from which these women 
exercise their agency. Exercising agency by taking control over the body 
and by negotiating its value still takes place within the oppressive context 
of the sex trade. Consequently, even though sexual transactions can be 
read as negotiations of ownership to the body, and thus may be perceived 
as acting meaningfully through the body by the woman selling sex, it still 
reproduces the oppressive framework of objectification and sexual com-
modification in which the woman fights for control.308 Hence, the strat-
egy for overcoming shame and regaining agency comes at a high price. 
Body shame as disruption and the resources of context
Can the example of a prostitute’s attempts to regain ownership of the 
body through negotiating value add to our preliminary definition and 
differentiation of shame as manifesting the rupture between the chosen 
objectives of the self and expressions of agency? We believe it can. How-
ever, one needs to bear in mind the initial premise for Coy’s analysis: that 
the women attempting to take control over the body through selling sex 
do so within an abusive and violent framework that disciplines habits 
of both reflection and action. This comment underscores a more general 
308 Wendy Parkins, “Protesting Like a Girl: Embodiment, Dissent and Feminist Agency,” Feminist 
Theory 1, no. 1 (2000).
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point: the chosen and intentional (bodily) objectives and the possible 
accompanying bodily actions of the embodied self are constituted and 
set within a broad and sometimes complex contextual frame. Thus, the 
experience of exercising embodied agency through acting in accordance 
with objectives is both constituted and informed by the given relational, 
social, and material framework. To repeat an earlier point, the extent to 
which shame can be overcome is dependent on the impact of this context, 
as well as the personal resources available to the subject. 
Even though contextual embeddedness is a premise for any individu-
al’s choices and actions, the construction of frameworks differs signifi-
cantly, as does their outcome. The contextual framework of a girl growing 
up in a home with a violent and sexually abusive father, and who later 
turns to prostitution and drug addiction, is qualitatively very different 
from a girl growing up in a nurturing and loving family, and who later on 
becomes a teacher. In this sense, the contextual frame of both choice and 
action can deplete or even deny the embodied self the necessary resources 
and expressive space to both choose and act on supportive and liberating 
bodily objectives as well as experience and handle body shame. Accord-
ingly, the development of a stable and mature embodied self, hinges – at 
least to a certain extent – on the quality of the context. The strong disci-
plining power of dysfunctional and oppressive contexts of, for example, 
violence and abuse, will reproduce sexual objectification and shame, and 
offer scant resources that one can use to transcend such contexts. Liberat-
ing contexts, however, tend to give the individual bodily expressive space 
to freely exercise agency through chosen bodily objectives, without inter-
ruption and concomitant shame. Such contexts offer resources that sup-
port both the reproduction of flourishing contextual frameworks, as well 
as transcendence and further development. Thus, to overcome shame by 
regaining control is not only dependent on personal resources, but also 
on the accessible contextual resources. 
Body shame as disruption in contexts with impossible ideals
Body shame is not only a response when disruption or rupture is caused 
by clashing contexts with different sets of values and norms, generating 
objects and actions with different and/or opposing bodily desirability. 
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The interruption of shame can also occur within the context of the per-
son themselves, when the context is such that it makes it difficult – or 
impossible – to realize the choice of bodily objectives through action. 
As we have mentioned above, when the impossible bodily ideals of the 
trending culture become our objectives, the possibility of realizing these 
ideals becomes very slight. The gap between the chosen bodily ideals or 
objectives and the possibility of realizing these through bodily action, 
increases the possibility for disruption between objectives and action – 
and hence the possibility for body shame. Such shame need not origi-
nate from a context that reduces or impedes the possibility of realizing 
bodily objectives. When adolescent boys and girls are shamed because 
their bodies do not adhere to or match the bodily ideals they pick up 
from the popular culture and make their own, it is not because of lack of 
contextual support. On the contrary: whole industries thrive financially 
on dietary programs offering slim and healthy bodies. Cross-fit studios, 
gyms, and spinning centers offer toned muscles, and clinics offer surgery 
and injections as medical short-cuts to the ideal body. Hence, the contex-
tual resources do not impede the ability to close the interruption between 
chosen bodily objectives and actions. It is the impossibility of the ide-
als themselves that leave many adolescents in a virtually exposed and 
shameful limbo between impossible ideals and exposed bodies that falls 
way short of expected bodily norms. As we mentioned above, in post-
modern culture, this bodily limbo is always under threat of being visibly 
displayed, demeaned, and ultimately without the possibility of retreat to 
safety.309 
309 For a sociological introduction to the transparency and fluidity of postmodern culture, see, for 
example, Bauman, Liquid Life; Liquid Modernity. For a narrower introduction to youth culture, 
see, for example, Ole Jacob Madsen, Generasjon Prestasjon: Hva Er Det Som Feiler Oss? (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlag, 2018); Jean M. Twenge, I-Gen: Why Today’s Super-Connected Kids Are Growing 
up Less Rebellious, More Tolerant, Less Happy – and Completely Unprepared for Adulthood (What 
This Means for the Rest of Us) (New York: Atria Books, 2017); Generation Me: Why Today’s Young 
Americans Are More Confident, Assertive, Entitled – and More Miserable Than Ever Before (New 
York: Free Press, 2006); “The Evidence for Generation Me and Against Generation We,” Emerging 
Adulthood 1, no. 1 (2013). For a discussion of Twenge’s analysis, see both Madsen, Generasjon 
Prestasjon: Hva Er Det Som Feiler Oss?, Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Kali H., and M. Brent Donnel-
lan, “The Dangers of Generational Myth-Making: Rejoinder to Twenge,” Emerging Adulthood 1, 
no. 1 (2013); Kali H. Trzesniewski, M. Brent Donnellan, and Richard W. Robins, “Is ‘Generation 
Me’ Really More Narcissistic Than Previous Generations?,” Journal of Personality 76, no. 4 (2008). 
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Body shame as disruption in overlapping contexts 
But can choosing objectives and acting in accordance with them within 
a given framework also generate shame? How can the chosen aims and 
actions of a woman selling sex generate shame when what she actu-
ally does is an attempt to transcend the limiting context and take some 
control over her body? One line of reasoning here is based on how we, 
as citizens, partake in a network of overlapping contexts where we 
take on different roles. When we seek recognition, our choice of objec-
tives is tied closely to the normative expectations of the different roles 
that present themselves in different contexts. We have seen that role behav-
ior that does not meet normative standards may easily be experienced 
as shameful. However, the complexities of human life may also present 
themselves as intersecting and normatively clashing role expectations, as 
well as in their moral ranking. One example can elucidate this point: 
A woman selling sex is also a daughter or a sister to someone, and she may 
be selling sex to support both her addiction and her child, of whom she is 
desperately afraid of losing custody. In the network of overlapping contexts 
and concerns, she is woven into a complex web of relations and roles where 
norms and values differ in both content and moral ranking. Thus, to sell 
sex and commodify her body is a way of reasserting her ownership of the 
body and thereby attempt to close the gap between her experience of being 
an embodied self and losing the body through objectification. However, 
she is also a mother, a role in which expectations entail desirable objects 
that run contrary to the objective of selling sex. A mother selling sex will 
most likely be evaluated as unfit to take responsibility for the caring and 
upbringing of a child. It is not unlikely that shame may occur in this web of 
overlapping contexts. Thus, gaining control over her body through selling 
sex may be construed as a meaningful and even role-transcending action 
in a context where sexual objectification, abuse, and violence have defined 
her role behavior. However, the context and role of motherhood certainly 
entail normative expectations that run contrary to selling sex, even when 
this in itself allows her to overcome shame to some extent. The intersection 
between morally ranked contexts and role expectations can thus enhance 
the experience of shame, as one is bodily exposed and found morally lack-
ing when the child welfare service discloses that the mother sells sex to 
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support herself. However, external exposure is not necessarily a premise 
for shame. The socially ingrained role expectations, as well as the desirable 
objectives of motherhood, obviously clash with the objectives of selling sex. 
Thus, the woman may experience a permanent rupture: the objective of 
providing her daughter with a relatively safe and nurturing environment is 
inconsistent with the objective of taking control over her body by relating 
to it as a sexual commodity. 
As subjects with manifold roles in overlapping contexts there are dif-
fering norms and expectations as to what the body should be like, how it 
should act or behave. Thus, exerting agency successfully hinges – at least 
to a certain extent – on the degree of freedom and lack of oppression in 
the different context in which an embodied subject partakes. In late mod-
ern society, this is made difficult because the virtual Argos Panoptes seem 
to invade all contexts. Thus, shame as a reaction to interrupted agency 
may present itself more permanently and/or more suddenly as the con-
textual complexity develops.
Shame and the female body
In a fresco in the Brancacci Chapel in Florence, the Renaissance painter 
Masaccio depicted the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden 
(1425–1427). One interpretation of the fresco is that Adam and Eve hide 
their shame under the gaze of the almighty God. Thus, it may represent 
an important historical insight into the phenomenon of male and female 
body shame. They attempt to hide their shame differently. Adam holds 
his hands in front of his face covering his eyes. Eve holds one hand over 
her vulva and covers her breasts with the other. As such, the fresco depicts 
a central and historical phenomenological difference between male and 
female body shame. Adam is the active one, who is ashamed because he 
is exposed as the one who has seen. Therefore, he hides his eyes. Eve, the 
passive one, is ashamed because she is exposed – she is the one who is 
seen. Therefore, she hides her body.310
310 Claire Pajacvzkowska and Ivan Ward, “Introduction: Shame, Sexuality and Visual Culture,” in 
Shame and Sexuality. Psychoanalysis and Visual Culture. (London and New York: Routledge, 
2014).
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Origin: evolution and existential threat
This chapter will elaborate on the social construction of female embodi-
ment, and the shame related to the experience of disrupted embodiment 
in different domains and contexts. As we shall see, feminist literature 
more than suggests – and rightly so – that the explanations for both past 
and present experiences of various degrees of disruption or rupture of 
female embodiment can be found in a plethora of disciplining power 
strategies. These are exercised to a varying degree of intent – promoting 
and securing male dominance and patriarchy. 
However, this is not the sole frame of reference for the analysis of female 
body shame. The anthropologist and philosopher Hans Peter Duerr sug-
gest that female body shame, including what leads to the covering of geni-
talia as in the fresco by Massacio, can be viewed as an adapted function in 
the evolved organization of human societies, for example, in couple rela-
tions, and the distinction between private and public.311 Through shame, 
the sexual attraction of the female body is hidden from the public gaze 
and privatized. This hiding serves to reduce dysfunctional male rivalry 
and strengthens the couple’s relation as the institution that has, histori-
cally, best secured the survival of offspring.312 Other theories attempt to 
account for the historical development of apparent male power strategies 
that have secured dominance and inequality by using body shame as a 
tool.313 The underlying assumption is that although death is unavoidable, 
311 Duerr, Myten Om Civilisationsprocessen: B. 2: Intimitet, B. 2, 207ff.
312 His five-volume magnus opus Der Mythos vom Zivilisationsprozess is, above all, a sharp critique 
of the two-volume seminal work The Civilizing Process by the sociologist Norbert Elias. The 
dispute between Duerr and Elias, and the following rather vivid scholarly debate, has thrown 
important light on the influential civilization thesis of Elias. For further reading of Duerr’s per-
spective on female shame, see volume 2 Intimitet. However, in this context we will not dwell more 
on the evolutionary topic of shame as we have briefly covered this earlier in the book. 
313 For an introduction, see Ernest Becker, The Denial of Death (London: Souvenir Press, 2011); 
Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law; Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczyns-
ki, and Sheldon Solomon, “The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror 
Management Theory,” in Public Self and Private Self (Springer, 1986); Brian L. Burke, Andy Mar-
tens, and Erik H. Faucher, “Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of 
Mortality Salience Research,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, no. 2 (2010); Jamie L. 
Goldenberg and Tomi-Ann Roberts, “The Birthmark: An Existential Account of the Objectifica-
tion of Women,” in Self-Objectification in Women: Causes, Consequences, and Counteractions, ed. 
Rachel M. Calogero, Stacey Ed Tantleff-Dunn, and J. Thompson (Washington, D.C: American 
Psychological Association, 2011).
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all beings are biologically programed to struggle for life, for survival. 
However, humans are the only species fully conscious of this basic fact of 
life. Thus, our awareness of the existential discrepancy between our mor-
tality and our struggle to survive causes anxiety that needs to be resolved. 
Due to our symbolic capacities, we can deny or defuse the unavoidable 
consequences of our own corporeality through religious or philosophical 
strategies. Thus, we interpret these phenomena within cultural systems 
that render them culturally meaningful, regulated, and even idealized. 
These strategies often involve power-struggles to establish cultural for-
tifications that secure a meaningful symbolic distance to the existential 
threat of death. 
It is in this context that some scholars suggest we should understand 
the repression and regulation of female embodiment. The underlying 
assumption is that female bodies, and the reproductive biological pro-
cesses and parts of female bodies, represent a threatening reminder of the 
unavoidable biological cycle of life. However, the same body and body 
parts also serve as objects of desire and sexual attraction to heterosexual 
men.314 The discrepancy between these two approaches to the female body 
is solved through various strategies of cultural objectification and subse-
quent self- objectification. However, we shall not follow this theoretical 
approach in detail here but return to it as we move into the specifics of 
female body shame.
We have emphasized the contextual embeddedness of the embodied 
subject and the disciplining structures within which a subject exerts its 
agency. We have also underscored the importance of overlapping con-
texts. The various theoretical accounts which try to explain the emer-
gence and existence of disciplining frameworks along long evolutionary 
lines that over time discipline and regulate behavioral adaptations need 
not conflict with the close-reading of the disciplining powers at play in 
specific contexts. Both may be relevant for the contextual displays of 
shame and contribute to a more nuanced picture of female body shame. 
However, as our focus in this study is on the contemporary context, we 
shall treat both theories about the evolutionary context and theories of 
314 “The Birthmark: An Existential Account of the Objectification of Women,” 84.
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existential threat only as part of the backdrop of current female body 
shame.315
Female embodiment: historical lines
Late modern society presents new challenges to female embodiment. 
According to Chrysler and Johnston-Robledo, women’s relationships to 
their bodies are complex:
The body should be a source of pleasure, the enabler of agency, and the media-
tor between the world and the Self. However, for most women, at least some of 
the time, the body is a disappointment, a source of anxiety, and a site of labor. 
The body is a self-improvement project for girls and women.316
The project of female embodiment – or the project of doing gender as 
West and Zimmerman called it in their seminal article from 1987 – has 
been and is a precarious project.317 Developing a secure and positive expe-
rience of embodiment is made difficult, both at present and historically, 
by always being evaluated and often devalued. We need not make the his-
torical account very extensive to emphasize this point. The female body 
has been treated as men’s property. Hence, rape under Babylonian law 
was treated as a form of property damage. According to Rose Weitz, it 
was not until 1984 that a man in the USA could be convicted for raping a 
315 A further discussion would hve to deal with the consequences of viewing female body shame 
as part of an evolutionary account of couple relations, and also what the distinction between 
private and public has meant for securing survival. In this context, it activates important in-
terdisciplinary discussions between, for example, evolutionary biology, anthropology, feminist 
studies and ethics. However, the many difficult and contested topics of evolutionary ethics, such 
as the problem of what is and what ought to be (is – ought), cannot be taken up here. For an 
introduction to evolutionary ethics, see, for example, Michael Ruse and Robert J. Richards, The 
Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); 
Scott M. James, An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics, (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).
316 Joan C. Chrisler and Ingrid Johnston-Robledo, Woman’s Embodied Self: Feminist Perspectives on 
Identity and Image (American Psychological Association, 2018), 11.
317 See C. West and D. H. Zimmerman, “Doing Gender,” Gender & Society 1, no. 2 (1987). This 
widely cited article has become a classic study in both sociology and gender studies. For a short 
introduction to the discussion and development of the concept, see, for example, numerous 
articles from a symposium on Doing Gender published in Gender & Society, 2009, vol. 23, No. 
1. See also Sarah Fenstermaker and Candace West, Doing Gender, Doing Difference: Inequality, 
Power, and Institutional Change (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).
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woman to whom he was married.318 In both Greek philosophy and med-
icine, the female body was viewed as an insufficiently developed male 
body where the sexual organs were located inside the body due to a lack 
of heat in the early developmental stage of the embryo.319 The view that 
females are passive, fragile, closer to nature and inferior, but also more 
driven by sexual passions and, therefore, morally more dangerous, has 
been documented in a variety of ways throughout Western history. Thus, 
by being a reminder of the natural and the corporeal, as well as being 
sexually attractive, women pose a threat that men attempt to solve by 
imbuing a distance between the superior qualities of cognitive, moral, 
male agency and the more inferior and natural agency of female embodi-
ment which lacks in both cognitive and moral capabilities. Such theoreti-
cal configurations of gender, mind, and body, and the definition of moral, 
emotional and rational qualities attributed to these, have been a central 
part of the oppressive framework that the feminist movement has had to 
struggle against. Shame has played a central part both in the construction 
and enforcement of gender roles and in gender definitions within these 
frameworks.
This mind-body split poses severe challenges to the very idea of 
embodiment in the current feminist discussions of gender construction. 
In principle, the idea of embodiment runs counter to the possibility of a 
split where the body is separated from the self and objectified as a sepa-
rate entity. It also links up to our previously discussed topic of what we, 
in a preliminary sense, have called objectification, which we will unfold 
in greater detail here. 
Objectification of the female body 
Objectification has been put forth as one of the central challenges for 
both female embodiment and female shame, especially sexual objecti-
fication. Broadly defined, objectification implies that the body is being 
318 Rose Weitz and Samantha Kwan, The Politics of Women’s Bodies: Sexuality, Appearance, and Be-
havior (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 8.
319 Ibid., 3.
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negatively used, controlled and owned through one’s physical proper-
ties.320 For example, many women experience it as extremely shameful 
to have their bodies reduced to sexualized flesh in the gaze of the other. 
However, we need to ask whether the different conceptualizations of 
objectification within feminist discourse offer an adequate framework for 
understanding shame in this context. To be treated as an object does not 
in itself necessitate shame responses. We call on physical therapists and 
plumbers because they have bodies and physical skills that are up to the 
task at hand, and they are not ashamed of it. Furthermore, when one part 
in a sexual relationship experiences desire because of the sexual attrac-
tiveness of the body of the other, it can be a source of pleasure for both. 
Thus, objectification need not be problematic in itself. Accordingly, it is 
questionable whether the broad definition above may be useful to elicit 
the specific connections between objectification and shame responses.321 
In our view, we need a more nuanced analysis of the concept of objecti-
fication and its role in shame processes. Timo Jütten draws up two main 
accounts of sexual objectification: the imposition account and the instru-
mentalization account.322 
The imposition account
The starting point for our discussion of sexual objectification is the imposi-
tion account.323 In her seminal book Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 
320 Rachel M. Calogero, Stacey Ed Tantleff-Dunn, and J. Thompson, “Objectification Theory: An 
Introduction,” in Self-objectification in women: Causes, and counteractions (Washington, D.C.: 
American Psychological Association, 2011), 5.
321 Ibid.
322 Timo Jütten, “Sexual Objectification,” Ethics 127, no. 1 (2016).
323 For further reading, see Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Put-
nam, 1981); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1989); Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phe-
nomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990). The development of a more formalized 
theory of objectification is an attempt to catch and conceptualize much of both the theorizing 
and the research on female objectification, in order to offer a conceptual platform for further 
research. For further reading into objectification theory, see, for example, Barbara L. Fredrick-
son and Tomi-Ann Roberts, “Objectification Theory: Toward Understanding Women’s Lived 
Experiences and Mental Health Risks,” Psychology of Women Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1997); Rachel 
M. Calogero, Stacey Ed Tantleff-Dunn, and J. Kevin Thompson, Self-Objectification in Women: 
Causes, Consequences, and Counteractions, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychological 
Association, 2011).
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Catharine MacKinnon claims that to be sexually objectified means having a 
social meaning imposed on your being that defines you as something to be 
sexually used.324 Accordingly, sexual objectification is always wrong because 
it always takes place within a context of male dominance and female oppres-
sion. It imposes a social meaning that undermines both equality and auton-
omy, as well as rendering the female body as an object to be instrumentalized 
and used. The cultural imposition of immoral values pervades the context 
and leaves no chance for the possible sexual objectification of male – female 
desire and pleasure to be played out in conditions of autonomy and equality. 
Thus, the many variations of being sexually instrumentalized and objecti-
fied produce – intentionally or not – variations of shame manifested within 
a wider frame of political and historical oppression. 
Even though this account has been seminal in revealing the oppressive 
premises for female embodiment through both history and the present, 
it has been challenged for its sweeping analyses and lack of sensitivity to 
context. 
The instrumentalization account 
Martha Nussbaum’s account entails the close reading of literary texts that 
reveal helpful distinctions between different dimensions of sexual objec-
tification that are not equally objectionable from a moral perspective.325 To 
elicit and understand what is morally problematic and shame-producing 
about sexual objectification – which Nussbaum calls a loose cluster-term – 
we need to be sensitive to the context in which the objectification occurs. 
The imposition account, where sexual objectification is always morally 
problematic, conflates the different ways in which different dimensions 
of objectification play together.326 
As mentioned, sexual objectification between equal and consenting 
partners can, for example, be a rather pleasurable part of sexual life and 
thus not shame-producing. In her reading, Nussbaum distinguishes 
between seven ways of treating a person as a thing:
324 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 140.
325 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Objectification,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 24, no. 4 (1995).
326 Patricia Marino, “The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent,” Inquiry 51, no. 4 
(2008).
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1. Instrumentality: the objectifier treats the object as a tool for his or 
her purposes.
2. Denial of autonomy: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in 
autonomy and self-determination. 
3. Inertness: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and 
perhaps also in activity. 
4. Fungibility: the objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) 
with other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other 
types.
5. Violability: the objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary- 
integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash, 
break into. 
6. Ownership: the objectifier treats the object as something that is 
owned by another, that can be bought or sold, etc. 
7. Denial of subjectivity: the objectifier treats the object as some-
thing whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into 
account.327
However, to identify these dimensions does not in itself answer the ques-
tion of whether all forms of objectification are morally problematic. Thus, 
in order to analyze shame resulting from objectification, and specifically 
from sexual objectification, we need to analyze which of these dimen-
sions of objectification that are present in shame. 
Furthermore, these are not mutually exclusive dimensions. Often a 
plurality of these dimensions will constitute a shame reaction. For exam-
ple, in a situation of persistent sexual abuse, more or less all of the above 
dimensions will be in play. Nussbaum herself does not answer what 
cluster of features would constitute a sufficient condition for a morally 
problematic objectification of persons.328 The only dimension she seems 
to identify as always morally objectionable is instrumentalization, that 
is, treating others merely as tools for one’s own purposes.329 In relation 
to sexuality, this sort of objectification seems to be closely tied to other 
327 Nussbaum, “Objectification,” 257.
328 Ibid., 258.
329 Ibid., 289.
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dimensions, such as adenial of subjectivity and autonomy, boundary vio-
lations, and ownership such as commodification. All these forms may 
be morally problematic and can be experienced as shameful within the 
cultural framework of male dominance. 
However, Nussbaum’s context-sensitive reading of literature shows 
that other dimensions do not always have to be morally problematic as 
long as they are based on consent. Even though she does not list up cri-
teria for when objectification is morally acceptable, it does seem to entail 
a form of relational symmetry, mutuality, and some form of intimacy.330 
However, one may object that using literary examples – although picked 
from a wide range of sources from Playboy to D. H. Lawrence – entails a 
stylized reduction of the broader experience of human life. Thus, one may 
argue that this method of literary close-reading may be sensitive to the 
context of the chosen literary texts, but not to the context of the female 
experience itself.
Critical remarks 
Although Nussbaum’s differentiations have merit, they have been con-
tested as well. It has been argued that in sexual objectification, only one 
morally relevant value is at stake: respect for autonomy.331 Hence, there 
is nothing morally wrong with the sexual objectification implied in, for 
example, anonymous casual sex, prostitution, and pornography, as long 
as it is based on consent. In fact, Nussbaum’s criteria of intimacy and 
mutuality only muddy the water because inherent relational ties and feel-
ings may influence and even thwart a free and autonomous choice. But 
even though autonomy should be the only moral reference point, it is 
difficult to ensure autonomy and consent in a political and cultural con-
text where female embodiment and female autonomy have had a history 
of being oppressed and undermined. Accordingly, in this respect, we are 
still no closer to a fine-tuned analytical tool that can separate shameful 
and non-shameful objectification of the body. 
330 Marino, “The Ethics of Sexual Objectification: Autonomy and Consent”; “Philosophy of Sex,” 
Philosophy Compass 9, no. 1 (2014).
331 Ibid.
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Another critic, Lina Papadaki, argues against both the imposition 
account and Nussbaum’s differentiation between morally negative and 
positive objectification.332 She criticizes the Kantian-based imposition 
account for being overly pessimistic and drastic in its description of the 
consequences of sexual objectification. Being utilized by somebody as a 
mere sexual object does not necessarily lead to serious harming of ratio-
nal capacities or humanity. Objectification comes in many forms, with 
varying degrees of intent and with varying degrees of harm. Being the 
recipient of catcalls on the street is certainly different from being the vic-
tim of physical sexual abuse, even though both may imply some form 
of sexual objectification. Thus, Papadaki opts for a more differentiated 
concept that allows for forms of sexual objectification that do not lead 
to serious harming of the other. On the other hand, she criticizes Nuss-
baum’s differentiated account for being much too inclusive. If objec-
tification includes any form of consensual instrumentalization of the 
other, as Nussbaum seems to suggest, we objectify all the time. In short, 
Nussbaum’s account does not give sufficient help in the struggle against 
shameful sexual objectification:
Furthermore, once this concept’s association with the negative and morally 
problematic is weakened, and it becomes, as in Nussbaum’s case, something 
ordinary, widespread, and in many cases a positive and wonderful part of our 
lives, there is a further risk: the risk that the fight against (negative) objectifi-
cation is undermined. The plea to end objectification, vividly put forward by 
Kant, MacKinnon and Dworkin will no longer sound so urgent and pressing; 
it might even sound misguided, if objectification is thought to be, in many cas-
es, a positive and valuable part of our lives, something we are not willing to  
give up.333
Papadaki suggests a definition that covers what is morally objectionable 
in the imposition account, but also includes Nussbaum’s account of what 
makes negative sexual objectification morally unacceptable: 
332 Evangelia Lina Papadaki, “Feminist perspectives on objectification,” in Stanford encyclopedia 
of philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 
2010); “What Is Objectification?,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 1 (2010).
333 Papadaki, “What Is Objectification?” 28f.
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Seeing and/or treating a person as an object (seeing and/or treating them in one 
or more of these seven ways: as an instrument, inert, fungible, violable, owned, 
denied autonomy, denied subjectivity), in such a way that denies this person’s 
humanity. A person’s humanity is denied when it is ignored/not properly ac-
knowledged and/or when it is in some way harmed.334
Papadaki establishes four categories that may seem important for the 
analysis of female body shame. Above we have suggested at least two 
main categories of shame: acute and passing shame, and toxic shame. 
The main distinction between these two is the degree of harm shame 
inflicts on the self, especially over time. Of course, it has not only to 
do with the harm inflicted by objectification, but is also dependent on 
the fortitude and resilience of the self. However, as embodied agency 
is a precarious and vulnerable project, distinguishing between degrees 
or categories of potential harm at least establishes one helpful refer-
ence point for the analysis of shame. Papadaki distinguishes between 
reductive objectification that harms the individual’s humanity (ratio-
nal capacities) and non-reductive objectification that merely ignores 
or does not fully acknowledge an individual’s humanity. Referring to 
the examples used above, to be the victim of physical sexual abuse is 
certainly to harm a person’s humanity. It denies the person a right to 
ownership of their body, to free consent, and inflicts irreparable dam-
age to both present and future embodied agency. But being the receiver 
of a sexualized catcall from a stranger in a bar hardly poses a threat to 
neither present nor future embodied agency, even though it is part of 
the structures within which the precarious prospect of female embodi-
ment takes place. It may nevertheless be experienced as degrading and 
generate acute shame as it ignores that the body belongs to someone 
and is someone. Such disrespect and lack of recognition of a person’s 
humanity is sadly the experience of many women. 
Papadaki also distinguishes between intentional and non-intentional 
objectification. This is an important distinction for the analysis of female 
body shame. In cases where, for example, violent sexual abuse and rape 
are used as a military and ethnic strategy and weapon in war (as in the 
334 Ibid., 32.
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Balkans War), the intent to seriously harm is obvious.335 This presence 
and acknowledgment of harmful intent have consequences for the expe-
rience of shame, how it is manifested, and why it occurs. Such shame is 
often tied to the violation itself; of being reduced to an instrument or an 
object without moral value or, as in the case of the Balkans War where 
Bosnian women were raped by Serbian soldiers so they would carry the 
children of the enemy, as part of a strategy of ethnic cleansing. The emo-
tional conflicts of these women, where shame certainly played a large 
role, are hard to imagine.
However, when the possible harm is a consequence of tacit and unac-
knowledged objectification, shame is more difficult to pinpoint. When 
both the objectifier and the objectified harbor no ill will towards each 
other and there is no intention to overlook or seriously harm, the 
inherent and potentially objectifying attitudes and values of the social 
topography become more difficult to identify. Thus, in such instances 
the presence of unexplained body shame may be an important identi-
fier of challenges that need to be met or addressed. When young girls 
experience body shame that keeps them from partaking in PE activi-
ties in school together with their friends and peers, similar shame and 
hesitance may not be seen among boys. Thus, it seems crucial to search 
for tacit and unintentional disciplining mechanisms as they may seri-
ously hamper and interrupt the natural flow of embodied agency and 
not allow for equal opportunities to develop and flourish into healthy 
embodied selves. Such unidentified and tacit disciplining frameworks 
are, in some ways, a more significant challenge than those that are obvi-
ously violent and oppressive: the latter is easier to fight against because 
we know who or what is the enemy. But the unidentified, unintentional, 
and unacknowledged remnants of a gendered past may still reside as 
tacit disciplining frameworks in our value systems, habits of role inter-
pretation and – not least – the regulation of the space in which we allow 
ourselves and others to exert bodily agency. 
However, Papadakis does not solve the unavoidable Kantian mind-
body split inherent in the concept of objectification. Thus, she fails to 
335 Vetlesen, Evil and Human Agency: Understanding Collective Evildoing, Chapter 4.
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take fully into account the role that the body plays in human experience. 
The phenomenological experience of being an intersubjective body in the 
world implies both being looked at as well as looking at. It implies bodily 
sexual attraction, and it implies objectified materiality. This fact is not in 
itself a problematic human experience, as suggested by the other accounts. 
Instead, it is constitutive for human experience, especially sexual experi-
ence. Sexual attraction, bodily pleasure, and erotic encounters may even 
serve to enhance or fulfill the potential of human experience and subjec-
tivity. Hence, framing such experience solely in negative terms, as in the 
imposition account, serves to restrict the experiential potential of human 
embodiment regarding sexual experience. The question is, rather, how 
to determine what makes some forms of bodily sexual experience mor-
ally problematic. We argue that bodily shame is not described adequately 
within the framework of a phenomenology of the body that sees objecti-
fication as the main culprit.
To help us further here, we turn to Ann Cahill. She takes as her 
starting point the phenomenology of (sexual) difference. Our human 
condition is that we are bodies among bodies, contextually and pre-
cariously exposed, and vulnerable to others. Being objectified, gazed 
upon, and treated as a material body does not entail losing ownership 
of our bodies, being denied subjectivity, or being pushed into passivity 
and shame, and losing the capacity for active consent. Bodily agency 
presupposes primarily being acknowledged as a body. So, according 
to Cahill, objectification is not the problem as such. She suggests that 
what is morally problematic is when we are gazed upon or acted upon 
in such a way that we lose our ontological distinctiveness and specific-
ity. She claims that the problem under such circumstances is that we 
become derivatized: 
To derivatize is to portray, render, understand, or approach a being solely or 
primarily as the reflection, projection, or expression of another being’s identity 
desires, fears, etc. The derivatized subject becomes reducible in all relevant ways 
to the derivatizing subject’s existence …336
336 Ann J. Cahill, Overcoming Objectification: A Carnal Ethics. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 32.
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Thus, derivatization is different from objectification. Being made into 
a derivative of the other is when our bodily ontology is denied its dis-
tinctiveness and specificity, and is reduced to sameness. What is morally 
problematic, according to Cahill, is, therefore, not so much that we are 
bodily objectified – gazed upon or treated as objects, but that our bodies 
are reduced to an object in a specific, reductive way. When, for example, a 
young woman is gazed and acted upon as the mirror image of the other, 
her bodily distinctiveness – herself – is lost in the eyes of the other. This 
experience of loss or discrepancy between her bodily self and the reduc-
tion to the mirror image of the desire of the other may be one that inter-
rupts her self-actualization and causes shame. 
This conceptualization provides a better starting point for under-
standing female body shame. It is a common human experience, not 
only a female experience, that there need not be any shame in being 
acknowledged as a material body. We precariously assert and develop 
our embodied agency in an intersubjective context of bodies. Thus, being 
acknowledged in our bodily distinctiveness can be a self-affirming expe-
rience. But shame may also be the response when our bodily presence and 
our material body is not recognized as part of a natural and positive way 
of expressing embodied intentional agency in the world. A preset norm 
of objectification as morally problematic may thus serve to thwart such 
a positive experience of sexual bodily pleasure as part of the active flour-
ishing of human agency. 
Female self-objectification or self-derivatization
Our next step is to briefly sketch how the concept of sexual derivatiza-
tion can be linked to the concept of self-objectification. This is an essen-
tial tenet in the understanding of the continuous societal reproduction 
of body shame. Within mainstream feminism, self-objectification has 
been one of the critical theoretical constructs that aim to explain how 
the oppressive order of patriarchy has been upheld not only by men, 
but also by women through self-policing. The basic feminist position is 
widely acknowledged, and rather succinctly put by the feminist Sandra 
Lee Bartky:
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In contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male connoisseur resides 
within the conciousness of most women: They stand perpetually before his 
gaze and under his judgment. Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an 
anony mous patriarchal Other.337
The sum of the daily experience of being under the gaze of the male other, 
of being Eve hiding from the gaze of Adam as in Masaccio’s fresco The 
Expulsion from the Garden of Eden, leads to an internalization of this 
objectifying gaze. In this sense, the female experience is not only one 
of sexual objectification through the eyes of the male other. It is also an 
experience of both viewing and treating oneself as a sexual object. This 
colonization of the mind, as Roberts puts it, leads to a self-imposed objec-
tification of docility and passivity where power and control are lost.338 
First unfolded in the seminal work of Simone de Beauvoir, it threatens the 
female self and female authenticity.339 This external and internal defining 
frame has obvious consequences for how females construct their bod-
ies. In most feminist accounts, it is about social regulation and control.340 
It defines, for example, the social and physical space for movement and 
agency, and the ideals by which an agent is evaluated. It also defines what 
proper and improper behavior are. The result, however, is disrupted or 
thwarted agency and shame, such as when subjects are scorned or nega-
tively evaluated because they cross these established borders. 
Consequently, the frame of agency for female embodiment is not only 
challenged by external and internal restrictions, it is also pushed towards 
an agency of sexual objectification and docility in which shame is per-
manently a tacit possibility. We have earlier pointed to the fact that the 
bodily ideals that define this successful female embodiment are unattain-
able for most. Thus, it renders the female body as a constant “work in 
progress” through inner monitoring and self-surveillance. According to 
Calogero et al., for some women, this external vantage point of bodily 
337 Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, 72.
338 Tomi-Ann Roberts, “The Woman in the Body,” Feminism & Psychology 12, no. 3 (2002).
339 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1st American ed. (New York: Knopf, 1953).
340 Calogero, Tantleff-Dunn, and Thompson, “Objectification Theory: An Introduction,” 8.
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self-scrutiny and self-objectification becomes a persistent trait.341 For oth-
ers, self-objectification becomes a state one falls into and out of. These 
traits or states reflect the subject’s way of attempting to express agency 
within the restricting ideals of female embodiment, and it correlates, to 
a certain degree, to body shame as either a constant possibility where 
self-policing is a persistent trait or as a possibility related to on/off states 
of self-policing. 
Thus, as Beauvoir claims, authenticity is at stake, as the view of the 
body that is the goal of agency belongs to someone else. In the words of 
Frederickson et al., “Far beyond the idea that adolescent girls simply do 
not like the size and shape of their maturing bodies, girls learn that this 
new body belongs less to them and more to others.”342 The others to whom 
she then “belongs” may interrupt her agency at any given time and cause 
shame to appear. To avoid the risk of shame appearing, she may develop 
an inauthentic lifestyle in which she constantly tries to conform to ideals 
or hide her failure to achieve them. Thus, the threat of shame determines 
life and agency. 
As a girl matures into womanhood, her body also matures into 
the public domain – but not solely as her own. By becoming the 
target of increased sexual objectification – not only by men but also 
by her female peers – the realization sinks in that it is not so much 
herself but her body that is evaluated. Although the objectification 
and self-objectification are present earlier also, it is in puberty that the 
girl integrates with the objectification/self-objectification framework 
of society. Throughout adolescence, attention and focus double: she 
both becomes an object and sees herself as an object. This doubling – 
combined with an increasing tendency to self-police – may seriously 
hamper or disrupt former cognitive, emotional, and bodily flow 
processes. The normative (and oppressive) borders and conditions of 
341 Self-Objectification in Women: Causes, Consequences, and Counteractions (American Psycho- 
logical Association, 2011), 10f.
342 Barbara L. Fredrickson et al., “That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex Differences in Self- 
Objectification, Restrained Eating, and Math Performance,” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 75, no. 1 (1998): 193.
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embodied agency become all the more visible, both from the outside 
and from within the subject. They render the subject in a double bind 
situation; on the one hand, bodily lacking as compared to the norms 
set, and on the other hand, with stolen agency by being rendered pas-
sive, docile, and objectified. Hence, self-objectification can be a female 
way of participating in the flight from the corporeal body. However, it 
comes at a price. In the discrepancy between positive and life-affirming 
embodied agency and the external/internal normative mechanisms of 
objectification and docility, shame appears as a response to disrupted 
or thwarted embodied agency. 
Is it possible to link this analysis to the concept of derivatization? To 
do so, we need to draw up a few rough and intersecting lines as a back-
drop for shame. First, as we saw above, to speak about derivatization is 
better because it allows us to draw a line between positive and negative 
experiences of being seen and treated as both having and being a body in 
the world. Against this backdrop, shame may be the result of interruption 
of bodily agency through not being recognized and acknowledged as an 
ontologically distinct body. Then, we are made into a derivative, a mir-
ror image of somebody’s dreams and desires. Moreover, shame may also 
be the result when a positive, self-affirming bodily experience of being a 
sensual/sexual object in the gaze of the other is thwarted and labeled as 
negative and dehumanizing. 
Self-derivatization may be constructed along the same lines. To 
self-derivatize is to internalize and police an ontologically reduction-
istic bodily image mirroring the desires and needs of the other. This 
result is the same double-bind situation as in self-objectification. The 
precarious and potentially self-constituting and self-affirming situa-
tion of being a specific embodied subject among other embodied sub-
jects is restricted, denied, or interrupted. It is so because the bodily 
image policed both internally and externally is ontologically not our 
own. Thus, the discrepancy between unaffirmed body-self and affirmed 
body-image is easily perceived as both lacking and shameful. If this 
reduction to sameness implies docility and passivity, it also negatively 
disrupts any positive and self-affirming experience of being a material 
body in the world.
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   192 2/25/2021   4:38:41 PM
s h a m e  a n d  e m b o d i m e n t
193
Niva Piran: The experience of female  
embodiment in context 
Five dimensions of experience
So far, we have attempted to sketch a position that allows for both an 
active and self-affirming, as well as a negative and derivatizing, experi-
ence of being a visible and attractive body in the world. However, we have 
sketched neither the conditions nor the dimensions of experience. Thus, 
the next important question to ask is: what kind of structuring conditions 
seem to promote either a positive body experience or a negative experi-
ence of body shame that reduces the ability to exert agency within the 
boundaries of a given context? 
As shown by Davis, there is a need for more empirically based knowl-
edge to understand both the specific structures and conditions under 
which female embodiment takes place, as well as the dimensions of how 
female embodiment is experienced in late modern society. Studies show 
that the intersection between body and culture is complex and far more 
difficult for girls than for boys, and it comes at a price.343 As mentioned, 
late modern virtual society also presents new structuring conditions that 
may well be novel to both the understanding of male and female body 
shame.
In her recent and well-researched book Journeys of Embodiment at the 
Intersection of Body and Culture: The Developmental Theory of Embod-
iment (2017), clinical psychologist Niva Piran analyzes the results from 
a rather comprehensive empirical multi-method research program that 
aims to explore critical dimensions of the experience of (female) embod-
iment (EE) across the lifespan. What emerges in the analysis are five 
related dimensions where the quality of the experiences are graded from 
positive to negative.344 These five dimensions are:
343 For the link between experiences of embodiment and well-being, see, for example, Niva Piran, 
Journeys of Embodiment at the Intersection of Body and Culture: The Developmental Theory of 
Embodiment (Waltham: Elsevier, 2017), 8ff.
344 Ibid., 4.
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1. Body Connection and Comfort versus Body Disconnection and 
Discomfort
2. Agency and Functionality versus Blocked Agency and Restraint
3. Experience and Expression of Desire versus Disowning Desire
4. Attuned Self-care versus Disrupted Attunement, Neglect, and 
Self-harm
5. Inhabiting the Body as a Subjective Site versus as an Objectified Site
We shall not expound on all the different dimensions of the experience 
of embodiment. Suffice to say, these dimensions provide a broad and 
complex dimensional map for understanding female engagement in the 
world. The chance for an overall positive and constructive experience of 
embodiment rests on a comprehensive set of dimensions. These dimen-
sions map the possibilities and the routes to a positive experience of 
embodiment. However, the possibilities for negative and disruptive expe-
riences are plentiful, as well. 
Disruption of agency, for example, through blocking, carries conse-
quences for the other dimensions of embodiment. The experience of pos-
itive embodiment and agency hangs precariously in the balance between 
two factors we have already stressed several times: a) The degree of 
repression or freedom – or as Piran would call it – risk factors or protec-
tive factors in external structures that provide pressures and opportuni-
ties; and b) The maturity or fortitude of the embodied subject. As shown 
in the analysis of Benkhe mentioned earlier, the internal forces of the 
self may serve as a counterweight against external shaping forces. Piran’s 
dimensions show both the severe and complex consequences of the loss 
of positive experience of embodiment, and manifest the comprehensive 
context in which body shame is situated:
In this process of disruption, the body becomes an uncomfortable “other” site – 
agency is dampened, ownership of desires is challenged, and compromises to 
self-attunement are frequent. Moreover, the carefree lack of self-consciousness 
found in early childhood – “I did not care about what I wore or what I looked 
like” – is lost as well. These compounded losses, associated with inhabiting a 
docile, feminine body, markedly change the way adolescent girls engage with 
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the world. Further, examining social processes that shape embodiment during 
adolescence clarifies that in creating docile bodies, all domains of the EE are 
concurrently targeted. As girls are initiated into owning and inhabiting women’s 
bodies, their bodies become less safe, their embodied agency gets penalized 
and negatively labeled, their appetites problematized, and acting in attunement 
with their needs is questioned. Simultaneously, the body becomes an objectified 
site.345
In our context, the above analysis is important because it suggests clearly 
the external-internalized context that causes shame. Previously, we have 
argued that shame may be seen as resulting from the clash of two differ-
ent contexts of agency: the subject’s immediate and uninhibited self-real-
izing agency clashes with the (imagined) context of the other. The present 
analysis suggests that such a clash and the accompanying shame not only 
occur as the result of specific, particular instances but are conditioned by 
deep and tacit structures that are embedded in the socialization process 
of the female self. 
Accordingly, imagine a young and fragile teenage girl working to 
establish a positive sense of self. The norms and expectations of the youth 
culture she belongs to are basically bodily in character. They evaluate her 
success through bodily standards that she, in her view, will never be able 
to meet, no matter how much she works out or diets. Thus, the fullness 
and potential of her human experience may, sadly, be evaluated through 
reductionist and barely attainable bodily ideals that are bound to cause 
shame unless she can liberate herself from them. 
This reduction to the body also implies a definition of what it essen-
tially is to be a young teenage girl, as it focuses on the evaluation of the 
docile and objectified – or more precisely the derivatized – body as the 
measure of success. Thus, she may experience a shameful gap between 
these impossible ideals and her appearance as her body becomes the 
material site where her lack of success is measured. This derivatization 
or reduction may lead to dysappearance, that is, she loses her natural 
self-awareness in which the body is the non-objectified extension of the 
345 Ibid., 11.
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self. Instead, the body becomes disconnected, being reduced to a deriva-
tive object under constant scrutiny, as it does not meet cultural standards. 
Thus, the reduction to solely body and the impossibility to conform may 
easily end up in an experience of being blocked, restrained, or losing the 
possibility of following your dreams, goals, intentions, and projects. The 
result may well be profound and toxic body shame, self-harm, as well as 
anxiety and depression, when an overall positive experience of embodi-
ment is denied or made too difficult. This underscores the severe moral 
dimensions at play in the social context of female embodiment. 
A social theory of embodiment
The second aim of Piran’s research program is to develop an empirically 
based social theory or model that explores the relationship between social 
processes and embodied experiences.346 The Developmental Theory of 
Embodiment (DTE) that emerges through her empirical analysis sug-
gests that:
… the multitude of social experiences described by girls and women shape their 
body experiences via three core pathways: experiences in the physical domain, 
experiences in the mental domain, and experiences related directly to social 
power. The theory contends that both protective and risk factors are organized 
along these three pathways, with the positive and negative aspects being con-
ceptualized as Physical Freedom (vs. Corseting), Mental Freedom (vs. Corset-
ing), and Social Power and Relational Connections (vs. Disempowerment and 
Disconnection).347
According to Piran, in the transition from girlhood to womanhood, dis-
ruptions are common in all of the above domains. The empirical findings 
also show that experiences in all domains are essential for a positive expe-
rience of embodiment. A context may, for example, offer opportunities 
for freedom of movement. Thus, it enhances the possibility of positive 
experiences of embodiment. At the same time, it may be characterized by 
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Positive experiences in the physical domain reflect the quality of the 
experience of physical engagement with the world. Such engagement is 
defined as the freedom to move and participate freely in activities with-
out any constraints, being safe from violation and coercive body alter-
ation practices, and also freedom and support to express natural desire as 
attunement to bodily needs. According to Piran, girls’ and women’s expe-
riences of physical freedom or physical corseting are crucial to how they 
construct or shape their experience of embodiment. The societal struc-
tures that serve to discipline girls and women’s sense of physical freedom 
hold critical keys to a positive experience of female embodiment. One 
prominent example is to be able to exert agency through physical activ-
ities, safe from harassment, abuse, and rape. However, the statistics of 
female abuse, rape and harassment show that girls and women are still 
at risk in society. Thus, they are constantly exposed to the risk of shame 
resulting from a disrupted agency – or corseting of agency – because they 
are denied protection to exert agency according to their intentions or 
desires.
A subtler example would be safety from cultural expectations and coer-
cive pressure to engage in unwanted body modification practices (such as 
dieting, cosmetic surgery, etc.) that disrupt the ownership of the body 
and portray it as deficient, shameful, and in need of upgrading instead.349 
As we saw above, even though different practices of bodily alteration can 
be the choice of the subject themselves, it does not alter the fact that it is 
a way to manage the shameful gap between the ideal body and the expe-
rience of a body found lacking.
In the mental domain, an experience of being able to exert oneself 
in critical discussions without being corseted by constraining and reg-
ulating social discourses that simply reproduce the gender status quo 
is crucial to a positive experience of embodiment. Piran identifies two 
main clusters of such restraints: appearance-related discourses where one 
portrays the female body as a deficient object, and comportment related 
discourses that portray it as a passive body. Both clusters of discourse 
hold the potential to disrupt the experience of the body as a powerful and 
349 Ibid., 19.
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worthy site from which to engage with the world.350 The appearance-re-
lated discourses – the body as a deficient object – include two well-known 
discourses: the discourse of the objectified body and the discourse of the 
female body as an object for the male gaze. The comportment-related dis-
courses – women as docile – include four separate discourses. The first 
discourse, women as submissive/demure, has a long and documented 
history. The second, engagement in feminine activities, is – according to 
Piran – so powerful that girls and women tend to think it is part of their 
wanted self-expression. The third, woman as desired but desireless, por-
trays females as an object to be desired. Here, women, in their desirabil-
ity, hold the responsibility for male desire. Thus, the regulation of female 
desire does not only mentally corset women’s agency, but it also rein-
forces the continued supremacy of the male gaze. The patriarchal shaping 
of relational patterns shows how the heterosexual structuring of relation-
ships disrupts the relational connections between young girls when they 
reach puberty and turn to in-fighting and policing among themselves.351 
Accompanying these corseting discourses, Piran also finds linguistic 
dichotomies and labels that further regulate female embodiment.352 These 
are crude reflections of the discourses. Dichotomies such as tomboy – 
girly girl, slut/prude, nice/loser, or expressions like bitch, dependent, and 
so forth, all regulate the different social dimensions of female embodi-
ment, whether it be freedom in the physical domain, such as freedom to 
move or to express desire, or in the mental domain, through the right to 
freely exert oneself through voicing your opinion in your arena of choice. 
In Piran’s words:
… different social constructions limit diverse girls’ and women’s possibilities 
of embodied engagement with the world. These possibilities can be expressed 
through widely disseminated molds of social expectations, dichotomized con-
structions, or labels. These mental molds are entrenched in individuals’ lives 
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embodiment, the varied forms of Mental Corseting need to be named and con-
tested, to allow for passionate and meaningful engagement with the world.353
The impediments that follow from such limitations are likely to contrib-
ute to experiences of shame. For a girl struggling with embodiment, both 
discourses and linguistics may offer rather scant or limited resources for 
finding a language and a story in which she can find support for a free 
and positive experience of embodiment. Instead, she may find herself 
in situations in which she repeatedly struggles to avoid or overcome the 
shame that is caused by such constraints. According to Piran, there is also 
an apparent lack of supportive discourses that facilitate female embodi-
ment on its own terms:
The research program on embodiment highlights missing discourses related to 
women’s embodied worth, power, passions, or their right for safety. Through 
this absence, girls and women of diverse social locations learn about their com-
promised worth within social structures of power.354
Discourses do more than discipline or set the parameters and norms for 
how one can exert agency. They also define worth, both in measure and 
kind. A teenage girl that needs a safe, protective, challenging, and con-
structive discourse and a narrative in which to interpret or experience her 
embodied life may easily end up mentally corseted within discourses and 
narratives that limit, devalue, and even internalize interrupted agency.
The third core pathway along which girls and women shape their 
embodiment experiences is through experiences of social power and 
relational connections. The quality of these experiences influences sig-
nificantly the possibility for a positive experience of embodiment. This 
pathway includes four categories: Freedom from Prejudice and Harass-
ment, Freedom from Appearance-based Social Power, Empowering 
Relationships, and Membership in Equitable Communities.355 As in the 
other domains, the resources for positive embodiment are decided by the 
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As stated above, the intersection between body and culture is complex, 
and the task of embodiment is far more difficult for girls than for boys – 
and it comes at a price. It affects well-being and may, negatively, for exam-
ple, produce isolation, shame, negative self-esteem, and depression, and 
predict severe conditions such as eating disorders and substance abuse.356
Conforming to the ideals of the marketplace? Cosmetic surgery
The female body has, to a large extent, been objectified through commod-
ification in the late modern marketplace. In a consumer culture, we are 
literally bombarded with film, pictures, and text displaying female body 
ideals of both slimness, curviness, sexuality, and attractiveness that are 
unattainable for most bodies.357 These idealized body-displays promise 
success, health, and happiness. Thus, the exteriority – the skin – talks. It 
symbolizes the degree of success in the body-project. In the words of the 
feminist Sandra Lee Bartky:
We are presented everywhere with images of perfect female beauty – at the 
drugstore cosmetics display, the supermarket magazine counter, on television. 
These images remind us constantly that we fail to measure up. Whose nose 
is the right shape, after all, whose hips are not too wide – or too narrow? The  
female body is revealed as a task, an object in need of transformation.358
However, the difficulty of succeeding in this transformation may leave 
a gap between, on the one hand, the normative ideals and, on the other 
hand, as a body among bodies, the inevitable display of a body that does 
not conform to these ideals. The shameful experience of being flawed not 
only becomes the mirror through which, for example, a teenage girl sees 
her body. It also structures her identity, her interactions, and the way she 
exerts her agency in the world in a profound sense.359 The gap mentioned 
has proved to be fertile ground for the grooming industry, especially 
for the industry of cosmetic surgery that promises bodily alterations 
356 For an introduction to the possible consequences of struggling with embodiment, see ibid., 1.
357 Sarah Grogan, Body Image: Understanding Body Dissatisfaction in Men, Women and Children, 
3rd ed. (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017), 65ff.
358 Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression, 40.
359 Kathy Davis, Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2013), 63.
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according to the ideals of the day. Thus, the increasing popularity of cos-
metic surgery has contributed to a medicalization of the female body, as 
well as contributing to further commodification through a tendency to 
reduce the female body to alterable body parts.360 The female body, as a 
work-in-progress, has become a marketplace for big money.361 
Feminist philosopher Kathryn Pauly Morgan claims that those who 
undergo cosmetic surgery conform to beauty ideals set by males and their 
exploiting and colonizing heterosexuality. Although the choice of under-
going cosmetic surgery may appear both empowering and liberating, it 
implies an acceptance of the female body as raw material to be formed 
and molded into the recognized norm of male supremacy. The choice is 
willingly helped along by highly priced cosmetic surgeons full of prom-
ises of a better life.362
Others, however, suggest that cosmetic surgery is not always about 
adhering to beauty standards. In a rather personal study, Kathy Davis 
takes on her earlier feminist views on cosmetic surgery along much of 
the same lines as Morgan and others.363 She points to several empirical 
studies conducted in the Netherlands that suggest a more nuanced pic-
ture. Here, women did not have cosmetic surgery because they wanted 
to become more beautiful, but because they wanted to be normal like 
everybody else:
… cosmetic surgery stories are presented as a trajectory of suffering.6 They begin 
with the woman’s realization that something is seriously amiss with her appear-
ance and follow her through a period of several years during which she comes to 
regard her body as an insurmountable constraint – a condition which leaves her 
“uprooted, at least to a certain degree, from the mundane common world and its 
normal course of affairs” (Riemann and Schütze 1993: 345). She describes her 
hopelessness and resignation as she discovers that there is nothing she can do 
about her problem. Her story takes on a quality of impending doom, becoming 
360 Chrisler and Johnston-Robledo, Woman’s Embodied Self: Feminist Perspectives on Identity and 
Image, 51.
361 For an introduction to the feminist discussion of cosmetic surgery, see Jane Megan Northrop, 
Reflecting on Cosmetic Surgery: Body Image, Shame and Narcissism (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 
31ff. 
362 Ibid., 46.
363 Davis, Reshaping the Female Body: The Dilemma of Cosmetic Surgery, 2ff.
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a “downhill path” or vicious circle (Riemann and Schütze 1991: 348–349).  
The stage is then set for cosmetic surgery as the event which interrupts the tra-
jectory. It allows her to take action and regain a sense of control over her life.364
As a conclusion to her survey of these studies, Davis points to how such 
surgery may, in fact, be a manifestation of female agency. Therefore, she 
claims, it is possible to see:
cosmetic surgery [as] an understandable step in the context of an individual 
woman’s experiences of embodiment and of her possibilities for taking action 
to alter her circumstances. They show that while the decision is not taken lightly 
and, indeed, remains problematic, it can be the best course of action for some 
women.365
Hence, if we ask why women desire and decide to undergo a practice that 
is both dangerous and oppressive, the answer is found in their need for 
developing another and different self. According to Davis, if you sidestep 
the few surgery-addicted females displayed in American reality shows, 
undergoing cosmetic surgery is not predominantly a capitulation to the 
norms and wishes of friends, husbands, or others. Instead, it mirrors the 
self ’s need to change in order to overcome a feeling of shame that has 
locked a person in a negative life trajectory. However, Davis does not 
refute the broader context – that the female body is always under the gaze 
of others, as we pointed to above. Her point is that the choice to undergo 
cosmetic surgery made by the women in her study is not characterized by 
succumbing passively to external pressure, as Morgan seems to suggest. 
Instead, it is a voluntary choice in a challenging setting. Davis describes 
it as an act of opposition for many females. It takes courage, espe-
cially because many have to confront objections from both family and 
friends.366 While still objects of critical scrutiny, they have taken steps to 
alleviate the pain of being found lacking.367 However, herein lie the dilem-
mas for women deciding to undergo cosmetic surgery; on the one hand, 




367 Ibid., 173. For further discussion on the findings and analysis of Davis, see 172ff. 
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and create a more extensive space for agency within a gendered social 
order and, on the other hand, they also recognize that the same oppres-
sive order produces both the pain and the restricted agency.368 
Hence, cosmetic surgery may serve a shame-reducing function as it 
conforms the body to prevalent bodily ideals. Through surgery, the body 
is modified; breasts are augmented, chins lifted, or noses straightened 
out. Thus, the shameful gap between the ideal and the actual display is 
nullified, or at least lessened, to the degree that shame is manageable. 
However, the women in Davis’ study are well aware of how they also con-
firm the oppressive gendered order by undergoing such surgery. This fact 
may also produce shame – at least when confronted with the many objec-
tions from friends, family, and themselves – also when they still choose to 
go through with it. According to Davis, this explains both the desire for 
and the problem with cosmetic surgery. It is desirable because it holds the 
promise of a more positive sense of embodiment and may create a wider 
space for exerting agency. But it is also problematic because it preserves 
the social order that produces the shame, negative bodily experience of 
embodiment, and restriction of agency. Hence, the analysis of female 
embodiment is like holding a mirror to culture that may well serve to 
shed light on the different forms of shame.369
We have attempted to show that the responsive movements of body 
shame, and more specifically female body shame, must be understood as a 
contextual phenomenon as circumscribed in earlier chapters. The differ-
ent manifestations and responses, and their severity, are not only closely 
linked to the degree of freedom or oppression these contexts provide, but 
also to the maturity and development of the embodied self as described 
in Chapter 3 on shame and psychology. None of these things can be sepa-
rated in order to understand body shame: we are bodies among bodies in 
an unending transaction with both structures as well as other embodied 
selves. Our ability to find strategies to handle shame adapts to the same 
contextual framework.
368 Ibid., 179.
369 Piran, Journeys of Embodiment at the Intersection of Body and Culture: The Developmental Theory 
of Embodiment, 257.
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Religion is a deeply ambiguous phenomenon. It may enrich the life of 
believers, but it may also cause severe damage to the self and injure capac-
ities for human flourishing, social interaction and personal development. 
Religion is not an independent variable, but works on the social, political, 
and psychological conditions that contribute to shaping peoples’ lives. To 
those for whom religion becomes an ultimate authority, it encompasses 
life and sets the stage or defines the resources for self-realizing agency, be 
it liberating or oppressive. For some, religion is not only a vital part of life 
or a specific area, but an all-encompassing reality. Religion can, under 
given circumstances, have a strong impact on the capacity for self-realiz-
ing agency, and sometimes impede it with shame as a result.370 
Religions relate to all the dimensions of human experience that we iden-
tified in the introduction: religions are not only about cognitive beliefs in 
peoples’ minds. They have to do with social and cultural components, as 
well as psychological ones. We consider religions from a pragmatic angle. 
They are symbolic resources for orientation and transformation in the 
different dimensions of experience. They provide resources for order and 
stability in a world that is constantly on the threshold of chaos, as well as 
for personal transformation. Religions offer a way of life, and they pro-
vide humans with resources for a specific mode of being-in-the-world 
where life is seen from the vantage point of what one considers as ulti-
mate. As such, religion constitutes a whole way of being that not only 
relates us to what befalls us in different ways, it also shapes our world, 
our experiences of ourselves, and the world we live in. Accordingly, we 
cannot separate the modes of being-in-the-world that religion shapes and 
370 Cf. this with Tomkins’ understanding of shame as the impediment and interruption of enjoy-
ment, in Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness, (New York: Springer Publishing, 2008), 388. 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   205 2/25/2021   4:38:41 PM
c h a p t e r  5
206
conditions from the symbolic contents of that religious tradition. This 
content expresses itself in identity-formatting elements, in rituals and 
stories, in beliefs about morality and the “afterlife,” and so on. A mere 
functionalist approach to religion that views it as a social phenomenon 
like any other, without taking into account these internal and internal-
ized dimensions and how they shape actual human experience, may con-
sequently fall short of being able to describe what religion is and what it 
does. Therefore, we need to address contents in specific religions that may 
engender, contribute to, or reduce shame. 
Concerning religion’s positive aspects, in a postmodern, hyper-technical 
society, religion offer elements that still help people to identify significant 
values, to orient themselves, and to partake in practices for personal or 
social transformation. Perhaps religious elements do not serve a disciplin-
ing function so much as previously, at least not in all parts of the Western 
world. We have seen, for example, how attitudes towards homosexuality 
have changed considerably over the last decades, with the consequence of 
less shame for sexual orientation, and how interest in religion has shifted 
from an interest in doctrine and behavior towards attention to the aesthetic 
dimensions of religion. So, although in new forms, religions and spiritual 
practices still contribute to many peoples’ personal and social development. 
Moreover, as we will argue, the continuing presence of religion also means 
that religious practices and elements of shame are nevertheless sometimes 
still interwoven – in familiar and not so familiar ways. Because religious 
elements based on pre-modern traditions live side by side with more per-
sonalized and individualized modern modes of religion, the role of reli-
gion in the present world is complicated. In this chapter, we will identify 
some religious elements that contribute to the emergence of shame. It is so 
because the symbolic world of religion provides a multitude of chances for 
a clash between contexts of agency and, concomitantly, chances for shame.
Shame within the porous parameters  
of religion and spirituality
In his The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James argues that 
under every religious creed, there is the foundational experience or sense 
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that there is something wrong with us as we naturally exist and that the 
solution to this predicament is that “we are saved from the wrongness 
by making proper connection with the higher powers.”371 As long as reli-
gious practices and symbols contribute to such experience, shame will 
potentially be interwoven with religion in a variety of complex ways.372 
The consequence of what James claims here is, namely, that the reali-
zation of something being wrong with one is part of what constitutes 
religious experience. Thus, religion, in his view, articulates what we have 
previously addressed as the clash between contexts of agency. Religious 
beliefs entail the constant presence of something that makes me aware 
that I need to change. The clash is even more predominant since religious 
beliefs are more or less internalized in the agent, and do not require a real 
other to be present. The most profound way to instigate the non-present 
other in the consciousness of an agent is to employ the symbol of God as 
the one who sees everything and judges all that humans do, according to 
God’s standards of perfection. 
From a religious perspective, everything that is is a sign of something 
else: of good or bad, of God’s way, of being on the narrow path or not, of 
being clean or unclean, devout or infidel, pious or not, etc. Against this 
backdrop, religious standards may constantly contribute to the interrup-
tion of agency in ways that go beyond what is usually the case in secu-
lar contexts. Thus, religion may easily become oppressive. Nevertheless, 
shame in the context of religion works according to similar rules as those 
we find elsewhere. 
James’ claim above points to how religious symbols and practices can 
contribute to identifying, articulating, and even enhancing the sense of 
371 Cf. Jill L. McNish, Transforming Shame: A Pastoral Response (New York; Oxfordshire: Routledge, 
2013), 125–26. Referring to William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Hu-
man Nature (New York; London: Penguin Books, 1985), 508.
372 The dynamics described by James here are also the reason why Lelwicka can see contemporary 
practices of eating and diet as parallel to more traditional religious practices, but also as enforced 
by central Christian narratives: “Elements of these three Christian narratives – the body’s pivotal 
role in salvation, women’s association with the sin-prone flesh, and the anticipated perfection 
of bodies in the resurrection – were recycled for centuries, inspiring practices and attitudes to-
ward food and eating that reflected dominant concerns and beliefs in their historical contexts.” 
Michelle M. Lelwica, “Losing Their Way to Salvation: Women, Weight Loss, and the Religion of 
Thinness,” in Religion and Popular Culture in America, 3rd ed. edited by Bruce David Forbes; 
Jeffrey H. Mahan (Oakland: University of California Press, 2017), 269. 
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there being something wrong with us or what we are doing. This contri-
bution may work in relation to already established senses of shame, but it 
may also engender shame where it was not present previously. Moreover, 
shame may also play a role when it comes to the possible access to solu-
tions to this predicament: the connection with higher powers that is nec-
essary for solving it is never established directly but is always mediated by 
practices in which others are involved. Hence, the individual who wants 
to overcome religiously mediated experiences of wrongness that lead to 
shame must still relate to people who either help facilitate such overcom-
ing or contribute to its further existence. Thus, agency based on inten-
tions and desires guided by religious conceptions to improve or change is 
exposed to the risk of further interruption in ways that may continue to 
allow for shame to be present. 
Religion and spirituality provide quite specific contexts and condi-
tions for coherent agency.373 According to Ryan, they provide chances for 
the “experience of conscious involvement in the project of life integration 
through self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives.”374 This 
definition is broad enough to apply to most religious traditions. Further-
more, by pointing to something beyond the individual, religions suggest an 
ultimate standard against which one can assess oneself, and this standard 
can provide guidance for a conscious decision about the direction of one’s 
life.375 Ryan, accordingly, sees spirituality as being about attentiveness to 
life, “an attentiveness which contains within itself a certain desire, a cer-
tain hopefulness, a certain anticipation.”376 Thus, spirituality and religion 
establish distinguished contexts for agency that are constituted by what 
is considered as ultimate. He writes, “Spirituality is attention combined 
373 We occasionally juxtapose religion and spirituality in the following in order to visualize that our 
analysis is relevant for more than what is often called “traditional” or “institutional” religion. It 
also relates to less organized forms of spirituality. In all cases where there is reference to a (more 
or less) authoritative tradition, stewarded by a (large or small) community of believers, the po-
tential for individual shame caused by the normative ideals, rules or expectations that emerge 
from the combination of tradition, community and individual conditions are present. 
374 Thomas Ryan, “The Positive Function of Shame: Moral and Spiritual Perspectives,” in The Value 
of Shame – Exploring a Health Resource in Cultural Contexts, edited by Elisabeth Vanderheiden 
and Claude-Hélène Mayer (Cham: Springer, 2017), 101.
375 Cf. ibid.
376 Ibid., 102.
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with intention. Attention animated by desire, or attention become inten-
tion, awakens within us the awareness of a deepened relationship with 
ourselves and with others, with the world and with some greater sense of 
meaning.”377 This is the reason why religion and spirituality can intensify 
modes of living. Everything gains increased significance. Against the back-
drop of this understanding, it is not at all surprising that religion and spir-
ituality may also cause experiences of shame: whenever the actual context 
of agency constituted by this attention/intention/desire clashes with a dif-
ferent context, or the prescribed project fails, shame may be a likely result – 
although admittedly not a necessary one. 
Spirituality and religion represent traditions and practices that are 
among the potentially most influential, relationally shaped contexts 
of agency in which a person can engage. Not only are religious groups 
places for feedback, socialization, moral formation, and discernment, but 
most religious contexts also provide the individual with the notion of an 
all-seeing eye and a constantly present deity which can be imagined as 
present at any given moment, and not only as present in clearly delineated 
contexts of agency. With regard to shame, that fact is important because 
it means that in any given context of agency there is a potential for being 
interrupted by one’s own consciousness of how the divine considers who 
one is and what one does. Such interruption may not only cause shame, 
of course, it can also cause pride and joy, depending on what one does 
and what type of self-esteem one can maintain concerning one’s being 
or doing. This double function testifies to the ambiguous role of religion: 
it generates joy, pride, and a deep sense of meaning, but it also mediates 
strong experiences of oppression, failure and shame. 
We can look at some examples that show how shame and religion may 
be intertwined, and which can contribute to exemplify the formalized 
description that we referred to by William James above: 
• A speaker in the church academy talks about how faith in God 
allows believers to see everything, including themselves, in a new 
377 For a thorough analysis of the role of such ultimacy, cf., for example, Jan-Olav Henriksen, Repre-
sentation and Ultimacy: Christian Religion as Unfinished Business (Münster; Zürich: LIT Verlag, 
2020).
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light and also enables them to see other dimensions of reality than 
those that would be possible without faith. He elaborates on the 
conception of “God as light” in order to convey this message. After 
the talk, there is a Q&A session. A woman in the audience responds 
like this: “I think this idea about God as light is terrible: it means 
that he sees me, and I feel so shameful for who I am!”
• A devout and pious teenage boy realizes that he has sexual feelings 
for other boys. His imam has told him that in Islam, homosexual-
ity is considered a sin. Although he is not “practicing” his sexual 
orientation, he feels that there is something fundamentally wrong 
with him, and experiences increasingly more that it is difficult to 
relate positively to Allah: he feels shameful for his feelings and has 
a growing fear of Allah’s rejection. 
• One of the prominent leaders in a congregation divorces after many 
years of troublesome marriage. Suddenly, he realizes that he is not 
eligible for positions in the church anymore and that people are not 
inviting him home any longer. He feels that people are avoiding him 
and he is not sure if he is shameful himself, or if people are shame-
ful on his behalf. His sense of belonging to the congregation starts 
to deteriorate.378
• A pastor preaches about how the death of Jesus on the cross atones 
for all the sins of humanity, and that the listeners can rest assured 
that their sins are not an obstacle for being accepted by God and 
receiving God’s grace any longer. However, several of the people 
in the pew feel that her message is of no help to them: they still feel 
ashamed in the eyes of God, because Jesus had to die for their sins. 
The above examples are sufficient to illustrate some of the various ways 
in which shame and shaming can interact with religious traditions – at 
378 This example shows how shame is backward-looking and does not necessarily offer guidance for 
future agency: one is ashamed of something in the past, and there is no obvious constructive way 
to use shame or shaming in such contexts. The only exception would be if one was able to con-
template future actions and what they may imply in terms of shame: “I will not divorce again if 
it leads to this shame that I am now bearing.” However, this use illustrates another problem with 
shame in this regard: shame may then prevent one from doing something that, in the long run, 
is healthy and important for one’s well-being (namely, to get out of a destructive relationship). 
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least negatively. They are mostly taken from a Western, Christian con-
text, but some of them, at least, should also be possible to recognize in 
other cultural or religious contexts. They also display the many factors 
that may be involved in shame and shaming: religious individuals, doc-
trines, symbols, practices, and communities are all possible candidates 
for being part of shaming practices that are intimately and insolubly tied 
to experiences with religion. 
Our initial description of how shame is the result of an interruption of 
the manifestations of the self through an intentionally directed agency 
can illuminate the ambiguous ways in which religion may play a role for 
the self. It can also illuminate the possible relationship between religion 
and shame: religion contributes essential elements for self-esteem, values, 
and orientation in human life. It provides crucial ego-ideals with which 
the person can identify, and on which basis the individual can develop his 
or her sense of self.379 By understanding oneself and acting in accordance 
with these (religious) elements, the self develops important features in its 
identity. Religious resources shape emotion, social behavior, and self-per-
ception. It is important to note here that these religious elements (self-sym-
bols, in a Kohutian sense, parts of which serve as ego ideals) become an 
integrated part of the self and are not easily exchanged for others. When 
people act based on such religious resources, it is because they find them 
meaningful, contributing to their agency in some way and to their long-
term sense of well-being and social belonging. That point, however, does 
not exclude that religious imagery may also have been internalized in ways 
that sometimes conflict with these positive contributions. 
For people to whom religion (as symbols, narratives, practices, social 
interaction, imaginaries and conceptions) is a part of their identity for-
mation, it becomes a vital part of what guides their ways of being-in-
the-world, their interpretations of experiences, and themselves. How 
379 Cf. the description of the idealizing pole in our description of the self according to Kohut in 
Chapter 3 above. Ego ideals are understood here as more or less conscious ideals of personal 
excellence, which are based on a composite image of the characteristics of people with whom the 
individual identifies, initially the parents, but later on also other authority figures. Such ideals are 
crucial because much of shame that is elicited in a religious context comes about as a result of 
an experienced dissonance with these ideals, be it real or not, and the concomitant desire to hide 
from this experience. 
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deep religious resources go in terms of contributing to a person’s sense 
of self and personal investment in orientation and transformation380 may 
vary considerably. People who are religious can interact with religious 
resources in a wide variety of ways, both positively and negatively. 
The relationship between religion and psychological conditions should 
not be underestimated either. How individuals interact with religious 
imaginaries, practices, etc., and their possible experience of shame most 
likely depend on their experiences with caretakers in early childhood. To 
what extent interaction with parents or significant others has made them 
prone to feeling shame or not will most likely have an impact on how 
religious elements interact with the self. If the relationship has been good, 
resilience with regard to shame and shaming may be more robust than if 
their upbringing made them more prone to it. The most clearly negative 
or positive effects of religion are when religious resources are employed 
in and entwined with the development of the relationship to the parent/s. 
However, as we shall return to, people may also turn to religious 
resources to overcome negative childhood experiences and conditions 
and use religion in ways that work against experiences of shame. Then 
they use religious resources in the way that James describes positively. 
Accordingly, we need to balance the above-mentioned examples and take 
into consideration the ambiguity of the relationships just mentioned. We 
will return to these positive features in the last section of this chapter, but 
need to make aware of it from the outset since much of what we are going 
to present in the following chapter deals with the negative aspects of reli-
gion and shame. Therefore, the following may contribute to a mainly neg-
ative picture of religion – which is not our sole intention. 
Understanding religion to understand shame
How can we think of the relation between religion and shame more con-
cretely? We can start by considering the following options: 
380 On the understanding of religion as practices of orientation and transformation underlying this 
analysis, see Jan-Olav Henriksen, Religion as Orientation and Transformation: A Maximalist The-
ory (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017).
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• Religion (through practices, rituals, symbols, teaching) may engen-
der or produce shame 
• Religion may enhance already existing shame or cause people prone 
to shame to feel ashamed
• Religion may reduce shame or offer a means to overcome it, for 
example, by providing resources for self-experience and participa-
tion in a community that run contrary to shame experience.
• Religious counseling, as with other types of counseling, can offer 
opportunities for distinguishing between shame and other feelings 
(such as guilt), or for conflating and confusing such feelings, mak-
ing it harder to deal with them separately. 
In principle, there is nothing exclusively distinctive or special about reli-
gion when it comes to how shame appears within its context. Religions 
do not work on a basis separate from the other conditions of human life. 
Therefore, the general conditions for (dealing with) shame come to the 
fore in religion as well. Moreover, since religion is an important part of 
many peoples’ lives, it is useful to look more closely at how the relation-
ship between religion and shame works. This approach may, in turn, allow 
us to see some of the more generic traits of this relationship in a new light. 
It may also be necessary for those who practice religion to become more 
aware of what may be at stake in this relationship. 
Religions relate to all the dimensions of human experience that we iden-
tified in the introduction: religions are not only about cognitive beliefs in 
peoples’ minds but have to do with social and cultural components, as 
well as psychological ones. When we consider religions from a pragmatic 
angle, it entails that we approach them as symbolic resources for orienta-
tion and transformation in the different dimensions of experience. They 
provide resources for order and stability in a world that is constantly on 
the threshold of chaos, as well as for personal transformation. Religions 
offer a way of life, and they provide humans with resources for a specific 
mode of being in the world where life is seen from the vantage point of 
what is considered as ultimate. As such, religion constitutes a whole way 
of being that not only relates us to what befalls us in different ways; it 
also shapes our world, our experiences of ourselves, and the world we 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   213 2/25/2021   4:38:42 PM
c h a p t e r  5
214
live in. Accordingly, we cannot separate the modes of being-in-the-world 
that religion shapes and conditions from the symbolic contents of that 
religious tradition. This content expresses itself in identity-formatting 
elements, in rituals and stories, in beliefs about morality and the 
“afterlife,” and so on. A mere functionalist approach to religion that views 
it as a social phenomenon like any other, without taking into account 
these internal and internalized dimensions and how they shape actual 
human experience, may, accordingly, fall short of being able to describe 
what religion is and what it does. Therefore, we need to address contents 
in specific religions that may engender, contribute to, or reduce shame. 
Religion is, nevertheless, rarely addressed in the growing literature on 
shame in present-day scholarly and scientific studies. In the literature we 
have reviewed while writing this book, religions and their role in relation 
to shame is, with a few exceptions, only mentioned in passing, if at all.381 
The cultural context, of which religions are a part, provides the environ-
ment in which shame and shaming are possible. Since shame implies a 
tacit or explicit evaluation of a person or their conduct, shame cannot be 
determined as a mere individually based phenomenon – it does not sim-
ply exist in the relation between the person and their deity but is always 
mediated through a third instance – the social world. Leeming and Boyle 
point to how the 
… evaluations are often achieved jointly with others and are shaped by avail-
able discourses that may construct failure or wrongdoing in ways that inevitably 
imply shame. Any continuity in these evaluations may arise from social rather 
than intra-individual processes. For example, within some religious commu-
nities unmarried mothers may find it difficult to avoid making attribution of 
failure to the whole self, leading to a continuing sense of shame. This would 
be likely where there is no image of acceptable single parenthood, and sexual 
activity on the part of single women is not only deemed unacceptable but is 
also considered a sign of a flawed moral character. This means that continuity 
of shame might depend in part on the particular social and cultural niche the 
person occupies. Evaluations of the self and attributions of responsibility that 
381 The only exceptions to this claim are the few studies we can find about shame and sexuality in an 
Islamic context. However, in these studies as well, religion is not foregrounded.
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show some degree of consistency cannot, therefore, be assumed to be simply 
characteristics of the individual, nor should they be assumed to be set in stone 
and entirely explained with reference to early family functioning.382
We will have ample opportunity to develop the points mentioned in this 
quote in the course of the present chapter. Among other elements, it is 
important here to note how Leeming and Boyle point to how it is the 
social context that constitutes the acceptable images of different states of 
affairs, as well as the continuity of such evaluations. Thereby, they indicate 
that shame in a religious context is predominantly a social and cultural 
phenomenon generated by the accessible and inaccessible social roles or 
conditions. Thus, religions, as providers of repertoires of orientation and 
evaluation, and as reservoirs of interpretative resources, contribute in dif-
ferent ways to either engendering or hindering shame. 
Shame for being and doing in a  
religious context
Religions not only determine how we may perceive and understand the 
“outside world” as well as our embodied condition, but they also pro-
vide the means for understanding oneself in a social and cultural context. 
They offer motivations for some types of agency and warrants to abstain 
from other types of acts and practices. Hence, religions provide symbolic 
resources for interpreting what the world is, how to act in it, and what it 
should be (normatively). In other words, religions provide ontological as 
well as moral orientation. 
Sometimes, the combination of ontological and moral elements con-
tributes to a special form of predicament in religion and spirituality: the 
shame that follows from quite natural conditions, like being a woman, 
gay or lesbian, or feeling anger when one is treated badly, or experiencing 
sexual desire. The normativity at work in religion may sometimes run up 
against these natural features, and the consequences can be devastating. 
382 Dawn Leeming and Mary Boyle, “Shame as a Social Phenomenon: A Critical Analysis of the 
Concept of Dispositional Shame,” Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice 
77, no. 3 (2004), 385. 
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The lack of positive recognition of the workings of these fundamental 
features of human life contributes to religion and spirituality being at 
odds with conditions in human life that are inescapable. Thereby, a clash 
with normative contexts is not only unavoidable, but it may be perpetual 
as well, and shame may therefore be close at hand. 
Martha Nussbaum’s work on shame points to some features that are 
highly relevant in the context of religious life, and which are related to 
this point. She acknowledges the ubiquity of shame: “Shame is a per-
manent possibility in our lives, a constant companion.”383 Furthermore, 
when she defines shame as “a painful emotion responding to a sense of 
failure to attain some ideal state,”384 this point is relevant for religion as 
well, since religion provides humans with ideals and chances for the ide-
alization of the self, others, and personal behavior to a large extent. Reli-
gious symbols or ideals thereby offer chances for experiencing self-worth 
through the relation to and fulfillment of these ideals, whereas they may 
also provide chances for experiencing shame when conditions for experi-
encing self-worth are not present, or when the relationship to these ideals 
is compromised. The actual articulation of such ideal standards and the 
employment of them in relation to how people are and what they do cre-
ates the potential for shame and shaming in religion.385 As Silvan Tom-
kins points out in one of his phenomenological descriptions of shame, 
“there appear to be a multiplicity of innate sources of shame, since there 
are innumerable ways in which excitement and enjoyment may be par-
tially blocked and reduced and thereby activate shame. Man is not only 
an anxious and a suffering animal, but he is above all a shy animal, easily 
caught and impaled between longing and despair.”386 Religious resources 
fit in well in the picture of what contributes to such processes. 
The above suggests that religions may not be reduced to morality only 
and to a self-perception that tells you that something you did was right or 
wrong. Religions also point to how some states of affairs may be right or 
383 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 173.
384 Ibid., 184. 
385 We will return to some of Nussbaum’s reflections in the conclusion to this chapter, where we 
address the more constructive features of religion’s understanding of the human condition. 
386 Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness, 387. 
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wrong, be it in the individual’s physique or inner life, in their moral dis-
position, their presence in the community, or in the cosmic order. Reli-
gion rests on ontological definitions and expresses ontological qualities. 
Hence, we can make a fourfold distinction between how religions may 
contribute to, or may impede, the development of shame (or guilt).387 It 
may be for reasons of agency, or for reasons related to who you are. Then 
we arrive at this figure: 
Ideals for agency Ontology
Engendering shame Doing wrong Being wrong
Impeding shame Doing good Being good
Of course, the above should not be taken as strictly delineated categories, 
as they may interfere with each other, for example, when permanent guilt 
for doing wrong leads to shame. They can be applied to other elements in 
human life than religion, as well. We nevertheless argue that in a religious 
context, these different options may serve to amplify each other because 
of the strong intertwinement of agency ideals and ontological elements in 
religion. For example, when young couples engage in sexual acts because 
they are attracted to each other, those who have had a strict religious 
upbringing may not only feel good about such practices. They may also 
feel that what they are doing is shameful, and may also feel ashamed 
about who they are, what they feel, and what they are reminded of having 
done. This example is not relevant in the area of sexuality only, though. 
It is similar to other cases where what you feel and what you do are inter-
twined in ways that are not deemed acceptable by peers or recognized as 
the good way to be and the right way to feel and act. 
The intertwinement of religious symbolism and ideals for agency 
makes it even harder for people who are prone to shame to separate 
between these two dimensions. If someone has done something that they 
feel is wrong in the eyes of God, their experience of God may not only be 
negative in relation to the actual conduct, but they may feel permanently 
condemned when they think of God, because of God’s omnipresence in 
their life from which they cannot separate themselves. Moreover, some 
387 Cf. how this setup may correspond with our previous elaborations on shame and guilt, in 
Chapter 2, pp. 47–51.
c h a p t e r  5
218
types of religious imagery may perpetuate negative self-experience in 
ways that may hinder religious people from overcoming their shameful 
status. We analyze some of these later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, other modes of power may operate in religious circles 
than those we usually reckon with in a modern Western context. To 
understand how shame works in a religious context, the relational focus 
that we argue for throughout this book applies even more here. The prob-
lem with shame in a religious context is that one must locate it in systems 
and situations in which the social exercise of power is involved. Only then 
can we also understand more about how and why individuals are suscep-
tible to institutional shaming.388 
Fundamental features: the past  
and (its) authority
Most religions have emerged out of traditional societies and cultures 
where shame was (and still sometimes is) part of what constitutes and 
regulates normative features of the society. Their origin shapes their 
content, also with regard to shame. The fact that religious traditions are 
dependent on references to the past and to authorities in other periods of 
history makes it hard to leave shame behind as a feeling, and shaming as 
a practice, as something that belongs only to the past. The past still plays 
a vital role in many religious contexts, not least in the appeal to religious 
authorities that require respect and obedience. Shame and shaming is, 
therefore, always a possibility since shame often belongs to the reservoir 
of resources on which religions rely.389 It is used in different ways: either 
as a disciplining element (as in the shameless Arabian daughters) or in 
rituals that expose it with the aim of overcoming it.
Religious resources that can lead to the development of shame may tell 
us something that is not always obvious about what it is to be human: as 
relational beings, humans are interwoven with, guided by, and connected 
388 Cf. Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female Sexuality, 35.
389 There are clear references to shame in the texts of the major religions, and some of these religions 
also have obvious practices of shaming. 
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to history. Even though we may think we live in a society in which shame 
is not the most obvious feature (and many modern Western humans 
may tend to think so), the fact that the roots of religions in most cases 
go back to historical periods in which shame was an integral part of the 
societal order, is of relevance here. When the individual develops his or 
her identity with the help of these resources, he or she taps into ways of 
thinking about the self that may not be obvious to the modern mind. 
An obvious example is how some Christians sometimes learn to think 
about their sexuality in terms of being clean or unclean, or how other 
religious traditions understand certain types of food as unclean or some 
types of clothing as more appropriate than others. Such evaluations go 
back to a time when those categories represented acceptable and widely 
shared ways of thinking. But hardly any person who grows up today with 
no link to ancient religious resources for self-understanding will think, 
for example, about their sexuality or dress code in terms of such catego-
ries.390 However, for those who do, the link back to traditional categories 
of self-assessment can be debilitating and shame-producing. 
Within a religious framework, topics related to morality, discipline, 
social belonging, acceptable feelings, and desires, as well as acceptable 
thoughts and values, are amalgamated into a unity.391 It makes it tempt-
ing to say that religions, with regard to shame, do not add much to our 
identification and analysis of shame in contexts that are not shaped by 
religion. However, even postmodern secular contexts carry the implicit 
values and frameworks of our shared past. Thus, unarticulated remnants 
of a cultural-religious past may still manifest themselves through current 
shame responses. Accordingly, it makes good sense to analyze the spe-
cific mechanisms of shame inherent in religious traditions. 
390 The underlying premise of this example is that shame is related to that which is impure. For 
how this notion of impurity remains the case in religious contexts, one only needs to search 
for “Shame, impurity” on the internet – and see how Catholics struggle with it. Cf. also Burrus, 
Saving Shame, Introduction. 
391 This amalgamation has profound and complicated consequences for how to address the rela-
tionship between religion and morality. For an interesting comment to the relationship between 
religion, morality and shame from the point of view of elements not thought through suffi-
ciently in the so-called “new atheism,” see Tony Lynch and Nishanathe Dahanayake, “Atheism 
and Morality, Guilt and Shame: Why the Moral Complacency of the New Atheism Is a Mistake,” 
Philosophical Investigations 40, no. 2 (2017).
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Due to the amalgamation just mentioned, religious traditions some-
times give the features of shame a stronger impact on personal life and 
the collective order. Therefore, we cannot and should not neglect or pass 
over too quickly the role shame has in religion or reduce it to features 
that we can detect in similar ways in other contexts. Religions often do 
go to the roots of personality development, and the combination of reli-
gion/spirituality and shame may, therefore, be of crucial importance for 
understanding how religious traditions influence a person’s identity. 
The fact that religious traditions are exactly that, that is, traditions, 
therefore exposes their adherents to possible experiences of shame in ways 
that are not so obvious in other contexts. That the past has an authority 
to which one is expected to be obedient, and which is the basis of more 
or less constant self-scrutiny, is an unfamiliar thought in a modern con-
text. Failure to live up to standards, and, accordingly, opportunities for 
shame, are already present here. Similar mechanisms are at work in the 
explicit and implicit codes of conduct and requirements for conformity 
that shape religious communities and groups; to not know these codes, or 
to go against them, or not to conform to the expectations of your religious 
peers, may also cause shame. 
A specific condition for shame is the relation to religious authority 
figures who often serve as substitutes for parents. Their role is to pro-
vide religious adherents with a necessary feeling of safety, recognition, 
ideals, and guidance. Religious authority figures, many of whom have a 
designated role as members of the clergy, never have a mere individual 
role but represent the stability, the normative framework, the trust, and 
the guidance that everyone needs to become socialized into a religious 
community. They are stewards of the past and guides to future practice. 
To be in opposition to them, question their authority, or not obey their 
guidance, may cause responses that lead to shame or shaming, as when 
an individual does not live up to the standards that she or he recognizes 
as the right ones. Since the past is stewarded by authority figures on 
whom one is dependent for being recognized and accepted by, religious 
leaders and authorities are in a position of power: they can easily shame 
people or exploit their position in ways that lead to shame in adherents. 
Religious adherents with low self-esteem are dependent on their positive 
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evaluations, and the greater their need for recognition, the easier it is 
for authorities to take advantage of them – which, in turn, can lead to 
exploitative practices and abuse that produce even more shame.392 
Religion and idealization
The person who feels shame experiences that he or she is not living up to 
the ideal standards he or she thinks apply to him or her. Religion delivers 
such standards efficiently. The words of Jesus, “Be perfect, therefore, as 
your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew, 5;48), are words that set high, 
if not impossible, standards for religious believers. No one is perfect, and 
one of the preconditions for becoming a mature person is to realize that 
this is the case. However, religious teachings and practices may often con-
ceal this fact and contribute to an idealization of adherents, authorities, 
or, of course, God or the divine. Thus, the impossible standards become 
“the norm” against which one measures oneself. What does it mean for 
the understanding of shame in religion?
One main point is that religion contributes to the double perspective 
on oneself and one’s agency that we have outlined earlier: thus, agency 
rooted in immediate interests, intentions, and desires is always at risk of 
being interrupted by standards of perfection. When religion manifests 
impossible standards, it also contributes to the clash between contexts 
392 The ways in which the clergy has sexually abused children and others, and hidden behind a veil 
of silence, and used the shame of the victims as a way to shield themselves, offers an appalling 
example of how such authorities, considered as representatives of God by their peers, have mis-
used their position for such purposes. The power at play in such abuse should not be seen as 
an isolated phenomenon, though. Miryam Clough, referring to the Roman Catholic Church, 
argues that “in a church whose symbolically constructed reality is based on the denial of both 
the natural human drive for sex and of innate human fragility, yet which conveys its core tenets 
through rhetoric and ritual that make mortality salient, it is perhaps no surprise that men’s abuse 
of women and children is proving to have been extensive. Neither are we to be surprised that 
studies have identified that high numbers of Roman Catholic priests suffer from emotional im-
maturity or psychological disturbances and that many have unresolved psychosexual problems. 
Whereas for many Catholics marriage buffers the death threat associated with sex, this is not 
available for priests and religious. Further, by emphasizing independence and self-sufficiency 
for males, gender-role norms have limited the ability of many men to comfortably experience 
intimacy, thereby restricting emotional development and provoking shame when these ideals are 
not met.” Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female Sexuality, 124–125 (references 
excluded). 
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of agency, since the immediate and actual context of agency is measured 
against the perfect one. 
Idealized states do not only present impossible ideals. According to 
psychoanalytic theory, individuals who have trouble facing difficult 
feelings of failure or incompleteness mobilize so-called “splitting” as a 
defense to overcome what they feel is an unbearable situation. The polar-
ization that results from such splitting leads to viewing events or people 
as either totally bad or good. At this point, religious imagery comes in 
as relevant because it allows individuals to see something as exclusively 
good. This strategy is called idealization. This strategy attributes exclu-
sively positive qualities to one’s religion, the group, the individual, the 
authority or teacher, or to the divine, as well as to oneself when one is 
part of this group or is recognized by this idealized teacher.393 Such ide-
alization contributes to ignoring problems and prevents criticism of the 
idealized instance and maintains one’s positive self-esteem and pride in 
oneself. However, the problem is never solved in full, since the negative 
or harmful elements that cause the need for polarization remain present 
although split off from where one places one’s identity and focus. 
Idealization can also provide the means for further shame – as when 
one is ill or not able to display the signs of success that are expected of 
believers, as in the so-called prosperity gospel religion. Here, shame may 
also increase because the responsibility for lack of success or health is 
placed on the individual – as someone who does not conform to the 
expectations of belonging to the community.
The opposite of idealization is devaluation. Religious imagery offers 
sufficient means for the strategies of both idealization and devaluation. 
The more clear-cut the distinctions are between good and bad, insider 
and outsider, the more religion may (but need not) contribute to the 
idealization that is quite natural at an early stage of childhood develop-
ment. However, such dichotomization is usually overcome and replaced 
by the capacity for experiencing ambivalence if the child’s development 
has not been interrupted by trauma or neglect. If the latter is the case, 
393 Note how this then also allows idealization to play a role in the narcissistic efforts to feel good 
about oneself. 
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idealization may be a working strategy also in adult persons – and con-
tribute to the unrealistic self-perception that makes one’s imperfections 
causes for shame. 
Here we can relate our understanding of religion to elements that were 
developed in the previous chapter on psychology and shame: Not all ide-
alization is problematic. Kohut sees idealization in childhood as a healthy 
mechanism. It is the task of parents to provide appropriate opportunities 
for idealization and mirroring in the child. Then the child can overcome 
the natural, initial grandiosity that makes him or her dependent on oth-
ers to provide his or her self-esteem. When this is done appropriately and 
provides the child with what Kohut calls optimal frustration, the child’s 
idealization of self and of others can gradually diminish, and more real-
istic perceptions of the self and the world can emerge. If this grandiosity 
is not overcome, the chances that shame will appear remain more likely.
James W. Jones has developed these insights with specific reference to 
religion. He underscores that all religion contributes to the idealization 
of everyday objects. Such idealizations provide much of the transforming 
power of religious experience and are central to religion in general. Jones 
underscores how the dynamic of idealization can account for the ambi-
guity in religion.394 To what extent religious imagery, resources, and prac-
tices contribute to a healthy and realistic perception of self, others, and 
the world, or simply underpin already existing patterns in the self that 
manifests arrested development, lacking the capacity for ambivalence, is, 
therefore, an open question. It may do both – although seldom at the 
same time. 
As already indicated, idealization is closely related to the capacity for 
tolerating ambiguity, and to the phenomenon of splitting. Since religious 
imaginaries are employed in a way that “divides the world into completely 
opposed black and white camps in which things are either all good or all 
bad,” splitting the world thus can only be dissolved by developing the 
capacity for ambiguity, in which that which was formerly understood as 
perfect or ideal becomes perceived in a more nuanced light.395 
394 Cf. James W. Jones, Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic Per-
spectives (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 2002), 6. 
395 Ibid., 58. 
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Against this backdrop, idealization, as promoted by religious resources 
and practices, can be seen as the result of the need for certainty in an 
insecure and precarious reality. A religiously diverse situation contrib-
utes to such insecurity. The presence of other religious views and orien-
tations makes it harder to perceive one’s religion as the sole or accepted 
alternative.396 Jones holds that the remedy for idealization is to acknowl-
edge one’s finitude.397 Thus, he provides an important corollary to Nuss-
baum’s argument for the realization of imperfection as a remedy for 
shame.398 Interestingly, some religious imagery provides opportunities 
for such acknowledgment – perhaps most distinctively expressed in the 
Jewish and Christian understanding of humans as created in the image of 
God – which is a combination of a high evaluation of humanity that can 
prevent shame and a more realistic attitude (I am not God, but a finite 
being called to make the infinite present in the world since I am created 
in God’s image). Thus, religious imagery or conceptions linked to shame 
may enable movements in different directions: away from the community 
and the self one feels shameful for, and towards community and self-ac-
ceptance. We can see the distinctiveness of religion in the fact that the 
experienced shameful action is explained and placed within a broader 
frame of reference where the movements are required, and secured, due 
to divine intervention. This frame of reference is fraught with the polic-
ing strategies expressed in religious communities.
Identity in religious groups – and shame
For most people, to be religious is to have some kind of belonging to a 
group. We stress the notion group here, since it seems more relevant to 
our topic than “congregation,” “community,” or other notions that depict 
a larger assembly of people. There can be many different groups within 
one congregation or community, and even more when we speak of the 
396 This point is analyzed well in Peter L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities 
of Religious Affirmation, Anchor Books (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1980).
397 Jones, Terror and Transformation: The Ambiguity of Religion in Psychoanalytic Perspectives, 
168–169. 
398 See below, pp. 264f., 343.
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members of a denomination. What interests us here is how the interac-
tion between the group and the individual shapes the religious identity 
of a person. 
To a large extent, how a person develops the religious dimensions of 
his or her personality depends upon the combination of social prac-
tices in which he or she partakes (including those that reflect specific 
psychological patterns and conditions) and what we can call religious 
imaginaries. Social practices – including religious ones – can build on, 
reinforce, supplement, or provide a substitute for (or an alternative to) 
the psychological patterns that the individual developed during his or 
her upbringing (by their parents). Sometimes these conditions may 
merge in ways that are hard to separate from each other, as when the 
parents or caretakers are themselves strongly invested in the religious 
group and bring their children with them. Thus, there may be various 
possibilities concerning how shame can emerge in a religious context. 
These are important to note because they suggest that shame’s con-
textual conditions are, also in religion, of crucial importance for its 
development: 
a) For someone who, as a result of their upbringing, is prone to shame, 
and has developed a strong psychological dependence on peers, 
religious resources may work in the following ways. For example, if 
he or she is part of a religious shame culture, his or her participation 
may enhance his or her shame. However, if he or she finds a more 
positive and affirming religious community, this community may 
add new and positive features that supplement his or her original 
shame-proneness. In some cases, a different community may even 
allow him or her to participate in practices that overcome shame 
and enable the development of a new identity that draws on and 
utilizes other relations and resources than those from which he or 
she originally came. 
b) For someone who, as the result of their upbringing, has developed 
high self-esteem and relative psychological independence from 
peers, religious resources may work in the following ways: On the 
positive side, a religious community may contribute to maintain 
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their positive self-esteem and improve it further. However, a reli-
gious community which uses shame as a disciplining or controlling 
element may also shape a more ambiguous self-relation that includes 
elements of shame as well as self-esteem. Then, community partic-
ipation may give rise to conflicted feelings. In the worst negative 
cases, participation in a community of religious practices where 
shame is involved and actively used may destroy the earlier feeling 
of self-esteem or independence.
The alternatives sketched here suggest two things: First, we should con-
sider how shame works in the context of personal identity that employs 
religious resources as dependent on, or at least related to, the conditions 
for the individual’s psychological development. Religious resources 
(understood as symbolic elements, doctrines that shape self-perception, 
ritual practices, social interaction, and other elements of identity forma-
tion) may nevertheless not only work on the premises of these psycholog-
ical conditions. They may also, to a greater or lesser extent, themselves 
be part of the (psychological) resources that determine to what extent, 
and in what way, the individual experiences shame. Second, the setup 
also indicates that one cannot speak about the role that religion takes on 
regarding shame independently of the contexts of upbringing and of the 
actual religious practices in which the individual takes part. Concerning 
shame, the content of religion becomes a dependent variable – a fact that 
makes generic statements about the role of religion in relation to shame 
difficult, and which underscores religion’s ambiguity in the development 
of the self. 
A religious context is often (but not always) marked by voluntary par-
ticipation and concomitant high personal investment. Here, the emo-
tional bonds that reinforce shame may do so in ways that would not be 
similar to cases where such bonds did not to the same extent determine 
the relationship between the individual and his or her peers. The group is 
the community to which the individual feels that he or she belongs and 
with which he or she shares a common cause. In a group, the chances 
for deep and personal relationships are stronger than those possible in 
a larger setting with weaker bonds – and this can bear much positive 
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fruit for the individual’s development of self-esteem. But the personal and 
emotional elements that are involved in group belonging also make the 
individual more vulnerable to misconduct or failed relationships with 
others. 
The religious context may allow the individual to come into closer con-
tact with him or herself and to learn more about his or her vulnerabili-
ties. Thereby, he or she may also develop strategies for how to deal with 
shame, and even find help and resources to overcome (at least, some of) it. 
However, the group context may also be the place in which these vulner-
abilities are exposed. It may leave him or her hurt or shamed – not least 
because this context is the place in which his or her basic value orienta-
tions, values and commitments may be grounded. If the group functions 
ambiguously, it may create an atmosphere of both belonging and of vul-
nerability, which can make the individual more prone to shame. A group 
that expresses such ambiguous traits may also be harder to leave. Since 
religion almost always exists as a community, to leave the group may be 
difficult without also leaving behind your religious loyalties. On the other 
hand, if you leave religion behind, this may be a cause for shame in the 
face of your peers; people may, therefore, sometimes continue to attend 
a church to avoid shame when they have stopped believing because of 
their emotional belonging to the group. But they may also stop visiting 
their religious group because of the shame they feel when they do not 
any longer maintain their religious commitments. In both cases, shame 
engendered by the conflict between commitments and the actual agency 
is dealt with.
Conformity and compliance 
Religious groups have rules of conduct to which they expect their mem-
bers to conform, to a greater or lesser extent. To express dissent is not 
always possible without the risk of being marginalized or ostracized. 
The smaller and more tightly knit the group is, the easier it is to make 
sure that members act in accordance with normative expectations. Thus, 
shame is a constant risk, since it means that the individual may have to 
create a barrier to his or her individual aspirations, desires, or projects 
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to comply with or conform to those of the group.399 Rules usually need 
not be policed but are often simply internalized by members. Thus, when 
members do not live up to the expectations of the group, it is their own, 
self-appropriated potential for shame through self-policing that regulates 
their behavior. Accordingly, shame results from incoherence between 
actual conduct and internalized ideals. Such incoherence manifests a 
certain lack of autonomy. Hence, to avoid shame, heteronomy is here 
expressed in the self-restraint and compliance that shapes the individ-
ual’s agency. This agency, nevertheless, is built on internalized virtues 
that make sure that the requirements for belonging are met. Identity as a 
consequence of belonging to the group is then secured. However, in many 
religious contexts, belonging is not secured once and for all. Because reli-
gious groups require the adoption of certain doctrines and conformity to 
specific practices, belonging to the group can be in jeopardy all the time. 
The more extensive or encompassing, clearly stated, and strongly prac-
ticed the norms are that guide the group, the easier it is to become subject 
to shame or to become shameful. Two examples which can illustrate this 
point are described in the following paragraphs.
In some strongly conservative and tightly knit religious groups, if one 
questions the authority of the leader or deviates from accepted doctrine, 
these would be instances that could subject someone to shaming. One 
would then, for example, be told that this is not something that one had 
expected of him or her to say, and the expressions of disappointment by 
the authority would not only make the individual ashamed. It could also 
activate memories of childhood experiences in which he or she had pro-
voked similar reactions. Such shaming furthermore makes it clear that 
the individual is not considered equal to the other members of the group 
any longer, as he or she has not lived up to the taken-for-granted norms 
that bind the group together. Group membership may be in jeopardy. 
This example also points to a factor we have touched upon in the Intro-
duction: how shame may emerge out of the conflict between two contexts 
of agency that are not possible to bring in consonance. In the above case, 
399 Cf. how Tomkins in Affect Imagery Consciousness, 389, sees shame as dependent on barriers to 
excitement and enjoyment. A consequence of this view is that the pluralism of desires must be 
matched by a pluralism of shame – it is not only experienced as one “thing”. 
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one’s context of belief deviates from the accepted one, which is taken for 
granted by the others. In the following example, agency that belongs to 
private and intimate contexts conflicts with more public contexts that 
provide a negative normative interpretation of the conduct in question.
In earlier times, mothers who had children out of wedlock (and, 
accordingly, in another context than the accepted one) were often shamed 
in different ways, both in churches and in society. It could taint them for 
the rest of their lives. But we need not gofar back in history to find sim-
ilar examples: Not so many decades ago, a couple with whom one of the 
present authors was acquainted had to stand in front of their congregation 
in a small town in the south of the then highly secularized Norway. They 
had to confess to everyone that they had been sleeping together before 
they were married.400 It is hard to consider this practice as anything other 
than shaming, and the shame was caused by the confrontation of two dif-
ferent contexts of agency. The example can, nevertheless, illustrate more 
than the often-observed religious preoccupation with sex. We can use it 
to illustrate some of the options that are in play when shame and religious 
belonging work together: Consider first of all how this shaming practice 
makes sex a matter of public interest. It brings something that belongs 
to the most vulnerable and intimate dimension of life to the attention of 
every member of the congregation. Consider then the shame that not only 
the couple themselves but also their families may feel.401 Besides them, 
this practice probably makes every other member of the congregation that 
has been involved in similar conduct without being exposed shameful. 
Thus, this shaming practice reinforces the idea that the actual behavior, in 
general, is of interest to the whole congregation (and belongs to a broader 
context than the private domain). Moreover, this behavior in question 
is especially shameful, since it leads to the need for a public confession, 
which may not be required in the case of other “transgressions.” 
Then, consider two more elements: First, what if the couple rejects the 
demand to confess in public? Then they run the risk of being subjected to an 
400 It is striking to the authors, as it probably is to the reader as well, how much religion is concerned 
with the regulation of sexual behavior. Why this is so is not the topic of this book, but examples 
of this are multitude, also in relation to our topic here. 
401 This is shame by association, a topic which we do not discuss in the present book. 
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even more shameful practice: they may be excommunicated from the congre-
gation and the community that has fostered their religious identity. Alterna-
tively, they may simply say that they will not do it and leave the congregation, 
regardless of the consequences they have to bear. How these options appear 
depends on how strong their ties are to the congregation or the group. If they 
do not think that what they have done is so serious, this can be an indication 
of their lack of socialization into the group and the accompanying lack of 
internalization of its normative requirements. But if they have internalized 
these norms and nevertheless fallen for the temptation that sexual pleasure 
presented to them, they may have a greater problem deciding what to do. 
In any case, the only option this couple has to avoid public shame or 
shaming is to adopt other norms and give up their membership of the 
congregation. But even if they adopt other norms, shame may still pre-
vail, since the impact of the view of others may still be persistent.402 If they 
want to maintain their relationship with the group, shame is unavoidable. 
Thus, shame is the cost of continued belonging.403 In addition, when we 
know from empirical studies that restrictive norms concerning sexual 
practices are something that cause many young people to withdraw from 
religious groups or communities, it is easy to see that shaming practices 
negatively impact adherence to religious communities.404 
On the other hand, though, religious groups can also contribute posi-
tively to the overcoming of shame. Many children and young people who 
have had a problematic upbringing and have never been given a chance to 
develop a robust feeling of self-esteem have experienced religious youth 
groups as places where they are accepted and recognized as valuable in 
themselves. Thereby, they are given better chances to develop resources 
for self-acceptance than they were given at home. The sense of belonging 
to a group like this can, therefore, be crucial to the experience of being 
something more and different to what one has experienced about oneself 
402 Cf. above pp. 227f.
403 We have deliberately used this example because it provides a vivid example of something that we 
know is presently happening much more often, but in ways that are more hidden: to “come out” 
as gay or lesbian in many churches is still hard to do in many cases. The dynamics in the example 
above may not always be the same, but the restrictive attitude towards homosexuality in many 
churches leaves the members involved with only two choices: either to conform, or to leave. 
404 Cf. Åse Røthing, Sex, Kjønn & Kristentro (Oslo: Verbum, 1998). 
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earlier. We have earlier seen how a lack of care in early childhood can 
make children prone to shame and dependent on others than parents 
for recognition and safety. When religious groups offer opportunities 
for self-esteem and recognition, for safety and for developing new and 
more positive roles in which one is not always dependent on the moods 
of others, they, therefore, serve an important positive function. However, 
the role that the religious group can play in this regard is nevertheless 
compensatory, and it continues to work on the premises of childhood 
development. It is, therefore, important to be aware of elements in the 
practices, symbols, and teachings around which the group gathers, since 
these can contribute to further experiences of shame or reinforce child-
hood patterns. For example, the teachings that God is wrathful because 
of one’s sin may easily reinforce childhood patterns that say that “I am 
accepted by God as long as I am not a sinner,” which is structurally par-
allel to “Dad only loves me as long as I do what he says.”
Below, we will further develop some examples of how religious imagery 
can interact with group dynamics in ways that have a profound impact on 
shame and shaming. 
The risk of shame in the context  
of religious practices 
Theologian Graham Ward writes, “Shame exposes that which is most 
intimate about the embodied self, but it also exposes sets of values and 
levels of interest. We can only be ashamed if we care about something. 
So, shame is both a very personal experience, but also a highly socialized 
event in the sense that it is saturated with social and cultural investments. 
Body, self and society meet around practices of shaming and experiences 
of being ashamed.”405 Not least is this expressed in religious contexts 
where the ambiguities of shame may be easy to detect. Religious prac-
tices relate to, articulate, and shape some of the most important features 
and events in human life. Most obviously, they provide rituals related 
405 Graham Ward,”Adam and Eve’s Shame (and Ours),” Literature and Theology: An International 
Journal of Religion, Theory, and Culture 26, no. 3 (2012)307. 
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to childbirth, death and mourning, and for marriage, to name the most 
obvious. Many religious contexts also provide opportunities for counsel-
ing in times of crisis, or simply for life-guidance to provide better chances 
for self-development and human growth. But the flip-side of all these 
practices is the risk of shame.
We want to identify two main points when we look at shame in the 
context of religious practices. First, as already pointed out by Ward above, 
such practices are often (but not exclusively) social: they involve the indi-
vidual in a context where he or she potentially interacts with others. 
Therefore, to think of religion as something that people merely believe 
is misleading: it is also about how the individual practices specific types 
of agency and interacts with and relates to other people. Thus, in cases 
where such practices are related to shame, it is not only because of what 
people think or the content of their minds: it is about what people do and 
how they interact with and communicate with others. Second, religious 
practices sometimes involve people when they are at their most vulnera-
ble. Not only in times of grief or bereavement, or in times of personal cri-
sis, but also in times of joy and expectation. The latter situations may also 
make people prone to shame, as we shall see in the following examples. 
We restrict ourselves mostly to examples from the Christian tradition.
When parents bring their child to be baptized, it is an occasion of joy, 
pride, and excitement: the rite gives them a chance to stand before the 
congregation and display how they are themselves and how they want 
their child to be, as a part of that community. The baptismal rite can serve 
as a way to recognize parents and the child as worthy of belonging, and as 
recognized in the eyes of God. When this happens, there is a correspon-
dence between the joy and the expectations of the parents, and the actual 
function of the rite. This is the positive backdrop against which such rites 
can also work negatively, for example, when clergy previously – under 
given circumstances – denied children baptism, be it because the parents 
were not married, or because the witnesses were gay, or for other reasons. 
As Christine Park points to, “for Christians, baptism is associated with 
the bestowal of a new identity and entrance into a spiritual family. In 
addition, baptism is a cleansing ritual that removes stain and impurity, 
conferring cleanliness on the shamed person who may suffer from a sense 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   232 2/25/2021   4:38:42 PM
s h a m e  a n d  r e l i g i o n
233
of dirtiness or defilement.”406 Imagine then the shame that the blocking 
of the agency that desires to obtain these values may cause.
To be denied participation in a religious rite is, therefore, a strong 
manifestation of someone considered not worthy. It may not only occur 
in cases like the above: it could also happen when someone is denied par-
taking in the Eucharist, or when pastors refuse to perform weddings that 
involve remarriage on the part of one or both of the prospective spouses. 
The people in question are then not accepted as belonging to the group or 
as living up to the standards for membership, belonging, or participation. 
Their justified sense of shame and resentment may feel especially strong 
because of the positive feelings invested by all of those who were intend-
ing to have a celebration or gain access to something considered valu-
able and important. Here, the clash between contexts of agency is further 
enhanced by the combination of positive investment and intention on the 
one hand, and the religiously charged rite to which their access is denied 
by others, on the other hand. 
Because rejections like these actually contribute to shaming people, 
they also more than suggest that people have done something wrong, 
which would then be a likely reason for making them feel guilty. It is not 
something they have done, but something they are (or are not) that makes 
these instances of shaming so severe. As long as religious authorities have 
the power to accept or reject peoples’ requests for rites like these, shame 
is a possible option. The very fact that life events like birth, marriage, etc., 
are at the center of many peoples’ lives and are reasons to celebrate makes 
it even more imperative to be aware of this point. The risk of shame is at 
the heart of these events in life when religious rites are the most usual way 
to celebrate them. When the intentions, desires, expectations, and antic-
ipation that guide agency in such cases collide with practices of rejection 
that do not recognize them at all, shame is a possibility. 
Many people expect the Church or their religious community to be a 
place to experience something good and beyond the ordinary. Religion 
and festivity have always belonged together. So have the expectations of 
406 Cf. Christine J. Park, “Chronic Shame: A Perspective Integrating Religion and Spirituality,” Jour-
nal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought 35, no. 4 (2016), 366.
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finding something good or valuable in times of trouble and/or bereave-
ment. When this expectation is not met or met with rejection, anger, 
frustration, and shame are likely results. Thus, the very ways in which 
religion is organized create expectations about the good to which the self 
can link up with, but they may also involve the risk of shame. 
Feelings of shame or inferiority (which are closely connected) can also 
occur in rituals and practices that do not necessarily address the indi-
vidual in question. One example of this is how some churches still only 
ordain men to the clergy. In such situations, women are not excluded 
from participating because they lack qualifications or because of some-
thing they have done. The exclusion is because of the gender to which 
they belong. Accordingly, the struggle for the ordination of women is not, 
as often portrayed, a question of equality only. It attempts to overcome a 
situation in which people are excluded simply because of who they are. 
Women who invest in studies and preparation for the ministry and are 
then turned down are likely to feel shame.407 
But women cannot stop being women or acting like women. However, 
for another group, the problem of shame in ecclesiastical circles may 
appear as different (even when we would argue that it is not, in principle): 
gays and lesbians may be met with an articulated acceptance of “who they 
are,” but told, “not to act on it.” Thus, they find they have a double status: 
they are accepted in principle, but not in practice. Accordingly, they are 
subjected to other rules of compliance than those of heterosexual orien-
tation, and are therefore also in a more complicated situation concerning 
their relation to the religious group to which they belong.408 The fact that 
407 Actually, similar patterns may still prevail with regard to race in some contexts. The case of race 
is even more problematic, though, since there is less acknowledgment of this being a problem 
in church circles because many may respond that “this is not an actual problem in our context”, 
and thereby allow political correctness to cloud the vision to the lack of equality in matters of 
participation, education, authority, etc. 
408 For a more extensive analysis of argumentation in relation to homosexuality, see Nussbaum, 
Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law. 154ff. Churches handle what they see as the 
challenges of homosexuality in different ways: some accept homosexual clergy when celibate, 
some not at all, and some as equal to heterosexuals. One of the reasons why the Catholic Church 
is not willing to open the discussion on celibacy is probably that such a discussion would imme-
diately lead to the concomitant discussion of what opening to a non- celibate clergy would mean 
for gay priests. 
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religious doctrines sometimes define or designate people according to 
their gender, sexual orientation, or even race, makes religious practices of 
orientation powerful tools for shaming. 
Our universal human propensity to feel shame leaves those who expe-
rience marginalization especially vulnerable to exploitation for the pur-
poses of power and control. Such abuse of power cannot and should not 
be addressed simply as the product of individual limitations. Such an 
approach would mean that one ignores the fact that in many churches 
there is still outright oppression and denigration of the marginalized 
groups present. Paul Goodliff writes, “The paternalistic theology which 
views women as less human, and more sinful, than men is an obvious 
structural source of shame (and this despite the evidence that men con-
tribute far more to the sum of human misery than women), as is the 
exclusion of those whose sexuality is deemed heterodox (homosexuals 
and bisexuals). If history is written by the victors, then such theological 
shaming is clearly written by the powerful as a means of maintaining 
their grip upon power.”409 
Rituals that can be seen as contributing positively to feelings of 
belonging can lead to shame as well. The Eucharist is, among other 
things, also a celebration of community. Many churches practice an 
“open table,” which allows for everyone to feel included – and thus, it 
can be a practice that works against shame. But as long as some are not 
considered as eligible for participation, and even sometimes outright 
rejected as potential participants, the risk of shame is present. There is 
sufficient evidence that the celebration of this rite still serves as a “defin-
ing” moment for separating insiders and outsiders – not only in parts of 
the Roman-Catholic Church but also in Conservative, Reformed, and 
Lutheran churches. 
Since many religious groups also strongly emphasize moral issues, 
shame can be evoked concerning issues that are not necessarily 
409 Paul Goodliff, With Unveiled Face: A Pastoral and Theological Exploration of Shame (London: 
Darton Longman & Todd, 2005), 101. He continues, “The Christian church, if it is to be a commu-
nity which alleviates shame rather than arousing it, needs to take a careful look at the practices 
whereby it seeks to ensure conformity of behavior and attitude on the part of its adherents.” 
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considered religious: instances of divorce, substance abuse, or alcoholism 
can be met with either outspoken criticism or, often just as effectively, the 
silence treatment. Because of the strong bonds that are often developed 
in religious groups, these reactions may be felt as powerful – as they may 
also be when, instead of being shamed, one is met with understanding, 
acceptance, and recognition. 
Confessional practices: shame perpetuated  
or overcome?
Confession is a special type of religious practice that should be dis-
cussed in connection with shame. Confession can be individual or 
public. In the public form, many churches have a common confession 
of sin during their worship services. Though for many it may be related 
to guilt, some members of the congregation may experience that this 
confession elicits feelings of shame as well. However, shame cannot be 
dissolved by the proclamation of forgiveness in a way that is similar to 
forgiveness of guilt. Concerning individual confession, it can enhance 
the feeling of shame even more, as this practice often requires one to 
confess specific things for which one feels ashamed. As forgiveness by 
itself cannot obliterate shame, this practice may appear ambiguous: 
on the one hand, it may contribute to the perpetuation and enhance-
ment of shame, since one has to confess to a person who can see and 
hear one. Confession is then a manifestation of the shortcomings or 
disruptions of agency that lead to shame, or for which the individual 
already feels shame. On the other hand, absolution may engender an 
experience of inclusion and acceptance, which in turn alleviates shame 
on a longer-term basis. 
Confessional practice may contribute to the perpetuation of shame 
insofar as it causes continuous self-scrutiny. Shame plays a vital role 
here, since such scrutiny sustains contrition, need for repentance, and 
desire for conversion. Thus, it simultaneously generates a double percep-
tion of who you are, and what you, ideally, should have been. Virginia 
Burrus critically remarks that confession does not provide the longed-
for catharsis, “but an ongoing responsiveness – a painfully unrelieved 
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openness” which implies an infinite responsibility.410 In confession, one is 
also exposed to the risk of acting shamefully again, since it requires the 
veracity of the confessor. Burrus argues that “the shame of confession 
arises not least at the point of the undecidability of veracity with regard 
to intentionality, where intention always exceeds our consciousness; it 
points, then, to the unresolvable hauntings of intentionality as such. Guilt 
in the face of specifiable injury may most effectively announce responsi-
bility, yet shame bears the awareness of the mysterious and uncontainable 
depths of our culpability.”411 Thus, to partake in the practice of confession 
always implies the risk of perpetuating shame. 
In her book on shame, Burrus nevertheless also makes some critical 
observations about confessions that are worth referring to because they 
provide an opportunity to consider in more detail whether confession 
represents a useful means for dealing with shame or not. Not surpris-
ingly, she points to the composite or complex situation that the practice 
engenders. In confession, the confessor measures him or herself accord-
ing to a given standard and brings to light what is construed as hidden or 
secret. Only then can a conversion take place. Both losses and gains are 
implied here. “The truth about the self that is produced in confession is 
also renounced in confession as if one discovers who one is – a ‘sinner’ – 
 only in order recklessly to relinquish an identity that is less illusory 
than all too real.”412 In other words, the confession implies that one has 
to accept oneself as not being up to the standards one recognizes. Such 
acceptance may, in turn, also lead to the alleviation of shame. Thus, we 
may also see confession as a practice that entails several of the movements 
we have claimed that shame causes: the movement away from the self that 
one needs to distance oneself from, the movement towards a more realis-
tic self-perception, and the movement that has the specific aim of leading 
410 Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects, 115. Note here how the refer-
ence to Levinas’ notion of infinite responsibility serves to obliterate the boundaries between self 
and other – another element that causes shame or makes one prone to it.
411 Ibid., 115. Cf. 145: “That the truth made in confession is fabulous and fictional, both exceeding 
verifiability and eluding finality, may itself seem a source of shame. Surely it is, at the very least, 
cause for humility. It is also the reason why we cannot stop confessing, must not refuse the shame 
of our own inevitable failure ever to get the account of our shameful culpability quite right.” 
412 Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects. 111.
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the shamed back to the community and ultimately to God. Confession is 
a way of ritualizing these movements. 
The ritual of confession thus contributes to ambiguity in relation to 
shame. On the one hand, it confronts the confessor with things that he or 
she experiences as shameful, and thereby, he or she has to relive the expe-
rience that causes shame and take part in that shame again. On the other 
hand, in the very act of confessing, and thereby recognizing the standards 
against which he or she is failing, he or she is also given a chance to renew 
his or her ego-ideals, as well as gaining a more realistic understanding of 
him or herself. The practice of confession can work against the narcissis-
tic self that lives in a delusion of being perfect. If the confession is wisely 
received, this ritual can then lead to a more mature and realistic self-as-
sessment. Burrus formulates it well in the following passage: “The act of 
confession is, then, at once assertive and yielding, a willful appropriation 
of the (divine) power of judgment that is at the same time a deliberately 
mortifying submission of will and self to judgment, and thus also – 
perhaps – to mercy. It is neither simply coerced nor simply voluntary but 
rather sits necessarily on the border of what is coerced and what is offered 
freely.”413 She goes on, “One must want, at least a little, to be broken, to be 
exposed, or the confession is sterile: it makes no truth; worse still, it forces 
stillborn lies. One must also resist, at least a little, being overcome by this 
desire, or the confession, rendered glib by the promise of cheap grace, is 
equally fruitless.”414 
Furthermore, against this backdrop, we can see how confession not 
only exposes the dividedness of the subject – it actively produces it. 
Shame fragments the subject’s self-experience. “It splits again (and 
again) along the fault lines of its performative ambivalence: I accuse 




415 Ibid., 112. Burrus quotes J.M. Coetzee: “in the economy of confession … the only appetites that 
constitute confessable currency are shameful appetites.”
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Burrus’ analysis sheds important light on the widely adopted practice 
of confession. However, in a way that surpasses analyses of shame that are 
oriented towards psychology but ignore religion, she adds an important 
dimension, by connecting shame to the desire to tell it all: 
If the self who is confessed and thereby alienated is necessarily marked by 
shame, so too is the self who confesses – marked not only by the shame of 
the temptation to hide but also by the shame of the desire shamelessly to tell 
all. […] The self-exposure of confession is desirable, and thus shameful, largely 
because the act of confessing is entangled with the act of excusing oneself, of 
laying claim to absolution: it is as if the very suffering of shame audaciously 
promises to atone for the shameful thoughts or acts exposed.416 
We see in this analysis how shame that is involved in the practice of con-
fession also implies the movements away and towards that we have iden-
tified in our earlier analyses. The practice of confession thus makes it 
clear that the complexity of shame is not reduced when it is involved in 
practices of religion. On the contrary, we would argue that the complex 
interweaving of shame with religious practices in some cases contributes 
further to the problems that shame creates in human life. 
The body as a religious problem 
In the Hebrew Bible shame appears early, expressed in Adam and Eve’s 
realization of their own nakedness. It is not their nakedness as such that 
causes shame, but the fact that they can be seen by others, to whom they 
are not ready to appear as naked and vulnerable. The other here is not just 
anybody, but God. However, God is never present as such – God is always 
represented by others, and in the gaze of other humans.417 This is also 
testified to by the fact that religion is a social phenomenon. The presence 
of this other changes the context of agency and elicits shame. The Genesis 
story is, therefore, not a story with exclusively religious significance. It is a 
story about shame in relation to the human condition, and especially how 
416 Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects. 112.
417 Cf. our previous reference to Masaccio’s fresco.
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this condition expresses itself in humanity’s desires and the concomitant 
vulnerable embodiment. Accordingly, shame is, in this context, depicted 
as about how the naked body is perceived and experienced as a sign. A 
sign of vulnerability, exposure, and desire: all involved in the agency that 
is interrupted by the perception of God’s sudden presence. Thus, we see in 
this story many of the features we have developed in our previous analy-
ses of body, vulnerability, intentionality, self-policing and agency. 
Miryam Clough develops these points further from a feminist point 
of view when she points to how the patriarchal shape of much religion 
defines the natural (embodied) states and conditions of women as reli-
giously problematic: 
Once sin is associated with the body – hence the feminine – the masculine is 
virtuous, and the feminine can only attain virtue by rejecting those embod-
ied characteristics that most distinctively define that gender, notably sexuality 
(jouissance) and motherhood. Within the framework of patriarchal Christian 
discourse, the individual who adopts an ascetic lifestyle with the goal of achiev-
ing religious piety in the ultimate hope of salvation (the alleviation of the fear 
of death) adopts a subject position of masculinity and superiority. For women 
as well as men, this discursive position was also regarded as a masculine one; 
only by the denial of feminine biological attributes (sex, mothering and feed-
ing) could women become “spiritual”.418 
Much can be said about how religious traditions have tried to keep women 
away from the public sphere and positions of power. It happens not only 
for the sake of maintaining male power and domination, but also to 
render sexuality, vulnerability, and other challenging features invisible. 
We have already suggested some of the elements in play in this regard 
in the previous chapter. The ordering of the body, and of what counts as 
acceptable bodily desires, functions, and features, has contributed to reli-
gious imagery in which the body is placed in a situation of predicament 
or challenge for those who are not male. Female bodies, sexed bodies, or 
homosexual bodies are obvious examples of that which is deliberately or 
subconsciously marginalized in ways that cause shame. 
418 Clough, Shame, the Church and the Regulation of Female Sexuality, 164. 
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We have already claimed that religion is different from morality in the 
way that it does not only emphasize what you do but who you are (iden-
tity) and what you believe (belonging and faith). Whereas what you do is 
something from which you can distance yourself, stop doing, or admit 
was wrong to do,419 it is not so easy when it comes to what you believe 
(which is often part of your identity, the underlying orientational struc-
ture that guides your agency) or who you are. This fact comes to the fore 
in the way religions are often socially structured according to one’s status 
as belonging to a specific category: man, woman, child, lay, ordained, etc. 
As Woodhead and Heelas have pointed to, these modes of being, which 
sometimes are closely related to one’s embodied status as well, make it 
possible to see some types of religion as organized around difference. 
They therefore, identify them as religions of difference. Although not 
always relying on markers that have to do with one’s embodied status, 
this type of religious organization or structuring may also contribute to 
shaming, for example, when one does not find oneself belonging clearly 
to one or the other category.420 
Authority (and thereby also normativity) is mainly shaped, sustained, 
and expressed by an emphasis on, and identification of differences in this 
mode of religion. Attempts to destabilize differences may be met with 
skepticism or rejection, and one, therefore, also risks being shamed if one 
questions the way they are defined. Furthermore, blurred or unclear gen-
der roles may create uncertainties and shame as well, for example, when 
a woman finds it necessary to take on a leading role without any support, 
or when gender roles become impossible to differentiate clearly, as in the 
present controversial issue of homosexuality. An important component 
of this type of religion is that religious authority is externally based and 
that humans have to be obedient to it. It is so even when this authority 
conflicts with personal interests or convictions. The neglect of per-
sonal convictions or feelings that are not in accordance with established 
authority can make individuals even more dependent on the authorities’ 
419 Cf. Deigh’s distinction between authorship and ownership, as developed in the chapter on the 
psychology on shame above, pp. 123–124. 
420 Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas: Religion in Modern Times. An Interpretive Anthology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000). 
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acceptance and recognition, and accordingly, also more prone to shame 
since it does not allow for a self-reliant psychological base. Hence, this 
type of religion does not contribute much to a social environment in 
which individuals can learn to trust themselves and their judgments – a 
precondition for developing lasting and positive self-esteem. 
Furthermore, in religious imagery, one is led to think of one’s own 
body as either God’s creation, or as not in accordance with God’s will. 
In either case, religious self-interpretation can reinforce feelings of worth 
or shame, respectively. Because one cannot distance oneself from one’s 
bodily condition, be it in terms of health, sexual orientation, or simply 
how one looks, a religious person may find it harder simply to say that “it 
is what it is.” Since religion makes everything into a sign, an expression 
of something beyond the apparent, dispositions or actualities that would 
have no specific significance outside a religious realm may take on strong 
significance within it. Due to being unable to distance oneself from one’s 
own body, the body’s religious status is not only ambiguous but some-
times also precarious. Thus, the power of religion manifests itself in its 
ability to shame a human’s bodily status as well. Graham Ward writes: 
Because shame is so visceral and embodied an affect, it is the body involved in 
the act bringing shame that is the first object to be abjected. This inner rejection 
is the source of shame’s extraordinary power over human beings. ‘In contrast 
to all other affects, shame is an experience of the self by the self … Shame is the 
most reflexive of affects in that the phenomenological distinction between the 
subject and object of shame is lost’.421 
Hence, Ward makes it clear how hard it is to overcome experiences of 
shame: it would entail having to distance yourself from yourself. 
In his analysis of Adam and Eve’s shame because of their nakedness, 
theologian Ward furthermore emphasizes how authors from Augustine 
to Tomkins speak of the ‘ambivalence’ of shame. His analysis at this point 
may not add so much to our understanding of religion and shame as it 
does to how religious imaginaries actualize and make apparent more 
421 Graham Ward, “Adam and Eve’s Shame (and Ours),” Literature and Theology: An International 
Journal of Religion, Theory, and Culture 26, no. 3 (2012), 310. 
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generic traits. Furthermore, Ward’s analysis underscores the element of 
frustration or interruption of the expectation of being good that shame 
displays. He writes: 
What makes it ambivalent is that it results from a certain incompletion or frus-
tration of a positive affect. In the beginning there is an interest and a promise of 
enjoyment. Eve sees the fruit as good, a delight to the eyes, and desired that it 
should make her and Adam wise, and, gnomically, the Scriptures tell that when 
she offered Adam the fruit ‘he was with her’ (Gen.3.6). […] In the response to 
shame, ‘the self remains somewhat committed to the investment of the positive 
affect [there is] a continuing unwillingness to renounce what had been or might 
again be of value.’422
The other, generic element in the Genesis story that Wards points to, and 
which has to do with embodiment, is Adam and Eve’s need to hide – be it 
their bodies, their faces, or their genitals. Shame, writes Ward, engenders 
a new self-consciousness, where they are thrown back at themselves, and 
realize that this is “their nakedness, their vulnerability” – a realization 
that implies that they have to do something about it – they have to hide 
their shame.423 Thus, the religious context contributes to similar shame as 
we analyzed earlier in the chapter on body shame.
The hiding of the body may also interrupt or impede further commu-
nication: “In part, this is because the face is turned away; in part, this is 
the silence that is self-imposed by the one who is ashamed.”424 We argue 
that this is one of the examples that point to how shame arises from the 
constitution of a context that is different from the one in which agency 
originated, and in which it tried to articulate and realize itself. This 
change of context may be seen as the backdrop for the different move-
ments it engenders, because actions such as hiding and being silent entail 
that the original intentional agency is no longer possible to articulate as 
previously assumed. 
The body, the flesh, remains a problematic element in many religions, 
not least because of the idealization of the spiritual in contrast to the 
422 Ibid., 313. The quote within the quote is from Tomkins. 
423 Ward, ibid.
424 Ibid.
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material or mundane. Although religious strategies and symbols exist that 
can provide the means to balance out this fact, the body itself remains a 
problem for many. Virginia Burrus reports succinctly about her students:
Armed with the doctrines of divine creation and incarnation, desiring to affirm 
the goodness of materiality, the poignancy of transience and finitude, the gift of 
sentience, my students still often seem to fight a losing battle against a theologi-
cal tradition that remains to this day marked by its shameful shame of the flesh. 
Sometimes they are ashamed of their failures to resist the force of tradition, are 
ashamed even of the passion conveyed by their very strength of conviction; but 
most of them continue to struggle nonetheless, shamelessly, against the weight 
of shame, in the face of their own shame.425 
This is a well-articulated testimony to the complicated and complex fact 
that even in a religion that confesses the resurrection of the flesh, the prob-
lem with shame and the body is not dealt with once and for all. This is so 
also because the body can engage us in projects and relations over which 
we initially may have no command, and which require that we become 
transparent to ourselves to gain control and see if this is an acceptable 
self-investment or not. It is so not least because the body harbors desire 
– and desire is a major component in our self-projects and investments, 
and simultaneously something that allows us to be in touch with our vul-
nerability. Because many religions, including Christianity, often associate 
desire with a negative state, as long as this is the case, the body continues 
to be a problematic element in religion.426 Desire furthermore manifests 
how the agency it engenders runs the risk of going beyond the accepted 
contexts and norms. Therefore, it needs to be kept in check. 
Religious doctrines and shame 
Religions offer an extensive repertoire of symbols and imaginaries. These 
provide humans with extraordinary opportunities for self-expression, 
425 Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, and Other Abject Subjects, XI. 
426 For more about this, see F. LeRon Shults and Jan-Olav Henriksen, Saving Desire: The Seduction of 
Christian Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). 
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self-interpretation, self-assessment and self-perception, as is also the case 
in the example of confession just mentioned. The imaginaries and notions 
at work in religion becomes realities to reckon with for believers. They 
function as self-objects in the psyche, that is, internal objects on which 
the psyche develops, orients, evaluates, and into which it also invests 
libido, creativity, commitment, and hope. Self-objects are not only the 
workings of the imagination, they also are charged with emotion. They 
affect human self-perception, emotion, behavior, intention, and agency, 
irrespective of the existence or non-existence of that which they repre-
sent. This fact means that religiously charged self-objects, such as “God,” 
can have a profound impact on humans, even if God does not exist. 
Against this backdrop, the reference to William James at the start of 
the chapter can be seen in a new light: religious self-objects contribute not 
only to the realization or acknowledgment of “wrongness,” but may also 
contribute to the experience that it is overcome. However, the religious 
individual and/or the group always inhabit a world in which doctrines 
and imaginaries shape self-perception and may interrupt the ordinary 
flow of activity in ways that may cause shame, or allow shame to emerge 
even when the individual is not engaged in action but merely listening to 
preaching or teaching. 
The following subchapter will analyze some religious doctrines or 
imaginaries that are relevant to understanding the possible shame-en-
gendering effect of religious doctrine. We will continue to concentrate 
on examples from the Christian tradition – thereby also making it visible 
that shame-effects do not only belong to religious traditions from which 
it is easier for people in the Western world to detach themselves. 
Atonement
Christianity in the West centers around two crucial doctrinal topoi that 
have significance for its ability to deal with shame. These are the under-
standing of the human being as a sinner and the understanding of the 
crucifixion of Jesus as something that atoned for this sin. The combi-
nation of these two mirrors well what William James described as the 
conditions for a religious experience. How can these doctrinal elements 
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have an impact on a human being who is prone to shame? What hap-
pens if someone who is prone to shame is confronted by the traditional 
understanding of God’s grace as offered in the reconciling act of Christ’s 
substitutionary death on the cross for the sins of all humans? 
The notion of the human being as a sinner implies that humans are 
fundamentally under God’s judgment. Jesus, on the other hand, is the 
one who takes on the punishment that humans deserve, and thereby frees 
them from it. God and humans can, therefore, be reconciled because of 
Christ’s voluntary suffering on behalf of all humans. Christ procures the 
grace of God that humans are offered and which implies the forgiveness 
of their sins. Norwegian pastoral theologian Berit Okkenhaug has prob-
lematized this approach because of its inability to address the problem of 
shame adequately.427 We agree and illustrate our arguments for this in the 
following example.
If a person prone to shame is urged to believe that Jesus had to die in 
order for her to be reconciled with God, her understanding of her rela-
tionship with God might, in fact, enhance the problematic role that shame 
already has in her life. To tell her about the sinner’s lack of self-worth, on 
the one hand, and about how much Jesus’ sacrifice is worth, on the other 
hand, may prove to be the opposite of liberating. Instead, it may lead her 
to self-perception according to the following destructive dynamics: 
1. I am a sinner, and for this reason, I am not worthy of the love 
of God. I am a sinner in the eyes of both myself and God. (This 
expresses the shameful self ’s self-rejection as motivated by religious 
teaching.)
2. Despite my lack of worth, God nevertheless loves me and loves me 
so much that God sent God’s son in order to die for my sins. (This is 
“the gospel” which is intended to serve as a solution to self-rejection 
and a lack of self-worth.)
3. The very fact that God’s son had to die because I am a sinner makes 
me feel even more unworthy and shameful. Because I am the cause 
of God’s son’s unjust suffering and sacrifice, this fact enhances 
427 Berit Okkenhaug, Når Jeg Skjuler Mitt Ansikt: Perspektiver På Skam (Oslo, 2009), 123ff. 
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feelings of shame and guilt. (For someone who is already carrying 
deep-seated feelings of shame, this is the result of 1 and 2).428
Although point 1 and 2 in the above sequence correspond with James’ 
analysis, the outcome is the opposite of what he suggests. We see here 
that one of the central religious doctrines in Christianity may, given a 
specific interpretation, contribute to the feeling of being wrong in a way 
that enhances personal shame. For those who are prone to shame, this 
doctrine may contribute to sustaining the shameful position instead of 
liberating them from shame. 
Eleonore Stump addresses these problems from a distinct understand-
ing of what it is that engenders shame.429 Stump approaches the problem 
from the point of view of philosophical theology – the discipline that 
tests the coherence of theological propositions to see if they are defen-
sible. She, too, discusses whether the notion of Christ’s suffering can be 
interpreted in order to alleviate shame. The reason for this discussion 
is clear: Christ’s atonement is traditionally supposed to reverse the bad 
effects of the so-called fall of humanity, and since shame is among the 
afflictions of humanity in its present state, it is an obvious thing to ask if 
the atonement provides a remedy for shame as well.430 Her argument is 
worth analyzing in detail, because it shows how different elements and 
conditions for shame, and for lifting shame, are similar within the con-
text of religious doctrine as in other cultural or social contexts. 
Stump distinguishes, importantly, between shame and guilt. Both are 
interpreted against the background of two desires that emerge out of love, 
as defined by Thomas Aquinas. According to his position, love consists of 
two mutually governing desires: the desire for the good of the beloved, 
and the desire for union with the beloved. Stump goes on, writing:
428 Another version of this criticism, which closely examines Eleanore Stump’s claims that the cross 
of Christ eliminates human shame because it shows that Christ wants to unite with us, can be 
found in E. J. Coffmann’s paper “Stump on the Nature of Atonement” (web.utk.edu/~ecoffma1/
SNA.doc). 
429 Eleonore Stump, “The Atonement and the Problem of Shame,” Journal of Philosophical Research 
19 (2016). Here Stump develops what Brad A. Binau claimed that no-one had done in his earlier 
article “When Shame Is the Question, How Does the Atonement Answer?” Journal of Pastoral 
Theology 12, no. 1 (2002): 89–90. 
430 Stump, “The Atonement and the Problem of Shame,” 112. 
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A person who is and feels shamed and a person who is and feels guilty each 
anticipate a repudiation, on the part of real or imagined others, of both of the 
desires of love as regards himself. But a person in the grip of guilt will tend to 
focus more on the first desire, and a person suffering from shame will tend to 
worry more about the second.431 
That she points to this fact is essential since it relates shame to the inter-
ruption of the desire for communion and belonging – which has been a 
central point in our previous analyses of shame’s various movements.432 
Shame, then, may lead people to despise who they are as much as what 
they have done, claims Stump.433 Such strong shame is ultimately com-
plete only when it is internalized, which emphasizes both the degree of 
self-loathing that shamed people can experience and, at the same time, 
the relative freedom, such that they could possibly choose to live other-
wise than with this shame.
However, shame is more ambivalent than guilt precisely because it is 
less objective. As guilt has its opposite in forgiveness, shame has its oppo-
site in honor. Stump argues that, “the most salient difference between 
shame and guilt is that, on the face of it, the alienation from the self pro-
duced by shame does not have its source in the will of the shamed person,” 
and thus “seems to stem from an involuntary suffering forced on a person 
by things that happen to him, outside his control.”434 This is a point that 
is also emphasized by Martha Nussbaum – shame is often reinforced by 
societal factors, and is used by society to try to enforce an order of things. 
Shame is the result of something outside our control – and therefore out-
side the initial scope of our agency. 
Stump points to two different elements in the subjectivity of the per-
son feeling shame: firstly, one has to imagine some repudiation from oth-
ers, and secondly, this imagined repudiation causes the feeling of shame. 
Thus, she makes the obvious point that the subject’s imagination is a 
431 Ibid., 113. 
432 Furthermore, it is notable here how both these desires resonate with the psychological features 
implied in our earlier chapter: if we think of these desires as that which shapes the parent’s 
relation to the child, in allowing her to be herself (what is good for her) and affirming, and not 
rejecting her (union), these features fit well with our previous analysis. 
433 Thus, in Stump’s view, shame seems to dissolve both self-respect and self-esteem.
434 Stump, “The Atonement and the Problem of Shame,” 148. Our italics. 
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necessary condition for feeling shame. Thereby, she can also address the 
complexity of shame and its conditions, since this approach means that 
shame does not need to emerge from the attitudes of real peers. More-
over, shame has an element of anxiety in it as well, which is related to the 
human desire for love. Stump writes: 
… a shamed person anticipates warranted rejection and abandonment on the 
part of real or imagined others, and consequently, he is anxious about margin-
alization or isolation. His anxiety is directed towards a distance, an absence of 
union, forced on him by others with whom he himself desires some kind of 
closeness. His worry is therefore that real or imagined others will be warranted 
in lacking for him the second desire of love, the desire for union with him.435 
Stump here points to how the anxiety is related to the desire for recog-
nition – a desire that presumably is behind much of human agency in 
the social sphere, and to the second element in what we have called the 
double movement – the movement towards others. It can help explain 
the shame felt in being ill, diabled, poor, unemployed, or lonely. In all 
these cases, the shameful can experience shame as a manifestation of the 
anxiety for being someone with whom others will not want to stand in an 
affirmative relationship. 
What, then, causes the imagined or real repudiation? Based on a 
long and interesting analysis, Stump argues that we need to distinguish 
between four different kinds of shame, all of which she then subsequently 
discusses with regard to the effects of atonement. These four are: 
a) Shame resulting from one’s own wrongdoing
b) Shame stemming from being the victim of someone else’s 
wrongdoing
c) Shame following some impairment or depredation of nature
d) Shame attached to being a member of the human race
In all of these types of shame, there is some standard of value involved, 
which provides a necessary condition for feeling shame or being ashamed. 
435 Ibid.
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In the first three, a standard of value that the person feels defective in 
relation to is implied, which he or she expects that should be accepted by 
both himself/herself and imagined or real others. The fourth, collective 
type of shame is caused by being a member of a group that is defective in 
relation to a standard that is valid for all of humanity.436 Stump holds that 
all human beings, at some point in life, will have to struggle with all of 
these types of shame. 
Stump rejects, head on, the idea that there might be some kind of 
compensation for shame in heaven. This notion implies that there will 
be a remedy for shame, although not here and now. She finds this idea 
confusing and unconvincing. No good can outweigh the shame that a 
person suffers, and the idea of compensation in the afterlife is not able to 
defeat shame. Furthermore, since shame is related to something in a per-
son’s past, this origin is impossible to change, as is all of history. The past 
remains no matter what is offered in heaven to those suffering from or 
subject to shame. Accordingly, to think that atonement can compensate 
for shame by providing access to the benefits of heaven is misguided.437 
Stump instead identifies the antidote to (some forms of) shame in its 
opposite: honor and admiration. Her argument is as follows: a person 
who feels ashamed is convinced that something about herself warrants 
that real or imagined others have no desire for being in community with 
her. Shame, then, emerges out of others turning away because of our 
weakness, powerlessness, ugliness, or other defects. The human prone-
ness to consider those without power or who have fallen from power as 
“devalued, degraded, debased, defiled, despoiled” implies that they are 
“diminished in social standing or cultural stature, and they lack attrac-
tiveness for us in consequence. And so a certain kind of vulnerability and 
helplessness is also a hallmark of shame.”438 However, whereas such con-
ditions for shame are what makes us turn away, the one whom we honor 
436 Ibid, 116. This type of shame is addressed, for example, in the analysis of Michael L. Morgan on 
the shame felt for being part of the humanity that stood behind the Holocaust, On Shame (New 
York; London: Routledge, 2008).
437 Cf. Stump, “The Atonement and the Problem of Shame”, 117. 
438 Ibid., 118. 
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or admire is one who is attractive to us, and the one we admire and with 
whom we desire to have community. 
To the extent that others have a warranted desire for him, they have the second 
desire of love for him, namely, the desire for union (of one sort or another). 
And if others are drawn to him and desire union with him, the shamed person’s 
shame is lifted. It helps in this connection to notice that a shamed person can 
be thought seriously deficient by others on the basis of highly varying scales of 
value, ranging from moral or religious standards to standards of fashion current 
in a particular community. And it is possible for a person to be shamed on one 
set of standards and honored on another.439
The fact that shame can be lifted when a person experiences that someone 
honors him or her, and that this can happen based on other standards 
than those which caused the shame, points to an important feature in 
religious believers: when they believe that God honors them, the belief 
in this acknowledgment may provide an exchange of standards of self- 
evaluation that may, in fact, liberate them from shame. On a more generic 
level, what religions do is that they often provide alternative standards by 
which people can experience their emotional predicament, offered as a 
remedy because alternative standards of evaluation are employed.440 
At this point, Stump’s considerations of the positive effects of the 
notion of Christ’s atonement show their relevance. Atonement provides a 
good that defeats the suffering of shame because it allows a person to see 
himself as honored and valuable or lovable – and “that is greater than his 
shame and for which his shame is somehow essential.”441
Stump is careful in extending the implications of atonement. She is not 
building on the ideas we presented in the earlier section, that imply that 
Christ suffered because of, or as a punishment for, human sin. Instead, 
it is God’s love for humankind that comes to the fore in atonement, and 
439 Ibid. 
440 However, this may go both ways: it is possible to imagine that religious standards sometimes 
contribute to shame with regard to something that the person previously has been proud of 
doing. The condition for this being the case, however, is that the person now recognizes the 
religious standards as more valid than the standards that previously generated his or her pride or 
honor. 
441 Stump, “The Atonement and the Problem of Shame,” 119. 
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which displays God’s desire for unity and community with the human 
race. Thereby, she can avoid the problematic elements in an interpretation 
of atonement where Christ must die because of the sins of the one who is 
ashamed – an idea that could easily lead to more shame. She writes: 
When, voluntarily, out of love for humankind, Christ dies by torture naked in 
the view of his friends and disciples, he joins the shame and suffering of human-
ity. By this means, he makes the shame of humanity something shared with the 
Deity, and that sharing is a great honor for the human race. It is one thing to 
be a member of the species that perpetrated the moral horrors of the twentieth 
century. It is another thing to be a member of the species of creature to which 
God joined himself in nature and shame and suffering.442
Thus, according to Stump, atonement can be seen as a remedy for the 
fourth type of shame that she has identified – that of belonging to the sin-
ful human race. “It is not hard to think of the good in question, namely, 
the honor of having God himself as part of the species and its suffering as 
greater than the good lost, namely, the honor that the race lost in virtue 
of its deplorable history.”443 
However, one needs to interpret atonement from a different angle if 
one is to see it as a remedy for the other types of shame that Stump lists. 
At this stage of reasoning, Stump enters into a far more distinct, theologi-
cal mode of thinking than she has done so far. Here, she takes as her point 
of departure the orthodox claim that in his human nature, Christ bore 
the sins of all of humanity on the cross. She takes this notion to mean that 
in his passion and his death, “Christ opened himself up to the psyches of 
all other human beings, all at once, so that he somehow received in him-
self, in psychic union, the psyches of other human beings, in their sin and 
shame, without himself actually becoming guilty of a sin of his own. By 
this means, he bears the sins of all human persons in himself.”444
Accordingly, Stump holds, what Christ did was necessary on his part 
for establishing a union between him and every human being. He opened 
himself up to their “indwelling” in him so that they could respond by 
442 Ibid., 121.
443 Ibid., 122. 
444 Ibid., 123. 
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uniting themselves with him. In such a union, Christ dwells in the human 
person, just as the human being dwells in Christ. This idea implies that 
what is required on the side of the human is to be willing to make this 
union happen.445 It is this personal union with each person that can pro-
vide a remedy for the other types of shame, according to Stump. 
In conclusion, then, we see that Stump’s approach to atonement as a 
remedy for shame provides alternative standards for honor than other 
human standards – the Deity is willing to join in the shameful conditions 
of humanity because of the desire for unity with the human race. The 
conditions that contribute to shame in humanity are not sufficient for 
Christ to give up the desire for community and union. Thereby, Christ 
shows that humanity is more valuable than any standards that cause 
shame. Furthermore, as Stump shows, this does not abolish the causes 
of shame and shaming but provides a chance to establish an alternative 
means for self-value. The challenge for the one who is ashamed is to be 
able to believe that this is something that took place for him or her. 
If we consider Stump’s discussion from a distance, we can see that the 
way she uses religious imagery is parallel to what it would be in contexts 
other than religious ones, as well. It is about accepting people despite 
their imperfections. Thus, again, we see that religious ways of dealing 
with shame explicate or articulate features common to all humankind. 
Religious ways of addressing or dealing with shame are not constitution-
ally different from those used in other realms of human life. 
Sin and feeling accepted or repressed
Religious imagery uses the notion sin for the dark side of the human con-
dition. This notion describes the depravity of humans, and as such, it has 
contributed significantly to human beings’ sense of being repudiated by 
God and others – thus causing shame. However, from a more positive 
angle, the notion of sin may also contribute something positive and real-
istic to the human condition, provided that it is used within a context that 
allows for nuance. That requires, however, that it is seen in relation to the 
445 Cf. ibid., 124. 
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most positive symbol that Christianity has for human beings, namely, 
that humans are created in the image of God, with the dignity related to 
that designation. 
The concept of sin may be a resource when it comes to the understand-
ing of human growth and transformation. But then it has to be under-
stood not only in terms of what must be morally rejected, but also in 
terms of what stands in opposition to the image of God in humans, and 
the human calling to do God’s work in the world – a calling which is 
the basis for human self-respect and self-esteem from a religious point 
of view. Sin is distortion and corruption of the goodness in the world 
and the personal life and experience of the individual. Accordingly, one 
could still use the word sin for certain elements in human life and human 
experience without having to accept the “Protestant-Augustinian tradi-
tion doctrine of original sin which holds that the entire created order, 
including human nature, must be repudiated in order to ‘put on’ a new 
life whose centre of gravity is not self but God.”446 This doctrine might 
then provide relevant resources for interpreting human experience. There 
are still a lot of horrors in the world that can be interpreted in terms 
of sin. Moreover, basic tensions in human life are not well served if we 
interpret them within a basically harmonious framework. Human life is 
about growth, transformation, and the overcoming of problematic fea-
tures. Some of these might be in stark contrast to the ideal human that 
both Christian theology and other spiritual traditions depict as desirable. 
However, talk about sin without causing shame is only possible if one 
can first underscore or affirm something constitutionally positive about 
humans, such as the understanding of them as created in the image of 
God. By affirming the human being as created in the image of God, 
theology makes it possible to affirm the human need for positive self- 
esteem and self-recognition (more on this below). Even more so, as these 
are elements that we know from psychology that are best nurtured when 
expressing a relationship that is unconditional. Let us explain: 
446 Linda Woodhead, “On the Incompatibility between Christianity and Holistic Spirituality; A Re-
ply to Jan-Olav Henriksen,” Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 19 (2006): 60. 
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When the self-symbol God is seen as one who loves you only when you 
conform to certain patterns, act in accordance with specific norms, or 
have or lack specific feelings and desires, it is hard to develop a positive 
and religiously based affirmation of oneself. It leaves one constantly in 
need of referring to and adjusting oneself to experience oneself as valu-
able, and it makes God’s love dependent upon one’s actions. 
Religious resources for work against shame need to uphold the dis-
tinction between humans and God, between the actual and the ideal, 
and affirm that this is unavoidable, even in a context where humans are 
aiming at growth and moral improvement. It is important to avoid the 
identification of the human with the divine because it would otherwise 
contribute to narcissistic grandiosity in the human. Such identifica-
tion would overload the human, and make the human’s religious status 
dependent on the outcome of human agency. Exactly that is rejected in 
both Luther’s theology of justification by grace alone, as well as in Augus-
tine’s doctrine on grace.447 Recognition by God is fundamentally unmer-
ited. Furthermore, one can address expressions of such overestimation of 
human abilities as expressions of sin, and thereby point to the limits of 
human life as something that one has to acknowledge. The hubris (note 
the allusion to Augustine’s understanding of sin here) of humans is to try 
to override the unavoidable character of these limits. 
The object of much pastoral counseling is to develop the ability to dis-
cern what the necessary limits are that cannot be overcome, and what we 
should, from a realistic point of view, strive to transform and overcome. 
Hence, to understand how sin works as hubris in human life means find-
ing out how one can become a better person. On the other hand, to find 
out where false ideals of humility are at work and hold someone back 
from developing the call to be an image of God is the other side of the 
same task.448 The result, given that this work succeeds, is that humans 
come to know themselves better. It might not, in effect, be very different 
from what Woodhead reports on the aims of the practices of the so-called 
new spiritualities: 
447 Cf. Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1996).
448 Cf. Judith Plaskow, Sex, Sin, and Grace: Women’s Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold 
Niebuhr and Paul Tillich (Washington: University Press of America, 1980).
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To be a mature human subject is to be someone who has a body and feelings, is 
aware of them, takes responsibility for them, and “manages” them successfully. 
It is to be a bounded emotional self, which is open to impressions from outside, 
but able to respond to them appropriately. Attentiveness to the bodily and the 
emotional states play a vital role in the construction of this sense of bounded 
individual selfhood. Religions may facilitate such self-awareness when they au-
thorize a self which is rooted and grounded in the emotions of that unique self 
itself. By being recognized, valued and discursively represented, the embodied 
emotional self comes into being.449 
Such an embodied and positively valued self represents a challenge to 
versions of religion that overlook, ignore or reject positive traits that are 
important for their followers. In their study The Spiritual Revolution, 
Woodhead and Heelas et al., give contemporary examples of how people’s 
inner lives are only to a certain extent recognized in the religious contexts 
they researched, and they see this as a challenge to Christianity’s present 
state.450 Their results are telling: specific feelings, especially strong ones, 
or those expressing positive self-esteem apart from what is recognized 
as religiously valid, or desires that are not in accordance with Christian 
ideals, are subject to repression. Thus, self-projects are interrupted. This 
causes shame, not only because one harbors such feelings or desires, but 
potentially also because they lead to agency that is not in accordance with 
that of the religious context to which they belong. 
Images of God and the processes of the self
A central element in many religions is the notion of God. In the following, 
we will call this the God symbol, to place it in relation to Kohut’s self- 
psychological approach. This symbol may have profound effects concern-
ing shame – regardless whether the person believes in the existence of God 
or not. God is a powerful symbol in many people’s psyches nonetheless. 
449 Cf. Woodhead, “On the Incompatibility between Christianity and Holistic Spirituality; A Reply 
to Jan-Olav Henriksen,” 59.
450 Paul Heelas. Linda Woodhead, et al., The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion Is Giving Way to 
Spirituality, (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2005).
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Shea understands the God symbol from the process of human imaging. 
For him, imaging is part and parcel of what it means to develop a coher-
ent self that can make sense of events, and which can negotiate meaning 
and deal with life’s contingencies. Imaging is both what we do and what 
we are. It engages all of the self ’s senses to help us grasp and relate to 
our reality. Shea holds that, “Imaging is a continuous, developing, bodily 
process, an ongoing organizing and reorganizing of perceiving and 
knowing.” Processes of imaging constantly help us to reconfigure “the 
whole.”451 Imaging is not subjective and arbitrary, nor should it be seen as 
a means for escaping reality; instead, it is how we entertain the real and 
engage fully with life.452 It is what makes it possible to have knowledge of 
reality, and for the mind, “the task of the imagination, and particularly of 
the religious imagination, is to compose the real.”453 
Shea sees religion as that which links the self and God. From that 
perspective, imaging is the very way in which such relations take on the 
character of being real. The incomplete process of imaging, which he calls 
fettered imaging, is a stage in the process of becoming a more mature 
self. Imaging is, therefore, part of that which constitutes the development 
that will eventually lead to the superego of the self. The content of this 
superego is made up of cultural understandings, societal norms, parental 
values, the influence of peers, and religious beliefs. This content “com-
bines with the incompleteness of the adolescing self ’s own perceptive and 
cognitive powers to hinder and constrain what may later be a freer, fuller, 
more complete, and more appropriate imaging of reality.”454 
What kinds of processes lead to a belief in a superego God and how are 
these, subsequently, of importance for shame and shaming? According 
to Shea, the superego God is produced by the adolescing self, with his or 
451 John J. Shea, Finding God Again: Spirituality for Adults (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publish-
ers, 2005), 9.
452 Ibid., 10. For a similar assessment from the point of view of the philosophy of religion, see R. 
Neville, The Truth of Broken Symbols, (Albany, 1996). For constructive theology, see G. Kaufman: 
The Theological Imagination (Philadelphia 1981), especially Chapters 1 and 2. The strength of 
Kaufman’s contribution is that he not only stresses that our conceptions of God are our con-
structs, but he also relates this understanding of the constitution of theological discourse to 
contributions in contemporary self-psychology. 
453 Shea, Finding God Again, 10. Shea is referring to Sharon Parks here. 
454 Ibid., 11.
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her particular needs, transference patterns of relating, and with his or 
her particular logic of objective knowing.455 As a consequence, this expe-
rience of “God” evolves alongside the self that holds on to this God. The 
result can be different versions of “God” which nevertheless all have some 
characteristics in common. In the following, we present the elements in 
the superego God (understood as a supreme being) that seem most rele-
vant to the topic of shame.456 
The God of law commands and is the source of morality. He com-
mands obedience more than understanding and insight into God’s will. 
This version of “God” is perhaps the one that most strongly implies a 
fusion of religion and morality. Here, the standards against which the 
person measures him or herself are rooted in an instance to which he or 
she cannot object, and to elements that are not negotiable. It is unavoid-
able that this God will become a God of guilt and shame. As the self 
grows, so do the ambiguities in its relationship with this God, who is not 
only benevolent and good but also judging and all-seeing – a point that 
contributes further to shame.457 Thus, this symbol mirrors the self ’s own 
dividedness and moral failure.
We can add the following reflection to Shea’s description here: under-
stood as a supreme being, this God is omnipresent. We have already sug-
gested in a previous analysis that this God can enter the consciousness 
of the individual at any given time and, as it clashes with it, interrupt 
the already existing context of agency by introducing a new and different 
one in which God’s presence is the main feature. For religious people, 
this point displays how the imaginaries that are enmeshed in their fun-
damental ways of relating to the world and the self make them exposed 
to the risk of shame in a way that is probably greater than non-religious 
people. God can always appear in the consciousness of the believer and 
disturb projects, intentions, and intentions in ways that cause shame.
455 Ibid., 23.
456 We will not refer to all of Shea’s points in detail as this is not necessary for our present purposes.
457 Shea places this God’s commandments entirely within the realm of Lawrence Kohlberg’s de-
scription of the pre-conventional and conventional forms of morality, which we discuss in the 
next chapter. See Shea, Finding God Again, 26. 
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Stephen Pattison sees the problems of the God of law most strongly 
articulated in the ideal of God as perfect, good, and complete in “God-
self”. For a person prone to shame, such a symbol of God can become 
destructive because the ideals it implies means that almost everyone is 
bound to fall short. Shameful dissatisfaction with oneself is the result. 
Pattison sees the aspiration to perfection as pernicious and persecutory 
for ashamed selves.458 The notion of God as a punisher may also deeply 
trouble people who have problems with the God presented by the author-
ities, and reinforce the sense of ontological badness in the believer.459 
Obedience and adaptation are the immediate requirements for good 
standing with this God. These form the preconditions for God to offer 
necessary security. However, in the long run, this God may be challenged 
by the experience that impossible and rigid commandments are not 
really helpful when dealing with the challenges of life. Moreover, such 
a God may also engender shame and a false self, because this God sym-
bol always demands conformity and the neglect of one’s own emotional 
responses.460
Closely related to the above God of law is the God of dependency and 
control. On the one hand, this God provides everything that the adoles-
cent self needs for growth and development, but on the other hand, power 
and authority are restricted to “Godself”. The self has no independent 
access to these resources. Providence and dominion describe this God. 
Shea holds that this notion of God holds an inbuilt contradiction: when 
related to the concrete experience of human life this God is all-power-
ful and all-knowing and desires our well-being. However, this God also 
allows humans no autonomy. The contradiction between the apparent 
458 Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 238.
459 Cf. ibid., 241.
460 Shea, Finding God Again: Spirituality for Adults, 26. For this point, see also Pattison, Shame: The-
ory, Therapy, Theology, 238, who points to how the rhetoric of God helping people to find their 
“true” selves in him nevertheless advocates conformity to God’s needs and will. This call “to be-
come as God wants one to be, to obedience and to conformity, can help to crush people’s sense of 
their own goodness and the appropriateness of their being.” As a consequence, such rhetoric may 
encourage a shameful heteronomy and conformity and leave people profoundly discontented 
with themselves as they are. 
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call to freedom and responsibility and God’s demand that we remain in a 
position of absolute dependence on God is not easily solved.461 
The benefit for the self in holding on to this God symbol is neverthe-
less apparent: this God promises to protect one from the pains of inner 
struggle and from having to make responsible life choices. However, the 
condition for fulfilling this promise is that one gives up the struggle for 
freedom and autonomy. Hence, comfort and security come at a price. 
Gratitude may, in the long run, be exchanged with rebellion.462 From the 
perspective of shame, this may be seen as negative: the idea that God does 
not need anything from humans and that humans do not actually desire 
anything from God may imply for people who are prone to shame that 
they will continue to feel incompetent and worthless, instead of being 
affirmed for actually being able to do something useful for others. “The 
price of developing a sense of absolute gratitude to and dependence upon 
God may be the acquisition of a diminished view of the power and value 
of the self,” writes Pattison.463 
The God of the group is linked to a group that is ordered hierarchi-
cally. God is at the top, and then come the authorities appointed to speak 
on God’s behalf, who therefore require attentive obedience. By accepting 
these terms, one can become a member. Belonging to the group deter-
mines whether one is a true believer in God. This God is a God of compli-
ance, convention, and conformity. At best, the group (and its God) offers 
comfort, strength, and solidarity. However, a lack of acceptance of the 
requirements may also lead to feelings of isolation and rejection – and 
thus engender shame, just as we can see in Stump’s earlier description of 
not being desired. So too can the lack of ability to adhere to the group’s 




463 Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 240.
464 Cf. Elizabeth A. Prosek et al., “Experiencing Shame: Collegiate Alcohol Abuse, Religiosity, and 
Spirituality,” Journal of College Counseling 20, no. 2 (2017) and Pekka Lund, “Christian Faith and 
Recovery from Substance Abuse, Guilt, and Shame,” Journal Of Religion & Spirituality In Social 
Work: Social Thought 36, no. 3 (2017).
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We may supplement the analysis of the superego God presented thus 
far with other traits that Stephen Pattison identifies as important in the 
symbol of a God that engenders shame. When God is understood as com-
pletely different from other beings, this may lead to a total dis-identification 
of God with humans. If this trait is dominant, it is hard to see how such 
a God can mirror human development in ways that provide affirmation 
of God’s attunement to human needs and interests.465 Moreover, and 
in line with this, as God does not have a body (unlike humans), dis- 
identification may also follow from disembodiment. Underscoring the 
contrast inherent in the body-spirit dichotomy may imply that all things 
relating to the body are negatively related to God, who is spirit.466 Pattison 
points to the possible consequence of this understanding that anything 
can be done to the body,467 not only by the self but also by others. Viola-
tions of the boundaries of the body, be they in terms of ridicule, violence, 
sexual abuse or drug abuse, may, as we have already indicated, contribute 
to shame, no matter if they are caused by others or oneself. As the body 
is our concern in terms of not only appearance, but also in terms of sexu-
ality, digestion or excretion, the body may be a source of shame in many 
ways, because it does not share in God’s nature or live up to the ideals of 
perfection that religions mediate. 
According to similar logic, a God that is primarily presented as pure 
and holy cannot tolerate the unclean. Such God images may increase 
the personal sense of alienation from both the ideal self and the divine. 
Furthermore, the associated quest for reconciling purification with the 
divine “can also foster some most unpleasant human attitudes and vices 
such as self-righteousness, exclusivism, and contempt for others.”468 
We have repeatedly pointed to the body as the locus of feelings and 
desires. However, many Western images of God portray God as rational 
and, accordingly, as one that does not have feelings or desires.469 For a 
self prone to shame, this God symbol contributes to a split in the self 
465 Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 236f.
466 Ibid., 237.
467 Ibid.
468 Ibid., 237f. 
469 Ibid., 238. 
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that can be far more complex than that described here.470 The contrast 
between a self-controlled and passionless God and a self in the hands of its 
own emotions may contribute to self-experiences of shame and inade-
quacy. Repression and the denial of feelings may turn into an ideal, and 
failure to live up to this ideal may, in turn, engender similar feelings of 
inferiority.471 It may also render the self more prone to abuse by others. 
How should we assess the risks of shame  
in the context of religion?
The present chapter has presented some of the different levels at which 
shame may be at work in the context of religion. Like other areas of 
human life, shame is prevalent here as well. How to evaluate the risks for 
shame in a religious context? The answer to that question may depend on 
who you are, and whether or not you are engaged in religion, and, if so, in 
what ways. For those who are religious and still find it is worthwhile to be 
so, we can offer the following options. 
Religious practitioners who are focused on the need for obedience to 
authority and the disciplining of the flock may find that shame is, and has 
to be, a part of the repertoire of interaction and conduct. They may argue 
that this has always been so, that this is a consequence of being faithful to 
tradition, and so on. The cost of this attitude is the possible arrested per-
sonal growth and development of adherents and the risk of losing some of 
them, especially if shaming practices become too pervasive. 
Other religious practitioners may see the analyses we have offered 
here, and similar ones, as an excellent opportunity to be constantly aware 
of the risks of shame and shaming. They may be motivated to develop 
forms of interaction and agency that impede the development of shame 
and utilize other mechanisms for moral teaching and codes of conduct. 
470 For the social effects of this godly ideal, see also the sociology of emotions as described by Riis 
and Woodhead in A Sociology of Religious Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 
which describes thoroughly the sociological functions that may surround the features we de-
scribe here. 
471 Cf. Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 238f. 
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Because religious practices and teachings are employed in so many dif-
ferent contexts and mean different things to different people with differ-
ent background stories, it is not likely that shame will ever be eliminated 
from religion. But if one has the aim of reducing shame in religious con-
texts, there is much to be aware of. If one does not see this as a valuable 
aim, then one can go one as before. If the latter is a good strategy for reli-
gion in a modern or postmodern context remains to be seen. We think 
not. 
The latter points notwithstanding, religion addresses – and must 
address – failure, because its acknowledgment is a precondition for 
growth and self-development. But how failure is addressed, and what 
symbols are employed for dealing with it, varies, and must do so. Gra-
ham Ward writes wisely, “Theologically, human beings still walk a high 
wire between amor sui and amor dei, pride and humility, assertive self- 
determination and obedience; with shame, the opening can always be 
seen beneath the feet, below the wire.”472 The religious practitioner will 
need to develop modes that overcome shame in a community, and can do 
so only if he or she can develop trust in an idealized figure with whom 
he or she can identify without also acknowledging their difference – and 
that can only be learned in healthy and well-functioning contexts of 
human interaction. 
In her analysis of various aspects of shame, Martha Nussbaum also asks 
if her analysis is at odds with major religious ideas regarding shame.473 
She points to some critical elements that are worth considering in this 
conclusion, and which we have hinted at already. Her recommendation 
is that religions emphasize that perfection is an implausible and inap-
propriate goal for a human being.474 At first sight, this might seem like an 
approach that could generate or contribute to shame, but that need not 
be the case. Consider what we have written above about standards that 
generate shame. If these standards are too high, they may cause shame 
by merely setting the bar too high. Thus, a more realistic understand-
ing of the capacities and capabilities of human beings contributes to an 
472 Ward, “Adam and Eve’s Shame (and Ours),” 313. 
473 See Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 342f. 
474 Ibid. 
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adequate understanding of the human condition and provides the means 
for more tolerance in the face of imperfection and insufficiency. 
Of course, religious ideas exist that consider the human being as not 
worthy of respect – as we suggested in the previous section. But Nuss-
baum holds that the major religions accept an idea of human dignity and, 
therefore, also human rights. They do not see this idea as incompatible 
with teachings regarding human frailty and inadequacy.475 Thus, she 
seems to underscore the point we have made above about seeing the fail-
ures of humanity against a fundamentally positive backdrop of human 
dignity, which in the Abrahamic traditions is expressed in the notion of 
the human being as created in the image of God. 
There are three important considerations that we can develop based on 
Nussbaum’s short remarks regarding religion: 
First, the idea about human inadequacy and imperfection need not in itself en-
gender shame – even when articulated within a religious context. To be aware 
of one’s finitude may provide a realistic notion about what it means to be hu-
man – and allow for a recognition of the vulnerable and frail human condition, 
without this being a cause for shame. 
 Second, it is primarily when these features of the human condition are re-
lated to specific standards that contribute to jeopardizing someone’s stature or 
belonging to a specific community that they may become problematic. When 
inadequacy and imperfection are employed as a basis for the evaluation of a 
person’s potential recognition by others, and as a condition for their desire for 
community with this person, shame lurks in the background. 
 Third, if religious symbols are employed to express the ambiguities of the 
human condition in a way that allows for the recognition of human dignity (be-
ing created in the image of God is a symbol used in Judaism, Islam and Chris-
tianity), as well as the imperfect status of humans, these in combination may 
contribute to a more sound and realistic understanding of the human condition 
that can hinder the development of shame. Then, religion can make a positive 
contribution to a culture in which shame is all too pervasive. 
475 Ibid., 343. 
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Furthermore, we can relate these points to Jill McNish’s suggestion for 
a religiously constructive response to shame. She holds that a certain 
“sense of being somehow flawed or at least feeble, inadequate, or finite, is 
an ontological part of what it means to be human.”476 Shame is, accord-
ingly, in her view, something we need to approach constructively to come 
to terms with the conditions for our existence. The argument that she 
offers to substantiate this point is as follows: 
Shame is situated at the borderline between unity and separation. Like 
many others, both secular and religious, philosophers, theologians and 
psychologists, McNish uses the Genesis story about Adam and Eve in 
the Garden as her point of departure for reflection. She sees the content 
of this story as an illustration of how separation occurs: “It is really not 
about God’s expulsion and banishment of the primal couple from the 
garden and/or from God’s presence, but rather the couple’s own shame 
experience and their need to separate themselves from the unity they 
had felt with nature itself and from God’s presence.”477 Hence, McNish 
points to how this story illustrates what we have previously identified as 
the movements entailed in shame: to separate oneself from community, 
and to desire for its return. 
If we, furthermore, consider this interpretation in light of our under-
standing of shame as the result of an interruption, the myth about God’s 
presence in the Garden is about a presence that makes Adam and Eve 
aware of a context of agency and intentions different from the one in which 
their own agency takes place. Thus, they experience separation from God 
as something that causes shame, whereas they previously lived in a state 
of unquestioned union and immediacy. But shame not only manifests a 
separation between humans and the God who can relieve humans from 
their sense of wrongness. It also holds a productive potential. McNish 
develops this potential in a critical comment to Vicki Underland-Rosow. 
She describes Underland-Rosow’s position as follows: 
Shame is antithetical to spirituality. Much institutional religion in our culture 
separates humans from themselves (their feelings, desires, and thoughts), from 
476 McNish, Transforming Shame: A Pastoral Response, 125.
477 Ibid., 130.
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each other, the universe, and a Higher Power. Spirituality brings things together. 
Spirituality involves connections. Spirituality is often experienced as profound 
oneness with the universe. Shame involves separation, alienation. Spirituality 
has no need for disconnection: Most western religion demands separation and 
shame.”478
Read in the light of the fundamental idea about religion in William 
James as stated in the introduction to this chapter, one might say that 
Underland-Rosow’s contrasting of religion and spirituality here points to 
how religion builds on the premise of separation, and therefore allows for 
shame to have a valid place in the religious context. However, spirituality, 
which is related to human growth and self-acceptance, seems to require 
for shame to be overcome. McNish nevertheless sees hidden problems in 
this way of establishing the solution. She critically addresses the premise 
that it is “in the nature of things that human beings should experience 
a perpetual state of unity and connection with the source of being and 
with one another.”479 The problem with this position is that it does not 
allow authentic spirituality to include experiences of brokenness, dislo-
cation, and fragmentation. Thus, this understanding of spirituality seems 
to offer a false and superficial picture of the human condition. Separation 
is a necessary condition for individuation and creativity, and without it, 
there would be no human growth or progress. Therefore, McNish under-
scores the necessity of separation: “In order to individuate and come into 
their own as separate and authentic human beings, people need to expe-
rience boundaries between themselves and God and one another. Shame 
is one of those affects that enables this experience.”480
478 Ibid., 134.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid., 135. It is against this backdrop that McNish interprets the myth about the Garden of Eden: 
“The advent of shame caused Adam and Eve to leave the paradisal garden. Yes, this was the 
end of dreaming innocence. It was the end of humankind’s thoughtless unity with God and 
nature and an end too of humankind’s unthinking identification with God. However, it was also 
the beginning of human creativity and invention. Eve ate of the Tree of Knowledge. This was 
the beginning of shame. From this archetypal moment, human individuals began to experience 
boundaries. Leaving the garden set limits and gave shape, substance, and direction to human life. 
They went out of Eden and began to work, to create, to invent – in short, to become individuals 
and to start the long process of individuation, both as a species and as individual persons. They 
lost their unthinking experience of unity with God and nature, but they began the process of 
finding themselves as human creatures. That unity which was lost is what individuals seek in a 
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McNish can therefore argue that the experience of shame is “an import-
ant way that God reaches out to us and touches us,” because shame may 
point to unavoidable elements in the human condition. Thus, she also 
points to the same elements that Nussbaum identifies as necessary for 
humans to acknowledge in order to come to terms with these features of 
human life that cause shame: “We are frustrated, even overcome at times, 
by our physical, finite nature and by failings and inadequacies specific 
to us as individuals.” However, these experiences are instances with reli-
gious significance, since it is possible to experience oneself as accepted 
by God, nevertheless. The unconditional acceptance of God can make 
experiences of shame transformative, “if and to the extent that we can 
avoid resorting to the various defenses which seek to deny our experience 
of shame.”481 Hence, she interprets the New Testament stories as chroni-
cles of shame. “They are about the outcast, the unlovable, the impure, the 
abandoned – the shamed – in all of us, not just outside of us.”482 
It is clear from her elaborations on shame as a contributor to spiritual 
and personal growth that the shame she is talking about here is adequate, 
that is, it is a shame that the person in question is entitled to feel. Hence, 
McNish’s argument rests on the premise that separating adequate from 
inadequate shame is necessary before one employs shame for a positive 
spiritual and personal purpose. However, given that premise, her con-
structive proposal for shame in a spiritual context can make sense: 
Psychic and spiritual growth can be attained only in this process of owning 
the fragments of ourselves, and this is what God asks of us. This is the pur-
suit of wholeness, and there is a cost to it because seeking wholeness does not 
mean finding only the good parts of ourselves but all of ourselves. This is what 
is involved in transformation of shame and the integration of shame experi-
ence. Unless we are willing to enter into this process of naming and owning the 
lifelong quest. The negotiation of the suffering involved in grasping and seizing that which was 
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shameful, shamed, and isolated parts of ourselves, we will be unable to achieve 
any sense of unity with God.483 
To acknowledge weakness and vulnerability, and own it, is an important 
condition for overcoming shame. McNish, therefore, sees the theme of 
transforming weakness and thereby shame as a central motif in Christi-
anity – and one that takes the human condition more fully into account 
than one that sees shame only as a way to spiritual suicide.484 We note, 
however, that her position needs the careful distinction and discernment 
suggested above: shame is not an unqualified way to a positive religious 
mode of being-in-the-world. 
483 Ibid., 167.
484 Cf. ibid., 169.





When we have talked to people who do not work in a scholarly context 
about writing on shame, we have had various and somewhat different 
responses. Sometimes when we said that we were writing about shame, it 
functioned as a conversation stopper. At other times, people brightened 
up and said, “Oh, yes! That’s interesting.” But people rarely pursued a 
conversation on the topic, and when they did, it was often in a way that 
indicated that they saw shame as a disciplining or moral phenomenon. 
We got responses like these:
• People have stopped feeling shame about cheating on their tax 
returns! They only feel ashamed about the wrong things, like about 
how they look or what part of their body is not in accordance with 
the ideals they have. What they should do is feel ashamed for lying, 
cheating, bullying! 
• We live in a shameless society! The moral decline has gone too far! 
• I feel ashamed of being English: about how we treat the homeless, 
and about how we may appear to the rest of Europe! 
These three examples show what some people think others ought to feel 
shame for. Said differently, shame is identified here as something that 
applies – or should apply – to others, and not to oneself. Even in the last 
case, it is not really the one uttering the statement that is at the center, but 
the others who make her feel ashamed for being English. 
Shame is, nevertheless, also tacitly present in other cases where peo-
ple are identified and exposed due to their moral transgressions. We say 
tacitly present because shame as such is not the topic, but the following 
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instances are cases where shame most likely plays a part, and also, to some 
extent, is instrumental for the actual agency of some of those involved: 
• A newspaper discloses that a prominent and highly profiled CEO has 
been using inside information to trade stocks for a considerable profit. 
He loses a vote of confidence. The media attention causes him to flee, 
and one day later he is found in his car in the woods, dead by suicide. 
• The #MeToo movement focuses on women who have been subjected 
to treatment they have been ashamed to tell others about, and who 
finally have found the courage to do so as they learn that they are 
not alone. They overcome shame by sharing their stories. But in the 
wake of this movement, we also learn about men who have been 
outed and fired from their jobs with no trial. Some of these men 
have committed suicide, most likely, partly due to shame. 
To be ashamed for a moral failure can have devastating consequences. 
As these examples show, the ambiguities of shame are apparent in moral 
contexts. They are taken from conversations and newspaper reports that 
have appeared during the period in which we have worked on this book. 
This chapter articulates a main element in what inspired us to write 
this book. We are critical to the employment of shame for moral pur-
poses. We are not alone in holding a critical view on how to deal with 
shame as a moral instrument, although we, like others, also disagree as 
to the extent of criticism. One can take a look at how philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum, to whom we have already referred,485 differs from a scientist 
like Jennifer Jaquet486 with regard to different views on the use of shame 
in the public interest. Furthermore, the chapter is written with a spe-
cific purpose in mind: it intends to show how problematic it is to employ 
shame for moral purposes and consider it a viable tool for moral develop-
ment, growth, and progress. 
To deal with the relationship between morality and shame, we need to 
distinguish the moral context from other, related contexts. Shame also 
485 See especially Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law.
486 Jennifer Jacquet, Is Shame Necessary? New Uses for an Old Tool (London: Allen Lane, 2015).
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exists in contexts of socialization (which has to do with how the individ-
ual develops an understanding of his or her role and acceptable behavior 
in society), and of disciplining (punishment or reward for behavior).487 If 
we understand morality as something different from socialization and 
disciplining, it becomes obvious that it is a rather complex phenomenon. 
We can understand morality as the ability to act on shared values and 
ideals that are recognized as your own, in a specific context and with ref-
erence to the relationships at hand. This definition of morality connects 
with the widely held understanding of shame as the reaction you have 
when you realize that you have failed to live up to specific standards that 
shape your self-conception.488 Fundamentally, it ties morality to agency 
as an expression of your own commitments. When we define morality 
in this way, it has two immediate consequences: First, it allows the agent 
to consider the contextual elements for agency. Second, it also opens up 
to other-based considerations that relativize a strict notion of autonomy 
as based in the individual only: the agent who acts morally may still con-
sider the impact of his or her actions on relationships and contexts. Thus, 
morality is not only based on principles but on the experience and assess-
ment of contexts and relationships as well.
This understanding of morality ties it closely to the ability to perform 
agency, that is, the capacity for making decisions based on understand-
ing yourself and your situation, following your own will, and determin-
ing your own interests and aims. Thus, morality presupposes a certain 
amount of cognitive and rational capacity, and empathy. Elements of 
self-evaluation and consideration of your own capabilities are involved, 
as well. Morality also requires subjectivity, that is, the ability to think of 
oneself as the origin of one’s actions and act accordingly.489
The emphasis here on agency may seem to cloud the idea that morality 
is not only about what one does, but also about who one is, about what 
is one’s character, and how prior experience or empathy may engender 
487 Cf. the presentation of findings in social psychology in Gausel and Leach in Chapter 3, pp. 43–46.
488 This is a fairly common definition, adapted here from John Deigh’s reference to Gerhart Piers 
and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1971), in Deigh, “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique,” 225. 
489 This last point can also be seen in relation to Deigh’s distinction between ownership and author-
ship, as referred to previously (see pp. 123–124). 
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a specific response. The character can dispose a person to do something 
based on intuition, almost like a moral reflex, without having to make 
a deliberate decision. This point is clearly expressed in virtue ethics. 
However, we argue that also in virtue ethics, the capacity for agency, and 
therefore actions, are within the horizon of what defines morality. One 
can never understand someone as courageous if the person never acts in 
ways that display courage. A righteous person is righteous in virtue of his 
or her decisions and the aims he or she pursues, and he or she is assessed 
according to these. What virtue ethics bring to light, though, is how one 
is not only occasionally morally challenged to feel shameful because of 
what one does, but one is also prone to shame because of who one is – or 
is not yet, as a virtuous character. Other moral theories may relate more 
one-sidedly to the aims or actual consequences of agency, or the norms 
that guide it. Thus, they address occasions or opportunities for shame in 
different ways. Nevertheless, we shall see that the focus on character in 
virtue ethics may shed light on specific features regarding the capacity for 
feeling shame, and provide reasons for an argument against some types 
of shamelessness.490
Thus, we can analyze the role of shame in morality from different points 
of view. We can ask: Is it good, from a moral point of view, that people 
should feel ashamed for their moral failures and shortcomings? Can the 
feeling of shame provide reliable information about what it is right to do 
or not to do? Are there good alternatives to shame in this regard? Does 
shame make the moral agency more or less rational or transparent? Can 
shame be said to be a moral instance at all, if it is so strongly related 
to the subject and his or her self-perception? Does shame make people 
turn away from moral challenges and become too self-occupied instead? 
Given that shame is almost always backward-looking, and emerges as a 
result of things past, can shame guide future moral agency? And if it can, 
can it do it well? We hope to have some well-founded answers to these 
questions at the end of the present chapter. 
490 See below, pp. 328ff. 
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Brief comments on shame and moral theory
Modern moral theory has not focused much on shame, and shame is 
hardly ever made a topic in the constructive considerations that moral 
philosophers make in order to argue their positions. Thus, shame has, to a 
large extent, become a silent topic in moral theory. What one has focused 
on is simply something different than shame. In this section, we want to 
reflect briefly on how shame may be silenced by the ways modern moral 
theories are set up – and thereby provide a framework for an understand-
ing of why shame is not usually a part of moral theory, although it may 
still play a tacit role in different types of human agency, among which 
moral agency may still be one. 
As moral agents, humans act on and articulate their values, ideals, and 
norms. These shape their intentions, desires, actual actions, and the aims 
they pursue. A moral agency shapes a sense of self and identity, as well. 
However, in what ways the relation between moral ideals or values and the 
self is understood varies in moral theories. It is not possible to develop that 
topic in detail here, but we need to consider in brief how moral theories pro-
vide different contexts for the role of shame with regard to moral conduct. 
Some of these considerations build on what we have presented above.491 
The deontological approach to ethics seems to restrict the role of shame 
considerably. No moral norm says that “you shall not act in shameful 
ways” – partly because this statement does not provide any moral insight, 
and partly because emotions do not in themselves provide us with some-
thing that in and by itself qualifies as moral motivation. 
Utilitarianism (or more broadly, consequentialism) may provide an 
indirect role for shame. This approach to agency focuses on the best pos-
sible outcome of an action in terms of utility, or the principle of avoiding 
pain and enhancing pleasure. Since shame is among the negative (pain-
ful) emotions, utilitarianism can address the avoidance of shame as one 
of the guiding principles for morality. Thus, shame can have a positive 
moral function. Furthermore, since utilitarianism mainly focuses on 
491 For further elaborations from a sociological point of view on how shame may be related to 
identity formation, see Jan E. Stets and Michael J. Carter, “A Theory of the Self for the Sociology 
of Morality,” American Sociological Review 77, no. 1 (2012).
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actions and their results, the only place shame can have in this theory, in 
addition to this, is where the result of an action seems to fail. Then, the 
agent may feel ashamed for not being able to realize this aim and achieve 
the desired outcome. However, nothing in the actual construction of 
morality from a utilitarian point of view suggests that shame should have 
a role in how the moral subject considers him or herself (as apart from the 
consequences of his or her actions). Similar considerations apply to other 
teleological approaches, except for virtue ethics. 
Virtue ethics emphasizes the formation of character. Virtuous acts 
reflect a virtuous person. Someone who fails to perform in a virtuous way 
is prone to feel shame, not only for what he or she has done but for who 
he or she is. He or she has failed to display the qualities that are expected 
by someone who has taken on the task of moral development – and he or 
she is then a failure, not only in his or her own eyes but also in the eyes 
of all others that know about the obligations that he or she has taken on 
concerning this development. In virtue ethics, we are closest to the con-
ventional level of morality. What is considered a virtue may vary from 
context to context and depend on cultural conditions.492 Within the frame 
of virtue ethics, shame may be a strong motivator for how one develops 
one’s moral competence, because the focus is on the moral agent, and not 
exclusively on the actions and goals one has set for oneself.493
Kohlberg’s different stages of morality: 
implications for shame
Development of moral competence
Shame can be analyzed in the context of morality from the point of 
view of the development of moral competence. In this section, we 
492 Cf. Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 2007).
493 See below. It is also worth noting that virtue ethics emerged in a (Greek) social context where the 
social bonds were tighter, and the actual social role of the moral agent had a bearing on how he 
was considered. On shame within different cultural contexts, including more aristocratic ones, 
and in relation to guilt, see also the analysis in Peter Hacker, “Shame, Embarrassment, and Guilt,” 
Midwest Studies In Philosophy 41, no. 1 (2017).
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provide a backdrop for the discussion of shame that follows by looking 
into some elements in Habermas’ adaption of Kohlberg’s analysis of this 
development. Habermas’ understanding of the conditions for ethics 
relies mainly on the stages of moral development Kohlberg identified. 
Kohlberg’s theory about individual moral development provides access 
to some of the conditions that are in play, and therefore also to the con-
text in which shame can emerge as a problematic issue for morality. 
However, Kohlberg’s position has also been criticized as being gender- 
biased, and Carol Gilligan has voiced concerns about how his research 
does not take relational elements fully into consideration because of 
this bias.494 Hence, the following approach is only meant to highlight 
conditions for shame and shaming in the context of different types of 
morality. It should not be read as a basic approval of all the empirical 
elements in Kohlberg’s analysis. Kohlberg’s starting point defies our 
initial premise: that we are constituted as embodied selves in a tight 
relational and structural network.
A major concern for Habermas is to develop an ethical theory that 
can be understood as universal and not only based on contextual con-
ditions. He sees this universality as a prerequisite for people to be able 
to handle ethical issues in a world where different opinions exist about 
what should be considered as morally good. Among the advantages that 
Habermas sees in Kohlberg is that the different stages in his theory allow 
us to reduce the different forms of ethics to a small number of stages in 
moral development.495 
The main features in Kohlberg’s identification of the stages of individ-
ual moral development are as follows:496
494 See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cam-
bridge; London: Harvard University Press, 1982).
495 Jürgen Habermas, Moralbewusstsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln, (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1983), 128. 
496 The following is from Habermas, ibid., 134f., but slightly adjusted in order to integrate the social 
dimension better, as these are referred to in ibid, 139. Our translation.
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Level A: Pre-conventional morality 
1. The Stage of Punishment and Obedience (egocentric)
The understanding of what is right is here related to obedience 
towards rules and authorities, and to the avoidance of hurting oth-
ers. The motivation for doing right is to avoid punishment. 
2. The Stage of Individual Instrumental Purpose and Exchange (con-
crete individualism)
The right thing to do here is to follow the rules that serve one’s 
individual interests and allow others to do the same. Hence, self- 
interest is the motivation.
Level B: Conventional morality 
3. The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and 
Conformity (the individual in relation to other individuals)
At this stage, the individual takes on the role of kindness towards 
others and is interested in their reactions and feelings. Loyalty and 
faithfulness towards partners and peers, as well as the willingness 
to conform to their rules and expectations, are central elements. 
The motivation for this behavior is to appear as good in the eyes 
of others and oneself since this is considered that which serves you 
best in the long term. (cf. The Golden Rule). 
4. The Stage of Social System and Conscience Maintenance (Inter- 
personal motives and agreement)
Central at this stage is to do your duty towards society, maintain 
the social order and the welfare of the group or the society. The 
motivation is to maintain self-respect and/or good conscience and 
to avoid negative consequences for the community or society.497
Level C: Post-conventional, principled morality
At this level, the focus is on rights, values, and principles that are, or 
can be, common to all individuals in a society that is “designed to have 
fair and beneficial practices.” This level has the two following stages:
497 Conscience is a topic we have deliberately left out of this study, due to the complexity it exhibits, 
and because we do not think it offers much in terms of understanding shame directly. Neverthe-
less, we would like to note that it should be treated as part of shame’s context. For an analysis of 
shame, guilt and conscience, see John Cottingham, “Conscience, Guilt, and Shame,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Ethics, edited by Roger Crisp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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5. The Stage of Prior Rights and Social Contract or Utility (The individ-
ual is aware that there are norms and values prior to a given social 
condition, and defines him or herself in relation to these)
The move beyond conventional morality at this level becomes 
apparent in the understanding of the right: the right is constituted 
by basic rules that express the fundamental rights, values, and the 
social contract, even when these may be in conflict with the con-
crete rules or laws of some groups that are members of the society. 
These “basic rules” are employed to regulate the interests of dif-
ferent groups in society, and recognizes their right to pursue their 
interests, but not at the expense of others. The motivation for doing 
the right here is the wish for all to live as well as possible, and the 
understanding that this right can only be realized when the social 
contract is maintained and respected.
6. The Stage of Universal Ethical Principles (Morality is the rational 
basis for the development of society, and every person is an end in 
his or herself, and not only a means for others) 
The underlying assumption is that all of humanity should be guided 
by universal ethical principles. The rules of a given society are valid 
to the extent that they are in accordance with these universal prin-
ciples. The motivation for doing the right is, at this level, that one as 
a rational person has realized the validity of these principles, and 
accordingly, is committed to them.
Several important elements in the above scheme can help us to get a bet-
ter grip on the role of shame in relation to morality. Let us start by look-
ing at some of the insights that appear from the post-conventional and 
most developed stage of moral development. 
Shame under the conditions of the  
post-conventional stage
The distinction between the right and the good comes to fruition at the 
post-conventional level. Here, the right is identified by what is in accor-
dance with universal principles, and not constituted by reference to 
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concrete and historically situated outcomes (of good). Whereas the good 
is linked to concrete empirical achievements, consequences, or outcomes, 
the right is conditioned by actions that are in accordance with specific 
principles, norms, or rules. It means that moral stages that focus on the 
right also make it possible to separate the agent from his or her actions 
since the focus is on the action. Thus, the extent to which he or she, in 
a given case, feels shame, will not be due to who he or she is, but what 
universal standards he or she has not been able to live up to through his 
or her agency. 
Furthermore, if one operates based on what is right to do, the moti-
vation for doing the right is linked to one’s insight into something that 
is defined as right for everyone to do. It is not linked to my status in the 
group, my relation to some others that may approve of me or make me 
feel ashamed. Therefore, a moral action is, in principle, transparent con-
cerning why it should be done, and why everyone who finds themselves in 
the position where this action is an option, should do it. Accordingly, the 
universal orientation in post-conventional morality excludes the clash 
between contexts of agency in principle. It also eliminates the possibil-
ity of experiencing the double movement of shame, as the agent here is 
always acting in accordance with principles that make him or her a part 
of the moral community – and which therefore does not jeopardize his or 
her membership in it. 
The emphasis on insight into the right as the valid moral motivation 
at the post-conventional level, therefore, excludes shame, or the potential 
for shame, as a possible motivation for doing the right. There can be no 
guidance at this level expressed in sentences like “if you do not do this, 
it is shameful” or “by doing this, you bring shame on us” because such 
statements do not convey any understanding of why this is wrongful or 
shame-causing. Accordingly, motivations that appeal to shame cannot be 
part of what constitutes post-conventional morality. The only option for 
feeling shame at a post-conventional level is if you do not live up to the 
moral standards given by the universal principles into which you have 
gained insight. Thus, if shame is present here, it is not as a motivational 
factor, but as a backward-looking response to what has taken place in the 
past. It expresses a self-judgment due to the realization that one has failed 
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to live up to one’s own standards. Furthermore, the role of others in this 
respect is not to trigger shame, but to instigate in you the insight into why 
what you did was wrong or should be otherwise – in other words, they 
may convey a sense of guilt, but not shame. 
Consequently, at the post-conventional stage, shame neither seems to 
have a role in providing moral motivation or guidance, nor in providing 
moral insight into why something is right or wrong. Furthermore, the 
focus at this level is on the well-being of society, from which no individ-
ual is excluded. We can, therefore, say that post-conventional morality in 
principle overcomes the potentially egocentric and/or divisive elements 
that may come to the fore at other stages of moral development, and which 
are in a profound way expressed in how shame closes in on and centers 
the individual on him or herself instead of the (generalized) other (to 
which he or she also belongs in principle). A society based on post-con-
ventional morality places all members at the same level with regard to 
the opportunities for acquiring moral insight and motivation. Because 
shame cannot in itself bring insight into why something is morally right 
or wrong, the communal element is constituted by shared insights and 
common reasoning. 
However, to move from one moral stage to another is the result of 
learning and increasing competence. It is also a development in which 
increased autonomy plays a role – a point that is especially important if 
one considers shame as a socially conditioned emotion. The autonomy 
we are talking about here is articulated in the moral subject’s ability to 
offer reasons for why something is right to do and make these his or her 
own.498 Thus, both Kohlberg (and even more so, Habermas) make a case 
for morality as rooted in cognitive considerations where the reasons given 
for an action or a judgment are what constitutes its content. Moral emo-
tivism is ruled out at this stage.499 So are contextual and relational ele-
ments. The universal approach here focuses instead on increased sense for 
non-partiality, reversibility, and mutuality. Thus, it leads to insights into 
498 Cf. again Deigh’s distinction between ownership and authorship, which seems relevant here as 
well: post-conventional morality focuses on actions that can be owned by the person performing 
them. 
499 Cf. Habermas, Moralbewusstsein Und Kommunikatives Handeln, 46, 130ff. 
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the conditions for just ways of acting and for assessing conflicts related 
to moral questions. One acquires moral competence by being confronted 
with and challenged by moral questions and the need to handle them.500
Accordingly, the motivation for action is no longer to be found in “it 
is good for me/us,” but in a de-centered perspective that shapes how one 
considers the moral problems at hand and finds guidance for solving 
them. Instead of viewing moral challenges only based on one’s own con-
text, one relates them to principles that transcend the given life-world 
of those who participate in the discourse, and is thereby more inclusive, 
and can in no way be accused of being egocentric or group-centered, as 
in the previous levels of morality. Habermas summarizes the outcome as 
follows: 
Only at the postconventional stage is the social world uncoupled from the 
stream of cultural givens. This shift makes the autonomous justification of 
morality an unavoidable problem. The very perspectives that make consensus 
possible are now at issue. Independently of contingent commonalities of so-
cial background, political affiliation, cultural heritage, traditional forms of life, 
and so on, competent actors can now take a moral point of view, a point of 
view distanced from the controversy, only if they cannot avoid accepting that 
point of view even when their value orientations diverge. With this concept 
of autonomy, the notion of the capacity for responsible action also changes. 
Responsibility becomes a special case of accountability, the latter here meaning 
the orientation of action toward an agreement that is rationally motivated and 
conceived as universal: to act morally is to act on the basis of insight.501 
Thus, Habermas develops an understanding of morality that de-situ-
ates it from the context that is the foundation for moral judgment. He 
also decreases the impact that emotions, which are always expressed in 
specific relations, have on moral formation. The actual social conditions 
thereby become neutralized, at least to some extent, and do not play a 
formative role in the deliberative process that shapes moral agency. 
Consequently, shame is rendered little impact and no role at the level 
500 Ibid., 136. 
501 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 162. 
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of post-conventional morality. One may ask, though, if this is not a rel-
atively ideal conception of moral agency, and one which is not among 
those that are empirically easiest to detect. At the other levels of morality, 
that take more into account the actual context in which moral percep-
tions are shaped and formed, though, shame still may play a considerable 
role. Perhaps not so much in terms of providing insight into the reasons 
for acting, as in other modes of motivation for moral agency. Let us con-
sider these in turn: 
Shame at the pre-conventional level of morality
At the pre-conventional level, shame can play the role of making sure that 
one is obedient to others and complies with their expectations. We are 
then speaking more about disciplining than about morality in the quali-
fied sense. Here, shame mainly functions as an instrument for disciplin-
ing, as one may wish to avoid the painful experiences of feeling shame for 
something one has done or plans to do. Furthermore, one can feel shame 
for being punished for showing a lack of obedience. Shame, accordingly, 
plays the role of a regulator in the close interaction between the agent and 
his or her peers. However, the agent may not have any insight into why 
something is right or wrong – only into what is shameful behavior and 
what is not. Against the backdrop of this insight, he or she may regulate 
his or her actions to avoid shame. The egocentric and context-bound per-
spective is hardly transcended. Shame remains either a predominantly 
backward-looking emotion, as it functions as a reaction to acts already 
done, or as a deterrent mechanism for future actions. In both cases, the 
behavior is regulated by relationships with actual others, and no real 
moral autonomy is possible here. 
Shame at the level of conventional morality
At the conventional level, moral motivation is related closely to the indi-
vidual’s ability to meet and conform to or comply with the expectations 
of the society of which he or she is a part. He or she can adopt the rules 
of society as his or her own, and therefore also act with a certain amount 
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of autonomy. However, the risk for shame is great at this level because the 
individual is always related to the opinions and norms of others in the 
performance of his or her agency. Hence, the clash of contexts of agency 
lurks here. He or she may realize that he or she is not facing up to the 
standards they represent or the normative components that he or she, as 
a member of the same group, has adopted for him or herself. Shame may 
occur whenever compliance is not realized, either because one becomes 
aware of this lack, or because someone else tells you. The interruption 
that this manifestation of lack represents disturbs the intended coherence 
of agency as hitherto performed. 
Since the interests of the individual as a member of the group are 
in focus, shame can play an essential role in securing conformity and 
compliance without any significant development of insight into why 
something is good or not. Thus, conformity does not necessarily equal 
morality. The most vivid example of this are the ideals for cooperation 
and loyalty that we find in a mafia context. Other examples are, for exam-
ple, how daughters are told to behave in a specific manner in order not to 
bring shame over the family or clan without learning about why this is so 
or why compliance is necessary. Thus, shame may impact agency in ways 
that restrict personal autonomy or obliterate it altogether. 
Habermas nevertheless does not reject altogether that contextual con-
siderations can have a role in the development of moral competence. 
But his understanding of this development implies that it is necessary to 
make sure that the individual is given access to resources that allow him 
or her to question legitimately, and eventually also transcend, contex-
tually given norms and expectations, and to do so by means of insights 
that he or she has had the chance to develop autonomously. Thus, the 
mechanisms that most strongly engender shame are not among those he 
considers as beneficial for moral development. One needs to base moral 
development on a mode of practical reasoning that is rooted in reason, 
and not in the emotions. 
Against this backdrop, Habermas makes a distinction between moral 
and ethical modes of practical reasoning. Ethical reasoning, he holds, is 
related to questions about the good life for the individual. In this context, 
Habermas uses Charles Taylor’s notion about strong preferences, which 
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is not about arbitrary dispositions, but about basic traits in a person’s 
self-understanding, character, and identity.502 To address questions about 
the good life, the individual must thematize his or her own identity and 
make him or herself and not only his or her agency a theme for reflection. 
This existential self-understanding has a strong evaluative component 
based on both adopted ideals and on the experiences contained in one’s 
life-history. Thus, it contributes main elements in what we can identify 
as the components in the individual’s context of agency, and also to what 
constitutes the architecture of the moral self. It can also imply a critical 
evaluation of the processes and values that have resulted in his or her 
actual identity: 
Hence, the clarification of one’s self-[…] calls for an appropriative form of un-
derstanding – the appropriation of one’s own life history and the traditions 
and circumstances of life that have shaped one’s process of development. […]. 
Bringing one’s life history and its normative context to awareness in a critical 
manner does not lead to a value-neutral self-understanding; rather, the her-
meneutically generated self-description is logically contingent upon a critical 
relation to self.503 
This understanding is notable for its relevance to how we have previously 
described shame as the result of interruption of intentions and the con-
comitant invested desire that emerges out of the individual’s context of 
agency when it clashes with a different (perceived, imagined or real) oth-
er-based context of agency (which includes different ideals, values, norms, 
etc.). Habermas seems to presuppose that the thematization of coherence, 
unity, and integrity of a given life and its accompanying agency should 
be understood as an ethical question. It entails that the moral self-evalu-
ation that considers one’s goals in life, what constitutes a good life, one’s 
achievements, etc., is of crucial importance for the development of a 
person’s self-understanding and the direction and the ordering of his or 
her desires and aims. The stronger one’s moral subjectivity is shaped by 
502 Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1993), 4f.
503 Ibid., 5. 
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the values and aims that have led to one’s understanding of what a good 
life is, the greater is the risk of experiencing shame if these ideals are 
rejected, and their pursuit is interrupted in a way that feels convincing 
for the subject. In this case, others may very well be within the context 
of consideration as well, since these questions are about the aim of one’s 
life.504 Nevertheless, the questioning of one’s own, or the group’s form of 
life, and to what extent it is built on acceptable ideals, requires a mode of 
reasoning that goes beyond the mere feeling of shame. Shame itself can-
not contribute significantly to solving questions about the good life in a 
viable, lasting, and coherent manner. 
Accordingly, ethical questions represent a level of reflection that can be 
developed into more moral questions when the answers to these are ques-
tioned from a more external and universal perspective. The increasing 
levels of moral considerations and argumentation seem to make shame 
redundant as a resource in personal moral development. Given the con-
siderations so far, there seem to be strong reasons for being critical of 
the role that shame plays in a moral context. However, there are recent 
attempts to rehabilitate shame’s role in moral contexts that merit further 
attention before we can draw any such conclusion. To one of these contri-
butions, we turn now. 
Defending shame: Resources
Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni: Shame defended  
as morally relevant 
In their thoroughly argued book In Defense of Shame, Deonnai et al. 
make a strong case for the rehabilitation of shame as morally relevant. 
The definition that their defense relies on can help us understand further 
some of the features related to shame in a moral context. Deonna et al. 
nevertheless acknowledge the ambiguous evaluation of shame in rela-
tion to morality: Some see it, they argue, as “a central tool for navigating 
successfully within our moral environment; at other times, it is taken, 
504 Cf. Habermas, Erläuterungen Zur Diskursethik, 1. Aufl. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 
105.
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rather, to be a morally suspicious emotion that we should do our utmost 
to rid ourselves of.”505 Tacitly, they also point to what we have called the 
backward-looking character of shame, since it is the negative emotional 
evaluation of our past traits or actions that may justify a negative evalua-
tion of ourselves as unworthy, as degraded, or as exhibiting an unwanted 
identity.506
Deonna et al. see emotions in general as morally relevant if they can be 
determined to be morally good or bad, or if the motivations they embody 
are distinctively moral. This qualification implies that shame cannot be 
understood as potentially moral apart from the themes or formal objects 
it relates to, or, in our words, how it is related to our intentions and desires. 
Shame needs to be related to moral objects and our eventual failure in 
achieving them if it is to work in a moral context. Thus, “it is not neces-
sary to possess an already established conception of the moral good to 
reflect on the relations between emotions and morality. For, rather than 
enquiring into whether an emotion is intrinsically or extrinsically mor-
ally good or bad, we may wonder whether it qualifies as morally relevant 
or irrelevant,” they hold.507
The distinction between morally relevant and irrelevant emotions 
implies that they can “count as morally relevant when the motivations 
they embody satisfy constraints we are familiar with from more classic 
ways of conducting ethical discourse.”508 Thus, shame becomes morally 
relevant if the reasons for it can be part of a moral discourse that offers 
reasons for acting in this or that way.509 Accordingly, shame offers moral 
guidance only when it is made transparent by a cognitive investment that 
can justify this function. Emotions are sensitive to reasons and, thus, 
potentially sensitive to moral reasons. Shame as “an emotion is morally 
relevant when the values in terms of which its evaluation proceeds are 
moral values.”510 Thus, they suggest that shame can have some cognitive 
505 Deonna et al., In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 4. 
506 Cf. ibid., 7. 
507 Ibid., 14. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Ibid., 14–15. 
510 Ibid., 15. 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   285 2/25/2021   4:38:44 PM
c h a p t e r  6
286
content – a point that is not without relevance if shame is related to moral 
agency as defined in the introduction to this chapter. 
Against the two dogmas
Deonna et al. devote a considerable amount of space in their book to 
argue against two dogmas that they think are misleading and which lead 
to a rejection of shame as a moral phenomenon. The first dogma they call 
shame socialism, which implies that the view of others on oneself fun-
damentally conditions shame.511 As such, it implies a moral heteronomy 
that should be avoided, and accordingly, it cannot be an acceptable basis 
for morality. The second dogma says that shame is morally bad because 
it is associated with other feelings that we usually consider as having a 
negative value. According to this view, shame correlates with a variety 
of insidious emotional conditions and action tendencies (such as aggres-
sion). From this perspective, shame promotes self-destructive attitudes 
and leads to anti-social behavior. Consequently, it should be avoided.512
Deonna et al.’s definition of shame identifies it as “the subject’s painful 
sense of her own incapacity to live up to, even minimally, the demands 
consubstantial with one or some of the values she is attached to. This ver-
dict of incapacity captures the distinctive sense in which an individual’s 
identity is shaken in shame.”513 The strength of this definition is that it 
relates shame to identity and the sense of self, or to the overall archi-
tecture of the self, and that is, we agree, crucial for moral concerns, as 
moral agency requires the ability to identify (with) some values on which 
one can act. It is also in consonance with our initial definition of shame 
occurring as a response when one’s agency is interrupted (be it by one’s 
realization of incapacity or the judgment of others). Furthermore, their 
definition also uses a metaphor we can relate to: shame is shaking, some-
times it even shatters or dissolves the (sense of) self. They hold that: 
511 Note how this “other-based” understanding of shame in a moral context runs counter to the un-
derstanding of morality that is based in autonomous acceptance of norms and ideals, as defined 
in the introduction to this chapter. 
512 Cf. the connection between shame, low self-esteem, and narcissistic rage, as described in the 
previous chapter on shame and psychology. 
513 Ibid., 98. 
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In shame, we take it that we exemplify a specific disvalue that strikes us as an 
indication of our incapacity to exemplify a self-relevant value even to a mini-
mal degree. This experience of incapacity, although circumscribed to the value 
undermined in the circumstances, affects the self in a way. Our identity being 
constituted by the values to which we are attached, it is shaken precisely insofar 
as we experience our inability to honor even minimally the demands that go 
with this value.514 
If we relate this definition to our previously established understanding 
of shame as resulting from the interruption of the intended projects of 
the self, as these projects are shaped and guided by values that we are 
attached to, Deonna et al.’s definition of shame in relation to moral-
ity makes sense. Mostly, shame is not a tangential experience, but one 
that involves the self – be it in a global sense or in a more restricted 
one. Shame is, therefore, more than an unfavorable construal of ourselves. 
It is sometimes “a verdict of unworthiness that has an all-or-nothing 
character.”515 However, occasionally we may also “feel shame in connec-
tion with values we hold only peripherally.” Then, the all-encompassing 
negative judgment about ourselves does not apply.516 Nevertheless, they 
emphasize that severe evaluation is present in shame. But they also argue 
that one needs to distinguish between the evaluation component in 
shame and the object dimension. Sometimes these two components can 
be separated and sometimes not. For example, they are combined when 
shame manifests an identity we do not want.517 Accordingly, for Deonna 
et al., “a full and ambitious account of shame” […] has to portray this 
emotion as a negative evaluation of the self that is severe but does not 
have an all-encompassing character.”518 
Furthermore, Deonna et al.’s definition of shame is pluralist and they 
can therefore identify how shame presents itself in a wide variety of con-
texts and different forms. Accordingly, the values that result in shame 
514 Ibid., 122.
515 For a critical discussion of the relation between shame and decrease in perceived self-worth, cf. 
Deigh, “Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique.”
516 Deonna et al., In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 98–99. 
517 Ibid., 77. 
518 Ibid., 99. 
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can be of different kinds: “Shame can arise as much in connection with 
the values manifested by an individual’s pudeur as with those manifested 
by his dignity, decency, or integrity.”519 Or, as they write later on, “what 
matters for shame within the present proposal is the attachment we have 
with respect to each and every value we care personally to exemplify. 
These might belong to any family of values, among which we can count 
moral, sexual, aesthetic, political, cultural, and intellectual values, as well 
as those values having to do with one’s public image.”520 Thus, shame can 
be conditioned by a multitude of factors or elements, among which not all 
have to be strictly moral in content but all of which contain some value or 
evaluative component. 
There are several preconditions for the experience of moral shame, and 
Deonna et al. list them in the following sequence:521 
1. A subject must be complex enough to be attached to values. 
2. She must furthermore be attached to self-relevant values – that is, 
values that she takes as imposing practical demands on her.
3. She must have the following discriminatory ability: she must be 
sensitive to the fact that she may fare more or less well in regard to 
the demands these values impose on her.
Given these preconditions, the subject will feel shame if, and only if, these 
conditions are met:
1. She comes to take a trait or an action of hers to exemplify the polar 
opposite of a self-relevant value.
2. She apprehends this opposition as indicating a distinctive incapac-
ity with respect to the demands of this particular value.
3. This incapacity is distinctive in the sense that it consists in the inca-
pacity to exemplify, even minimally, the value in question.522 
519 Ibid., 75.
520 Ibid., 118. 
521 Cf. our definition of morality above, p. 271.
522 Deonna et al., In Defense of Shame, 102–103. Our italics. 
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We find it notable that this description of the conditions for shame in 
a moral context contributes to our underscoring of shame as the result 
of interrupted agency. On their part, and given this account of shame, 
Deonna et al. argue in the following way against the two “dogmas” they 
find prevalent in the recent literature on shame: 
Against the socialism position, they hold that the relevant values for 
the constitution of shame need not have to do with our social standing, 
or with the invasion of our privacy. It is only some types of shame that are 
elicited thus, and they should be distinguished from other types of shame. 
In moral matters, “the role of others […] is most of the time confined to 
triggering our realization that we are or have behaved in a way that is 
below the threshold of what we personally deem acceptable.”523 Therefore, 
shame does not always require the subject to take the perspective of oth-
ers upon what he or she is or does. Furthermore, they argue that “shame 
is social when, and only when, it construes the self-relevant values of rep-
utation or privacy as under threat or as out of our control.”524 Far from 
all shame involves such evaluation, though. Therefore, they suggest dis-
tinguishing between social and personal shame: “Shame is social when 
the self-relevant values concern the way we appear to others; it is per-
sonal when the self-relevant value has nothing to do with appearances.”525 
In other words, shame in the context of morality is not always a social 
emotion or one that needs a social context to appear. 
The distinction that Deonna et al. establish between social and personal 
shame sustains their argument “that cases of social shame so defined are 
not coextensive with cases of public shame – shame occurring in the con-
text of a real or imagined audience – but can also occur in connection 
with solitary shame – when the emotion is experienced in the absence of 
any public, real or imagined.”526 Thus, they distinguish between personal 
and social shame. This distinction makes it possible for them to claim 
that personal shame often occurs in front of, and because of, others, who 
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done or who he or she is. However, such instances need not have anything 
to do with the features that usually are seen as connected to social shame, 
such as threats to reputation or failure to control what should be kept 
private.527 
As we have seen, according to Deonna et al., personal shame results 
from the individual’s negative assessment of themselves in the light of 
the values with which they identify. Shame thus tells them that, in some 
sense, their identity project and/or the intentions of their agency have 
failed. Again, we note how this is in accordance with what we have pre-
viously sketched about shame. It is notable that shame in this sense is not 
necessarily the result of heteronomy, nor the result of non-transparent 
evaluations.528 It may be caused by some lack of control over the condi-
tions for agency, though. 
Turning then to what may be the content of social shame, Deonna 
et al. identify three main features, among which only one of them (and 
one that has already been mentioned) seems to make shame problem-
atic from a moral point of view: shame is properly social when the self- 
relevant values of reputation or privacy are at stake. However, it is hardly 
the case that all instances are morally relevant in which this is the case. 
Even though shame is social in such contexts, it is not the same as saying 
that this shame has moral content or implications. 
Furthermore, shame is social because “we learn in situ and in contact 
with others about those circumstances that merit shame.”529 However, 
shame is not the only emotion that falls into this category. Concerning 
moral values, this only tells us that values “are singled out in specific 
527 Ibid.
528 The point that shame does not compromise moral autonomy is also argued strongly by Fabrice 
Teroni and Otto Bruun in “Shame, Guilt and Morality,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2011). 
However, there as well, the understanding of shame as productive and resting on personal moral 
convictions tends to overlook the complexity of interrelations between selves and others. Dan 
Zahavi comments on this position, and argues that it “mainly targets highly elaborate, self-di-
rected judgmental forms of shame.” Therefore, it is cognitively demanding, and accordingly, it 
“would rule out not only something like pre-reflective shame, but also anything like infantile 
shame. Another worry might be that shame is less about one’s failure to exemplify a self-relevant 
value than it is about exemplifying a self-relevant defect; that is, what is shame-inducing is not 
the distance from an ideal self but the closeness to an undesired self.” See Zahavi, Self and Other: 
Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame, 220.
529 Deonna et al., In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, 152. 
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social and historical settings” and that we “find in shame an especially 
powerful tool for their inculcation.”530 Thus, Deonna et al. seem to con-
sider shame more relevant for disciplining than for moral teaching, but 
we would argue that in itself, it does not mean that it is any more morally 
qualified than, for example, fear. 
Shame triggered by the attitudes of others (“public shame”) need not 
have an undisputed moral function. We may also feel shame when no 
one makes us fear for our reputations or makes salient our lack of control 
over what we think should be kept private. Deonna et al. hold that others 
are ancillary to the shame we feel in such cases, and they put forward the 
strong claim that shame is never heteronomous. Interaction with others 
is, nevertheless, often required for us to realize the full extent of our moral 
shortcomings. They can draw our attention to our theoretical or practical 
blind spots. “Because we take autonomously the insights of some of these 
others to be authoritative, they may contribute to correcting, refining, or 
enlightening our moral sensitivity. For this reason, shame may constitute 
a privileged route to moral progress.”531 This point we aim to discuss fur-
ther below, not least because it seems to run the risk of oversimplifying 
cases where we feel ashamed because of the appeal of others, and despite 
ourselves being convinced that we are acting in a morally justified way. 
Despite their strong argument for shame as a potentially moral emo-
tion, Deonna et al. claim that it makes little sense to speak abstractly about 
shame as morally good or bad. There is “ample reason to conclude that the 
moral character of shame will be a function of the particular value attach-
ments it manifests and which it is likely to further promote.” They continue: 
This shows that shame not only need not be morally ugly but that it can also be 
morally beautiful. This beauty is admittedly fragile, since it can easily succumb 
to two great evils: shame is potentially informed by ugly values (e.g., concern 
with appearances fostering servile conformity) and, when felt chronically and 
irrationally, potentially destructive for both the individual and those close to 
him. This, we submit, is the source of the diverging diagnoses about shame.532
530 Ibid., 152.
531 Ibid., 152–153. 
532 Ibid., 183. 
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Deonna et al. suggest that shame may compare favorably with guilt 
because shame is associated with shortcomings that cannot be captured in 
terms of right or wrong action, and therefore requires a deeper self-aware-
ness. In other words, shame may contribute to ground moral values more 
profoundly in the moral subject. Because shame is a response to defi-
ciencies concerning the moral virtues, it does not undermine morality, 
but “serves to place our moral concerns within the broader context of 
our general interests and values,” they argue.533 Thus, they see shame as 
playing a potential role in moral formation that is much in consonance 
with what we briefly described above in relation to virtue ethics. Shame 
as a phenomenon in the overall architecture of the moral self serves the 
internalization of virtues. Then the question is, what kind of moral sub-
ject does one become when shame is given this role? If the development 
of virtues employing shame instead of moral insight emerging out of 
deliberative reasoning takes place, what kind of relationships does that 
engender between the potentially virtuous moral agent and their peers? 
J. C. Manion: The possibility of determining  
the moral relevance of shame 
The arguments
We saw in the chapter on shame and psychology that Martha Nussbaum 
worked hard in order to identify to what extent it is possible to ascribe 
a positive function to shame. Her conclusion is that such possibilities 
exist only to a limited extent. Other philosophers seem to come to much 
the same conclusion. Jennifer C. Manion’s article “The Moral Relevance 
of Shame” illustrates this point.534 She argues that shame can “play an 
important positive role for the ashamed person despite its negative and 
potentially debilitating effects.”535 The italicization of words in the quoted 
sentence intends to show the ambiguity that she thereby admits that 
shame has. The quote also signals the challenge present when shame is 
533 Ibid., 184. 
534 See Jennifer C. Manion, “The Moral Relevance of Shame,” American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 
no. 1 (2002).
535 Ibid., 73. 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   292 2/25/2021   4:38:45 PM
s h a m e  a n d  m o r a l i t y
293
identified as playing an important positive role, despite its debilitating 
effects.536 Accordingly, it is crucial to look into her contribution in detail. 
Manion’s intention in rehabilitating shame’s moral relevance cen-
ters around two main elements: first, she thinks that negative accounts 
of shame underestimate and misdescribe its motivating power. Second, 
shame represents a possibility for self-reflection that can “motivate an 
agent to seek a (re)considered moral identity and a closer approximation 
to an improved and improving moral ideal.”537 
Manion holds that not all instances of shame are morally relevant. 
Shame has a broader scope than that which is relevant for morality. 
Accordingly, one must account for when it is morally relevant and when 
it is not. One strategy for identifying the moral relevance of shame would 
be to say that it must be based on traits, acts, or features in a person 
that are under their control and which they can, therefore, correct or 
adjust.538 This strategy makes shame morally relevant when it is related 
to the capacity for agency, which, on its part, can be assessed in relation 
to specific values or norms. Nevertheless, in Manion’s view, shame is not 
only related to acts, but also to who the moral person is.539 In that regard, 
shame’s moral relevance points us to a notion of morality we find in vir-
tue ethics, insofar as this position in moral philosophy underscores the 
formation of a person’s moral character and abilities, and not only acts or 
their outcome. 
Against this backdrop, Manion defines moral shame as “shame precip-
itated by some moral lapse, failure or omission that results in an agent’s 
disappointment in aspects of her own moral character over which she has 
some significant control.”540 Thus, it is primarily an experience of fail-
ure to meet one’s moral ideals. Manion’s emphasis on disappointment is 
interesting to note since she thereby points to how it can be merged with 
536 Manion seems quite aware of the challenge she has put before herself: She sees shame as a “sig-
nificant blow to the self. If shame is therefore to be recommended as beneficial for the person 
experiencing it, this blow cannot be devastating to a person’s moral character or agency. Any 
good that shame serves must counteract its negative repercussions. Shame must produce a cer-
tain good especially well.” Ibid., 78. 
537 Ibid., 73. 
538 Ibid., 75. 
539 Ibid., 76. 
540 Ibid., 77. 
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the emotion of shame. We would nevertheless argue that disappointment 
need not be a consequence of moral shame. 
Shame may also work against moral motivation, either because it 
erodes one’s confidence in one’s own potential for moral agency, or 
because it causes outright immoral behavior, be it rage against others or 
more self-absorption or isolation.541 On the positive side, though, is its 
capacity to motivate improvement: we can ease the discomfort of being 
shamed by trying to prove to ourselves that what we are ashamed of is 
not an irreparable trait in us. “We can and do seek our own approval and 
to reaffirm our goodness in our own eyes constitutes one aspect of moral 
integrity.” Thus, it can lead to an improvement in our moral character, 
Manion claims.542
If we read this against the backdrop of our previous analysis of Kohlberg 
and Habermas, Manion’s reasoning at this point presents us with a prob-
lem. If we act morally because our motivation to do so is that it eases our 
discomfort in feeling shame, we find ourselves at the pre-conventional or 
conventional stage of morality. It is pre-conventional because the motiva-
tion is the desire to avoid discomfort and conventional in terms of trying 
to look good in our own eyes again as measured by the standard of conven-
tional morals. In other words, insofar as the overcoming of shame is not 
morally motivated, shame also does not seem to motivate actions based 
on moral insight. Instead, the morally relevant function, which appears 
as secondary, emerges from one’s concerns regarding oneself or oneself 
in a social context of expectations, conventions, and assessments. Thus, 
Manion’s argument for the moral significance of shame rests on the levels 
of morality in which communal and relational elements play a significant 
role, and in which moral insights may not contribute significantly to the 
development of a mature moral subjectivity. However, that does not imply 
that such secondary functions cannot contribute morally to society. In a 
less than perfect world, there will always be people who are morally imma-
ture and that may be tempted to pursue their own immoral desires that 
will put vulnerable others at risk. Thus, even at a pre-conventional level 
541 Cf. ibid., 80. 
542 Ibid., 81. 
Shame’s Unwelcome Interruption and Responsive Movements_V3.indd   294 2/25/2021   4:38:45 PM
s h a m e  a n d  m o r a l i t y
295
shame may serve as a morally protective bulwark against immoral desires 
and actions.
Evaluation
Manion is right in arguing that shame may sometimes contribute to our 
awareness of values and how we function in a social setting. Shame’s dis-
ruptive character may provide us with new assessments of our expec-
tations and capacities and put “a sudden halt to any unquestioning 
operations of the self.” Thus, it provides the opportunity for self-doubt, 
and “it is precisely because of this feature [self-doubt] that shame is a 
potentially valuable moral emotion.”543 Its moral value lies in its ability to 
question our moral identity or character. As a consequence, we may be 
able to shape new and better ideals of who we can still be in the future. 
Manion may be right in arguing this, but we would still like to ask: at 
what cost? Is not the risk in employing shame as the primary motivator 
for moral formation that one loses sight of the necessity of building moral 
character on moral insight about what is right and good to do, and not 
on the need for overcoming the negative emotion of shame that emerges 
out of one’s former conduct? We can push this critical question even fur-
ther by addressing the conclusion in Manion’s discussion of the positive 
contributions of shame to morality. She writes, “Because it requires an 
evaluation of core aspects of the self and not simply one’s isolated actions, 
moral shame is more likely to encourage deep, significant transforma-
tions of moral character than are guilt feelings.”544 Given the ambiguities 
of shame’s function in the context of morality, to which Manion herself 
testifies, one can ask if shame can contribute to profound moral transfor-
mation. We would argue that shame in itself offers no necessary or valid 
moral insight, although it may occasionally mediate it. Thus, shame may 
continue to hold the moral self captive in unfavorable conditions, instead 
of contributing to the liberation of its moral potential. Against this back-
drop, we acknowledge that it can also motivate the moral subject to move 
543 Ibid., 83. In these lines of reasoning, she bases her reflections on the analyses of both J. Rawls and 
G. Taylor. 
544 Ibid., 84. 
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away from the morally problematic situation. In such cases, it mediates a 
morally relevant transformation.545 
Support for morality? Pattison on shame
Arguments
Among the risks of employing shame in the context of morality is that 
it makes the shame-experiencing individual self-occupied or too self- 
absorbed to achieve the necessary distance and clarity that can lead 
to genuine moral insight and assess the moral challenges in ways that 
are not conditioned by the agent’s concerns for him or herself. But as 
suggested at the end of the previous section, shame may also be a push 
towards employing other elements in the architecture of the self, which 
may lead to a transformation of the self ’s conditions for agency. Fur-
thermore, moral insight at the post-conventional level relies on autono-
mous considerations and reasoning. In the chapter about psychology and 
shame, we pointed to how important it is that the self is provided with 
opportunities to develop emotional self-reliance in its relation to others 
to avoid being prone to shame. Accordingly, the need for some indepen-
dence from others is not necessary only to develop genuine moral insight 
but is also needed to develop a capacity to resist the influence of shaming, 
especially when it is not, or should not be, morally relevant. 
We are not referring here to self-reliance understood as a mode of 
total independence from others. We find such ideas about indepen-
dence in modern forms of individualism. Instead, we argue in favor of 
an independence or self-reliance that can recognize interrelations and 
dependencies as the flip side of our differentiation from others. Such dif-
ferentiation implies that one can model the relationship with others along 
the same lines as a mature relationship between a parent and a child: as a 
545 The critical point made here can be developed further in light of the comment made by Rom 
Harré and W. Gerrod Parrott in The Emotions: Social, Cultural and Biological Dimensions (Lon-
don; Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996), 8: “Shame, to return to a point made by Gabrielle 
Taylor, limits the shamed person’s motives to make things right. The shamed person in effect 
must accept a debased self as congruent with the wrongful action, and is motivated not so much 
to compensate for the action as to withdraw from public scorn.”
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relationship marked by increasing differentiation, and by a growing level 
of trust in oneself, as well as the recognition of the importance of the 
other for becoming oneself. Under such conditions, the self can receive 
the necessary affirmation and recognition to create the fundamental con-
ditions for self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem. 
These considerations may also be developed further in light of the dif-
ference between guilt, feelings of guilt and shame that we presented ear-
lier. In contrast to feelings of guilt, from which the self can differentiate 
itself and to which the self can relate in a transparent manner once the 
distinction between action and agent is learned, shame has a different 
status. Stephen Pattison speaks about the tendency for shame to take over 
the self, and underscores the pre-subjective status it sometimes has. One 
can feel guilty and still maintain a sense of self-esteem, even to the extent 
that one can admit to being guilty of a particular action without feeling 
disparaged by the reactions of others. Shame does not make this possible 
in the same way.546 It is, therefore, of the utmost importance to be able to 
differentiate between feelings of guilt and shame and to acknowledge that 
the two may not operate according to the same kind of logic. However, 
they may be more intertwined than is often recognized.547 
Furthermore, Pattison points to an essential element in the relation-
ship between shame and morality that may help us to see problematic 
and even pathological traits in the way in which shame conditions (or 
fails to condition) human agency. He asserts that humans suffering 
from pathological shame (shame that has an enduring negative effect on 
self-esteem, social interaction, and capacities for agency) are often not 
part of the moral community or lack the necessary competence to be 
546 For further elaborations on this distinction, see Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 43f. 
547 Cf. Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, 361: “In guilt, one typically ac-
knowledges that one has done (or intended) something wrong. In shame, one acknowledges 
that one is something inferior, falling short of some desired ideal. The natural reflex of guilt is 
apology and reparation; the natural reflex of shame is hiding. And while guilt typically suggests 
a constructive future – making reparations, not doing that sort of bad thing again – shame often 
offers no constructive advice. Sometimes one can resolve to correct a perceived inadequacy, but 
often what one is asked to blush for is an ineradicable part of what and who one is. Because 
shame pertains to any ideal, social or personal, it is a mistake to think that it is entirely a public 
or social emotion.” 
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genuinely moral.548 We find it is important to underscore that this is not 
the case for everyone that suffers from such shame. Some may also use 
morality and moral action to overcome the enduring feeling of shame 
and to regain their experience of being part of a community. Remaining a 
moral person despite suffering from pathological shame can be extremely 
important. It may well be what makes them still able to hold on to some 
self-esteem and dignity. Thus, what Pattison does not take sufficiently 
into consideration is that chronic shame does not need to invade all parts 
of human agency. 
However, when shame has the effect that people become “trapped in 
themselves” in ways that cut them off from genuine relationships with 
others, morality becomes a challenge. Although they may have a strong 
sense of other people’s opinions and even be supersensitive about the 
effect of other people’s attitudes and actions upon themselves, they are 
not “other-regarding and moral in the sense of being able to take properly 
defined and limited responsibility for their own actions and then being 
able to execute them,” writes Pattison, who sees them as being in a pre-so-
cial and pre-moral state.549 We underscore that he says this about people 
who suffer from pathological shame – and not those who may occasion-
ally experience shame in relations or because of what they do.550 We nev-
ertheless find that his generic statements about this condition seem to 
render those who suffer from pathological shame with fewer resources for 
morality. However, such statements consider neither specific individuals 
nor the fact that specific contexts may add to the burden on those who are 
fighting for their decency in a situation of pathological shame. A survivor 
548 He is not alone in this – the incapacitation of the self by shame when it comes to social interac-
tion is pointed to throughout much of the literature. 
549 Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 123f. Cf. Brené Brown’s observation in I Thought It 
Was Just Me: Women Reclaiming Power and Courage in a Culture of Shame (New York: Gotham 
Books, 2007), about how shame is highly correlated with addiction, depression, violence, aggres-
sion, bullying, suicide, and eating-disorders, whereas guilt is inversely correlated with these. 
550 Nevertheless, shame’s complexity with regard to its impact on morality in general should not be 
ignored. Research suggests that people who score high on shame-proneness will be more likely 
to engage in unethical behaviors. Furthermore, also people with low self-control have difficul-
ty foreseeing the longer term consequences of their actions, which when combined with high 
shame-proneness, may make unethical actions more likely. See Steven Murphy and Sandra Kif-
fin-Petersen, “The Exposed Self: A Multilevel Model of Shame and Ethical Behavior,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 141, no. 4 (2017), 664. 
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of child sexual abuse may struggle with such shame. Regaining or hold-
ing onto their other-oriented morality by pursuing moral goals may pro-
vide a much-needed confirmation that not all is broken. So, even though 
there is a self-affirming element to this, it does not exclude the true moral 
value of both deliberation and action. This self-affirming element does 
not have to differ, at least not in principle, from the self-affirming element 
present in any moral other-oriented deliberation and action.
Based on his critical assessment of pathological shame-carriers’ 
capacity for moral responsibility, Pattison concludes that shame is not 
a particularly useful tool for morality. From his point of view, shame 
produces humans who are under the risk of being unable to act entirely 
as moral agents.551 To the extent that shame is used as a mechanism for 
discipline, its moral potential appears in a new light. Instead of being a 
useful tool for enforcing moral capacities, shame impedes these capaci-
ties, although it may look at first sight to be an effective and useful tool 
for discipline and control. Using shame for such purposes may, there-
fore, be counterproductive: it contributes to the dissolution of the moral 
self that it is intended to edify. This point is overlooked by both Deonna 
et al. and Manion in their attempts to rehabilitate shame’s contribu-
tion to morality. Nevertheless, we should not forget that sometimes it 
may mediate the need for transformation, or for regaining dignity and 
thereby indirectly serve moral purposes. 
Pattison identifies the problematic aspects of the moral uses of shame 
in how it makes people feel bad about who and what they are. Identity as 
a sinner or as morally pernicious is “a global judgment about the whole 
self as fundamentally bad, defective and worthy of rejection.” When, for 
example, religious moral teaching addresses shamed people who think 
like that about themselves, this teaching may achieve the opposite of 
what it is aiming at because it “maintains sinners rather than enhancing 
personal and social responsibility.”552
The recognition of the humanity of people and their moral standing 
are closely linked to concepts about humanity. In Pattison’s view, shame 
551 Cf. Pattison, Shame: Theory, Therapy, Theology, 126. 
552 Ibid., 266. Cf. our thoughts below about the necessity of paying attention to the distinction be-
tween the pre-subjective self and the active subject. 
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implies a potential impediment to the moral self since shame may imply 
a dehumanization of the self and defines the self in categories that do 
not involve oneself as a person, but define one in terms of abstract and 
pejorative characteristics. This concurs with what we saw previously in 
Cahill’s analysis of derivatization, and we will return to other aspects of 
the same feature below when we look at Thomason’s understanding of 
shame. A society that shames groups or individuals thus does not recog-
nize them as equals. Shaming may imply rejection and contribute to pro-
jecting images of others as enemies to be feared. Furthermore, those who 
are shamed may be “confined to a realm of wordless invisibility.” In this 
way, shame marks the bounds of the human community.553 This delinea-
tion represents in an almost violent manner the clash between contexts of 
agency, where the shameful is left as an outsider. 
Our initial reference to the “shameless Arabian daughters” is one 
prominent example of what is at stake here: when people act in ways not 
recognized as acceptable, they may be subjected to shaming that defines 
them as unclean. If I do this or that, I am unclean. If I have these thoughts 
or feelings, my feelings and thoughts are unclean. Hence, the employ-
ment of such notions in relation to shame makes it more challenging to 
differentiate acts from the self. Processes of differentiation/separation are 
blocked because the shaming notions are employed by those who have 
the power to define them.554 
The immense issues to which this may lead can be discerned by look-
ing at sexual emotions, which are deep and complicated elements of the 
human self. If such emotions are identified as unclean, part of the self 
may be perceived as unclean, and the problems related to this unclean-
ness may seem insurmountable.555 Furthermore, shame is often used to 
deliberately exploit the close relationship between identity and sexuality 
to control the sexuality of others. Since sexuality and sexual emotions, as 
pre-subjective, cannot be assessed as things that are only related to one’s 
own subjective choices, or considered as objects of one’s attitudes toward 
these emotions, the ability to separate oneself from them, or disown them 
553 Ibid., 183. 
554 Pattison Shame, 182f. 
555 Cf. the discussion of Eleanor Stump above, pp. 247ff.
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is limited.556 Accordingly, speaking of desire or thoughts or imaginings 
as clean or unclean may contribute to the enhancement of (the pathology 
of) shame, since it directly targets the source of agency in desire.557 
Violence as a response to shame compromises a 
moral definition of shame
Violence is among the problematic moral topics that humans face. It also 
presents us with some specific problems related to morality. Violence 
contributes to making problematic some of the prevalent definitions of 
shame, including those presented in this chapter as advocated by Deonna 
et al. and Manion (above) and Kekes (below). To discuss this problem 
further, we will take our point of departure in Krista Thomason’s critique 
of the definition of shame as the reaction when we fail to live up to stan-
dards, norms, or ideals, which we can call the standard moral definition 
of shame. Her critique aims to demonstrate that this definition is flawed. 
The reason for this claim is the empirical observation that agents often 
respond to shame with violence and aggression. However, to act violently 
is not an obvious or intelligent response to the painful feeling of failing 
to live up to an ideal. In other words, the standard moral definition of 
shame cannot explain why such reactions take place. Thomason, there-
fore, implicitly argues that we need a definition of shame that is not based 
exclusively on moral concepts but which nevertheless can allow us to 
address the morally problematic feature of violence as a reaction to moral 
failure. Her main claim is that “shame arises out of a tension between our 
identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feel shame 
are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception.”558 
556 Cf. Manion on moral shame as based on the capacity for agency, and Deigh’s differentiation 
between authorship and ownership.
557 If we link these points to the topic of the former chapter on religion, this is probably also why 
many homosexuals perceive strict religious positions on their sexuality to contain a double mes-
sage: on the one hand, they may be told that they are valuable as they are created in the image 
of God or fully equal with the rest of society whereas, on the other hand, when it comes to their 
sexual identity they are unclean and unworthy, and should be different. As we are speaking about 
layers of the self that are predominantly pre-subjective, this may cause a great deal of confusion, 
frustration, and anger.
558 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality,” 1. 
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Let us consider her position in more detail because it also presents us 
with opportunities for understanding more profoundly what we have 
spoken of as a clash between contexts of agency.559 
A philosophical account of moral emotions, among which shame is 
usually included, faces two challenges. The first challenge is to explain 
how the emotion has moral value and what role it plays in moral life. We 
have done some work previously in this chapter to clarify to what extent 
that is the case with shame. The other challenge is to provide a good con-
ceptual analysis of shame that can account for the way we actually expe-
rience it.560 This second challenge is not only philosophical, but empirical: 
a definition must make sense of the empirical data we have on shame. 
This last point is where the moral definition of shame fails, according to 
Thomason. She articulates the empirical falsification of the moral defini-
tion of shame as follows: 
If shame is the painful feeling of not living up to one’s values, it does not make 
sense that agents would respond to that feeling by doing something morally 
bad. What is more, doing something violent alleviates feelings of shame. If the 
traditional view is right, this experience is impossible: doing something morally 
wrong should make agents feel more shame rather than less.561 
Thomason refers to several literary examples in which people respond to 
shame by doing something violent to themselves or others. Now, since 
the moral definition sees shame as a painful response to the failure to 
embody the values we care about, the standard moral definition is chal-
lenged by such examples. According to it, shame should cause us to act 
with restraint. We have also seen above how Manion argues for shame as 
instigating self-improvement: the moral definition implies the expectation 
559 Another version of this section has previously been published as Jan-Olav Henriksen, “Violence, 
shame, and moral agency – An exploration of Krista K. Thomason’s position” in De Ethica, 2020. 
560 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality.” 2.
561 Ibid., 2. A precondition for this analysis should be noted: this analysis fits insofar as shame stands 
alone. However, shame, guilt, aggression, and striving for dignity may all be part of the emotional 
turmoil of chronic shame. Thus, studying shame as an empirical phenomenon also needs to take 
into consideration the fact that cause and effect, reasons and actions, are complex. This complex-
ity adds to the turmoil and is hard to make sense of. It is a complex relational social system where 
we can observe correlations without being able to separate one or the other empirically to test 
them against clear-cut definitions.
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that one attempts to overcome shame by living up to one’s ideals and val-
ues in the future. However, in the cases that Thomason describes, shame 
inspires the opposite of self-improvement. The standard moral definition 
of shame cannot explain this fact. Moreover, it also fails to address the 
fact that immoral acts can make those who experience shame feel better. 
In other words: immorality sometimes alleviates shame.562
Thomason presents several possible strategies that one can adopt to 
explain instances of alleviating shame by acts of immorality without hav-
ing to give up the moral definition. First, one can claim that shame is 
sometimes irrational, and accordingly, in exceptional cases, irrational-
ity serves as an explanation. Second, one can also argue that in some 
cases, shame is not adequately focused. It is properly focused when “(1) 
we hold ourselves responsible for our failure and (2) when the norm to 
which we respond is a legitimate one.”563 Third, irrational shame, defined 
as shame that leads to incomprehensible acts, can also be explained by 
Gabriele Taylor’s notion of “false shame,” which occurs when we have 
standards or norms imposed upon us for a brief period, and these are 
contrary to genuine shame, which is the moral kind that occurs when we 
fail to live up to our ideals.564 Finally, one can classify cases of reactive and 
immoral shame as those performed by shame-prone individuals with a 
maladaptive self-image, because “shame-prone individuals are more apt 
to respond with aggression than those who are not, but this is an issue 
with shame-proneness and not with shame.”565 
Thomason nevertheless finds no reason for comprehending violent 
responses to feelings of shame as irrational.566 That some shame-prone 
individuals respond to shame with aggression does not mean that anyone 
562 Ibid., 6. Cf. how the elements we described above on the transportation and transformation of 
shame (e.g. by blaming others, scapegoating, etc.) contribute to such immorality. 
563 Ibid., 7. 
564 Ibid., 7. The reference she uses here is to G. Taylor, “Shame, integrity, and self-respect.” In Dignity, 
Character, and Self-Respect, edited by Robin S. Dillon (New York: Routledge, 1995).
565 Thomason, ibid., 7. 
566 Cf. ibid., 7–8. She also points to how these approaches can in fact contribute further to shame, 
and to people feeling shame about feeling shame: These explanatory approaches “encourage us 
to find fault with ashamed people. Because the traditional way of understanding shame is about 
failing to live up to values, we are forced to claim that agents who experience shame about their 
faces have misguided values and false beliefs. A different account of shame could explain them 
in a way that does not require attributing mistaken values to agents who feel this way.” Ibid., 12. 
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who responds to shame with aggression is shame-prone. No empirical 
data suggests this to be the case, she claims.567 Thus, she rejects all the 
attempts to explain the link between shame and violent response within 
the frames of the moral definition. Accounts of shame based on this defi-
nition cannot explain why agents are tempted to respond to shame by 
doing something wrong.568 Her alternative account for the relationship 
between shame and violence widens the scope beyond shame caused by 
failure to achieve ideals and values. In our context, it is notable since it 
points to the broader conditions for agency, and to how shame may be a 
response to its interruption. 
According to Thomason, shame arises when we feel that some aspect of 
our identities defines us.569 She does not address in detail what causes this 
feeling, but according to the examples she offers, it is likely to think that 
they are the result of interpersonal exchange, and not only an intra-per-
sonal experience. It is the globalization of one aspect of us that comes to 
dominate our inner realm of experience. To make this definition work, 
she has to make a distinction between identity and self-conception: “those 
things about which we feel shame are part of our identities, but they are 
not part of our self-conception.” Thus, she contributes to nuancing the 
role of shame in what we have called the architecture of the self. The fol-
lowing example is an illustration: 
An agent feels shame when some aspect of her identity becomes prominent 
or revealed in the shameful moment and that she feels that this thing defines 
her as a whole. That is, in episodes of shame she feels defined by, reduced to, 
or totalized by some feature of herself. I take this defining feature of shame to 
be necessary rather than sufficient. In other words, someone may find herself 
in these circumstances and feel something other than shame. My contention is 
that when an agent reports feeling shame, this feature will be present in the ex-
perience. Similarly, if an agent does not yet feel shame, but fears it, it is because 
she fears that some aspect of herself will define her.570
567 Ibid., 8. 
568 Ibid., 10. 
569 Ibid., 2. 
570 Ibid., 11. 
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Accordingly, shame is the experience of feeling defined, reduced to, or 
totalized by some feature of ourselves.571 As mentioned, this view corre-
sponds to Cahill’s understanding of derivatization.572 Thus, experiences 
of shame involve a tension between our identity and our self-conception. 
A self-conception is our “self-image,” that is, “how we represent to our-
selves the person we take ourselves to be.” On the other hand, “our iden-
tities extend beyond what we represent to ourselves. An agent’s identity 
is who she is in a broader sense and can include things that fall outside of 
her self-conception.”573 
In this analysis, two elements are worth highlighting. First, the dis-
tinction between identity and self-conception sheds light on how shame 
results from what happens when two different contexts of agency clash, 
that is, when they do not complement each other but are in conflict. 
This conflict causes what we have called a disturbance of interruption 
of agency. Second, Thomason sheds light on Deigh’s distinction between 
authorship and ownership, because shame makes it impossible to disown 
the feature in question: Shame as “the result of our inability to disavow 
that aspect of ourselves by which we feel defined explains why shame 
makes us feel so powerless. The thing that causes me shame both over-
shadows me and yet is me.”574 The combination of these two aspects helps 
us to understand the complexity of shame. But she also provides us with 
additional insights into these complexities: 
The metaphor “overshadow” that Thomason uses can also be linked 
to our previously established notion of interruption, because Thoma-
son uses it in the characterization of shame as experiencing one’s lack 
of agential control over the feature that causes shame. “Shame arises in 
response to those aspects of ourselves over which we have very limited 
571 Ibid., 12.
572 Cf. above, pp. 188ff.
573 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality.” 12. Here, Thomason seems to build on G. Taylor 
when she speaks of the agent experiencing shame as “becoming aware of the discrepancy be-
tween her own assumption about her state or action and a possible detached observer-descrip-
tion of this state or action, and of her further being aware that she ought not to be in a position 
where she could be so seen, where such a description at least appears to fit.” See Taylor, Pride, 
Shame and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment, 66. 
574 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality,” 13.
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control.”575 It can be features related to our bodies, our intelligence, our 
grace (or lack thereof), our families, and our socioeconomic status, all of 
which are things over which we have little influence: “The shame that we 
feel about these aspects of our identities does not stem from the fact that 
we falsely believe we are responsible for them and thus failing to live up to 
ideals. It stems from the fact that they compete with our self-conception 
in comprising who we are.”576
Another important element in Thomason’s understanding of shame 
is that it also provides the means for understanding how it correlates to 
issues like race and gender, which in a similar way are beyond one’s ability 
to control.577 Such shame is not due to the feeling of failure because of sex 
or skin color but caused by how others have identified these traits in ways 
that overshadow what else they may feel about themselves. “Women and 
people of color are often thought of as a group rather than as individuals 
and others attribute thoughts, feelings, and behaviors to them in light of 
their sex or their skin color. Feeling as though one’s identity can be ‘read 
off’ of one’s skin color or sex understandably makes one feel totalized 
by one’s skin color or sex.”578 Hence, this phenomenology of shame can 
account for feelings of being made small. “The feeling of smallness is the 
feeling of our self-conception being dwarfed by the aspect of our identi-
ties that inspires our shame.”579 When that which causes shame thus over-
shadows us, or, as we would say, interrupts us and our self-conception, it 
impacts how we can articulate ourselves in agency. 
Thomason argues that her understanding makes it unnecessary to 
divide shame into kinds: all shame results from the lack of coherence 
between self-conception and identity.580 Thus, she can explain cases of 
moral shame without reference to a failure to live up to ideals. Shame 
emerges because someone, despite how she represented her moral character 
575 Ibid., 14
576 Ibid.
577 Cf. ibid., 14f. This also goes for features of embodiment, as we have pointed to previously. 
578 Ibid., 15. 
579 Ibid.
580 Cf. ibid., 16. Or, as we would state it, all shame is the result of clashes between different perceived 
or experienced contexts of agency and their conditions.
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to herself, clearly was capable of doing something she thought she would 
never do. Shame thus interrupts or disturbs one’s self-conception.581 
How can this account of shame explain the relationship between 
shame and violence better than the moral definition can?582 Thomason 
argues that “we respond to shame with violence because it allows us to 
once again feel defined by our self-conception rather than those aspects 
of ourselves that fall outside of it.” Violent acts should be seen as a protest 
reaction that tries to manifest that I am more than my face, my arms, my 
failure. It is, in her view, not the destructive element in the violent act that 
is its main aim, but the attempt to regain control. “Violence is the attempt 
to regain control, which shame itself has caused one to feel that is lost.”583 
She elaborates: 
Our bodies, our sexuality, and our socioeconomic statuses are all rich targets 
for shame that are a part of our identity even though we do not choose them. 
Shame makes us feel that we are not in control of who we are: parts of my 
identity define me independently of how I want to define myself. One of the 
ways of alleviating shame is to do something that regains a sense of control. We 
try to hide, cover ourselves, or get away from the situation, and these actions 
can help us regain feelings of control because we remove from sight the thing 
we experience as shameful. Violence, anger, and aggression can accomplish the 
same goal. At first this looks puzzling because it seems that we might be equally 
reduced to or totalized by our acts of violence or aggression as much as our 
faces or bodies.584 
Although she sees the violence in question primarily as an act of self-as-
sertion, it is reasonable to ask why one cannot regain control and assert 
oneself in other and less destructive ways. Thomason seems to down-
play the severe content of acts of shame-induced violence.585At least, one 
581 Ibid., 16. 
582 For the sake of the argument, we follow Thomason’s line of reasoning here, in which violence 
is a liberating action. But also the opposite, striving for dignity, may be a liberating action as a 
response to shame. What contextual factors or parts of our architecture that play together with 
a search for dignity or violence are nevertheless not clear. For example, the shameless Arabian 
daughters reacted to objectivization by striving for dignity and not by acting violently.
583 Cf. Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality,” 17.
584 Ibid., 17. 
585 Cf. Breivik, see below. 
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would think that violence was performed against the one who made one 
feel ashamed. But that is not always the case. 
Against this backdrop, shame that results in violence becomes possible 
to understand as rational to the extent that it restores a sense of agency:
My sense of myself as an agent is closely connected to my self-conception. That 
is, one of the primary ways I think of myself is as an agent: one who chooses, 
acts, and makes decisions. Since my sense of my own agency is a large part of my 
self-conception, when I am seen as an agent, I feel as though my self-conception 
(not the parts of my identity that fall outside of it) is determining who I am.586 
Thus, shame’s violence is also a protest against becoming “reduced to 
some feature of our identity that we experience as fixed.” The act of vio-
lence constitutes the one who performs it as something else and more 
than what he is in his shame. That is the rationale for performing the act. 
The response from others – even a negative one, implies that the person to 
whom they are responding is more than the possessor of some shameful 
feature.587 Moreover, 
becoming the object of resentment by doing something violent helps us to re-
gain the feeling of control we lose in shame because we once again feel that our 
self-conception determines who we are. Others surely respond negatively to me 
as the violent agent, but they are no longer seeing me as an object of amusement 
or fascination. What we seek in shame is not approval, but recognition […]: 
Violence gains us that recognition because in asserting our agency, we assert 
our self-conception.588 
There are several elements to point to and discuss in Thomason’s alterna-
tive understanding of shame. First of all, we need to ask, why does vio-
lence stand forth as the most obvious reasonable way of assuring one’s 
agency? Violence is not only destructive, but it is also almost guaranteed 
to diminish the status of the agent in the eyes of others, and thereby, it 
may cause even more shame. One could easily think of other less destruc-
tive ways of responding to shame: protest, laughing, or simply by doing 
586 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality,” 18. 
587 Ibid., 18. 
588 Ibid., 19. 
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something that shows that you do not accept being defined exclusively 
by this or that trait – as in running for public office if you are a woman 
or black. Furthermore, since not everyone responds to shame by acting 
violently, the variation in responses may also suggest that some do not 
consider it a good solution at all. Hence, one should distinguish between 
what makes acts of violence possible to understand, and what makes them 
the most reasonable choice, that is, founded in good reasons or warrants. 
We do not find this distinction in Thomason. 
A related, second comment follows. According to Thomason, it is pos-
sible to see a moral interest in the struggle for recognition that the vio-
lent act implies. But the negative recognition that is provoked by a violent 
act (which is usually morally condemned) is most likely going to end up 
in a new rejection and more shame, due to how the violent act defines 
the agent. The most obvious example of this is the Norwegian terrorist 
Anders Behring Breivik, whose acts can be understood as the result of 
narcissistic shame and rage. After his deeds, however, hardly anyone can 
relate to him without thinking of the shameful acts he performed. The 
extensive discussion about his sanity and to what extent he could be con-
sidered responsible for his actions (cf. the discussion of authorship vs. 
ownership previously) suggests that it is not logical to consider violence a 
rational response to shame – simply because it can engender more shame. 
Nevertheless, this criticism does not exclude the possibility that shame 
can catalyze different strategies that articulate struggles for recognition.589 
Thirdly, in the description referred to of self-asserting violence, Thom-
ason seems to emphasize the response of others to these acts as crucial for 
the experience of overcoming the shame-defining features in the agent. 
This explanation may be relevant to some instances of violence, but does 
it also explain self-inflicted violence, like suicide? Is it not more likely 
to see violence as one painful act performed to numb an experience of 
another pain, without ascribing too much rationality to it? 
Thomason’s conception of shame does not lead her to argue for the 
elimination of shame altogether, though. She sees shamelessness (which 
589 Cf. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1995).
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for her is the alternative) as something that “reveals an agent’s failure 
to recognize the limitations of her own self-conception.”590 She also 
sees shame as valuable because it can open us up to the perspectives of 
others – “it means that we do not take our own points of view as the 
only important ones.” Shame allows us to overcome the limitations of our 
self-conceptions, by disturbing them: “The more authoritative I think my 
self-conception is, the more prone I am to overlook things that do not fit 
with it.”591 She continues: 
A liability to shame prevents us from taking the way we see ourselves to be the 
primary authority in our self-estimation. Feelings of shame arise when we feel 
defined by some aspect of our identity that is not part of how we see ourselves. 
Even though that part of our identity is not part of our self-conception, we feel 
shame because we still acknowledge it as ours.592
We can rephrase Thomason’s intention here more negatively: we need 
shame when we become too conceited. Our all-too-prevalent tendency to 
evaluate ourselves positively is the reason why we need shame to prevent 
self-inflation, “not because it is morally good to judge ourselves lowly or 
poorly, but because a liability to it requires that we recognize that we are 
not always the people we take ourselves to be.”593 Accordingly, she takes 
issue with conceptions of shame that see it as an emotion of self-protection, 
although she does so without offering any discussion of the positions that 
argue thus. In other words, shame can contribute to moral progress. This 
topic is discussed further by John Kekes. 
John Kekes: Shame and moral progress
John Kekes’ article “Shame and moral progress”594 takes as its point of 
departure the ambiguous evaluation of shame in the scholarly literature: 
at the one extreme, shame is always justified, but at the other, shame is 
590 Thomason, “Shame, Violence, and Morality,” 20. 
591 Ibid., 21. 
592 Ibid., 21. 
593 Ibid., 21–22. One could, of course, ask if these aims are not better reached by means of other and 
more transparent strategies that allow for deliberation and weighing of shortcomings. 
594 John Kekes, “Shame and Moral Progress,” Midwest Studies In Philosophy 13, no. 1 (1988), 282f. 
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seen as inflicting a wound in the self. He places great emphasis on shame’s 
contribution to moral agency, and it is therefore of vital interest for us 
to discuss his contribution critically. His argument that “whatever value 
there is in shame can be achieved in less self-destructive ways” than those 
manifested in shame experiences is what interests us the most.595
Kekes discusses how we should assess shame in relation to possible 
moral progress. From a moral point of view, shame is caused by the real-
ization that we have fallen short of some standard we regard as import-
ant. Hence, he argues for a moral understanding of shame, which is what 
Thomason wants to move beyond. However, against the backdrop of the 
previous section, this understanding of shame in the moral realm can 
be integrated within the broader understanding of shame as the tension 
between self-conception and identity for which Thomason argues. In 
both cases, we may become aware that there is a dissonance between our 
standards and what we are.
According to Kekes, “those who are incapable of this emotion cannot 
be seriously committed to any standard, so they are apt to lack moral 
restraint.”596 This strong and generic claim requires empirical underpin-
ning, which he does not offer. It can also be questioned from a moral 
point of view since it sounds somewhat arrogant or stigmatizing. One 
can, for example, easily think of someone with a strong sense of justice 
and moral insight into why something is right, who nevertheless feels 
guilt and not shame when he is found to lack in some act the standards 
to which he is committed. Although one can say with Kekes that, “Shame 
is a sign that we have made a serious commitment,” shame is not the 
only sign of such commitment. It is also not necessarily the only condi-
tion under which it may appear (think of gendered shame, impairment 
shame, class shame, race shame, etc.). Furthermore, when he sees shame 
as an impetus for honoring our commitments, he argues that this is so 
based on a motivation that belongs to other levels of morality than the 
one we find in post-conventional morality: shame motivates honoring 
the commitment, “since violating the commitment painfully lowers our 
595 Ibid., 282. 
596 Ibid.
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opinion of ourselves.”597 This fact in itself can cause one to have some 
doubts about shame’s positive contributions, in ways similar to those we 
have addressed in previous sections. 
Thus, shame implies a self-denigrating aspect. It “does not merely alert 
us to our shortcomings, it makes us feel deficient on account of them.”598 
Feeling shame is likely to be self-destructive because it can “undermine 
our confidence, verve, and courage to navigate life’s treacherous waters.” 
This makes shame problematic from the point of view of moral progress, 
since it diminishes the resources needed for the only agency capable of it, 
namely our own.599 
Fundamental to shame is its self-directed orientation: the subject 
who has it and the object towards which it is directed are the same. 
We have previously described this as the double position that shame 
instigates. Human beings “are not merely the subjects and objects of 
it [that is, shame], we are also aware of ourselves as objects when we 
feel ashamed.”600 The experience of shame involves a sense of failure. 
However, to “recognize a failure in ourselves requires the comparison 
between some aspect of our present selves and the standard which a bet-
ter self would have more closely approximated than we have done.”601 
Again, we see shame as occurring as a result of the clash between differ-
ent (normative) contexts. 
This point becomes even more obvious in what Kekes writes next: For 
shame to have cognitive value, one has to make a comparison with a cer-
tain amount of detachment. This detachment allows for another perspec-
tive than the one we initially and immediately had. Then we can consider 
our characteristic or action as others would see it.602 Thus, Kekes argues, 
“What is essential to shame is to detach ourselves from what we are, have, 
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be it private or public.603 Or, in other words, the potential contribution of 
shame lies in its capacity to help us objectify ourselves and our agency. 
However, contrary to other self-insights that can be established by 
progress in reflection, shame’s way of disrupting our previously estab-
lished intentions takes place in other ways. For example, it does so by 
shocking and interrupting us “either because we have not engaged in 
self-conscious examination or because the result of the examination has 
been to subsume the relevant characteristic or action under a neutral or 
complimentary description.”604 The realization “that, in fact, we have 
been cowardly, or cruel, or dishonest” causes the shock as “we suddenly 
see some aspect of ourselves in a new and unfavorable light.”605 The cog-
nitive contribution of shame is therefore related to the fact that: 
We see what has been there, but we see it for the first time or we see it differently 
from the way we used to. Shame involves interpretation, which is often reinter-
pretation, and what produces it is some episode, some criticism, some com-
parison which we encounter and whose significance forces itself on us, such as 
Adam and Eve discovering that they were naked.606 
We cannot consider shame’s moral aspect unless we have first developed 
an understanding of the cognitive aspect thus described. However, Kekes 
makes a central claim in his assessment of shame as a moral feeling: he 
argues that there is no difference between moral shame and other types 
of shame. The distinction between moral shame and “natural shame” 
or other types of shame “rests on the assumption that morality and the 
domain of choice coincide.”607 Kekes’ argument against this distinction 
is therefore interesting, as it related to an understanding of shame that 
relates it to conditions of agency, among which choice is a crucial one. 
His argument goes as follows: “Since the objects of natural shame are not 
chosen, natural shame is placed outside of morality. However, the domain 
of morality is wider than the sphere of choice. Morality is concerned with 
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living good lives and there are many constituents of good lives about 
which we often have no choice.”608 Shame is, therefore, not only the result 
of choices we have made, but also due to failures and defects for which we 
have not made any choice, but which nevertheless mean that we are not 
up to our own standards of excellence.609
It is essential to living a good life that we should, at the very least, not feel bad 
about ourselves. Our self-respect depends on the sense that we are living up to 
our standards. Shame may occur when we realize that we have fallen short of 
these standards. Thus shame is an experience of failure, but it may or may not 
be culpable failure.610
At this point it is necessary to stop and ask if this is a sufficient argument 
for leaving the distinction between moral and natural shame behind and 
if it rests on an adequate understanding of shame. Take as an example a 
person who feels ashamed for a natural trait for which they did not make 
a choice, like skin color or red hair. There is absolutely no failure involved 
in these features. Nevertheless, people may feel ashamed of them, just as 
they may feel ashamed of belonging to a group or a family that is consid-
ered by the majority of members of society as outcasts, without having 
done anything morally reprehensible. This example suggests that shame 
is caused by the interruption of the desire to belong – also when belong-
ing is not defined by moral standards or standing. Kekes does not discuss 
this point. 
The only way Kekes’ refutation of the distinction between natural and 
moral shame can make sense is if it is restricted to the standards we have 
accepted as valid for ourselves. It would make sense of his claim that 
“whether we feel ashamed depends on our standards and not on whether 
the failure to live up to them was due to innate or acquired, voluntary 
or involuntary, or cultivated causes.”611 Furthermore, “Shame painfully 
brings home to us the brute fact that we have committed ourselves to be 
a certain way and we did not live up to the commitment. Since the reason 
608 Ibid.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid., 285f. 
611 Ibid., 286. 
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behind the commitment was that being that way was a good way of being, 
having failed, we feel bad about the way we are.”612 He concludes this line 
of reasoning with the claim that “shame is a moral feeling, because the 
fact in its case is that we find some aspect of our lives bad.”613 But this final 
statement, italicized by us, can only make sense when the aspect of our 
lives that we find bad is determined as being thus by a standard that we 
accept. When I feel bad because someone thinks my red hair is ugly, this 
is not a moral feeling, even though I may feel ashamed by it. Kekes seems 
to be on the wrong track here when he sees shame exclusively as the result 
of how we evaluate our commitments. 
However, despite these critical remarks, Kekes identifies an essential 
element in what causes shame when he links it to our commitments. He 
argues that from a moral point of view, shame is “proportionate to the 
centrality of the unfulfilled commitment to our conception of a good 
life.” It is this connection to our agency as based on a conception of a 
good life and the commitment it engenders that makes the occurrence of 
shame significant for considering it in relation to moral progress.614 He 
sums up the considerations of shame and moral progress in three inter-
related claims. 
The first claim is concerned with how individuals can move from expe-
riencing one type of shame to other types. He underscores that it is first 
and foremost a development in terms of how individuals change their 
attitudes towards norms and standards: going from a superficial attitude 
towards a deeper one in regard to moral standards. The movement of 
individuals from liability to propriety-shame, to honor-shame, and to 
worth-shame is one kind of moral progress. In propriety-shame, we care 
about appearances. It appears when standards set by appearances count 
against us. In honor-shame we care about appearing as we are, and this 
shame is dependent on our failure to conform to standards of appearance 
definitive to our honor that we have developed. Finally, worth-shame is 
the result of how we care about being in a certain way. It is indepen-
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standards. Thus, “The progress is from caring about how we seem, to car-
ing about how we are.”615
The second remark concerning shame and moral progress is linked to 
development in a similar way to that identified by Kohlberg and Haber-
mas, and builds on the previous comment: it is progress towards more 
self-direction. “People whose chief moral concern is with appearances 
are at the mercy of public opinion and depend on it for their choices and 
judgments; people moved primarily by honor subordinate their choices 
and judgments to public opinion, but they have made it their own opin-
ion; while people whose moral standards include both public and private 
ones can criticize and correct their choices and judgments in both social 
and personal morality.”616 The advantage of this is that the development 
of increased self-direction thereby provides “greater scope for moral crit-
icism, and consequently, a better chance of moral improvement.”617 
The third comment is especially relevant for us since it concerns the 
conditions for agency and the potential to develop some resilience con-
cerning shame: Kekes argues that “the more we concentrate our moral 
resources and attention on what is in our control, the less scope we leave 
to chance.” Furthermore, he argues that the described development is 
towards one in which there is increasing emphasis on the moral resources 
in the moral subject herself, and in her private world, since “our control 
over the private sphere is always greater than our control over the public 
615 Ibid., 290. 
616 Ibid.
617 Ibid., 290f. There are more favorable approaches to shame in the formation of the moral self than 
Kekes. Johannes van der Ven argues against Kekes’ rejection of the teaching of shame and says 
that it is only acceptable for so-called inauthentic shame, “in which the person fears for his/her 
reputation in the eyes of others. This kind of shame, in my interpretation, is based on other-di-
rected self-esteem. Moral progress, however, cannot and must not lead us away from what I call 
authentic shame, which is shame engendered by a failure to meet my own longing for honesty 
and integrity, which are based on inner-directed self-esteem. The education of shame means to 
advance the child’s transition from the stage of inauthentic to authentic shame. The transition 
from inauthentic to authentic shame cannot be made by the child without educational assis-
tance. It requires educational conversation or even educational counseling, which must include a 
certain mix of nondirective and directive approaches. Nondirective interventions are, for exam-
ple, mirroring, supporting, cognitive understanding, and emotional understanding of the child’s 
utterances. Directive interventions are questioning, interpreting, exposing, or advising.” J. A. van 
der Ven, Formation of the Moral Self (Grand Rapids; Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans, 1998), 334. Van 
der Ven does not seem to consider the full ramifications of Kekes’ argument. 
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one.” Therefore, “a moral attitude which concentrates on the private is 
more likely to lead to a good life than others.”618 Thus, the progress here 
can also be estimated with regard to the improvement of the chances 
to live a good life.619 Progress is correlated with “greater depth, self- 
direction, and control” and thus, to fundamental conditions for coherent 
agency. These regard the individual (depth) and moral traditions (self- 
direction). In the latter case, we can see a moral tradition improving 
when it fosters the moral progress of its members.620 
Kekes also argues that this progress should imply moving away from 
all forms of shame toward other responses to moral failure. This recom-
mendation has implications for individuals as well as moral traditions.621 
He expresses his reason for this recommendation in the following claim: 
shame “weakens moral agents, and it leaves a residue which adds a burden 
to the deficiency with which the agents already struggle.”622 Furthermore, 
Shame is a bad feeling. It is not just painful, but the pain it makes us feel is on 
account of our own deficiencies. It diminishes our self- respect, and it does so 
in important ways, because the deficiencies which occasion it are obstacles in 
the way of living what we regard as good lives. Thus shame is a kind of moral 
double jeopardy. Not only are we saddled with deficiencies, but we have shame 
to pillory us for them.623
Against those who argue that shame is painful but necessary, Kekes 
replies that there are more constructive reactions to violations of moral 
commitments: “Anger at ourselves, resolution to improve, the desire to 
make amends, a quest for understanding why we did what we regarded as 
wrong are some others.”624 All of these reactions contribute to maintain-
ing our self-respect, a point that is important to counter the claim that 
one cannot have self-respect if one cannot feel shame.






624 Cf. ibid., 292. 
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Furthermore, Kekes argues that shame cannot serve to protect against 
the corruption of the moral self. It cannot protect us from doing wrong 
in the future because if the wrong is in the future, there is nothing to be 
ashamed about yet. Hence, it is not shame, but the fear of shame that 
supplies the function that guides future action here. What Kekes ignores 
here, however, is how I may be ashamed of some of my inclinations, and 
therefore keep myself in check concerning future actions. In such cases, 
shame may prevent me from specific actions in the future and serve a 
moral function. 
On the positive side, the wish to maintain self-respect may be a better 
candidate for supplying this function. But also pride, honor, vanity, kind-
ness, etc. can do that. Negative modes of motivation can be fear of pun-
ishment, fear of loss of love, of respect, or of status. These may serve just 
as well as fear of shame, according to Kekes. With regard to past actions, 
shame is likewise not able to supply any protecting function, because the 
wrong has already been done. Shame is not the only response that can 
contribute to the removal of our sense of self-corruption in such cases. 
Recognition of failures “may produce many morally acceptable reactions 
of which shame, at best, is only one.”625 
Accordingly, Kekes comes fairly close to arguing that the case for 
shame as a contributor to the development of a moral self is not a strong 
one. Instead, it seems to decrease some of the competencies needed for 
moral progress on both the individual and the collective level: 
If moral life is to go well, there must be a robust self capable of engaging in it. 
It must be able to make more or less detached choices and judgments, it must 
be able to withstand adversity, it must have strength, confidence, and integrity. 
Shame undermines all this, weakens the self, and that is why moral progress 
consists not merely in developing from propriety- shame, through honor-shame, 
to worth-shame, and thereby growing in independence and self-direction, but 
also in developing from worth-shame to less destructive forms of moral re-
sponse to the recognition of our moral failures.626
625 Cf. ibid., 292. 
626 Ibid., 293. 
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Kekes claims that “This is not seen by many writers on shame”, and we 
agree. Much of the material we have reviewed for this book overlooks 
these problems of shame’s effect on the development of a mature moral 
self. Shame taps energy from the self and its projects, undermines self- 
confidence, and makes us less capable of developing the moral creativ-
ity we may need to instigate progress and thereby become more morally 
mature. Or to put it negatively, in the words of Kekes: “shame undermines 
self-direction, reduces the chances of moral reform, and weakens our 
selves. Correspondingly, a moral tradition which makes available moral 
possibilities other than shame is better than one which does not.”627
Can we then find alternative means for moral progress if shame 
apparently is a feeling over which we have no control? Kekes argues that 
although we cannot have direct control over shame, we can control it 
indirectly. What he means is that “once we have it, we can decide to cul-
tivate or to minimize it, to strengthen or to weaken it, to attribute greater 
or lesser importance to it. What makes this possible is that in addition to 
the emotive aspect of shame, which is beyond our direct control, shame 
also has a cognitive and a moral aspect, and these we can control.”628 In 
short, “The cognitive aspect of shame involves a self-conscious detached 
comparison between the deficiency responsible for our failure and the 
standard of which we have fallen short. The moral aspect of shame is the 
identification of the standard as an essential component of our concep-
tion of a good life and the acceptance of the standard for the evaluation 
of our own character and conduct.”629
Accordingly, Kekes suggests that we cultivate our capacity for direct-
ing our attention in a way that enables us to minimize the influence 
of shame, and instead direct our attention toward our conception of a 
good life. This conception “is bound to have sufficient force to coun-
teract shame, for the intensity of our shame depends on how much we 




630 Ibid. “Thus, the stronger our shame is, the more attractive we must find the goal of which we are 
ashamed to have fallen short. And if the goal is not very attractive, then we could not mind all 
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interesting in itself, but it is also one which we can relate to Thomason’s 
idea about violence as the immediate response to shame: the more one is 
able to detach oneself, and consider alternative reactions to shame, the 
more constructive those alternatives have the potential to become. 
Cheshire Calhoun: Moral shame as the result  
of relational practices
The primacy of human practices
Instead of addressing shame in a moral context as something that only 
has to do with not conforming to moral standards, one can also see 
shame as deeply rooted in human practices. These practices have also, of 
course, moral components, as they rely on the expectations that partic-
ipants in these practices have to each other. Cheshire Calhoun has pro-
vided an interesting analysis in which she provides an apology for moral 
shame that offers an alternative to shame as analyzed by B. Williams, J. 
Kekes, J.P. Tangney, and others.631 To a large extent, her analysis provides 
us with a description of shame’s function in a morally charged context – 
and it is less directed towards making a strong normative case for shame’s 
unavoidable role in moral matters. 
Calhoun points to how philosophers see shame as problematic because 
it is often more concerned with how one appears in the eyes of others 
than with what was done. Thus, it profoundly compromises the agent’s 
autonomous judgment about what morality requires. The relevant rec-
ommendation to deal with this challenge would be for agents to develop 
the capacity to be more insensitive “to the shaming gaze of others and 
attentive only to the demands of their own practical reason.”632 
Calhoun nevertheless argues in favor of the importance of being able to 
feel morally ashamed. Shame over moral failings is “essential to a mature 
ethical agent’s psychology. More controversially, I think that vulnerability 
that much the failure to achieve it. So we can’t always derive from shame the clue to a better, less 
destructive response.”
631 See Cheshire Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 2 
(2004).
632 Ibid.
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to feeling ashamed before those with whom one shares a moral practice, 
even when one disagrees with their moral criticisms, is often a mark of 
moral maturity.”633 To sustain this position, she must argue against posi-
tions like Kekes’ above, and also against that of B. Williams, who argued 
that the only relevant shame we have to feel is when we look bad in the eyes 
of those whom we respect and agree with concerning values. She claims 
that both scholars “make shame suitable for an autonomous agent only by 
reducing the other before whom we feel shame to a mirror of ourselves. 
Both drop from view the fundamentally social nature of shame.”634 Thus, 
she identifies two crucial features: the perspective of the other is essential 
to understand shame, and, correspondingly, shame is a social phenome-
non. The relational element in shame especially comes to the fore in what 
she calls “the primary fears attached to shame.” These “are fears of being 
ridiculed, made the subject of gossip, subjected to demeaning treatment, 
and of being ostracized or abandoned.”635 Such fear can also help explain 
the desire to conceal one’s failings from others’ view. And this is what 
attempts to reconcile shame with autonomy, as Kekes tries to do, cannot 
explain. Addressing such attempts, Calhoun writes that, 
it severs the connection between shame and concern for one’s standing in a so-
cial world. It does so because it mistakenly takes the object of shame to be what 
the agent alone believes is a moral failing. The real objects of shame, however, 
are failures to meet moral standards that are also held by other people. Shaming 
moral failures are paradigmatically ones that might, if exposed, reduce one’s 
social standing in some actual group and might degrade the quality of one’s 
social interactions.636
Thus, Calhoun identifies as central to the experience of shame the con-
cerns about how one appears in others’ eyes, as well as the fear of having 
socially exposed discrediting facts and the anxiety about others’ con-
tempt and about having one’s social relations impaired.637 In other words, 
633 Ibid., 129. 
634 Ibid.
635 Ibid., 131. 
636 Ibid.
637 Ibid., 132.
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shame engenders the experience that the other’s perspective towards me 
is not coherent with that which determines my agency, and this lack of 
coherence makes me aware of the clash of perspectives that may imply 
discrediting, negative exposure and contempt.
The position that accepts that one should feel shame in the eyes of 
respected others (Bernhard Williams) also acknowledges that there is a 
social dimension in shame.638 It nevertheless does not solve the main 
problem, since Williams, like Kekes, “traces the power to shame to 
the shamer’s mirroring to a large extent the agent’s own evaluative 
perspective.”639 However, this position does not make it understandable 
“why moral criticisms with which one disagrees would have any power 
to shame at all.” Accordingly, it is “hard to see why particular moral 
criticisms shame an agent who does not endorse them.”640 The attempt 
to reconcile shame with autonomy in this way cannot capture shame’s 
distinctively social character, Calhoun holds.641 
A final problem with these suggestions is that they must render some 
specific experiences of shame as irrational. Otherwise, we cannot explain 
the fact that people feel moral shame when their behavior is exposed 
publicly is problematic, even when they do not see it as problematic 
themselves.642 The views Calhoun criticizes cannot explain why someone 
suffers from shame in cases when he is otherwise considered “a mature, 
well-formed ethical agent” who would presumably “only feel shamed 
by moral criticisms that mirror his own, or that at least invoke ethical 
standards he respects. More worrisome, we must discount as irratio-
nal or immature much of the shame suffered by socially disesteemed 
populations – racial minorities, women, the poor, lesbians and gay 
men.”643 Pervasive shame often coexists with a denial that there is 
638 Cf. how this differs from Deonna et al.’s understanding of shame, above. 
639 Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” 135.
640 Ibid.
641 Ibid.
642 Many of the men who have been exposed in the #Metoo campaign probably did not see any 
problems in their own behavior prior to being exposed in the media. But as a consequence of 
being outed, shame was the result. 
643 Calhoun, “An Apology for Moral Shame,” 135. 
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anything to be ashamed of. Such cases remain unexplained in the views 
that Calhoun criticizes. 
In sum, we have instances in which we feel shame without good rea-
son, and instances in which we feel shame when we differ from the values 
of those who make us feel ashamed. The question is how we can make 
a morally relevant case for shame that can explain these experiences 
and give us a better grasp of what is at stake. Calhoun suggests that we 
approach this problem from a wider perspective and see shame as an 
expression of the fact that we have the capacity to take fellow participants 
in the social world seriously.644 Moreover, she argues that taking other 
participants seriously is not the same as giving in to others’ views, which 
would be the main argument for arguing against moral shame to protect 
moral autonomy. Her suggestion fits well with how we see shame as the 
result of the interaction between different evaluative contexts of agency, 
and helps us to specify our position further.
Shame as an element in social practices
Calhoun uses the metaphor “weight” when she analyzes shame in the 
broader social context. She says that it is a question about allowing 
the judgments of others to have some weight. However, she rejects the 
assumption that “weight” is an epistemic notion: that would mean that 
they can be weighed in our reasoning process if we have accepted their 
truth. Moral agents are nevertheless not just knowers, but participants in 
various social practices of morality. This fact enables Calhoun to suggest 
that “the ‘weight’ central to shame is not an epistemic notion.” Instead, 
the “weight” of others’ opinions is related to their relationship with us as 
fellow participants in social practices. If we approach shame from this 
angle, it becomes understandable why another’s view of us can have prac-
tical weight, even when we deny the truth of their view.645 She sums it up 
thus: 
Moral criticism that shames has what I will call “practical weight.” Moral crit-
icism has practical weight when we see it as issuing from those who are to be 
644 Ibid., 138.
645 Ibid., 139. 
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taken seriously because they are co-participants with us in some shared social 
practice of morality.646
In other words, Calhoun’s understanding of shame situates shame within 
a broader context of social practices. These emerge because people want 
to do something together. Such practices are not only those which we 
identify as professionals, although these are also included. Many of them 
are also related to what takes place in institutional contexts, although 
Calhoun does not address the institutional dimension in her description 
of these: 
A social practice of morality comes about because there is something else that 
we want to do together – work in a profession, engage in religious worship, play 
sports, live together in a neighborhood, have a marriage. These various activ-
ities are sites of particular moral problems that produce the need to generate 
shared moral norms. The practice of education, for example, produces a need 
for norms governing student–teacher relations, including sexual relations. The 
practice of medicine generates a need for norms governing the response to ter-
minal illness. Those moral norms then get hammered out among people who 
already share a social world.647
Everyday life consists of a plurality of moral practices, each with its 
shared understandings about how “we” do things. The contexts of these 
practices, accordingly, allow co-participants “to engage in a shared enter-
prise of evaluating each other’s behavior and character, determining who 
has lived up to and who has fallen short of shared moral ideals, and call-
ing each other to moral account for transgressions.”648 At this point, the 
notion of expectations becomes essential, since shaming within the con-
text of such practices means “impressing upon the person that she has 
disappointed not just one individual’s expectations but what some “we” 
expected of her.”649 Moreover, “The power to shame is a function of our 
646 Ibid., 139. 
647 Ibid., 140. 
648 Ibid.
649 Ibid.
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sharing a moral practice” and is articulated as a representative viewpoint 
within the practice. It is why shaming criticisms have practical weight.650 
The expectations towards participants in social and moral practices 
are, therefore, the backdrop against which one can see shame. However, 
there is one more element in Calhoun’s analysis here that is important, 
namely that the moral criticisms that lead to shame must have a repre-
sentative character. Thus, it is understandable why one can feel shame in 
light of some appraisals and not in light of others: if the critique is not 
representative of the standards of the moral practice, then it does not lead 
to shame in the same way as when it is. Thus “vulnerability to shame has 
more to do with our sharing a moral practice with others than it does 
with accepting another’s criticism.”651 
To share a social practice means that one finds its moral understandings in-
telligible, even if not endorsable. One understands how people could come to 
think this way about moral matters. One understands what counts for others as 
acting responsibly, being truthful, being honorable, giving good moral advice, 
and so on.652
Such emphasis on how evaluation is representative means that Calhoun 
can shift the focus from how the shamed person endorses the shamer’s 
perspective to the representativeness of the shamer’s viewpoint. “What 
inspires shame is recognition of who we are for those with whom we share 
a moral practice.”653 It is the representative viewpoint that constitutes the 
power to shame. This interpretation can also explain why one may feel 
shame even when one has nothing to be ashamed of. The unfortunate 
consequence is that “the power to shame is likely to be concentrated in 
the hands of those whose interpretations are socially authoritative.”654 
This point may not only be valid for moral shame in the strict sense, but 
may also apply to, for example, shaming practices in other social settings, 
such as sports clubs or religious groups. 
650 Cf. ibid., 141. 
651 Cf. ibid., 141–142. 
652 Ibid., 143. 
653 Ibid.
654 Ibid.
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The emphasis on representativeness constitutes a problem because 
the power to shame may be unequally distributed, and therefore be to 
the disadvantage of minority groups. How can Calhoun then develop 
an argument in favor of moral shame? Given that “the burden of shame 
seems unfairly distributed in inegalitarian societies, serving only to fur-
ther burden those who are already unfairly burdened […], what apology 
could be made for moral shame”?655 
The moral relevance of shame in the context of practice
Calhoun defends moral shame by pointing to its social function. She 
describes morality in a way that nevertheless could (almost) be done by 
a cognitive ethicist like Habermas: “Morality is, in part, a critical, nor-
mative enterprise conducted by individuals who use their own best judg-
ment to arrive at moral standards and practical conclusions, who seek 
the rationally best justifications for their judgments, and who critically 
assess the standards and practical conclusions of both particular others 
and of social practices of morality.”656 We have italicized ‘individuals’ in 
the quotation here not only to suggest where Habermas and others may 
disagree but also to point out how Calhoun sees shame as the element 
that opens up to the social dimension of morality: she admits that shame 
does not serve the normative and critical dimension of the moral enter-
prise. Nevertheless, “moral criticisms that we judge to be rationally inde-
fensible may provoke shame.” But this does not mean that shame seconds 
“the critical normative judgments that we reach as autonomous, reflective 
individuals.”657 It serves another function than the reflective, normative 
one. Shame’s contribution to morality is related to its role as a funda-
mentally social enterprise. It serves as a means to regulate interactions 
between social actors. Calhoun elaborates this point: 
Morality regulates interactions between real social actors. Even if particular so-
cial practices of morality seem flawed from the individual’s critical, normative 
perspective, the social practice of morality is the only moral game in town. It is 
655 Ibid., 144. 
656 Ibid.
657 Ibid.
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only in real social worlds that I have a moral identity. Who I am, morally, is who 
I am interpretable and identifiable by others as being. That I fancy myself (even 
with what I take to be the best reasons) to be one kind of person rather than 
another does not give me an identity as that kind of person. Instead, the set of 
one’s possible moral identities is delimited by the available moral interpreta-
tions within an ongoing moral practice.658
The way Calhoun situates the moral self in the context of practices is 
crucial to her explanation of why we can be vulnerable to being shamed 
before others with whom we disagree. Participation in moral prac-
tices provides us with inescapable moral identities “because one’s own 
self-conception does not decisively determine who one is.”659 Thereby, she 
tacitly utilizes a distinction between identity and self-conception, similar 
to Thomason. Moreover, “the identities that we have within particular 
moral practices are inescapable because we typically do not choose moral 
practices.” Instead, we choose social practices, and as a consequence, 
“we then find ourselves located for better or worse in particular ongoing 
moral practices.” Accordingly, she sees shame not as “the emotion of a 
critical, normatively reflective, autonomous agent. Shame is the emotion 
of the practitioner of morality.”660
Is Calhoun’s argument for shame really an argument for moral shame? 
We think it is. To situate shame in the context of practices makes sense. 
She is nevertheless clear that shame can be abused for disciplining and for 
oppression, and that it does not convey any guidance that is automatically 
possible to justify as moral content in itself. Shame can make us aware 
that there are certain standards that we do not live up to, which we should 
have. But it is not clear that shame is an obvious, or even a good, tool 
for moral formation of regulation of interpersonal relationships and the 
content of social practices. Thus, the main contribution of Calhoun lies in 
how she points out limitations in the positions that try to combine a cer-
tain sense of shame with moral autonomy, and how shame may make us 
more open to the judgments of others who are more experienced moral 
658 Ibid., 145. 
659 Ibid.
660 Ibid.
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practitioners than we are ourselves. So far, we can thus conclude that she 
offers a clear, albeit not very strong, defense against the promotion of 
shamelessness. We now turn, therefore, to another philosopher who has 
analyzed reasons for being shameless or not. 
Michelle Mason: Are there good reasons  
for not being shameless?
Shame as a behavioral regulator
Calhoun’s description of how shame works in social practices is not a 
strong argument in favor of shame. It is more explanatory than apolo-
getic. However, as has become increasingly more apparent throughout 
this chapter, we are developing a relatively critical assessment of shame’s 
moral contribution. This assessment can be seen as a normatively aimed 
argument for shamelessness. Against that backdrop, perhaps the stron-
gest objection to the trajectory of the argument in this chapter so far is 
the claim that shamelessness is a moral fault. Intuitively, though, to make 
the generic claim that this is the case seems to be a somewhat hasty con-
clusion. Therefore, we have to consider in more detail under what condi-
tions we should regard shamelessness favorably, and when we may assess 
it critically. 
If we look back at the positions we have identified as important con-
cerning the problematic features of moral shame, we can, with Michelle 
Mason, identify them either as positions in which shame has no moral 
content or as positions in which shame is considered as expressing 
a primitive mode of morality.661 We can also, alternatively and in 
light of the analysis of Calhoun, see shame as a morally relevant 
emotion that may, on occasions, contribute to the regulation of behav-
ior for participants in practices that have moral content, but without 
shame itself having a necessary moral function or providing moral 
guidance. 
661 See Michelle Mason, “On Shamelessness,” Philosophical Papers 39, no. 3 (2010). For examples, 
think of our initial description of the shameless Arabian daughters. 
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Shamelessness as a moral problem
However, it is not only shame that presents problems for morality. Mason’s 
contribution addresses the problematic absence of shame. She argues that 
it is necessary to consider shamelessness as a moral challenge. Her precise 
scope is based on the claim that shamelessness, understood as an evasion 
of moral self-censure, can be morally pernicious. Against this backdrop, 
we need to assess its problematic moral stance.662 
Mason argues against what she calls “the common assumption,” that is, 
that “to call a person or action shameless often purports to mark a moral 
fault in that person or action.”663 There are notable exceptions to this com-
mon assumption about shamelessness. Aristotle, for example, points to 
the fact that we consider the morally virtuous person shameless – simply 
because she does not have anything of which to be ashamed. This seems to 
be a case of actual shamelessness, and not a case in which the agent does 
not have any capacity for shame, or evades moral self-assessment.664 Other 
positive cases of shamelessness are when someone distances themselves 
from others’ wrongful attempts to shame them. In such cases, the absence 
of shame manifests autonomy or independence from the pressure to 
internalize another’s evaluation, even when someone else would be likely 
to feel ashamed for the same act.665 In these cases, lack of shame does not 
necessarily signalize a moral lack, and they run contrary to the common 
assumption. All these are cases that Mason calls “autonomous shame.” 
This autonomy impedes shame and results in shamelessness. It can be 
considered as positive because one is then not subject (or, as she says, “a 
slave”) to another’s evaluation and the shaming effect of it. However, she 
also sees this autonomy as a condition in which one is precluded from 
another type of “slavishness”: the one that is “constituted by the evasion of 
any evaluative ideal of the person or by the total subjugation of one’s eval-
uative scheme to another person or unworthy end.”666 It is this evasion, or 
662 Ibid., 403. 
663 Ibid.
664 Ibid., 404. 
665 Ibid., 405.
666 Ibid., 408. 
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the tendency to evade evaluations that may cause justified shame, that she 
sees as a potential moral problem concerning shamelessness. 
This problem can be highlighted if we address it in relation to the afore-
mentioned two positions that are skeptical towards shame as a moral 
device: the one that sees shame as having no essential moral content, and 
the one that sees it as an instance of primitive moral thinking.667 Con-
sidered from the point of view of both positions, heteronomous shame 
should be abolished and shamelessness appears as a recommendable 
alternative to such shame. This approach entails that shamelessness is “a 
moral fault only in cases where shame registers something within the 
agent’s control and morally assessable as wrong.”668 Furthermore, “The 
philosophical account of shamelessness this version of the Moral Primi-
tive critique of shame suggests is one where shamelessness consists in a 
willing disregard of moral values others would impose on one in favor 
of those one has autonomously endorsed oneself. It is easy to see how, on 
such a view of shame, shamelessness might emerge as a virtue of authen-
ticity or integrity rather than a vice.”669 
The critique of shame as morally primitive contains one important ele-
ment: it points to how the experience of shame may involve the perspec-
tive of another and the other’s evaluative expectations.670 Sometimes it 
makes sense to think of this perspective of the other as one from which 
one should rightly distance oneself. Yet, sometimes, it does not – and 
then, shamelessness is not a moral virtue and a sign of the mature, auton-
omous agent, but his or her vice. One way to get around this is to make 
a distinction between shamelessness and the lack of shame, in which 
667 Ibid., 410. In the first case, “shame is not a properly moral attitude at all, understanding ‘mor-
al’ here to function descriptively in delineating an area of practice characterized essentially by 
a concern with obligation and individual responsibility.” Mason describes shame’s problematic 
standing here, interestingly, also from the point of view of practice (cf. Calhoun above): “On this 
first view, any practice lacking essential conceptual ties to notions of obligations and individual 
responsibility is not properly regarded as a practice of morality.” Accordingly, she names it the 
“No Essential Moral Content critique of shame.” In the latter case shame is “not a properly mod-
ern moral attitude but instead a psychological remnant that finds its conceptual home in forms 
of moral thinking, albeit primitive forms of moral thinking.” She calls this the “Moral Primitive 
critique of shame.”
668 Cf. ibid., 414. 
669 Ibid., 415. 
670 Cf. ibid., 416. 
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the latter means that you do not feel shame, and have no reason to, even 
though you have the capacity for it. What, then, makes shamelessness, as 
Mason defines it, more specifically a moral fault in her opinion? 
As already suggested, Mason sees shamelessness as a form of moral 
evasion. To be shameless is to regard oneself as “beyond the reach of any 
ideals of character appraisal.” The notion of character is essential here.671 
A shameless person sees moral appraisal from a narrow perspective: it 
concerns one’s actions but leaves one’s character untouched. “Because 
those moral standards to which the shameless do subscribe are narrow 
in this sense, behavior for which one might hold oneself accountable in a 
way that bears on the esteem one regards as one’s due is, for the shame-
less, at most an occasion for guilt or regret.”672 In other words, shame-
lessness excludes one’s character from appraisal. To have shame, though, 
would include an appraisal of character. Accordingly, Mason suggests the 
following definition of the experience of shame as morally relevant: 
To experience shame is to experience oneself (shame’s object) as diminished in 
merited esteem (the property that renders the emotion fitting its object) on the 
ground that one has violated some legitimate ideal of character.673 
Thus, Mason comes close to the earlier mentioned understanding of 
moral shame as defined by Rawls and others: it is the reaction to not 
being able to live up to one’s ideals and standards. It needs to be pointed 
out, because the moral context then, in her view, seems to presuppose 
that shame is related to cognitively accessible content, and accordingly, 
that it needs guidance to have an adequate focus. 
Shame with a proper focus
Mason lists the following conditions as necessary if shame is to have a 
proper focus, that is, to be morally relevant, and therefore convey some 
bearing on the character assessment of the person in question: 
671 Cf. how we discussed this notion and its relevance to shame briefly in relation to virtue ethics 
above.
672 Mason, “On Shamelessness,” 417. 
673 Ibid., 417f. 
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1. It is directed at oneself as a response to one’s violation of an ideal of the person, 
2. The violation is one for which one appropriately holds oneself responsible, for 
example, a) one was not on the initiating occasion acting with nonculpable ig-
norance, compelled, or forced, b) one is not psychologically abnormal or mor-
ally undeveloped, and 3. There is a legitimate expectation or demand that one 
approximates the personal ideal.674 
There are several important features in Mason’s approach that are worth 
highlighting: First of all, this allows for considering shame as an emo-
tion of self-assessment.675 Against this backdrop, lack of shame is a tes-
timony to one’s indifference to ideals of character and to the evaluation 
of one’s esteem-worthiness that such ideals support. Concomitantly, “a 
healthy sense of (properly focused) shame signals a susceptibility to more 
comprehensive moral appraisal of oneself in light of certain character 
ideals.”676 
Thus, Mason’s contribution builds on the distinction between doing 
and being that we have identified as relevant in a previous chapter.677 
Actions may provoke shame: “just in case I fear or worry that what I have 
done […] reflects back on myself in a way that threatens to challenge the 
esteem that I or others reasonably can maintain for myself in the light of 
some ideal of character I myself endorse.”678 Shame establishes a focus on 
who I have revealed myself to be. Thus, she sees shame as a response to 
what one fails to be. Unlike guilt for specific actions, “shame is an emo-
tion that constitutes a wide esteem evaluation of self.”679 Furthermore, 
by an esteem evaluation of self, I have in mind the features of shame as involv-
ing a deeper assessment of the merit of one’s character in light of an ideal of 
such and as possessing an essentially reformative motivational force, one that 
674 Ibid., 418. 
675 Ibid., 418. 
676 Ibid., 419. This definition seems to be especially relevant to the analysis of why people can com-
mit crimes or atrocities that subject others to suffering and pain: they are able to ignore such 
ideals or substitute them for others. Cf. the case of the guards in the concentration camps during 
WWII: they had ideals about character formation that excluded compassion for the prisoners. 
677 See above, p. 217. 
678 Mason, “On Shamelessness,” 420. 
679 Ibid., 420. 
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looks inward toward reforming those aspects of one’s character that fall short of 
the ideal in question.680 
In contrast, shamelessness emerges from this view in the following way: 
“Shamelessness consists in a failure to value any character ideals recog-
nizable as worthy of a well-lived human life.”681 Accordingly, such shame-
lessness can be seen in the manifestation of a lack of interest in being a 
faithful lover or a true friend – such ideals are simply considered as not 
relevant. Against this backdrop, in the cases here discussed, to be shame-
less is to lack any constraint on what one will allow oneself to be.682 This 
approach does not exclude that one still has to ask if the shame one may 
hold is morally justified or if shamelessness shows a lack of willingness to 
subject one’s character to moral standards. That can only be determined 
by considering moral reasons for certain behavior that involves character 
assessment.683 
A final consequence of Mason’s position is that those who lack shame 
because they do not consider their character ideals in light of their 
actions, may, in fact, lead shameful lives. The ideals that help us measure 
the conditions for a good life appear to be outside their horizon. When 
one is shameless because of this lack of ideals, one is also blind to signif-
icant moral goods, Mason argues, and goes on: “In denying shame its 
place in the moral domain, a shame-less moral theory likewise obscures 
an important form of moral failure.684 
Thus, Mason seems to argue that shame has a precise contribution in 
the context of morality: it does not convey moral insight, but it helps us 
to be aware of flaws in our character in a way that a guilt approach can-
not do. Shame makes us attentive. Her position does not, nevertheless, 
exclude that one should try to overcome the conditions and instances in 
which shame would be relevant, adequate, or necessary. Thus, her argu-
ment for the adequacy of shame and against certain types of shameless-
ness is an argument for increased moral sensitivity and for developing 
680 Ibid., 420. 
681 Ibid., 423. 
682 Cf. ibid., 422. 
683 Cf. ibid., 421. 
684 Ibid., 425. 
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moral characters that would not need to feel shame because they acted 
in accordance with moral ideals into which they had a rational insight. 
Concluding remarks
As a conclusion to this chapter, let us return to its Introduction and ask 
if we have answered the questions there. There were several questions 
listed, and we will present the answers to them briefly, not by repeating 
the detailed analyses in the different sections, but by indicating in what 
way and to what extent the material we have presented provides us with 
resources for answering and arguing their outcome. 
The first question we asked was, is it good from a moral point of view 
that people should feel ashamed for their moral failures? To this question, 
we will answer yes – and no. Yes, to the extent that shame is a natural 
reaction to specific self-perceptions of failure. Because we are fallible as 
humans, it is good that we react to our failures, as such reactions can 
make us more prone to altering our behavior. As Manion rightly points 
out, shame may occasionally also function positively as a motivating fac-
tor to establish deep-going and necessary change. Furthermore, as Mason 
argues, sometimes shamelessness is morally pernicious. Then, shame may 
contribute to initializing transformations in our characters or provide 
more comprehensive perspectives on character formation. However, it is 
better that people feel guilt rather than shame, as guilt makes it possible 
to differentiate between agents and act in a way that allows the agent to 
see and experience him or herself as more than the one who performed 
the despicable act that caused the reaction. Moral competencies are better 
enabled by guilt than by shame. Therefore, the question should also be 
answered with a “no,” since moral failure should not be identified with 
personal failure, and moral insight is better enabled by reactions of guilt 
to specific actions than by shame that also makes the agent shameful. 
Furthermore, and concomitant to the rather limited credit we are 
willing to give shame as a moral resource, we will argue that the answer 
to the question, “Can the feeling of shame provide reliable information 
about what to do or not to do?” must be negative. Shame does not in itself 
provide us with genuine moral insight – at best, it can provide us with 
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knowledge about how we have not met our own or others’ expectations 
and ideals. Thus, shame is a negative resource. Moreover, it can lead us 
astray since the expectations and ideals that clash with our shame-caus-
ing agency need justification by other instances than our emotional reac-
tions if they are to count as justified from a moral point of view. 
Therefore, the question, “Are there good alternatives to shame in this 
regard?” must be answered in the affirmative, by pointing to how con-
tinuous moral discourse, where all voices are heard and all perspectives 
are taken into consideration, is systematically pursued in order to estab-
lish a shared understanding of what shall count as justified, rational and 
good behavior. Moral discourse can, as Habermas argues, contribute to 
the formation of will and desire in ways that display moral insight and 
an agency that does not engender shame. This moral discourse cannot be 
conclusive but needs to remain open and probing, subjecting every action 
to repeated scrutiny and critique. It needs to be so not only to ensure that 
it is justified in the eyes of everyone involved, but to allow this discourse 
itself to contribute to the moral formation of subjects who learn to take 
a moral stand, in an autonomous and self-reliant but not individualist 
or subjective manner. Furthermore, the discussion on shamelessness 
above suggests that shamelessness is not a good alternative to shame – 
but rather, in problematic cases, an indication of the morally problematic 
stance of a person lacking the capacity for assessing one’s character. 
Accordingly, we hold that shame does not make moral agency more 
rational or transparent in itself. It complicates moral judgment, and when 
it overlaps with moral judgment established by discourse and rational 
insight, this is a contingent result of shame, and not a result that shame 
alone can carry the burden of justifying. 
Can shame be said to be a moral instance at all, if it is so totally related 
to the subject and his or her self-perception? We acknowledge that shame 
can perform a rudimentary moral function but, when and if it does, it 
is a contingent fact and not a function that is based on shame’s inherent 
moral character. 
Does shame make people turn away from moral challenges and instead 
make them too self-preoccupied? We have suggested that this may be the 
case sometimes, and thus, the answer to this question contributes further 
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to the problematization of its moral character, as indicated in response to 
the previous question. 
Given that shame is almost always backward-looking, and emerges as a 
result of things past, can shame guide future moral agency? And if it can, 
can it do it well? Again, its contribution to these functions is uncertain 
and not helpful unless complemented by other means. Shame can show 
us that something is wrong, but not necessarily what is wrong or why, and 
not what is right either. 
Finally, how do we assess – from a moral point of view – that peo-
ple do or do not feel ashamed for their moral shortcomings and failures? 
That people feel shame is the result of conditions in problematic human 
situations and relations, which one should try to overcome, abolish, and 
leave behind. As said before, shame is a signal that something, until fur-
ther analysis undetermined, is wrong. A genuinely human society that 
aims at the respect of others fosters moral guilt instead, based on rational 
discourse instead of feelings of opaque (moral) shame. To protect people 
from moral shame and to make them better moral subjects can be done 
by teaching them to employ the distinction between doing and being. 
We cannot abolish shame, including moral shame. Still, we can try to 
build societies, social practices, and relations in which shame has mini-
mal space and does not necessarily occur – for the sake of both morality 
and humanity.




We started writing this book because of our years-long discussion about 
the question, can shame serve a positive purpose in human life? We have 
seen that several authors maintain that it is possible. On a biological level, 
some experience of shame seems important for the development of a 
child’s brain. Moreover, psychologically, experiences of shame will, most 
likely, inevitably be the consequence of what Kohut calls optimal frustra-
tion. But in both these cases, the neurological and psychological facts are 
not sufficient to argue for shame taking on a constructive role throughout 
the life of the individual. When shame interrupts the child’s agency, it can 
only play a limited positive role for a restricted period of time. There is 
nothing in these dimensions of life that suggests that shame should have a 
continued role as a tool for regulating, disciplining or controlling behavior. 
We can substantiate these principled remarks on the restricted role of 
shame with a further look into Martha Nussbaum’s work. Nussbaum’s 
considerations about shame’s positive consequences are restricted and 
cautious. Much of what she claims seems to be in accordance with the 
position that we have developed. But Nussbaum also argues that shame 
can, in fact, serve positive functions later in life, because it can point us in 
the direction of goals and ideals that may be valuable, and does so when 
we have failed to live up to them. Furthermore, shame does not always 
present us with unrealistic ideals but can provide guidance on how to 
live and what actions to avoid – similar to what Deigh suggests when he 
says that shame contributes to the regulation of behavior. “It often tells 
us the truth: certain goals are valuable and we have failed to live up to 
them. And it often expresses a desire to be a type of being that one can 
be: a good human being doing fine things.”685 Under such circumstances, 
685 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 207. 
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shame can take on a positive character or have a function related to 
more than social approval or disapproval, Nussbaum holds. Accordingly, 
shame may inform us about which projects are worthwhile to engage in 
and orientate oneself towards. Thus, shame may not only contribute to 
regulating behavior according to the norms and conventions of society, 
as Scheff and others have claimed, it may also serve to strengthen social 
bonds – or put otherwise – the responsive movements of shame tell us 
that the social bonds to those who we care about may be at stake.686 There-
fore, we seek strategies to restore these bonds. Through the movements of 
shame we seek to ameliorate or restore the shameful situation so that our 
social bonds may again be confirmed. 
However, on the more critical side, our extensive analyses have already 
suggested that the information or cognitive content that shame con-
veys concerning conduct is not morally reliable. Shame presents us with 
problems that are linked to its origin in what Nussbaum calls “primitive 
shame,” which is the shame that results from the failed desire to be com-
plete and completely in control. It also testifies to our vulnerability and to 
us being too susceptible to the judgment of others. The positive achieve-
ment that shame allows for may therefore be contingent. Hence, we do 
not consider Nussbaum’s argument as strong, so far. 
Even when shame is adequately motivated, narcissism and its concom-
itant aggression represent a danger, according to Nussbaum. Therefore, 
shame as a social instrument appears to be a problematic tool for the 
regulation of social behavior, be it in moral, educational or religious con-
texts. In other words, because shame from the outset is the result of a 
negative relationship between the self and others in the world, it proves 
problematic to employ it as a valuable social tool. Shame contributes 
to impeding the subject’s experience of both self and world because it 
restricts the perspective by which to assess the situation. 
An adult bearing narcissistic, primitive shame presents us with “the 
image of a hungry, enraged, empty self, full of impotent anger at being 
frustrated, and fearful of a world which seems as hateful and revengeful 
686 Scheff, “Shame in Self and Society”; “Shame and the Social Bond: A Sociological Theory.”
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as the patient himself.”687 In Norway, we find perhaps the most prom-
inent example of this rage expressed in the terrorist attacks on 22 July 
2011. These attacks were a profound example of how shame-driven rage 
often constructs its own object. There is not necessarily a reality behind 
the creation of enemy images such as those then in play – a shameful and 
raging narcissist may pick whatever is in the surrounding environment 
as the most plausible surrogate for the original source of frustration.688 
The negative relationship between the individual and the world that is 
constituted and manifested through shame points to its limitations when 
it comes to its role in, for example, education and child-rearing. A child 
is susceptible and vulnerable to the behavior and responses of significant 
others.689 Nussbaum’s view is, accordingly, “that any appeal to shame in 
connection with the child’s human weaknesses, whether bodily or mental, 
would be a dangerous and potentially debilitating strategy. And since the 
child is always so vulnerable to the parent’s power and can so easily interpret 
even a limited moral shaming as a painful humiliation, we are inclined to 
say that shame is always dangerous in the child-rearing process.”690 Hence, 
to allow shame to interrupt the child’s agency may, in the long run, affect 
the child’s potential for individuality and self-reliance. 
This argument can also be applied more broadly. Being bodies among 
bodies, we are always fragile and vulnerable, always forming and being 
formed in relation to the other(s) with different levels of self-reliance and 
self-esteem and within different power relations. As works-in-progress, 
we are interwoven in a web where the other always matters to us. The 
humiliation of shame interrupts our intentions and projects, and informs 
us that these are not alright or accepted as valuable. Thus, using shame as 
a social tool is dangerous. We seldom know the vulnerability and fragility 
of the other fully. Shame may severely affect the self of the other. 
687 Otto Kernberg, here quoted by Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity, 210. 
688 Ibid., 211. Cf. also for narcissistic rage, shame and humiliation, James William Jones, Blood That 
Cries out from the Earth: The Psychology of Religious Terrorism (Oxford; New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2008), passim. On the analysis of the events of 22 July from an interdisciplinary 
point of view, see also Arne Johan Vetlesen, Studier I Ondskap (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 2014).
689 An obvious example here is the effect of parents’ comments on the weight or other bodily char-
acteristics of their children. See for devastating effects in this regard, Jane Megan Northrop, Re-
flecting on Cosmetic Surgery: Body Image, Shame and Narcissism (London: Routledge, 2012).
690 Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, 214. 
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Nussbaum is nevertheless open to the fact that some cases can be 
addressed in other ways than pointing to guilt concerning inappropriate 
behavior. Shame may be one of these. However, even though it might be 
adequate to both feel shame and sometimes use shame, it does not imply 
that it should be encouraged either in child-rearing or in other social con-
texts. A person may feel shame because he was caught on tape uttering an 
immoral and racist personal comment about another person in public. 
It is certainly appropriate to feel shame in this situation, especially if the 
person is incapable of feeling guilt, and shame is all we have. Hopefully, 
shame will cause him to refrain from making such comments again. But 
that does not imply that shaming is the way we should deal with racist 
language. It is preferable to argue cognitively for adjustment in behavior, 
and such arguments are also better than a mere infliction of shame. Mere 
shame is not sufficient to develop a moral attitude that is truly rooted in 
the self ’s capacity for moral behavior and development. Consequently, 
we argue that fighting shame is appropriate and should be encouraged in 
almost all cases. If shame emerges in ways that address features such as 
skin color, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation and so forth, it should be 
addressed as morally repugnant. In short, it is our responsibility to fight 
such shame in a social web where we both form and are formed by the 
other.
This allows us to pick up our discussion of shamelessness. Nussbaum 
does not think that being totally shameless is a recommendable attitude: 
“Whether one is young or old, it seems appropriate to be sensitive to an 
invitation to shame, and related self-examination, issued by people one 
loves and respects. Indeed, if one were ‘shameless’ toward people whose 
ideals one shares and on whose good will one has learned to rely, that 
would be a dangerous sign, itself, of narcissism.”691 
We have argued in both Chapters Two and Four that there is a distinc-
tion between shamelessness and fighting shame. We initially introduced 
shamelessness in connection with “the shameless Arabian daughters” 
who used the concept rhetorically in order to fight the use of shaming as 
a tool for what they claimed was immoral social control. Thus, what the 
691 Ibid., 216. 
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Arabian daughters suggested was in fact not shamelessness, but a call to 
fight shame and pursue freedom to realize their own projects without the 
restrictions of shame. In the analysis of Manion in the previous chapter, 
we made a distinction between shamelessness and lack of shame, which 
applies here. “The daughters” pleaded for lack of shame, as shamelessness 
is not an antidote to shame. As we argued in Chapter Two, shameless-
ness is the opposite of what we call protective discretionary shame. In 
this sense, shamelessness breeds shame because it does not protect the 
borders and the vulnerability of the other. Thus, discretionary shame is 
ethically informed insofar as it sees, respects, and protects the vulnera-
bility of the other. To sum up, actual shamelessness is morally destruc-
tive because it manipulates and disrespects the fragile boundaries of the 
other. Discretionary shame is morally constructive as it entails a moral 
judgment of the situation of the other. Other types of shame may serve 
moral functions, but the basic tenet is that it is retrospective and reactive, 
holding little value for our capacity for moral behavior or development. 
As such, shamelessness should not be considered a preferable option. 
Against this backdrop, let us also look at Nussbaum’s notion aspira-
tional shame as a relevant but not recommendable element in child-rear-
ing. In our view, parents not only endorse valuable ideals and encourage 
children to live up to them, but often, they are “rigidly imposing personal 
ideals and expectations on a child who has different talents and wishes.” 
The discrepancy between parent and child then causes shame in the 
child. A serious similarity to this lack of acknowledgment of the child’s 
talents and wishes is when the child experiences shaming as an expres-
sion of the parents’ lack of love and acceptance.692 “Again, a focus on acts, 
in the context of expressing love for the child, seems a more constructive 
and clearer message.”693 We could also add to what Nussbaum says here 
that such shame undermines the child’s self-confidence and self-esteem 
in ways that make it even more prone to shame in the long run. Under 
such circumstances, he or she learns that being perfect is the only condi-
tion for being accepted and affirmed by her peers. 
692 Ibid., 215. 
693 Ibid.
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Again, we will argue, on the basis of our analyses in the second part of 
this book, that to encourage ideals of perfection is problematic in all the 
contexts we have addressed: body perfection, moral perfection, or reli-
gious perfection are all contrary to the realities of the human condition. 
The gap between what in reality is reasonably attainable and impossible 
ideals serves to produce shame. Shame exploits the vulnerabilities that 
emerge from body image, and moral and religious imperfection. 
As we have argued, shame is part of the complex architecture of the 
self and manifests itself through responsive movements when the self sees 
that these projects or ideals can never be realized fully. Thus, it places the 
self in a limbo between ideal and work in progress, guiding the focus away 
from more realistic, fulfilling and maturing projects. Through the pres-
ence, tacit implicitness and power of the disciplining forces of society – 
whether these address gender, ethnicity, or religious affiliation – norms 
and ideals become part of the internal self-policing structure of the subject. 
Thus, the possible appropriateness of shame is contingent on the moral-
ity of the framework to which it refers. As we have tried to show in the 
analysis of both body and religion, there is little doubt that shame, at least 
for the most part, has been used to support or reproduce immoral power 
structures and frameworks that have served, and still serve, to repress and 
hinder the flourishing of groups and individuals.
Although Nussbaum works hard to find the positive functions of 
shame, it is evident that her first choice is not to have shame in any case, 
and that it is mostly not within the horizon of recommendable choices 
at all. However, she mentions some cases that lie within the parameter 
of morality and where shame neither reinforces nor undermines narcis-
sism. “Shame over laziness, lack of dedication, and other failure to pursue 
valuable personal ideals” may be constructive for aspirational purposes, 
but “it seems most appropriate that the invitation to feel shame come 
from oneself.” Nevertheless, her final words on the topic are that “it seems 
wiser to focus on acts, even if they do form a pattern that is generally 
defective.”694 Thus, Nussbaum touches upon the role that shame can play 
in the motivation for specific modes of agency. Its role, as she describes 
694 Ibid., 214. 
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it, is nevertheless ambiguous: In the social dimension, it is possible to feel 
shame if one displays a pattern of underachievement, and then, it can 
play a constructive role that motivates dedication and hard work. But in 
similar contexts, shame can be paralyzing or debilitating as well. To some 
extent, the different functions it takes on may be dependent on the extent 
to which shame is issued by oneself or by another.695
Nussbaum elaborates on this point in a way that adds to Deigh’s under-
scoring of the necessity of a conception of shame to integrate the idea that 
it reflects one’s concern for the reaction of others. To be a mature person 
is to accept one’s own moral imperfection, she writes. Part of this self- 
understanding means that one also has to recognize that “one’s efforts toward 
valuable personal ideals (including moral ideals) can always be improved 
by the insights of others.”696 Accordingly, the interruption that others may 
cause to our agency is possible to handle and to be prepared for in differ-
ent ways. If you have come to accept that you are not perfect, that is a per-
sonal competence that can bolster you against shame. Furthermore, if you 
consider the one who interrupts the agency that may cause shame a friend, 
shame may not have a strong impact on your self-esteem or self-respect. 
The upshot of Nussbaum’s analysis of shame is that even though it can 
be constructive, there are always dangers inherent in every invitation to 
another person to feel shame. As we claimed above, the fragility, vulnera-
bility and fortitude of the other are never fully known to us. Thus, shame is 
ambiguous, as is the invitation to feel it.697 So, although Nussbaum explic-
itly affirms the constructive role of shame in promoting responsibility, her 
analysis is primarily focused on the dangers that arise. Accordingly, she 
sees in shame “a threat to all possibility of morality and community, and 
indeed to a creative inner life.”698 Shame is therefore not the first instance 
695 Ibid., 215. 
696 Ibid., 216f. 
697 Ibid. “Such invitations may be non-narcissistic or even anti-narcissistic, but they may also bear a 
concealed narcissism at their core—as when a parent, under the guise of encouraging a child to 
work harder, tries to control the child and make him just like the parent’s ideal self-image. And 
they may be expressions of respectful criticism in a relationship of love or friendship, but since 
love and friendship are hardly immune to the dangers of narcissism, even here they may bear 
subtle messages of narcissistic control that belittle the very humanity of the person shamed.”
698 Ibid., 208. Cf. also a similar assessment of her position in Burrus, Saving Shame: Martyrs, Saints, 
and Other Abject Subjects, 149. 
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to incite or encourage in interpersonal relationships or psychological con-
texts that aim at freedom, creativity and emotional transparency. 
The above points may also prove relevant in the other contexts we have 
analyzed. Without doubt, shame will continue to exist and exert its role in 
relation to the body, in morality, and in relation to religious contexts and 
other contexts of disciplining. However, we need to differentiate between 
what is the case and what ought to be the case in all the contexts of shame 
we have analyzed. In some cases, shame may be all we have, and hopefully 
it can serve as a bulwark against immorality and oppression when other 
more appropriate social tools are not present. But that does not imply that 
this ought to be the case. Against the backdrop of our analyses above, 
there is no strong case for the active employment of shame in any of these 
contexts, with the exception of discretionary shame. On the contrary, we 
have seen that shame entails a movement towards the community that 
should be supported by those who care for the shamed. Shame is usually 
only effectively overcome when one establishes inclusive practices that 
express dignity, worth, and recognition. These are the elements that also 
enable the building of communities that allow for diversity: be it in body 
shape, ethnicity, religious stance, or moral commitments. 
Shame interrupts. While it may sometimes be useful to stop and ask 
what is happening, when shame interrupts, it is a disturbing and unpleas-
ant experience – not an occasion for pondering and reflection. It may also 
confine the individual within concerns and feelings about him or herself. 
Thus, experiences of shame may actually hinder or restrict the potential 
resources available from broader contexts of agency. This fact suggests 
that one should work to reduce instances of shame and shaming as much 
as possible, because other conditions for agency and community may 
work better in the long run. To make a twist on the title of this book: we 
should try to interrupt the development of conditions that lead to shame 
as much as possible, and we should encourage others to move away from 
using shame as a tool in social contexts where experiences of self-worth 
and dignity are at risk. 
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